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![Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spi Special Edi n - Wincer 1999/2000 On The Murder Of Horst-Ludwig Meyer And The Arrest Of Andrea Klump In Vienna On Wednesday, September 15, 1959 Horst-Ludwig Meyer was shot and Kiled by WEGA poiice units n Vienna and Andrea Kiump. was amested. According 1o the media, mem- bers of the publc were involved in the arrest and murder. Inerior Minster Schiog! spoke on TV of an investigatve success. and he heaped praise on the winesses, the motorcycist who ‘aced I the chase, and the poice officers in- Voived. According o offiialstatements on the events. t was said that members of the public hac reporied “suspicious” individuals to the police. Caling people “suspicious” s a part of Caminaiization. Anyone who does1’ fit o the Social “nom” can be “suspicious’. What was suspicious about Ancrea and Horst was that they often met each other on the same sireet corner and were dressed in baseball caps and Sunglasses. One winess told poice they was afrad of being attacked by such people in their home. For years now, media reports have cre- ated fear among the general public wih taes of “organized crime. ‘the East Bloc matfia”. “Black drug deslers”, and “terrorsm”. The sate response i Austria] has been more weapons for the police, wiretapping. the Schengen Agreement, and aining NATO. Athe same time. ctizens are calied on 1o keep an eye on and Genounce otners. Media headines which e- port on the RAF [Red Ay Fraction) routnely use such phvases as trai of bood” and “cold blooded kilers” Tne RAF was formed from the student and oppositon movements of the 1860s. Dur- ng demonstratons againstthe re-armament of West Germany, againt the Vietnam War, and against the Shahis regime in Iran, police used uter brutalty against demonstrators. In the ’1950s and 1960s, iberation movements arose. inmany countries inthe Three Continents against colonial powers and attempts by the USA to Secure ts own economic and miltary power.In Vietnam, the commnist guerrla forces sirug- gled since 1345 against the colonial French Tegime. ..)1n 1958, the Cuban revolution suc- ceeded against the USA. n many Latin Amer- an nations, querrla organizations ook up the struggle against miltary dictatorships backed by the USA In Namibia, SWAPO fought against the apartneid regime. In the USA tsef. a civi ights movement arose agains racia discrim- nation. Mass uprisings resuted. In 1966, the Black Pantner Party was founded as a Black selfdefense organzation. In 1971, the Pales- tinian organization ‘Black September’ was. founded. The RAF orented s intematonalist Struggle against imperiaism and the class soci- ety,and i attacked, n s own county, the eco- “The Police Did Not Know Who We Were” A Letter From Andrea Klump | was very happy to see this text. The women who wicte thave brough the ques- tions and specations abou the shooting of Horst and my arrest back down to earth po- Icaly. Thi politcalrelationship s iso a very human one: Horsthas not been steiized into an icon. and | have not been put nto an un- welcome situaton. | value tis a ot Horst and | knew for years about the “grop-out program [Aussteigerprogramm] of the German nteligence agency and of the efforts of one so-called M. Benz. Neither Horst nor | ever had any intention of kissing thei feet. That’s how we interpreted their offer. since they weren’ really concerned with who had or hadnt done what, partcu- Iary after the breakup of the Soviet Union For Horst and for me, that would have been a betrayal of aur own, our common, story. We dd’t want o become complictin the snaking of heads, deadened by hunger and the yearning for another worid. Remain- ing true o our own history s al that remains for the isolted left. This posiion is also an expression of the misery of the German lef, d in istory, be- vacuum in which polftical movement took place. The problem s this was aiways quckly tumed into ideclogy. “The poliical climate offear and the will ingness to denounce others is connected to the problem of the modern mass media:Inan age when the consumer society i filed with the latest technological gadgets, like cell phones and video cameras, which are avai- able fo everyone, people have the means at their isposal to be executies of the sys- tem. The police cid not know who we were. Horst was kiled in a shoofout which he ac- tvely patcpated in. s notonly the Septem- ber 17, 1999 edition of Standard which ‘cast Goubt upon the sclual membership” of Horst ‘and me Inthe RAF. Those doubls are real. “Never forget, now s not the time to achieve victores. but rather o fight against efeats.” (8 Brecht) Andrea Kiump November 1999 (Source: "So Oder o’ the publication of ‘Libortact, Nr.5 - January 2000; Transiated by Amn The Spint) omiciosses. the NATO mitary, and the NATO bases who were working agais: these ibera- ton movements Media reports on the actions and attacks. by the RAF were designe (o prevent crivcal publcty and soldarty. n order o soiate guer- ila groups and amed resistance from the gen- eral public and desiroy them. But we wil o et ourseives be divided of muted. Al people who dream of a ife infreedom, equalty. and solcar- iy, all those who organize against sexsm, rac- ism, and captaism, must consider the possbir ties and contradictions of armed struggle and milary actions. Several tings aboutthe arrest and murder are unclear to us. Alegedy. one person fimed “two suspicious persons’ for an extended period of ime. This biack-and-whte ‘amateur video was broadcast on TV. We have our doubis about the ongn of s fim. We can wellimagine that this stuation was staged af- torthe-fact. Newspapers spoke first of a fe- maie winess, then of a male winess. The ques- ton s, was there really a monih-ong observa- ion of Horst and Andrea by someone from the. general pubic. or were they beng cbserved by the polce for a ong tme? Also unclar are the reports of possible contacts with the. Verfassungsschutz’ the German iteligence agency. known as the VS]. Accordng 10 the media, Andrea supposedly contacted the VS in 1996. The media are unciear about whether this contact was concerning a “feturn o legal- ity" I there was a contact made to the VS, then the murder and arrest can be seen as part of the true anti-nsurgency efforts of the VS, An aricte published in Standard on September 17 1899 mentioned one VS report which "cast Goubt upon the actusl membership” of Andrea and Horst in the RAF. Nevertheless, thei pho- tos were on intemational wanted posters for 15 years. In this way. a “realty of the ruing powers" has been consiructed o deceive the publc. () Now Andrea is being made to pay forher poltical convictons by being put behind bars. Austrian authorities are preparing o Charge Andrea with resisting arest’, “using & fase D", and “attempted murder”. The police are investigating unsolved robberies as wel Wi the aim of pining them on Andrea. As part ofthe poliical investgations, Ausran, Halian. ‘and German polce offcas held a summi meet- ing n Vienna. () Andrea has efused to make any statements to the poice. ) The police are now checking into who Andrea and Horst had Contact with. I ofher words. they will cbserve. Who calls the murder of Horst wha it really Was. 3 “murder’, and who supports Andrea in prison. We must not et such repression keep s from providing public soidarty. in our daily Ives, we all experience the viokence of economic explotation, sexism, rac- ism, of isolaton, competiion, and desiruction ‘Some people have decided to fight against this continued on the next page.](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 4.png)


![ter 1999/2000 Political Prisoners And The Question Of Violence “There is no revolution without violence Those who don’t accept violence can cross out the word revolution from their diction- ary." - Malcolm X Working tofree poltcal prisoners is not a neutral act. H never has been. It must prmarly be a means of reappropriatng the concept of revolutonary violence. To do sotoday i 1o chak- lenge the sense of taboo and mandatory si- lence that befel the movement afer the de- feats and reversals suffered by the guerrila and other hostie forces on this continent. The bourgeasie has repressed the very idea of violence From Paris o Naples. from the workplace o the ghetto sireets. a recompositon of the revolutionary forces has begun. It cannot be denied. Within this overall revival. the move- ment shoukd now fnd the strength to stop re- peating simplistic antterrorist denunciations and chuming out watered down revolutionary ciches. Because both of these betrayals main- ainthe proltariat i the same state of impotent submssion “The years of reformist pacifism and sec- tarian catechisms, ail about what the counter- vience ofthe exploted and oppressed should and especially should not consist of, have clouded any emancipatory vision. Sure, some St taK of icking up the gun but aways with- out acting concretely to prepare the organisa- tion f the revolutionary war. As far as they are concerned. the time is never rght for revo- Iutionary acton, The big anti-errorist campaigns of the eightes took advantage of these twin betray- als of the fake revolutionaries. And now cam- paigns for the freedom of poltical prisoners are being organised based on the same col- Iaboration: st ofthey ciamthat no good came of the armed struggle ofthe sixtes to the eight- ies. That i stugge represented nothing more than a “Geath-wish” ate the barricades of ‘68 were defeated. Tnat t al originated n the badly healed history of the fortes. Turning a new page is what is most mportant for alof these “supporters”. The obvious conclusion. then nothing eise wil hapoen and their past and present betrayals wil al b justfied For others, the faiures of the eighties all il down to the simple defeat o the guerrila, and are mystifed by the maniras of the offcai protester. Al of ther favourte emty formuias are called out the absence of 3 Pary. of 3 class union,ofan organised autonomous move- ment. Within these rearguard campaigns the ib- eration o poltical pisoners becomes the ult- mate way of rewrting the revolutionary history of our coninent since the sixties. It amounts to the partal sectarian citaue carried out by the new taking shops. We, Who have for years been held hos- tage benind these prison bars, refuse 10 have any partinthis or to be tumed into the objects of these underhanded operatons. (One does not work o free poftical prison- ers out of a sense of charty or humanism. Denouncing the conditions in which politcal prisoners are held should maily be a matterof agtation and propaganda. It shouid automat- cally overstep the boundaries imposed upon and confront the fundamental questions of revolutionary process n our era. It i thus 3 polticalact and a class positon. A way o fight 1o reappropriate our memary and knowledge. o empower us and destroy bourgeois power By fighting for Iberation we reapproprate our hidden history and experience of siruggle. But more than anything else, we reapproprate the very concept of legiimate “counter-violence’ For years this concept has been atacked disorted and dragged through the mud “The class struggle, however, i constanty creating and reproducig this counter-viokence. tis inherent n the violence of the capialist system self. The first violence is that o ex- plotation. routne, the discipine of the factory barracks, misery and forced labour. The vio- lence of profis. Witin this mode of production the exploted naturally engage in this counter- vilence: i s the unavoidable resul of the vio- lence of capital rlatins of production. It i ts condemnation During the movement againt the closing of the Renaul factry in Viorde a worker re- minded us of ths, remarking that ‘the violent ones are those who shut the factory and throw the workers int the street” “The violence is the whole system. The least of s social relations is vioent Violence is the logic of mperialist subordination and im- poverishment that condemns humanity n the periphery to_ misery. Violence is. the fascstization of the monopolies’ power. It is the apartheid of institutonal racism, the rise of reactionary poliies. I s sexist violnce. Daly Ife leaves the mark of vioence on the body of every man and woman who is ‘exploted, oppresse, pushed around, forced o struggle just o survve. To resist and rebel against this violence is: a ife instinct e exploters monopolise violence, which is concentrated in the mechanisms and rela. tlons of the State. The confrontation between State and Class s thus at the heart of all con- ficts, but in a difierent way than in the past. ‘Wnat with globalisation the State is no longer simply the govermment apparatus of the na- tion-state of the State system. The relations. and mechanisms of State express themselves aiferenty within the global conjuncture of thei D contradictions and poltical crss. The State s the refiecton of mulinavonal monopoly ter- ests and also refects their contradictons in @ compelitve war without mercy. “The cops and antterrrst laws are the ‘armour that protects these local, national and ‘continental mut-State powers. They miltarse them. The more violent power becomes. the more violence becomes power. The more they are taken over by the real econamic power of a handful of monopokes and manageril eltes, the more they insiston the spectacular manpu. Iation of democracy” wih s Gbsessive, ever- present and one-dimensional seltlegitmising propaganda. This show has become the dicta- toral means by which the viokence of every- day ife is managed. Those in power have ahways accepted “protest’ as a perfecty tolerable ghetto - more: than that, today it is a subculture parasitcally tied to the surviva of the bourgeois regime. I has guaranteed tsel this status by going along with the manipulation and denuncition of evo- Iutionanes, out of fear perhaps that even si- lence could be construed as tacit support for “terrorism” “The protester’ pacifismis bound by what ‘over the powertu wil make of i Tne social movements only threaten the established order when thei actions contain the possibilty of stepping outside of the reguiar framework of struggle. They are only a threat inasmuch as they appea 1o be abie to tum to revolutonary acton raisingthe question of revo- lutionary violence. But 1 clea today that the card-carying activists have intealised the maniras of offiial aterrorsm o the paint of caricature. They stitch the slogans of order ‘and moraity in the praines of submission. ‘At the p of thei lungs they repeat tha it is the aggressor who is weak one and the victim who is sirong, that those wh rebel are fanatics and those who explot are legitmate ‘spokespeople, partners n ‘democrati” recon- ciiaton and republican antifascist fronts! “The offcial commemoration of May 58] *](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 7.png)
![I Edition - Winter 1999/2000 Was a true victory for these pseudo-revalu- tonaries. Their f0ad to Damocies had been blessed. By condemning violence, the sanci- monious ones justiied the fact that they had etumed to the old of the bourgeas elte. Sixty-eight was recuperated because it ‘coud be. Everything about that was. charac- terti of protest i the metropole and that i never managed to completely escape allowed 1 Pistory o be taken over. The nsurrectionary autonomous movement tht ollowed in 77 hat 1o be dealt with iferenty. From the insurrec- tionary demonstrations in Mian and Rome to the acts of anti-NATO resistance. to the “asambleista” movement n Spain, and from the grassroots rebellons of the working class to the guerila attacks, 77 was autonomous and amed and ripped a hole n the consensus of the mperalist centers. Faced wih this st tion the repression could not aford any hal- measures These events had to be wiped from the collectve memory and those who partc- pated were 1o either repent or ot in specal prisons. The movement of ‘77 had pushed the au- fonomous atermatve (0o far. and so il of the system’s various forces unfed in attacking 1. making i pay with every ounce of s being Yel revolutionary viclence remains on the agenda. al the more so because the monopo- lies have taken over and fenced off al poltical ‘space. Revolutionary violence defntely car- ot and wil never take the archaic form many imagine ort.For the t s nothing more than a memory. a fantasy or @ dversion They should explain to us how we are to Subvert and destroy the monopolies and their militarism. how we should sabotage the fascistzation of globaisaton. 0 all senousness, who st baieves that we can win by reading ffom our prayerbooks. of pious wishes, by fighting for e reforms. by signing petiions and going or long walks? For having merely asked such obvious questions we can already hear the regular n- sults: adventurists. substitutionists. immediatss, anarchist. Backn 1671 Lotta Continua aready knew exactly what to make of such atacks: “Those who get scandaized and yell about terronsm and romanticism are usually Just trying o hide their own cowardice before ther revolutionary dutes” ‘And ths s exacty what s going on tadsy. “The violence that poltical prisoners sym- bolise i not just ancent history. It s more than. justthe human legacy of the past two decades of struggle with its successes and faiures. Anyone who st cares abou the emancipation of the proletariat and who takes the time to understand it within s historc contex! knows thatt s much more than that, 1t shows that armed violence is neces- sary i one wants 10 subvert the management of our neoleral societes today. That f i and willcontnue to be necessary o use t in order 1o break out of the straightacket of the fake protester. This straighiacket is necessary to maintain submission, with some diferences but st essental the same submission to dicta- torshi’s future. Only armed violence can tear away the banner of citizenship’s "g00s wishes”. of new “New Deals” of a retur to the welfare state. of antfascist undy with the “progressive" bourgeaisie ‘A minor sidenote. Lots of people demon- strate every week against Le Pen. against Fin. alongside the very people who maintain the wall of sience that surrounds poitical mprs. onment in our European countries. As far a5 the prsoners from the guerila are concerned. the social-semocratic managementofhe prison systom has nothing o lear from authortarian regimes. They use the same methods such as. crminalization, white forure [soltary confine. ment], arbiary reatment and beatngs. andhde. them all behind a fabade offoolproof arrogance. I France our comvades Groix, Ramazan Alpaslan and Pello Marinelarenari have died i their cells. Many other comrades suffe from incurable diseases that were caused by the conditons of their mprsonment Two hundred polfical prisoners are rot- ting in the French prisons, and yet those in charge of this “slow death’ st want to lead the ant-fascit struggle! Those who 6o not want to talk about im- periaism and State repression should aiso re- main guiet when it comes to fascism. To aise the question of potical prisoners. and revoiutionary violence is to relentlessly work o revolutionise the “revolutionaries” in the metropole. Firs of il because this question reveais the degree to which an aliance has been buit Wih the “lefi-wing managers during two dec- ades of campaigns for chart or establshment antiascism. When these do-gooders were in the government they enthusiasticaly defended the trumph of neaiiberaism and were respon- sile for a leap forward to unprecedented in- ‘equalty. They wiote the laws ofthis new apart heid and proportional representation for the FrontNational Futhermore. used properly the question of violence and poliical prisoners shouid siso. be a 100l o fight agains th graduais radition that was inherited from the opportunistic okd “Communist” Parties. Al those concepts of peaceful coexistence that are repeated out of a sense of habit “the mass e and the rejec- tion o the minory aspect of vioence, every- thing that has been used to indefiitely post. pone any revalutionary action Decades of “responsible” actions. ap- peasement, electoralsm, routne, reducing revo- utionary aciiity and ideas 10 a set of ciche- idden platiudes... this has made the move- mentlose sight of one of the key points ofMark. ist theory.that the transtion from captalsm to socialsm wil be ull of revolutionary violence. t cannot happen any ther way. o raise the issue of revolutionary vio- lence is thus 10 regain a sense of the revolu- tionary goal. 1t means reconnecting our present. day struggles and resistance 1o the possible destructon of the system e, tying a sense of daily combat to our historic class intrests. Imeans acting in the spit of past strug- gles and rediscovering the red thread thatruns. rom June 1848 o the Paris Commune, rom the. Revoluion of 1905 o the European Revolution o11917-1523,tothe Spanish Revoluton in 1636 toBarcelona’s Mayo 37, o Chna’s Long March ang Cultural Revolution. 1o al the anticolonial siruggles, 1o Che Guevara and the Cuban Con- ‘golese and Boivian guerrila; and fiom Europe’s May piu senza fucie of 1968 1o the automous offensives and movements of 1977-78, It means putting tneory back on s feet The lessons and experiences of past sirug- gles and the ente revolutonary process. are part and parcel o the practcal problems. the resolution of tasks. the drect acton of evol- tionariestoday. Gravediggers and talking shops will never own the theory of stuggle. Wher- ever struggle breaks out anew it s mperative tobreak through all theItanies and spectacuiar raffic and reappropriate the practical theory Today as in the past, communism is the language of preparation and applicaton of revo- Iutionary violence. s the wl 0 incarnate times of [working] class power. With o theory. memory or violent praciice, proetarian ci- ists will never be able to afford a consistent strategy to buld ciass power “This i all the more tue now tha the key subject is a highly margialsed proletarat. in fact, the revolutonary subject capable of rans- forming society is no longer a professional worker. of even the mass-worker of he post- war era, but rather the impoverished worker Wwho i sufferng the intense vioence of worid- wide expiotation. The same subject from Ja- Karta to La Courveuve, from Los Angeles to Lagos. but at the same time subject that re- fects sirong social ersiy. The homogenss- tion and polarsation of nisier conditon has rearranged the context of the class struggle. It is obvious that the proletariat can no longer recompose el wit the same means ofstug- gle and organisation as I the past. These his- torc methods have actualy become obstacies. that aggravate hisier economic and social marginaisaton, wih all the assocated poltical and cultural consequences. The super-ex- ploted proletaniat wil no recompose el s & revolutionary class through sirkes or trade uion poltics. nor even by joining this or that poltical party whose tak is more radical than its neighbours. These are o longer optons. Instead, helshe wil lear thiough direct acton and in the flames of revol. The misery in which e lives and the repression sihe faces from those who represent captalism in crsis con- stanty force nimher into violent confrontations. o prepare for armed confrontation i to work fo the recompositon of the class, for the unty and poiticisation of tis global super-ex- ploted proletariat. It is to show that i repre- sents the only wordwide class capabie of car- ying the revolutinary process to s ina con- clusion. A class which is made to il thi role, it historc and collective nature being to de- stroy ts present indvidualised postion as an economic and poiticalsiave of captal, This i a long-term process of conscious- ness raising and organisation. a class war in which sporadic batties wil spread nto an surrectionary confrontation. To face up to the question of vilence im- plies organising it along revoluionary nes. 115 an intal collective and practical atiempt 1o](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 8.png)
![Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide! Arm The Spi ter 1999/2000 rearm the proletarat wit the desite to am - self and wage revolutionary war against capi 1al i the concrete applicatio of the ques- tions af the heart o the struggle for poliical autonomy I tme the [working) lass will once again take up both t flag and fs gun, in one burst, as they are inseparable. It wil cary forth s own interests and the war 1o make them trumph Through thei interaction class interesis wil ‘guide the gun and the gun wil cear the way to eveal s uncompromising global iterests. n conclusion Wrat does it mean o aise the question of ames violence on ths Inemational Day of the Revolutonary Prsoner? From the back of our pison cells we can already hear the sighs ofthe intentioned. No comrades. the question of armed viclence is ot the only revolutonary issue we care about. ors it the only pressing issue that needs to be addressed. Some people have aays disorted the guerria’s posiion by caiming tha ths s all e think about This is a ready-made argument that il 100 often serves as an excuse for not cartying out any real discussion about the ne- cessity of viokence and s organised practice It has aways been the trump card used by those who wish to silence the debate. We prisaners from the guerila are simply rying 1o examine some basc elements of this auestion. s actual nature and the contradic- tions with which it conronts actvists in the imperalst countries ‘Amongst the latter there are many who support a guertila somewhere in the world Few, Rowaver, take the next step and go from support n this paricular stuation onto the glo- bal nature of the issue. and 5o on to the con- crete impiications concerning where we Ive. Because supporting the dea of a revoluionary guerrila automaticaly raises practcal potical questions Todo all you can so that the guerrita wins i Mexico, Turkey or Asia demands us thought about what action revolutionaries should take in the “belly of the beast” n the fotress where the monopolies keep thei loot Wnere the owners and technocrats who carve up the whole planet ive in prosperty. Where the exploters and oppressors of over 90% of the global proletarit ve. In 1572 Andreas Baader, Urike Meinhof and the other comrades from the RAF offered an intial answer to this question by estioying the American miltary computers that were be- g used o plan the bombing of Vietnam. This action overstepped the boundaries of mere Support, becorming instead a concrete act that united the anti-capitalst and antrmperiaist struggles here wih the struggle for freedom on the periphery. Forthree decades the giobalisation of pro- ducton and exchange has undergone an un- precedented qualtative advance. Not & day passes thal even the least of things does not reming us of ths fact. But this globalisaton fs first and foremost the globalisation of class struggle. the globalisation of poblems and the globalsation of solutons. AL ths point, who can seriously clam to understand why people take up ams in the ‘Siera and simultaneously condemn those who o the same in the forresses of the imperiaist order? Who can ciam tha the specic factors dominate the generalconfict o tis pont? That this is a air and revolutionary position? “The search for unity is the revolutonary projectin of the giobal proletarat. Wherever they find themseives revoiution- aries should reinforce and direct this “long march”. They should work towards the poliiczation and recompositon of the class in the framework of this era’s dominant space, in al s dimensions fom the local to the global Everywhere they should destroy obstacies and imits that aways reduce struggles 1 the rues and boundaries o the system’s natiol and nstiutional organization. The two are now rectly connected. And in the imperialist metropole, the national an the insttutional are all the more reactionary. as they become mechanisms in the process of fascistiation of the monapalies “The vast amnies of poor workers, the big monopolies’ new siaves and the disinheried slum dwellers, consttute the majorty of hu. manity. This super-exploted proltariat s the axis around which the questions of wealth re- distrioution and the appropriaton of the means of producton must be resolved. Its the only Way. No other ciass or subclass can be sub- stituted for it in the revolutionary process. Least of all the representatives of local and ratioal metropoltan classes who aways end up de- fending “progress”, the reforms of imperialst clizenship and the sacred charties How can anyone believe that there s even a grain of hope to be found in the netherworkd of the “eft of the lef” and the other foms of metropoltan protest? In the end al they wil ever 6o is work to protect and manage the minor local advantages. They can not escape. this bureaucrati destiny. Futhermore, they know very well that these itte reforms are oniy granted on cond! tion tha they divide the [working] class and mbiise i around ssues tied foits own backyard Which is protected by borderguards and Vigiirate plans (tansiators note: “vigipirate” is an antiterrorist pan that especially targets - migrants). Behind thei facade they are col- Iaborating with apartheid For more than fity years, the trumph of “social democratc” thought in the European metropoles has revealed fself o be a shar at both the level of nstitutions and protestgroups. The half-measures of populist programmes. have not saved the proetariat fom monopoly ‘captalism’s legal claws. On the contrary, they. have made the caws more dynamic. The chasm between stolen wealth and poverty has never been 5o violent. Not only increased productv- ity and the infernal mythm of producton, but also precarty and the insecarty of millons of proletarians have all aggravated the aiready intense level of explotation. As far as the proletariat is concerned in- sttutional poltics offers a choice between the lesser of two evis, or simply quiting the garme. Around the wori the proietarian class is alone faced wit the altamatve of socialsm or barbarism that s comes from the development and decompositon of capialsm. From e streets of Gaza tothe barricades. of Bogota, from Chiapas to the ghettos ang slums of our own European megacities, whe- ever it revels 1t must take up arms. . every- where the masses are overstepping the roten boundaries o the od structures. The poitcal parties and instiutionalsed trade unions are today reduced to impotence and inadequacy when faced with the new spaces and their globalisation. Everywhere the proltarit s so- Calising new resistance, i selleducation and selforganisation. n the quest for s poltical autonomy. Of course this doesnit come about ‘wihout many mistakes. Faise belefs and real fundamentalism are spreading like a new plague. Yet the winds of reedom are biowing and they are stronger. Wnerever proletarians rebel they recover the sense of revalutionary violence. Where there are no guns they use stones. And yet ‘some people nsist that the guerrla’s tme has pas, hat armed struggle s ancient history! We are told that ll oftis changes nothing for revolutionaries here. That we mus faith- fully continue 1o go through th ridiculous mo- tions of revisionist gradualism. That we must perfect our boted jargon on imaginary insur- rections to come and remain patient whie ge ting ready fo them. The only way to eally get ready for he revolution i by engaging i revo- utionary action. Legalism, pacifsm and daily ‘compromises have never come ciose to bing- ing about revoluton. Only fim revolutionary action. the resalutin of tasks as they actually arise and the subversion of barracks rules will ‘awaken the revolutionary spir. “The precondiions of the coming revols- tionary surge show e centralty of the per- fect i binding together the struggles for class autonomy. armed Iiberation and proletarian in- temationaiiem. I’s ony a beginning, It is Right To Rebelt Dare To Struggle, Dare To Wint June 15, 1998 Joelle Aubron Nathalie Menigon Jean-Marc Roulan Note: A second theorstial pollical contribu- ton by the AD prisoners, entiled Do la fausse alternative entre nealiberalisme et neo- reformisme et de fimportance den ot was reloased during the Day of the Gand. The APAPC ang ABC willsend a copy of this docu- ment to inerested comrades.](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 9.png)
![Freedom For Al Policical Prisoners Worldwi cer 1999/2000 Collective Biography Of The Action Directe Prisoners We. members of Acion Drecte, have been incarcerated since February 1987. When the four of us were amested it became a symbol forthe government o ts figt against he guer rila on this terriory. It brought s propaganda and counte-revolutionary methods to bear o us.isoating us by reorganizing, for example, & secton of the Fleury-Merogis Maison darret des femmes [women’s prison - ed.] The frst rals were meant to show off the omnipotence of bourgeois justice. Cerain cases. for which other comrades had areacy been ncarcerated for years, were a last closed in the delinum thatsurrounded our “partcipation” n this show. On December 1. 1987. we began our fist hungerstrike to be reunited together and for an end to soltary cofinement Before t ended on Aorl 15. 1988, two of us had appeared in fve rial after more than two montns on stike. i at ease, sem-conscious. put on a drp behind the scenes, it didn’ matter the Special Sectons’ Show had to go on. Everyday. the powers that be deploy their forces against many hoste reaites. Athough there were actvsts from the organization or from other ealfes behind bars, t was our ar- rests. trals, and detention thatthe State made into the perlect expressions of s monopoly of violence. of s wil 10 trumph and to trumpn quicky atthat A perfect example if there ever was one of this show of force was the trial of January 1883 Dealing with the “Pierre Overney” Cor- mando’s action against Georges Besse, the fi il act n this rama just ad o be in step with the hateful barrage of propaganda that had for- lowed our action Named President Director General of Renault by the socia-democratic government. Besse speciaized in brutal fe- structuring, laying off tens of thousands of workers at 3 time (34,000 at PUK-Pechiney, 25,000 at Renau) Despt the siander by the bourgeoisie’s media lackeys and trade union collaborators, the action met wih sympathy. amongst the workers (2). So the trial had two objectves: to maintain the e put forward from the beginninng that the atack was nt a polt- cal act, and 10 take yet another opportunty to hammer in the wonders of neciberalsm. We were treated o the speciacie of both a minister and an ex.minister paying homage 1o the per- fect technocrat G. Besse: Edith Cresson, who had assigned Besse (o Renaut whike Miister of Indusiral Restructuring and Foreign Trade and then became Minster of European Afairs in the new socialist government in 1988, and Andfre Giraud who was Minister of Defense in the previous ight-wing goverment. Whatever contradiction there was in two such high-rank- ng polical figures testiying at the tria of “four criminal fanatics” was simply buried under the Violent consensus of the media and polfical establshment They enthusiastically haled our frst sentence of e pius 18 years (3 as if 1t were theit own personal victry, the crowning glory of thei strategy to anniilte the revolu- tonary lefwing struggle We called off our frst srike without hav- ing most of our demands met. Any siight rem- edy to our isolation would prove to be only temporary. Two months after tis tria the four of us were once again subjected to the torure of soltary confinement.in Apri 1989 we again ‘wentnto bttle with the same demands, namely an end to solfary confinement and the feunificaton of poical prisoners. In Jly 1989 our detentin in saltary confnement was off- cially ended and we were partaly reunited we were furthermore promised thai accomodations would be made S0 we couid speak with one another (a promise that was. never kept) in fact that fall we found ourselves in partalsoltary in a secton specially buit for us. “The right we had won to be grouped by sex, w0 women and two men. was not wihdrawn, and yet neither was the State’s strategy of Gesiroying revolutonary hostiy on this terr- tory. as expressed thiough s actions against In January 1991 we began a new battle Once again our demands were to be reunited together and for an end to salfary confine- ment. A the same time we were trying to buld 2 Resistance Front to class justice and prison. 0 for two years. up unil Aprl 1993, we took tums going on hungerstike for a week at & tme each In May 1995 we received our second ife sentences. Before the tral had even started it was clear that all over the worid a cycie of struggle had petered out. Whatever is errors. o ths terrtory Action Diecte was without 3 doubt the most advanced expression of this cycle. This explains the extreme symbolzation that sumounds us. Time wiljudge our contribution o the pro- letariat’ long march towards poltcal autonomy. the proletariat being the only class tht s fun- ‘Gamentally revolutinary tothe end. Like many others throughout history and in our own gen- eration, we have made choices that demanded 2 total commitment of our Ives. We have no regrets. Our indiidual paths are intertwined wih an important era or the proletarian move ment on this continent at a tme of growing in- ter-relatedness between the ant-capitalist and ant-mperiast struggles. Jean-Marc Roullan was sixteen years oid in 1988, From a leftwing famiy, he was nev theless. not very poliical. He has suggested that this might be what enabled him to engage nthe revolt against totalarianism with o hes- tation. He was active wih the CAL (Comite action Lyceen - Student Acton Commitee) ‘events n e neighborhoods norh of Toulouse He then joined the anarcho-communist move- ment, notably the Autonomous Libertarian ‘Groups (iansiator’s note: Groupes Autonomes. Livertaires -t mporant o note hatn Europe the word “ibertarian’ is not assocated solely wih anarcho-capialism as n the United States. but aiso with leftwing anarchism and antr-au- thortarianism). These months were a tme of intense learning where direct action was & common occurence in the many struggles within the reviaized revolutonary movemen. Occupation committees in the factories. rent striks in the Gltes, struggle against the poice state Given that the city was gty considered the capital of antifrancoist Spain. he then be- ‘came involved in support work for the revolu- tonary sinuggle against Franco’s dictatorsnp. n 1570 he was a member of the frst nucieus of the Movimente lberico de Liberacion (MIL), the armed organization of the Barcelona (Catalunya) underground workers movement. The MIL scqured funds for the soiarty Chests and lent s poltcal and technical sup- port o the sell-organized groups and the d- ferent fighting assemblies that were growing on the ground. I functioned as a network of antifascist resistance (the GACs, Groupes ‘Autonomes de Combat - Autonomous Fighting (Groups) but t also developed an ant-capiaist praxis tailored o this perod: pitical autonomy for the working class, radical critaue and ant- revisionism, against il colaboration with the “democratc” forces hat only wanted to shep- herd Francolsm into a new authortarian bour- geois regime. The MILGAC was destroyed by fierce repression. One of ts members, Salva dor Puig Antich, was the las poltical prisoner 1o be sentenced to dealn by garrtting (March 2,1974). Back n France, Jean-Marc worked to bring together many iertarian and autonomist ‘roups willng to carry out intematonal armed siruggle against the dictatorship. Out of this came the GARI (Groupes GAction Revolutionnaie Interatonalistes - Internation- alst Revolutionary Amed Groups) which were active at ths time in many European countres. Jean-Marc was arrested in 1974, but when Franco died he was amnestied and released in spring 1977. He then started working to bring togetner the post-May 68 autonomist movement with the new expressions of autonomous working class struggle that came out of ‘68 and the battes of the late seventes. and which found most of thei inspiraton in the various laiian theses. He worked to set up underground groups Iike the Coordinatons Autonomes (Au- tonomous Coordinations) and to generalz](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 10.png)



![Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide! Arm The Sp ion - Winter 1999/2000 Q: Since the 1980s, the armed revolution- ary struggle has almost disappeared in Europe (except for the IRA and ETA). Ac- tion Directe, GRAPO, the Red Brigades (BR), and the CCC ail ended their activities. The RAF first announced it was suspending its political-military_operations and has recently dissolved itself. Are you aware of this evolution? What do you think about this? Does this point to a new direction for the revolutionary left? Of course we keep a close eye on the. evolution of the revoluionary movement n Eu- fope, but we don’t tink that things are as sim- ple as your question may suggest. Different groups have stopped for diferentreasons. The CCC and AD. for example, because they were. miltary defeated. The BR because pottical re. organization was made impossibie by repres.- sion. The RAF because they have polically degenerated and dissolved themselves. The PCE(1) and GRAPO are st aciive, and commu- istand antimperiast guerilas are very strong in Turkey and Greece. “The revolutionary struggle never devel opedin a uiform and inear way. s a phenor- ‘enon of great complexty, subject to conjunciuri ‘and localinfluences. etc. At ihe end of the 605 and the beginning of the 70s. a big wave of struggle emerged in Wester Eurcpe. although tstaried 10 collapse since the mic-80’s, thats a fact. But we do think that the next wave fo come will be stronger, because of a more favorable socio-economical context as well as because of the rich heitage of experiences. ang reflctions from the previous wave. “The most important mertt of the trugle of the RAF inthe 70’s, of the BR, the PCE(]) and GRAPO, and of the CCC., efc., s the fact that the first steps have ben made towards the poltical rentaton and the revolutionary stra. gy that are presently needed in the imperialist Gountries. Only by relying on a ciical and con- structive balance of these 15 years of strug- gle. and by valuing this decisive contribution, Wil be possible for the revolutionary move- mentto resume the offensive for the overthrow of capitaism and the fiquidation of the bour- geoise. Q: What makes you think that a new wave of armed struggle is on its way in Eu- r0pe? This, considering - again - the s dissolution of the RAF and the peace ne- gotiations in Northern Ireland which seem to indicate the contrary? These two examples divert our attention from the subject. The RAF already lost sight of the revolutionary objective 15 years ago (and turned in the direction of radical reformism), and the goal of the IRA has never been social revoluton but the end of Brtish domination in Northern rland. We are only talking here about the amea struggle as an expression of the revolutionary contradictions withi the capital- ist sockty ‘We are Manxists, we think that social and historical phenomen are dictated by the evo- Iution of objective circumstances, and in the last resort by the contradiction between the. development of the forces of production and the mode of producton. These conradictons. dictate the necessly today of the overthrow of capitalism and the amval of sociaism. “The central questionis: Howto bring about the step from captalsm o socialism? Historical study and Engels answer. “Vilence s the mid- wie of the eniire ol sociey that bears a new Society within. It is the means by which the Social movement wil make t and by which 1 ‘smashes fossiized and dead poltical forms.” “The practica question is: Which strategy has to be appiied for the struggle to accumu- late the necessary forces to attan iberaton? The experience of the class-struggle i this century and the characeristics ofthe situation answer. the continuous revolutionary war, of Wwhich the first phase is amed propagand. Once there exists a revolutionary way out (sure i ths case. very difficut) i stuation which seems {0 be furter completely blocked one can be sure tha this way out wil be used one day or the ofher. Firs of al, this wil be. one by the avant-garde elements, laer, once the r0ad is Iaid, by growing paris of social groups which have an inerest in ushing past captaism Al his, 1o say a couple of things very quickly, because the queston i very complex. Among the tendencies where people tink it opportune 1o take up weapons only when the masses have already done so and the part- 5ans of "here and now” without any prepara- ton (without a program or organzation), one finds a diversity of analyses. Our analysis is siusted on a level in between, and one can also quote those who set the foundation of a real Leninst party as a condton to tigger oft the amed struagle. We invite the comrades Who are interested in our vision on tis subject and in the various conclusions we made to take notice of the documents we have ex- changed wih the French fevolutionary organ- 2ation Vaie Proletarienne” devoted tthis ques- tion n he debate. Q: Can you give a short history of why and how you made the choice for armed struggle? Are you still convinced of the choice and the analysis made at the time? The struggie of the CCC s stuated i the spin-off of the break wih Sovit revisonism hat emerged inthe 60s. I this period. the Ch- nese revolution and the struggle for iberation in the Third World stmulated a new revoluton- ary trend inthe imperalst countres Thi trenc convicted the Communist Parties who walked behind the banner o the Sovet Union,and every other reformist onentation A the start of the. 705, thefrst movements carme forward in West ‘Germany and then n laly. who openly ques- tioned the use of revalutionary violence and. the polical-miltary practice to overthiow the. power of the bourgeoisie. The CCC are the inhertors of these first experiences. wih the advantage of the roads already travelled i the 70 and they have tned to go even futher by taking up the task of giving thei share of the. answers 1o the questions which are only put forward by the revolution. In ths respect s Worthwhie 1o state that b theoretcal acvances often emerge from efeats: Bolshevism is the crtical inhertance of the Paris Commune. the cultural revoluton is the criical inhentance of the vicory of the bourgeois powers in the So- viet Union of the 505, etc Sofar as mitant commiment s concerned. we’ve never been atiracted by violence or rmed struggle in and of tself. Communism means peace. brothehood. and it this knd of world we fight for_If we really want a workd wiout war and without weapons, a world of brotherhood, then we have to begin fo defeat the (fuly amed) bourgeosie in a cass war. “The rest is ony hypocrsy One often hears the remark that the CCC came out of nowhere. This is in contr diction with, for example, the milltants of the RAF, who chose the armed struggle only after a long evolution among the ranks of the radical non-parliamentarian movement. Your answer is so abstract, it brings only forward purely theoretical considerations. Could you be a bit more concrete? It s true that the cells aren’t the aimost- spontaneous. empirical outcome of the radicalzation of a non-amed movement, non- parliamentarian or ofherwise. But why does 1 always have to be lie that? The hitory of the intermational communist movement s not cha acterized by the eteral repetiton of aiways the same processes but. on the conlrary. by assimiltion of the lessons from former exper- ences - and tis is only for the better! To be able o talk expicitly about the foun- dation of the Cell, we have to state precisely one person (with this political background) mests anther (with a dfferent poliical back- ground) who knows a third person (with yet another poitical background), etc- We consid this of minor importance, but i you really insist, we can present things i the following order Plerre: This is the r0ad | travelled as a miltant Informal particpation in several struggle and protest movements ffom 1872 onwards; agfa- tion in secondary schools and with students, the denunciaton of the coup in Che, 0ppos’- *](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 14.png)



![Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide! Arm The Spirit Special Edi n - Winter 1999/2000 A Brief History Of The Armed Struggle Of GRAPO In Spain The Fist of October Ant-Fascist Resist- ‘ance Groups (GRAPO) were formed inthe sum- mer of 1975. AL tha time twenty members of the Re-Constiuted Spanish Communist Party (PCE-1) an underground pary formed five months before, carried out their first amed action against the fascist securdy forces. On August 2. 1975 two Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) members were shot in the centre of Madrid One died and another was seriously njured This was th fist srke back of GRAPO against the wave of fascist-nspired terror known as “the summer of terro” The PCE(1) had its own “technical sec- tion" created to carry out expropriations of banks o support the revalutionary siruggle and punish police informers. From the core of ths Seclion emerged GRAPO. On October 1, 1975 fve different GRAPO ommandos executed four policemen and ser- ously injured anather ane in Madnd. Ths was thei answer o the assassinations of five ant- fascists (two members of ETA and three mem- bers of the now defunct FRAP organization) Kl on September 27, by poice firing squads applying Geath penaltes ordered by the miltary authorties. ’GRAPO gt claim responsiily forthese. actions until July 8. 176 when 60 bombs. blasted fascst targets thoughout the county. Itwas the 60th anniversary of the beginning of the Civl War won by the fascists in January 1977 the police arrested 40 PCE(1) and GRAPO members in Madnid and Barcelona and succeeded in freeing Lieuten- ant-General Vilaescusa and a member of the Spanish aigarchy Orol. who had been kept pisoner by GRAPO commandos for 60 days in order to exchange them for polical prisoners and to force the government to agply an am- nesty. A few days before two GRAPO com- ‘mandos had executed two policemen and one Gl Guard in Madrd and injured three more Civil Guards in two separate attacks on the fascist forces as 4 reaction to the Kilings of v lefist lawyers by a paramiltary gang act- ng under Civil Guard orders. On June 4. two Civil Guards were shat dead in Barcalons, tis was the day of the frst general electon since 1936 and the reformist farce was going on. This action was a clear 5ign that showed that the revolutonary organ- Zations would not accept the renewal of fas- clsm under any “democratic” mask. On September 27, 1977, Captain Herguedas.ofhe Natinal Polce was shot deac by aGRAPO commando n Madr. He had been one of the fascist volunteers who executed five ant-fascits just two years earler. 1n 1877 and 1578 GRAPO actons contin- ved, mainly bomb atacks against amy and mil- tary quarters but also against govemment fa cies. Some selective assassinations were also carmed out. On March 22. 1978, the Gen- eral Manager of Prisons was shot dead near his house In Madrid. He was responsidle for the kiling ofa anarchist prisoner in Carabanchel Prison, who was beaten to death by guards Wh ted to get nformatin from him about an ‘escape plan of GRAPO and PCE() prisoners. 1879 was the year in which GRAPO car- 18 out s most acions: on January 9 a judge from the Supreme Court was shot dead. on March 5 an Afmy General was executed when his car was attacked by a GRAPO team on a centre street of Madri. and on Apri, achief o he “Antterrorst” Brigade of the Natonal Plice (NP) was executed in Sevile. Alto- gether 20 members of the fascist police were executed that year in a combination of actions by the urban guerrila throughout the country, and there were many bombs attacks that year as well On the other hand GRAPO and PCE() miltants payed a high price for this: 100 people were Jaied - accused of membership i these organizations. (Police claimed that the PCE(() and GRAPO were the same thing and many PCE(1) miltanis were arrested wihout any evidence against them. The Party was banned again, just as t had been under the miltary dictatorship). Seven members of the PCE(] and GRAPO were kiled by the police that year. On June 28, Martn Eizaguire and Femandez Cario were assassinated by 3 spe- cil tear of the Sparish miltary secret service. in Paris. They were members of the Commitee of Foreign Relations ofthe PCEI() and were in exile. On April 20, Juan Carios Delgado de Codes. a member of the Central Commiiee of the PCE() was shot dead by the poice i Ma- i - e was unarmed and didn’ belong to the guerrila. Between Aril and May GRAPO car- ied out 30 amed actions in response to the King of Delgado de Codes. This was later cr cized by the Central Commando of GRAPO and the PCE() as a aling into bind miltarstctac- tics. From that moment on GRAPO aimed all s effots at maintaining the armed struggle and qving 1t a protracted character, assuming that Lis not only possible but aiso necessary 1o follow a Protracted People’s War strategy and that i is possible to develop this stalegy in & doveloped European country. On December 17. 1978 five prisoners of GRAPO escaped from Zamora jai through a tunnel dug for months by GRAPO and PCE(r) prisoners (some of them were miners). I was a real snock fo the goverment, which tned to recapture them atany cost. Three o them were finally kiled by the police (in 1980, 1981 and 1882) and the other two were recaptured shortly afte they rejoined the struggle In 1980 and 1981 GRAPO was a weak organization due o the repression carred out against ts supporters. In these years GRAPO carmied out eight executions,incuding o Army Generals and one Colonel o denounce the role played by the army in the difty war and coun- termsurgency. A few policemen and civil guards were aiso executed. GRAPO, 35 an organization that aims at becoming the core of the future People’s Ay has never targeled innocent civilans nor used dangerous devices againstcivilans n s miltary acions and sabo- 1age. In 1980-81 nine members of GRAPO were Kl by the police in a ciear shoot -kl pocy. One PCE() mittant died a5 consequence of torture in 1980 and on June 19, 1981, Crespo ‘Galende, PCE(7) prsoner, ded n hunger stike (he lasted 94 days) against the poicy of tor- ture, isolation and anniniation of the poltical prisoners. The government was forced to reunity the prisoners and allow thefn 1o keep theirCommunes inthe as. (The Karl Manx Com- mune - 80 prisoners of PCE() and GRAPO - in Soria Prson lasted unt 1989 when the social- fascist government dismantied 1) In October 1982 he PSOE (socialfasciss) came to power. The PSOE began by kiling Juan Marin Luna, leader of GRAPO, who was shot sixtmes in Barcelon n an undercover-opera- ton. He was unarmed. and some years later three poicemen were charged with murder, but they were acquitied_On the eve o the elections, (October 28). GRAPO planted 30](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 18.png)

![Arm The Spiri Special Edition Winter 1999/2000 Inthe dawn of Apr 7t an active com- mando of our organization, the First of Octo- ber Antifascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO). has demolished by means of & powerful explosive charge the interor of the Vale de fos Caicos Basica, he funeral monu- ment where the morta remains of he main heads of the Spanish State are buried and which was inaugurated by the dictator Franco forty years ago. “The Vale de los Caidos Basiica i one of the most clear examples of the persist ence of he fascist regime and has aiways aroused the hatred of the masses since represants the sweeping away of thei demo- cratic nghts and berties. The fascist regime 15 stil standing and ths s also proven by the fact that, after more than twanty years of “democratc” reforms. the men and women that fought against the mast are stil i the prisons. Many of them for more than twenty years - even when they have aiready served thei sentences. It s also proven by the am- nesty gven to those who were responsidle for the GAL [so-called Ant-Terrorst Groups. of Liberation, n reaity government death squads responsible for the Kiling of 27 Basques between 1983.87 - ed ] whi st e same tme t mprisone the Natonsi Leac. ership of Herr Batasuna and continues the [First of October Antifascist Remstance)‘\ Groups (GRAPO) Communique diny war with ther pracice of toture and po- tical assassinations such s that against ETA member Jose Luis Geresta Muika. s action agains ine Valle d los Caidos Basiica joins others recently caried out by our 9roups of which we highigh the following - Placement of explosive devices in the faci- ties of the Cope Racio Broadcast in Barcelona on August 5. 1998, in the Temporary Employ- ment Agencies “Ata Gestion” in Vigo on No- vember 6. 1998 and Adecco’ located in Marques de Vadilo in Madrid on November 25, 1998, - Bombing of the Temporary Employment ‘Agency “Unitrab" located on Lenda street in Madrid on November 12, 1998, and the National Insitte of Labour, Healh and Securty in Cudad Lineal, Madid on November 13, 1986, - Bombing of the central offices of the Catalonian Employer’s Assocition i Barcelona and of the Young Businessman Associaton of Baix Lisbregat in Cornela, both on December 30,1998 it s clear that under this regime, we, the Workers. cannot expect 3 solution 10 the many. problems that affect us diectly and that the captalist economic criss s sharpening more and more each day. Neither can we expect the least economic. social or poltcal con- cessions of the Spanish oigarchy in apeace- flmanner. The ones tha have imposed them- selves by means of arms and teror and are st maintaining themsives in power by arms must be overthrown by arms. For ths re: son, we have to figt resolutly. uniting the popular masses and increasing the resst ance everywnere. ‘There s No Truce Against Fascism! Join The Resistance! Let’s nite Our Forces! Forward With The People’s Resistance Movement! Central Command of the First of October Antfascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO) April 12, 1999 and after a retalaton action (e execution of an Army Colonel on June 15 in Valladoid)cen- tred themssives on carrying out an offensive 1o take theiniiative again in September. In September 1990 GRAPO planted six bombs in Madrd, Taragona, Barcelona and Gion. On the 6th thee bombs went off n Ma- i (one inthe Stock Exchange, ancther one in the Supreme Court and te last one inthe Min- istry of Econamy). None of these actons re- Sulted in any cviian casualtes. On September 8,2 bomb blasted petrl aciities in Tamagona causing damage o 3 milion doirs: and on the 101h the PSOE central office in Barcelona was bombed causing damages valued at 100,000 dolars. September ended with a GRAPO ac- ton in Gijon in which 8 commando raided an offia buding seging one thousand biank driv- ing licenses and then planted & bomb that biasted the faciiies. In November 1990 two. more bombs rocked two offcial buiings in Barcelona In 1891 and 1992 GRAPO continued with it bombing campaign against offcial buidings: in April 1962 GRAPO bormbed the National nsts e of Industry and the Minisry of Employment in Madrid, two Civi Guards were injured. One year earier n February 1991 a GRAPO bomb cut, for six hours. the miltary NATO pipein that supplies the U.S. air bases in Spain. The intent was to sabotage this pipeine which wi being used by the US. B-52 Superforresse that had devastated Iraqi cies. There wers also sabotage actons against the faciites of the energy monapolies in 1991 and 1952 as well as bank expropriatons. In 1983 three GRAPO miltants died in Zaragoza n an attack on an armoured car that was blown up with explosives o expropriste the funds tha t contained. One securty guard g and oo wer ey e Tt seven bombs exploded n official buid- 1158 in Mace nthe Empiyers Associaion. PSOE offces, and other offies involved in the industrial reconversion which had (8 of thou- sands of workers) In 1984 GRAPO actions were ntended to seize funds that were desperately needed ‘Some expropriations were carned out. In Janu- ary two bombs expioded in Madiid on the eve. of a general strie. a Tax offce and an Unem- ployment offce were bombed. In July and De- cember two armoured cars were attacked and money was expropriated (about a haff millon dolars), n 1995 GRAPO caried outone of he most important and decisive actons of the last few years. On June 27 they kidnapped Pubiio Cor- don, wealthy businessman and presiden of the insurance company PREVIASA; he was. freed on August 17 in Barcelona aflr paying 400 millon pesetas (about three millon dolas). He had o pay ancther 800 millon pesetas after his ieration but he decided to fies (nis bus- nesses are not very clean. he was also consul of Guatemala and has important business in that country) In November the polce arrested three GRAPO members in Barcalona and Va. lencia but they could not recover the money. Nowadays it seems that GRAPO is under- going 3 new re-organization and one thing is very clear. the fascist Spanish state has lost the bate i the sense that t has not been able 0 anniiate the amed organizaton no the revo- Iutionary pary. the PCE() I the past 21 years, 3,000 people have beenarrested by he polce nrlaton to GRAPO andthe PCE(), of which 1.400 have been aied Nowadays there are 54 prisoners of PCE(1) and GRAPO n Spanish k. From 1875 0 1995 ‘GRAPO has carried out 60 execuions, more than 300 bombs nave been planted and over 3,000 armed actons have been carred out (The Spanish goverment recognizes 545.) ‘Twenty GRAPO miltants have ded by po- lice action or 35 a result of premature explo- sions. Seven PCE() miltants have been kiled by the police and paramiltary gangs. Accord- ing 1o police sources there about 100 PCE(r) and GRAPO members inclandestinty. We hope this bref history of the armed struggle of GRAPO - unique due 1o the Pro- tracted People’s War strategy folowed by the PCE(7) and GRAPO - has been useful and inter- esting Association Of Relatives And Friends Of Politcal Prisoners (AFAPP)](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 20.png)
![Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide! Arm The Spi Freedom For Francisco Brotons Beneyto, Now! Francisco Brotons Beneyto, Communist 22 Years In The State Dungeons, Kidnapped By The Regime He was bor in Petrel (Alicante) n 1944 His father was a wood lathe operator and his mother was 3 shoe trmmer. When he was 11 years old he entered a technical college in Ma- i, where he leamed the trade of de-stamp- ing adjuster. At the same tme he studied in the ‘evening high school courses. and later he en- tereg uniersity where he studied the frst two. years of Engineering. In order o pay his stuc- fes he worked a5 3 mechanic, administrative assistant.teaching in schools and giving pr- vate classes By the end of the 19605 he started to be poltically active in different organizations of the communistlef. In 1573 he foned the OMLE (Organization of Marxist-Leninists of Spain). He participated in the preparation of the Reconstiutve Congress of the PCE(1)in 1975 I January 1977 he assumed the responsibity of leading GRAPO. He partichated as a de- egate in the 2nd Congress of the PCE(r) whe e was elecied to be 3 member o the Palfica ‘Commission of the Party. He was arrested or ‘October 9, 1877 in Benidorm together with ‘Central Commitee ofthe PCE() Together with Enrique Cerdan Calixto, Bist chag Abelardo Collazo Arauxo. Femando ‘Ghomon and Juan Martin Luna, on Decert 17, 1975, he regained freedom through s el whih they dug over 8 months using vised toois and avoiding the constant searche which, at thal tme, were made by the police . themseives inside the prisons. Once out and ater geting in touch withthe comr the underground. he sssumed again the v of GRABG (Frtof Gcber A Fasct Groups) unil his e-arrest on September 20, 1880. Since then, he has been in fourieen pris ons. He i now is the Sevile-l prison. He has particiated in more than twenty hungersiies.Strikes o solidaty, to denounce the poltcal manouevres of the regme, and mainy. hungersirkes to achieve decent iving conditons n the prisons. We can highight two ofthe lattr:that o 1981 against he extermina- tion regime of the Herrera de la Mancha pison, thatcost the fe of Juan Jose Crespo Galende, and the one tha lasted from December 1989 15 February 1991 n which Jose Manuel Sevilano Martin died. During this latter hungerstrike Brotons was repeatedly transferred from jal to Jail and from hosptal o hospital handcuffed to is bed forlong periods of tme and submited 1o harrassment by the policemen who guarded im.In 1980 he suffered a heart attack, escag- ing death only by the factthat he was already in’a hosptal and under medical care. When he started the hungerstrike he was 72 ks, when e finished it e was under 39 kios. “This comimunist should have been released four years ago according to the regime’s own Taws. However. notsatisfied withthis proloning of is sentence.the PP [Partido Popuiar-ruling pary - ed] govemment pians to keep hm in prison for ancther four years: penitentary in- Sttutions and thei frends, the judges. refuse o apply to him the sentence reductions that correspond to him by law. For tha, they assert that these reductons are annulled by his es- cape from Zamora prson in 187 together with four comades, even i ths is not provided for in any judicial sentence. “The truh of the mater is that they do not forgive i the audacty of having broken down the wals of their dungeons and even less that he did 0 In order to undeniake the reorganiz: tion of GRAPO, who at that time were deci. mated by poiice repression. n fact. the polce. declared a death penalty upon al the fugitves: Avelardo Collazo Arauxo, Enriue Ceran Calcto and Juan Martin Luna were assassinated in palice ambushes; only Brolons and Femando \Fierro Chomon saved the ves since they were crowded places at the time of heir aests. Neither do they forgive him the fact that in the conditons of isoation and disper- years, he and his comrades have ‘denouncing the fascist and teror r o the Spanish State. giving an f rovolutionary commitiment and ‘ahways in the front line of the strug- carried out by the poltical pisoners against repressive onstaughts of the regime. We st have in our minds his skeletal - % age nthe ngertunger sk mariained ity rment, 440 days and nights; mages that ) Seditose ofthe Naz concenraon xposed the cruel and paranoid Cararess s oot e PO gou ‘emment. The hungerstikers only demanded to be regrouped in the same prison in order to carry out an ordered Ife in accordance with their communist policy and ideology. It was 00 much dignity for the cowardly vermin of the ‘goverment Brotons is i pison because he has fought for the peaple’s and working-class nterests. These are the real reasons for his never- ‘ending kidnapping: the class hatred of the Fa- langits disguised into ‘democrats of the par- ament of his gracious majesty and their fithy spirt o revenge. The proloning of his imprisonment s aiso meant to be 3 lesson or all those who struggle against the system. It i the duty of al o support him in the denouncement of his siutation. We Have to Stop this Fascist Revenge! Immediate Freedom for Franciso Brotons! Amnesty for All the Polltical Prisoners! (Source: Published by the Communist Party of Spain (reconstituted) - December, 1999) ter 1999/2000 AFAPP Statement Francisco Brotons Beneyto has been imprisoned for 22 years. He was arrested before the so-called Amnesiy of 1977. This leader of the PCE() and GRAPO is one of the polical prisoners that were excluded by the regime fom that achievement of the People’s Movement. From that moment he became one of the vctms of al the repres- sive plans carred out againt the imprs. oned revalutionaris by the diferent gov- ‘emments of UCD, PSOE and PP. addressed o infict an additional punishment and o achieve their renouncement of their ati- fascist and democratc beliefs Brotons has already served his sen- tence - no pisoner can remain n pison for more than 20 consecuive years. In spite ofthis, the PP government s prolonging the imprisonment and punishment o this revo- Iutionary. This is mainly for two reasons. because they have not sucoseded n crush- g his spint in spite of all hei repeated attempis to make him abandon his comm- st beliefs and because they are using the prolongation of hs mprisonment as a re- Venge for his combative stand. Through- out these years of imprisonment, Broton has always been one of the poifica prs- oners who have headed the resistance to the repressive pians apoiied within the ais. He has suffered isolation and has taken part in many and prolonged hungerstikes. n defence ofdignty and o his belefs. Only a fow montns ago, Azmar’s goverment i not allow him (o see his father when he was dying and afterwards did not allow im o attend his fathers funeral o say his last farewel t0 him. “This special punishment inficted on Brotons shows the cowardly, cruel and fascist nature of the Bourbonic Monarchy ‘and shows it n s ful brutaly, # we dont lose sight of the reatment given to the GAL Kilers and the corupters of the system. Who were freed immediatey after having been sentenced to tens of years o impris- onment by theit own courts “The Spanish regime s punishing nthe person of Brotons the workers, the youth and all those men and women who rebel ‘against injustice and truggle for the demo- cratc Ibertes. For alhese reasons, AFAPP, besides. denouncing once again the stuation of im- prisonment in which this revolutionary re- ‘mains, calls upon the workers, the youth and their rganizations to make this sirg- gle theirs and to adhere (o the campaign that we start o achieve his immediate re- lease. since his dignity and his stand of resistance are our own dgnty and resis- ance. Stop The Injustice! Amnesty! Association of Relatives and Friends of the October 1995 Poltical Prisoners (AFAPP)](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 21.png)







![Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide! ter 1999/2000 war which had been started on by his pres- ‘ecessor. the “socials president Garcia. Fuimori Sent tanks to close down the pariament, in- salled miltary tibunals where masked judges handed downs hundreds of years in prison terms, meaning hundred of comrades and pro- letarians were sent to prison for e without any chance of defense. Fujimor rued by croe. and at he same tme passed laws grani- ing leniency to colsborators. In Turkey. the fascist state has legalized terror. censorship. banning. and repression (Law No. 413)n s effort against the Kurdish revolution and the Turkish revolutionary move- ment nthe heart of ‘Gilzed Europe”. the impe- iast states follow an amost unfied counter- revolutionary polcy n oppositon o the revolu- tionary movements and lberation movements of oppressed peoples n France, Belgium, Spain. Northen lrland, and so on. Laws, courts. and special psons. Torture, solaton, and the dis- persion of revolutionary prisoners. “Death Squads” to elminate miftats from resistance movements and revolutonary organzatons. in Gernany, the siate develope s atack on the antagonistic movements by means of Articie 1293 (which has been used against Coutiess comrades). which gives the intell- gence agency a blank check in s repression against 3l those who arganize in oppositon to the ruiing system. The authorities do every- thing possible to destroy salidaty and the re- sistance Even in lay. due to the deep roots of the urban guerrli and the autonomaus tendencies in the Class struggle. the preventive counter- revolution of the past decades has reached such a level that i is now aimost a mode for others Haly combines the most brutal forms of repression (mass arrests, torure, special pris- ons. planned execuions, like the Via Fracchia incident [On March 28, 1980, Carabineri police aided a Red Brigades (BR) base on the Via Fracehia in Genua, due to information from a BRtmcoat named Patrcio Peci Polce general Dalla Chiesa warted no prisoners. Four BR mi- tants were murdered. They were Lorenzo Betessa (Antonio), Anna Maria Ludmann (Ceciia). Riccardo Dura (Roberto), and Piero Panciareli (Pasquale). - d] with a very re- fined system of ‘rehabittatng” people (special aws for Dissociatf and ’Pent collaborator. s well s periodic campaigns forreduced sen- tences and amnesties. which are carried out by the state and is lackeys). In Western Euope, the presence of a deeply rooted and progressive revolutionary movement and an urban guerrila, which tacked and took apart the war and restructur- ing projects of the imperalsts, was met wih the intemationaization of power relations and the development ofa madel of repression which has been sdapted by the indvidual imperialst states. Also, repression became increasingly centralzed into supranational organs, which consolidated the preventive counter-revolution efforts against the European melropoltan pro- letariat at the highest evel n the 19705, this process was repre- sented by tne formation of the TREVI group and the “Anti-Terrorism’ Commission witin NATO. Inthe 1980 the TREVI expanded and the Schengen Agreement was passed (tnereby insttutionalizing European racism ‘against immigrants and refugees). meaning the Courter-revolutionary integration o the imper- alist bourgeoisie in the hunt or ‘domestic” and “foreign enemes’ On ‘the foundations of TREVI ang Schengen. a European forress is being bui, ‘equipped with the counter-revolutionary func- tons of controling the population by means of a comprehensive databank. computerized den- tifcaton, the redefintion of poliical crme. and the procedures of deportation and the abolish- ing the right 1o asylum. “The Maastricht Treaty of the 1990s has. Cleared the path for the formation of a joint police organization - Europal - and perfected TREVI, the network for police cooperation, as. an insirument for repression n ail European Union memoer countres As the class war, in which the intern tional proletariat and the imperiast bourgeaisie stand opposed to one anather, deepens, the levels of preventve counterrevolution are in- creased by imperiaism in conjunction with his of that “serous incident” in some part of the world. The preventive counter-revolution is oW 3 stable factr in the power struggle be- tween the classes at the international level Wherever it is employed. it marks out a“pointof 0 eturn” and is contnually adapted. “Therefore. there can be no greater mis- take than to think that the various ‘serous inci- denis” which have characierized the poltical repressive counter-revolution in taly o eise- where for years now were facts in and of themsalves. And nothing i more disarming for the proletaiat than the series of Itanes about the end of the cycie” or the time for pause and historical reflaction” or “emergency xits” or the good oid days’ ‘And bastards of worst kind are trying to tear apart the legacies o the siruggies and revolutionary experiences. which grew from the fires of the clashes between the class and the ruing powers Making the freedom of the revalutionary prisoners. apartof thatprocess is noth- ing more than a counter- revalutionary operation. The liberation of the revolutionary prisoners is closely tied to the struggle against the strategy of pre- ventive counter-revolution. that’s why it is and will al- ways be an unneglectable goa forth intemational pro- letariat But t the same time, his must not be the center around which the revoluton- ary perspective for emanci- pation and iberaton turms. Every revolutionary Mors Wotta Sitta comrades (clockwise): Susanna Berar, Caterina Spanc, Anna Cotone and Rosa Murs and every antagonistic projetarian Kknows tn repression never ends at ail tmes (and in all places) i is organized and seeking fo desiioy curent struggles. by means of denunciaton layofts, beatings.the closure ofpoltcalspaces. arrests, prison, isolaton...all the way 10 tor- ture, execuion. and "state-assisted sucies’ That’s why the struggle against repres- sion and for he Iieration of the revolutionary prisoners can be nothing eise than he siruggle for beration from oppression and capitaist explotation. And tha’s why i must be inierna- tonalzed, o increase s strengths and cap bilties, to make advances inthe casn of power betwesn revoluton and imperiaism. For this reason, we send our inlemation- alst soldarty 1o al the prisoners i "adm rative detenton’ in Palestine and to alrevolu- tionary prisoners across the workd, who are fighting against isolation and physical and psy- ‘chological destructon. Soldarity belongs to all revolutionary prisaners who are struggiing for the defense and development of ther revolu- tionary identiy and for their iberation Freedom For Ahmed Qatamesh And For All Palestinian Prisoners In “Administra- tive Detention’! Freadom For Mumia Abu-Jamal And For All Revolutionary Prisoners In The World! “Solidarity Is The Tenderness Of The Peoples” - Che Solidarity Is A Weapon! Aoril 1988 - some comrades from the commurist poltical prisoners collective “Wotta Sita” Vianale (standing),](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 29.png)


![Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwi Arm The Spi ter 1999/2000 Interview With Ahmed Qatamesh Definition of Administrative Datention: the zionist practice of locking up a Palestinian for an indefinitely renewable six monts period Without formally charging them with anyihing in court. Introduction Ahmed Suiayman Musa’Qatamesn has. earned himself a reputation as one of Paies- tine’s foremost poliical actvists and prisoners. of conscience. A wter by vocation and a evo- Iutionary by nature, Qatameshs invoivement with the Popular Front for the Liveration of Pai- estine (PFLP) prompted his Zonit interroga- torsto prociam victorously upon hs capture n 1952 “There s George Habash on the outside and Anmed Qatamesh on the inside’! After 17 years in hiding, Qatamesh was. 1o spend neary ix years in prison without tal as the Zionits’longest.held adminisrative de- tainee. His plght eptomizes that of al admiis- tratve detainees, while his char, ntellect, and optimism color 2 thorough interview that the Free Arab Voice had the opportunty of con- ducting wih him. ‘As is frequenty the case with deposio- ies of the Palestinian experience like Ahmad Qatamesn, the interview turned out ather longer than our average FAV issue. Howeve. we trust that the valuable insights Qatamesh provides on the sate of the Palestiian psy- che, the htorical mpact and context o Oslo. the status of the PFLP, and his ole as an agent in his own destiny will make for some very good reading. SUl, the longer unedited version of the interiew s available upon request. [Thisinterview with Ahmad Qatamesh was con- Gucted for the Free Arab Voice (FAV) by Fadia Issam Rafide]. Even though you have lived in Palestine your whoe Iife, one could conclude that your imprisonment In the early ’70s fol- lowed by 17 years of life underground and another 6 years in administrative do- tention means that you have been ‘re- moved" from the Palestinian community at large for almost three decades. Upon your release, what environment did you find yourself in? How do you think our “shaab” (Palestinian people) have changed? Though | was not directly a part of the mainstream, | was not away from the poltical scene because | was working underground and engaging in potical actvites. Madrid-Oslo happened and their impacts were drastic on the whole society. They cannot be reduced to the fact that the Palestinian Authorty is in “charge’ f 4% of the West Bank and Gaza. Our eople were psychologically affected. Before Osio, the Palestnian people used to have an ‘agenda and a common slogan ofberatin; now we have o agenda and no siogan. They have gone on diferent path. The Palestinian people. in Jordan became a part of Jordan. Their agenda s now a Jordanian one. In Lebanon. the Palestinians are on thei own, There i noth- ingto unte them. Our shaab is dispersed now and they have been swallowed up in the environments of theiDiaspora. Every segment started think- ing on its own and this led to isolationism. a very different envionment from that which the older generation grew up in when they were united toward common goals. Many have begun to look at the struggle completely diferently than before. For exam- pl. they are now considering akermative ways that in my opinion are not very eflective. In the past, we used 10 say the more you put pres- Sure on the enemy. the greater your ikelinood of succaeding. Now many people see negolia- tions s the way 1o bring us our rights. The phenomenon i that peaple are waiing to see. what will come of Osio, looking passively and thinking thatthe future will magicalybring them something, have noticed that the youthful generation now pines only for recreation, happiness. uxury, fun, and entertainment. The reason for this i ihatthere is no evolutonary atmosphere anymore as a result of Osio. I you compare. his with the atmosphere of the Intfada, you would find. as you would expect, a drastic change. Now there i no Intfada, no revolu- tion. There is only the aftermath of Oslo nthe 70, people wanted 10 be cutured and well-read because f was mporant for the cause. After Oslo. they do ot care for that much anymore. But without intelectual aware- ness, we cannot continue to manufacture evo- Iutionaries. Only 2% of our people read the press these days and even fewer read books. according to a recent poll. If ur poltical stua- tion were difirent, this 2% would be much higher. There is a direct relationship between the ack of a revolutionary environment and the lack of peopie’s desie to be intellectual and ‘aware. Instead, many people have justtued toreigion. In my opinon, the majorty of people are searching for a revolutonary altemative. Be- cause there is none, people are frustated. angry, and negaive about tings relating 1o polic. The prevaiing misconceplion s tha he. confict with our enemy s over. Oslo defeated ourwil o struggle and o sacrfice. People use. o be wiling 1o be martyred of jailed for the sake of iberation. Now, people are questoning themselves. Why should | Gothis? s tworth 17 Instead, they begin 1o tend to thei personal affirs: how o Ive. wha o eat, wht o buy, and how to find individual ways 1o suvive ‘Some people are even ready to sel thei co- ‘science for money with 1o regard o the ideals of the previous period. They start looking for rewards whether through a ministry or as & miniser’s assistant. They are thinking: s tme for us to get what we deserve money-wise, fame-wise, and profi-wise. We have fished our struggle: it s time o collect some of what weire owed et regardiess of what | said. or what | 6id ot say, the contradiction stil exsts between s and our enemy. befween our shaab and our occupier. The larger contradiction is between s 85 an Arab nation - wih s objectives and Visions - and the zionis abjectves i the area The contradicton i stil aive but the way 1o express i 1 not represented revlutionariy Our enemy’s victory does not mean the loss of our program for beration. We did not lose out ights 1o continue the struggle. Al the same time, tis does not mean that we lost our per- speciive of being one Arab ation agais! the Zlonists. Even i they have won now. tempo- Fary, that does not mean we lost strategically. Al this stage, we have suffered a poltical fal- ure. We are in a state of retreat. This is not catastrophic nevertheless. s temporary. Pec- ple in other struggles have gone through this: Victories and relreats. As long as we Nave & just cause, this shazb demands s ight of re- tum even in the 1948 areas. The subjective condiions thatspurred ourrevolution are st in place for people to use as a springboard for Fevoluton. But they need a revolutonary mecha- fism to upift them again 1 predictthat i the future,the peaple wil ‘explode again because the condtions are stil there for them to explode again. There are ex- ‘amples to foretel of this. One is ‘meseeret e ‘mellon” [the Palestinian milion persons march] Wi people going down 10 the streets f0 ex- press their dream for Palestine, including the land occupied in ’48. Another is the events of digging the tunnel [beneath Al-Aqsa Mosaque] creating many martyrs and inficting many injo- ies on people who were willng to sacrifce Recertly we have even the police rising up in Gaza 1o face down the army of occupation. ‘The capabiltes of our people wil never dry up They are waiing for an incident or a spark to energize them sgain as well as a leadership they can trust on Oslo The polfical strategy and philosophy of the US. i to manage our present crisis not to resalve it. They want to prolong i years and years 1o gain tme so that they can change reaities on the ground. Oslo dd not prevent the “Israelis” from exproprating 320,000 dunams of ourland aflr the so-called negatiatns. Now they are expanding Jerusalem. Every time they ‘expand i, they take extra and from us. Since 1967, they wanted a ‘unted’ Jerusalem Tneir project o expansion s til existent, even after Osio. The settiomens are growing 30% annu- ally. This s despit the fact that 30,000 apart- ments buit on the settements are st vacant They do not need more apartments; they just want to promote expansion. This expansion has the objectve of creating a demographically lopsided area of predominantly Jews. East Je- rusalem now has 170,000 Jews and 160,000 Arabs, “They want to compartmentaize our er](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 32.png)

![Freedom For All Polici ter 1999/2000 There is no continuing threat s0 why 6o You put us n jail and then release us? Up untl ow, 5 unciear why they let me go. | cannot tell you exactly why. But | can tell you the only reason they imprisoned us was {0 suppress our activity because we are act o support of our people and they want 1o prevent us from continuing the struggle When they asked me about Arafat, | tolg them we are united against you_ Even if our Vison i differen, we are not going [0 give you the pleasure of seeing us fight against each otner Mahmoud Abbas tried an ntiatve (a main PNA intiatve) to tellthemto release me. Thatis ancther factor. Since my name was brought up in the Knesset and on the Israsli streets. Mahmoud Abbas fet comfortable addressing the issue because it was already in the air The PNA took it upon ifselfto ask for my release afer al of that. Allthe factors | mentioned cul- minated n my release. Comment on the common perception that the PFLP as a party has been dissolved. Tnere st exists an historical task fo the PFLP. The role of the PFLP i not over yet Its special. We should have a different way of hinking, bu I should existwith a new form and new approaches. The people are going to say that we need an atemalive (o the Palestiian Autnorty. That is why there is a need for the PFLP. Tre religous project also has s agenda and approach. I has s vision and project. In between these two camps. there is a large constituency and the PFLP should be con- ermed wih winning them over. Neiher o them represents he needs and desires of he shaab. St within this framework, we’l find instances where we can ally with the PA to tackle some issues, and with the Islamists 10 tackle other Issues, whi remaining autonomous. There are daly baties that we can fight alongside both ‘camps, butthis doesrit mean we melt o them. You need your own front to continue the sirug- ge They say tha religion solves all conficts inife. f wereto address Isiamists, | would ask them, where is your development plan? Where. is their vison of how democracy fies into soci- ety? Where do they see the role of the iber ton and aciwities of women in sociey as part. ners in e with men? Where isthei clear pol- cal program? Where are thei poltical tactics ‘wheneverthere s an ncidenthappening? What is their postion with respect o the unty of the Arab nation and the united aims of the Arab nation? How Go they look at the status of ofher reigions? What is their position on class strug- gle? 10% of our people are hal-hungry and the other 90% are really hungry. How are they go- ng o approach this? What s ther positon on imperialism? Sometimes they are against America, sometimes they are with them. Their postion s not clear. You need a vision and a program that the people can be convinced of. These are big is- sues and the Islamic front has to answer them 50 we can analyze them and work wih them. Whoaver gives the right answers to the people to convince them will win over the masses. Taking in foggy generaities wil get you no- where. 1 1sam solves al problems. then what about the countres in the word that aren’ Is- lamic but which flourshed i Japan. the U.S. China, etc? It s not enough o preach a solu- ton; you must go nto detai how you are going to achieve a solution. The PFLP is 3 necessity and i is needed but it has a crisis wihin fself organizationaly and this should be dealt with 1o I t out of s cisis. s criss s not I 1t vision but n s or- ganizational aspects. If everything in life progresses. the PFLP should progress too. The. PFLP lost many members as a fesult of Oslo and it needs to reevaluate how i’s going to approach people n the future We should resiructure the PFLP 1o put tin a better stuation This is the main question the PFLP is facing. If they can o the transiton’ estructuring el they will be the true leaders. of the future. We should have a restructuring that does ot ony accept the theoretical tink- ing we had before; i has to renew self to Cope with the new realities. in structure as. well as leadership What should the shaab’s relationship with the PA be? The PA’s historical choios for velinood is America and it depends on for everything There should be anather phiosophy instead of just depending on America. There is los of Cormuption going on in the PA now. There s bad ‘adminisration People are lostand do ot know What ey want. They are ot enthusiastic bout anyihing. They are ready to accept anything. If Wwe are to present an afermatve, shoukd be a Clear one. It should be & different vision flom their vison. The relaionship does not prevent us from joining forces on @ daly basis on is- sues that relte to cvi society. We should mo- bize our forces with hem in attacking hese. issues. We should not llow the Palestiian Authority to contain us and prevent us from having our own entty as the PFLP. Lam against any poliical discussion with Arafat. [he di- gressed a bit in private abaut the Arafat meet- ing with Habash and Hawatmeh] Using his program/agenda wil legitmize him and his polical thinking more than helping us achieve uny. Any group wiling to dscuss an altemative to Oslo would be benefcial to engage n.Every meeting s called or the sake of poiticalunity but we should not e callng for that right now. What s needed now is not poit- cal unity that we used to raise as a siogan the past; we should be asking for people’ unty. The instfutions in Palestine should get together and promote a program for the im- provements of sacity. Unity among the people through thei nstutions mstead of the poltical eaders should be our objectve. It s beter for the PFLP to unite s forces, fiht occupation help the masses .. not fo sit wih Arafal. The PFLP should have ts priortes. There are many more issues 1o discuss. Arafat aready made s line clear and we know i $0 why bother? Some PFLP leaders nvolved themseives n the Labor Ministy (wizaret ek-aamal) “They snouid not have_ They snouid not have joned the police. the Information ministry and the securty department.If peaple were confused about the PFLP’s position n the past because of these things.let me make t least that pont clear. Araat chose a certan path through the US.and some say ne wil achieve hs goals He depends on the U S.to suppor him finan- cially and every decision should be agreed to by the U.S. Anything he wans o 6o i related tothe United States. The ther deology s notto e one’s sef 1o America because twil ot give. us the solution we need. My solution entaiis depending on ourselves and buiding a good relationship with the Arab masses and con- tinuing the struggle without dependence on America. Many FAV readers are living in the Diaspora. What advice or suggestions can You give them to be involved in the strug- gle? Each person regardiess of place of resr dence has hismer own ole and they should ‘complement the role of people eisewhere be- ause our siruggle is nt over and the condi- tions we fiht against arestl there. They should ot be competing with each other they shouid be complementing each ofher. There are cer- tain issues that are st in common between those onthe inside and those Iving outside. We Have 2 batte: they are tryng o get us o forget about ouridentty. We should attack this batie ity Since peaple are in Gaza,the West Bank. Jordan and eisewnere, our enemy i rying o make this division permanent, not temporary. 50 that we wil not ever be unified. They wart each segment o soiv it problem thiough the area it is in 5o we should stand against that I they succeed in tackling us as shoe-boxed Palestinians. i wil be easier for them to over ‘come us. I they try to tackle us as one people. they wil fai. Regardless where our people are. they beiieve in one people and one common ‘cause and thisis what urites them and makes them work together. We have a ot of capabil- ties. Our peopie need to understand our his- tory, atampt to preserve our anguage and cul- ture and, besides that, hey shoukdkeep in con- tact with the people back home though visiting them 80 tha they kee the elationship srong. Septomber 16, 1898 (Source: Free Arab Voice <www fav net>)](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 34.png)
![Free Arab Voice Iniroduction: In ths issue of the Froe Arab Voice we present an exclu- Sive inferview with Dr. Habash, the General Sacrotary of the PFLP, on his oppositon 1o dialogue with Arafal. and his future plans. in- cluding i forthcoming resignation from the General Secretariat of the PFLP (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palesiine) Prelude It an unfortunate facttha n our struggle against Zionism. we tend to pay more atention 1o ongoing poltical miltary. or Ciandestine Z- onist efforts against us, and less attention o the Zionist long-un effort to bring about our psychologicaldefeat by tamishing the symbols ofthe Paiestinan and Arab struggle. Even the continuous humilaton and daily mistreatment of Yasser Avafat by “lsraef”, in spie of all his senices rendered. serves the same Zionist purpose of biinging about Arab psychological defeat. It s crucil therefore that ALL those Who work for Palestnian and Arab causes re- alze that when they sell out or buckle under pressure. they do not only compromise them- seves, but a e part o the cause as well This i true regardless of the actists rank in the struggle, because the activst’s unoffcial public office is a rust bestowed by the people Who are the first ones o be let down should 8/ e betray that trust It is specically that be- rayal that oppressors wil seek. notjus or the. sake of neutralzing the particular actiist in question. but to demoraize other actvists as. well and o shroud the cause in despair. Osio s defeatist mentalty, and the inst- tutons t generated on the ground are not only an oppressive status quo for the Palestinian and Arab people; they are a test in which you either cross or do not cross the ine between patrotism and treason. o between justca and njustice. The later are morally charged words frequently subject 1o ridcule of course, as i is in the best interest of oppressors anywhere to blur that I for those who might ever think of challenging existing power amangemens. Yet, when the DFLP and the PFLP cross that ine, they don’t anly compromise themselves. but a piece of the Palestinan cause and the Arab lef wih them as well It i in such crcumstances that Dr George Habash, an entrenched symbol ofthe Palestinian struggle, has to make his stand for the sake of Paiestine and for the sake of hope. Much confusion has surrounded the posi- tion of Dr. Habash, otherwise known as I Hakim, regarding his real position on his rgani- zation’s dialogue with Arafat and is setting of one foot n the track of the Oslo process. Thus the followng is nat an open-ended Interview. but ather a serious attempt o clarty where Ei Hakim stands now. 1 the following. you’l see that E1 Hakim remains E| Hakim. He emerges unscathed. With ‘wisdom and carty. he dispels the mystifcation surounding his postion, while inserting what Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide: Interview With George Habash, General Secretary Of The PFLP ocks like subtle messages between the ines a5 well. Read all about .- The Free Aab Voice [This interview was conducted for the Free ‘Arab Voice (FAV) by lrahim Alloush] Wnat is your position on dialogue with Arafat? Why has the PFLP changed its position on such a dialogue? Is that re- lated to the election of Barak? Dialogue i tis crical phase that the Palestin- ian cause is going through can’t be rejected by any rational person, as a matter of princple. But we can’t tackle his question only on an abstractlevel. Dialogue inprinciple s one thing, and dialogue with Arafa is ancther. We i the. PFLP called for dialogue with everyone with- out exception, including dialogue with Avafat, when Netaryahu became prime minister sev- eral years ago. Such a cal for dialogue had is Justfcations at the time. We called fordialogue. with Arafat enthusiastically then, but Arafat gian’ care much for ialogue. He took the whole thing with ndiference. So when Arafat becomes o eager now fordislogue with us, we have to ask ourselves. why he was 0 much less eager for dialogue. before. | asked myself how we may under- stand this shiting positon of his. My answer to myself and to the Poltbureau of the PFLP was thatine U.S. Govemment now realzes thathere s to be some kind of soluton for the Palestin- fan question. Given their knowledge of Arafat’s Character, they most kel resoived to gve him sometring that may be called a stae, regard- less of the content of such a state, of course. In such a case, Arafat has to accept funds mental clauses o give to “Israer” n return for this state, or cal 2 educed state’ f you wil n exchange or ths stat, Avafat wil have 10 acquiesce to very fundamental concessions, from the point of view of the Palestnian peo- pl, specifcally o the issues of Jerusalem and the right o return of five millon Palestinians abroad. “Israer” wil not at this stage make any concessions n these two crucial reas. Other areas i settlements, water, and the borders of the reduced state’ may be on the negoliating table. Whereas Jerusalem and the rght o re- tum ofthe ive milon to Palestine are not. Arafat Knows that his acceptance of such conces- sions inthese two areas is equivalent {0 com- miting a crime against the Palestnian people How could the Palestinian people give up Jeru- salem and the night of return?! ‘Thats why Arafat suddenly became en- thusiastic for dialogue with us: he wants a cover for commiting such a crime. That’s why. 1 oppose dialogue with Arafal at this point. He Wants us 1o become a cover to legmze his concessions But if you were against dialogue with Araat, why don’t you try to change the position of the PFLP on such a dialogus especially given ail the weight you carry inside the PFLP? 1 am currently doing my best to change the. postion of the PFLP on dialogue with Arafa. | ‘am going through a dificul phase i this perod of my ife. There has been inside me a furous contradiction that needed to be resolved be- fwoen the poltica Ine of the PFLP that elped deineate since the estabishment of the PFLP on one hand, and the queston of democracy inside the organizationofthe PFLP on the othe hand. Because inthe final analysis the majory of my comiades inside the Central Commitee of the PFLP accepted the call for dialogue wih Arafat. They have their premises that | donit Subscibe to. This led 10 a sharp contradiction wihin me: should | give pririy o democracy {majorty ule] or o the established poitcal ine: of the PFLP? Tne latter mind you is no less important han the former. Evertualy | went with thelattr. the poltical ne of the PFLP, ourscru- pulous positons. and the constanis of the Pa estian struggle Hence. some comrades n the Central Commitee suggested the following to me. ‘Dr Habash. since you say thal you o longer want 10 be the General Secretary of the PFLP. and Since that will e setled n two o tree moniths when the PFLP’s Sixih Convention meets, we will gve you your perfect freedom 1o present your point of view on dialogue wih Arafat in public In return, you remain General Secretary until the Sixth Convention meets.* And tis i what | chose to do, and am doing rght now. So it s true that you decided to retire from politcal activism? What are your fu- ture plans? Leaving the positon of General Secretary ofthe PFLP is one thing, and retiing from polt- cal activsmis another. | want o resign from the General Secretaria for a number of reasons: 1)1 want 1 set an example that s not neces- 1y for anyone to remain General Secretary forever. 2) | want o fnd the tme o study and draw the lessons of my poitical experience and to write them down for the benefit of fu- ture generations. I’ve tried to do that i the re- cent past. but | couldn’ find the tme really, and continued on the next page. e](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 35.png)






![Worldwide! n - Winter 1999/2000 work out 1o the maximum the cooperation Wi EAJ but using reason. tnal s, adapng self o the variabie moments and occasions but a- ways wihout losing its own identty Regarding participatory democracy, do you think there are enough possibilities to spread this great idea? Does a major ity in the Euskal Herria knows what this concept means? “This s relative. Most media ill ever help us 1o spread the dea therefore, 1 is diffcult to reach people massively. In any case. the Aberzale Let learmed long time ago that ac- tions are much betterthan the projection of the declogy. ather than getting los talking about the ideology. We will continue as we have. since s our best method of expression. And the poltical pedagogy cannot be anything but the same. With words and wih actions, but specially with actons, we have the lead. The Basque Conflict And The Politcal Possibllities For Herri Batasuna What importance have the relations be- tween Herr Batasuna and the Basqus la- bour unions? They are very imporant. Defiely. the poltical isolaton that the Spanish state wants toimpose on us has been broken by some spe- cific problems - the prisoners. etc. - and be- sides this. 1 is clar that cooperation among lefist organizations s totally necessary in or- der o chalienge an imposing neo-iberalsm; all s auays within the dynamics of a nationai siruggle. Those relations have to be solid and am sure that Herr Batasuna would make ef- forts 1o move them foward in the right direc- tion How would you dsfine the ‘third political space’, and how would you Judge or value this third space? Oihartzuna: Basque Media Workers Against Dispersion Of Prisoners Oinartzuna (the Basaue word for “echo’) s a magazine whose aim s o try and buid a bridge between Basque pris- oners and the media. This magazine ries 1o bring media workers closer 1o the real- e of prson ffe. But not only that, t also endeavours to favour communication be- ween prisoners and jouraliss, overcom- ng the heavy mistust the issue of prison- ers sts up in the media. Oihartzuna aiso points out and crilcses the lack of con- rast that 5o frequenty occurs with news ‘about Basque prisoners stemming from official sources; and publishes news th have gone unhesded in some media Onartzuna: nttp:/www olharizuna.netl Jazaindexen hm I recent years. many people in Eus Herra have waled away from petly paliical quarrels and dvisions and joned the struggle against specifc problems. On the one hand. this. On the other hand. a wide sector emerged Wwih people coming from two sides: there are people in the Basque nationaist lef who after many years of sruggle have sunk into despar Who are nationalist and n the Left and Basaque nationalsts and lef-wingers who have sunk in despar. and also there are many people close o the pact of Ajuria Enea (the ant-terrorism pact of the poliical paries in Bascongadas] Who 4o not believe anymore in a mittary solu- tion. n any case, the “third space appears (o be unstructured, but t seems that the majorty are nationaists and in the Left and that there- fore, see the necessty to have a poliical ne- gotiaton for overcoming the violent parameters of the conflct Do you think unity among the Basque na- tionalist parties EA, EAJ and HB, and a common line of work, would ever be able to function well? As 1 said before, we only value actons. Until now. EAJ and EA have not made cear what is that they want. They may say nice things once in a whie. But in practice, tme afer time. they obey Spanish nationalism at iferent levels which are fundamental to our homeland. Euskara (Basaue language], educa- ton. infrastructures... When they show more than the wil to act, and go ffom words 10 ac- tion then EAJ and EA wil gain, as poltical par- ties. lgitimacy before the Abertzale Lef. Tme. wiltel us. Do you think Herri Batasuna in the future could reach an agreement with the United Left [Spain’s Izquierda Unida] in Euskal Herria o that together could demand the right to self.determination and promote a project of the Let? Yes, but forthis o happen. the Urited Left Would ave to keep a more posite atitude regarding the confict, especial, o be able to join in the construction of the Basque nation from 2 Basaue perspectve. So far they have damonstrated theirsubmission to Madn, ideo- fogicall and politically. Forthe tme being. i is very difficul o think of any kind of agreement. Bt in any case, the Abertzale Left aiways. and specially now. has called on people who Support a negotated solution o the confict to join in and work together for tis. The Unied Let can have s place in this task...but s in thei hands. Can you imagine the independence of Euskal Herria without Navarre? What do you_prefer, _independence _without Navarre o the unity of Bascongadas and Nafarroa without independence? It very, very difficult for me to speak of Basque independence without Nafarroa. I or- der for ths to happen, the Navarrese wouid have to decide o go by themseives, caiming to & SENIDEAK Basque prisoners relatives association be aferen from the rest o the Basques and ths today is unthinkable since none of us have. the nignt to salf-determnation. And it is ciear that | prefer Euskal Herria totaly independent The other possiiities do not seem to me a5~ proprate New Forms Of Struggle And The Future Of Armed Struggle In many people’s opinion, the Abertzale Lef cannot achiove victory through ETA’S rmed struggle, but through sensible and skillful politics. How do you see the fu- ture of ETA’s armed struggle? 1am not amemberof ETA and. herefore. | cannot know the analyss that the organization is making towards the fuure. I any case, any analyst could see that the miltary actons of ETA are impregnated wih s politcal content. In fact, it takes responsiily for al of s actons. through documents impregnated with poliics Andthe poltical credibikty hat ETA has achieved in Euskal Herria cannotbe denied. fac that s accepted by fts most vinlent enemy. I facing the fture. ETA. in my opinion, should invest- gate how the poliico-miltary strtegy can be understood today by Basque socely. begin ning wit the polfical line establshed by the reportof the ’KAS Bloke Gidara’ [the coordina- torof the Basaue nationslberation movement] nany case. ETA, through s Democrati Ater- native, made very clear that f the condiions for a truce were given. it would give up armed struggle. And taken into consideration that ETA leaves 1o the Basque people the finaldecision ina democrati process, i can be said that ETA will do what Euskal Herria. with words and actions but necessarly in freedom, tels 110 do. Do you think ETA is the most important part of the Abertzale Left? Historically, the Abertzale Lef has been structured around ETA and aiso, the harsh- ness of the siruggle has created very deep affectonate relatons with the collectve sub- Ject that ETA supposedy represents. Bu the ‘Aberizale Lef is much more, much more than ETA. and | am sure that given the moment, ETA would know how to make its contributions through organizationstoaly poltical Being that independence and socialism are the axes of the Abertzale Left movement,the structures of the movement are the instruments. And of course, ETA iselfcannot be more than that ETA tries to kill its opponents and the ‘Spanish nationalists can ask for “the unity of all democrats against violence” with- out greater diffculties. Being that money the most important thing (in Spain and in the entire world) why, in your opinior](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 42.png)
![Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide! Arm The Spi n - Wincer 1999/2000 has ETA never attacked important eco- nomic targets in order to cause the state greater economic losses? In my opinion, ETA has worked for many years mainly agaist repression. Along with this, has ht directy and with great strength the juridicaland poliical sructures o the state. Besides that i would be dificut o achieve and maintain an infrastucture capable of creating materal losses. in my opiion, ETA has setasile the economy because i thinks it was more im- portant 1o hit other targets raiher than the economy. which is also mporiant may resut more abstract o people. Altnough ETA does ot touch economic targets, knowing how im- portant these are. is the resul of s own analy- s of the process, and perhaps it tinks these are targets fo another phase: an nterpretation of s poltico-mitary drection What can we learn from the Irish peace process, if Basques nationalists want to demand the right to self-determination, and wish to free Euskal Herria from the repressive forces? There are manythings thatcan be learned but.in summary. | wouid ke to meniion the fo- lowing: first. that armed struggle. aiong with otner forms of struggle. can change the jurd- calpoltical structures; second, tnt a truce is ot a condition to begin a process of negotia- tions; thid, that a poltical agreement on min- mum crierion is necessary between the poit- cal pares and al Abertzale forces [nationalst forces] to build strengt for dealing with the central powers: and finaly. to make ths bref that peace can be achieved even when ail 3p- pears gloomy, as ong as there i the wil o 6o for it What possibilities do you see for the Abertzale Left if it would make use of new forms of struggle? In the fight for independence and socialism, which new forms of struggle you would like to ses are employed? Wahout any doubt, wha | would like the most i to develop a siuggle without blood- shed. You should take into account that the poitica, cutural socal economicntiates and activites of the Abertzale Leftare by far rcner thana mere projection of ETA’s poltico-miary actwites. In caly . the Aberzale Left em- ploys a ot of non-vilent means of sruggle - the streets. through the instiutons, in enter- prises and factones... And one also must take 0to account that we have a great experience n organiing ourselves unti we become a drv- ing force within the social dynamics. The Abertzale Lot has a great uture. il now we practically have not worked on our poliical project. because what we are proposing and cultvating i the struggle for the fundamental ights of Euskal Herria. Ourtur wil come when we have achieved the Democratic Atematie. [Mantrod Ostrowski, a German inguist and wrer, nterviewed Joseba Uranga in Tolosa (Gipuzkoa) this summer] Euskal Herria Journal - August 20, 1898 (Source: Euskal Herria Journal - hitp.// i freespeech org/eh]) Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) Communique Announcing Ceasefire By means ofthis communique. Euskad Ta Askatasuna wants 1o let the Basque people Know abaut our analysis on the situation and istorcal moment in our country and the deci- sion we have taken accordingly Afer twenty long years. once again, we have a good chance to take decisie sisp in our way towards independence. W frmiy be- lleve we now have the same opportuniy we ad twenty years ago. in the so-called period of “transiton’, in such a diffcul period. But now, our job must be o tum this poltical stage into the stage of sovereignty. The chance we lost at thattime must become true today. ETA enters into this new stage i a spirt of hope. Hopeful. above all, because we think the mistakes commitied i the past wil be 3 good lesson today; hopeful, because we be- Ileve the work, experiences and strength gath. ered for all these years are enough guarantee for this new polical stage o succeed. However. we should not be binded by this new chance and generated expecations. We shouid not cose our eyes to the alaming stuation in the Basaue Country. Whichever way one looks at . the siuation n our counlry s deeply worrying. The two States have al- ways used al ther nstruments - miltary. polt- cal. econamic and cutural - o destroy this n ton’s resources 10 be free in the fure. As & esult of that tenacious iniiative of Spain and e, our people have been seriously nured. Ttwill not be easy for us o st free. I s obvious thatthere is not the shghiest movement on the part of the two repressive states. They con- sider us ther enemies instead of neghbours and prefer to oppress this naton rather than to respect the voice of Basaue pecple i a peace- ol way. ‘Regardless of the attacks and prodlems, and led by the determination to fight and sur- Vv, the Basque Country is now on th thresh- 00d of the 21st century. We are not actually a free country, but we have an extraordinary opportunity 1o be free in the future. By now. everybody knows we are able 1o stck 10 our laims and fight for them,. Let’s now prove we are able to have our ighs. wishes and capac- ity o organize our home as we want Before we go further. we would like o put forward two important questions and o ‘answer them. On the one hand. how can the Basaue Countrybe on the threshaid ofthe 21t century with the chance to become a free Country?. And on the other, why is not the. Basque Country stlfree aimost in the year 20007 “The first question has an easy an- ‘swer. Easy and even hon- ourable. We are atthe be- ginning of 3 new ea of freedom thanks to old Basque peoples d mined struggle and chefly, thanks to the generous work of thousands of brave. men and women for the last twenty years. Their dedi- cation and commitment remain ave inthe hearts and minds of the mer- bers of the Euskad: Ta Askatasuna organaa- ton. We would ot be entering into this new siuation wihout the work of those comades and cizens who died as a result of the en- ‘emies’ miltary attacks; wihout the sufferng of those comrades and cizens who are totured and constanty humilaed in poice stations and quarters. both n Spain and France; wihout the endeavours of hose comrades and citzens Who have aways rejected foreign Spanish and French laws in force and had carried out a sient, dangerous and commitied dally work in favour of our culture, language, fnancial nel- works and social customs; without he resist- ant strength of those humble comades and Ghizens who have been and sil are ighting the](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 43.png)


![Freedom For Al Poliical Prisoners Worldwide come that of sovereignty. to take on defintive commitments and specic steos. 3.0ur main goal s related tothe curent nsttu- tonal and state partion. We must start 10 ook for solutons to overcome It to that end. we must star taking steps now to create one sov- ereign instiutional structure including Araba. Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa. Lapurdi, Nafarroa and Zuberos 4 1f il the poitical and socia forces sharing this goal come together, i order o achieve the. nstitutional structure we wan, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna publicly commits tsef 1o welcome, protect and promate every initiative to over- come current inttutonal and statute partion Butat the same time. we ask the others o take the same commiment. endeavour and wort. even i they were uninerested or cowardly as regards this claim before 5. The forces supporting democratc rights and constructon of the Basque Country must pro- mote dynamics and agreements around funda- mental and basic cams. 6. The project supported by the Basaue Coun- ry and by Spai or France are compietel op- posite. A long-standing conflict has ciearly Shown us that there is o room for hallway solutions. The point is whether 10 go on Iving as Basaues or to be eiminated by Spain and France. Thus. we deem i essental o calon all those people who agree with the points sbove. We suggest they should get away from ties and agreements defended and promoted by the repressive Spain and France s high tme. that we all openly and completely undertake the fight for reedom. It s hgh tme that we ail destroy the links and agreements with poltical forces which aim o desiroy the Basaue Coun- try. Hence. i is high tme that we al abandon settiements promated by polticalpartes, sty tuions!structures and repression to favour the construction of Spain and France and the de- Struction of the Basaue Country. 7 Taking into account the siation of the Basaue Country. as wel as the present oppor tunity and longing for freedom. Euskad T Askatasuna announces an indefinte compiete cessation of miltary operatins. ETA’s actons will be imited o providing ourseives wih Sup- plies, to maintain our structures and to defend ourseives in hypotnetical confrontatons. This Complete ceasefire il star on September 18 1998 8T sim of the Basaues i o have the Basque Country’s realty. nghts and free ecisions re- spected. The aim and wish of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna is that Basque people face Up 1o ther responsibiles and achieve independence for the Basaue Counlry. We really hope the Basque people’s answer wil be as sgniicant 25 the step we have taken. Finaly. we want to let everybody know tht it wil be future events and atttudes that wil determine whether this ceasefie wil last forever or not Euskal Horria, September 1998 ETA’s Communique Announcing Its Decision To End Its Unilateral Ceasefire The following text is an unofticial transiation rom Basque of the ETA communique announc- ing its decision fo end ts 14-monih ceasofire and (o esume its armed siruogle. The onginal toxt in the Basque language was pubished in the Basque newspaper Gara on Novembar 26, 1999, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’s Communique To Euskal Herria Euskadi Ta Askatasuna wanis 10 tel the Basaue people s opinion and decision. Given the seriousness of tis decision we wil at- temp o explain as brefy and cleary as poss- bl the reasons which made possible to begin the polfical process, In September last year, the mechanisms used by Spain and France to piace obstaces 1o our freedom failed. and Euskal Herria was on the eve of a new siuation: “The Moncioa Statute (Baskongadak’s stat- ute of autonomy] and Nafarroa’s special aws aid not satity the desie of the Basaue people for freedom. at he same time, a desire for st tutional recognition was present in Lapurdi, Baxenafarroa and Zubero. “The stategy of crushing us falled: the pro- Independence Abertzale Left maintained its option fo 3 free Euskal Herria, in spte of the repression exercised against s poiticalforce the poitico-miary boards of Madrd. Ajura Enea [in Baskongadak). and Iruna [in Nafarroa] did ot offe altematives 1o the Democatic Aler- native of the Abertzale Left A desire for peace based on a polfical solution was present in Basque sociey. ‘And finaly, the various (Basque national- is] poltical forces (PNV. EA. ELA) who in 20 years were satisfied with th it bit agreed by Spain and France, and collaborated with them. started to show a desie for changing the siuation. “That s, we tink that the opton t replace the 0ld politico-urdical framework designed during the reform of the dictatorship and in existance forthe last 20 very long years, and the decision to take steps in favor of a new poltico-uridical ramework based on a demo- cratc opton for Euskal Heri, is pe. “This context made possive for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna to propose an agreement (0 the. PNV and EA n the summer of 1998, According to this agreement the signato- ies [PNV. EA. ETA} agreed to take steps that would bear fruit in suppor of a sovereign and unique institution comrising the entre Euskal Herta. I this sense, they agreed o seek some minimum point that woud support the righs ang interests of Euskal Heria and the basic needs and interests of the Basque people. (On the other hand, PNV and EA agreed to break of relatons with Spanish polical forces. against Euskal Herria. and Euskadi Ta ‘Askatasunak would announce an indefinte i temuption of s actions. This was 3 secret ac- ord that set a via period of four months. PNV and EA accepted and signed the ac- cord. Taking their signatures as the starting poit, ETA guided the intiative n eflect during s year. “The maximum qualties of the Iniiative are: new hope and energy emerged in Basaue - the Accord signed in Lizarra on the 121h of ‘September 1998] by poltical. socil, and labor union forces. identied the poltical 0ot of the conflct between Euskal Herria and Spain/ France, and proposes a methodology entiely democratic for s soluion - the creation of the fist natonal nsttution of moden times comprsing the entre Euskal Hema That s, to manfest the pofcal nature of the confict and to design s soluton, by act vating the various forces In Basque socety During the first months of the Intative. a basic change nthe poica iuation ook piace. But ater four month. things started to change. and the Iniative was facng an mpasse. In our opinion, the reasons for this change are as follows: - the poliical tempest afer the good results achieved by the aberizale left [Euskal Herrtarrok inthe October [municipal lectons. and the first meeting of Udabiltza [national Basque assamby) highighing the viabilty of the Intiatve, tuned on he red hght of the Span- ish and the French goverments who then ried 10 510p the process with 3 epressive reacton detentions, torture. and the murder of [ETA] fighter Tiotto the sirategy of the PNV and EA hghighied the partes: inerests in the June [regional] elec- tions. ‘Spai’s pressure on the PNV and EA at- tempted to change the nature o the Intative](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 46.png)
![ion - Winter 1999/2000 Tney tried to turm a process of nation- buiding 1o 3 peace process without content, ana to crown the averizal left in the polical ‘nomalty.” Wit the obstinate and evi ntention of wming he “provisional iterruption of ETA’S actons o “permanent” and “Ireversile.” During last summer it was noted that the process was blocked and poisoned ETA nad. and st has. the firm intention of taking this process (o the end when i started out the Intitive last year. Therefore. we pro- ceeded to indentlt the dificlites and pro- lems of the Intiatve: - on the one hand. the secrt nature of the [PNV. EA, ETA] accord generated confusion wih s content and the functon of the Lizarra- Garazi Accord. and at the same time it had @ negative ientfication. - and as we stated areacy, the attempi to is- or the content of what was signed by the PNV and EA. and 1o presen the process of nation-building 1o the Basque pecple as 3 “peace process for the disactivation of the mechanisms of the struggle. used in the de- fence of the aberizale lef In ETA’s opinon. tis atiempt was mani- fested i the lack of wil by those paricipating inthe process tobring the crical mass in Euskal Herra o a democratic stuation and to actvate al the forces. ‘We made an analysis of the process and saw that the accord sgned in the summer of 1888 has not been implemented (i respect to the concrete steps to be taken, and t breaking of elations with the Spanish polticalforces) and deliberated over the interruption of actons thatwe propased in Septermber 1998: and [ETA] ok hs to the PNV and EA in the summer of 1895, aready four montns ago. t was made clear that the process was facing an mpasse, but no effectve poitcal pro- posalwas made. PNV and EA gave importance tothe curent framework.stckingto the Moncioa stalute, and not o the intiates for a new po- Micorudicil framewor. ‘Seeing that there was 1o poltcal proposal or concrete sirategy at time in which the fu ure of Euskal Herria was on the table. ETA highighted the need fr poltcal proposals. and came up with one. Brief.this is ETA’s poltical proposal:that the people of Araba, Bizkaia, GipuzKoa, Lapurd, Nafarroa and Zuberoa choose fealy and demo- cratically a sovereign consttutonal pariament. n one unique circumscription encompassing all Euskal Herria. That s, that the vote cast by each Basaue ciizen ought to count the same Value inall of Euskal Heria i this context. and considering the strength and stabiy of the various instiutions that would emerge from this constitutional processs. ETA would make the decision o end s armed siruggle. used in the defense of the rights of Eusial Horra ‘Many of the poiical, social. and labor un- fon forces in Eusial Herria know this proposal. Moreover, the polce have hadthe texts of ETA’S debates. which were given (0 the media and the leadership of the polticalpartes. Thus, ETA proposed to the PNV and EA to reach & new accord based inths democratc proposal. PNV and EA have not yet given a concrete re- sponse. Euskal Herria has made some progress walking the road o froedom As aways, the Key to thatprogress has been the struggle. the aulet work. and facing up oppression with al the means we have. However, during this last year. the aberizales [Basaue nationaists] are again tak- ing and working together and we must con- tinue to o t but, in the meantime. Spain and France continue wit their 0CEupation. atacks. and repressive dominance; and th forces in Euskal Herra are not suffcenty actvaled o face that atack and to continue walking the foad to nation-bulding. Therefore, the process that started last year is blocked and poisoned, and in that con- ext, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna has made the de- Gison to reactvate its amed struggle given its ompromise on the defence of Euskal Herria ‘More concrete intiatves are needed. as well a5 more sirengih, o end the process i ated last year, and we call on the Basque peo- ple to continue therr work of naton-buiding facing up the enemy and re-enforcng the ba- sic pilars of our nation The ceasefire that was in effect since ‘September 18, 1998, i over ‘Beginning on December 3, 1999, it wil be up to Euskad: T Askatasuna to inform s 0p- erational commandos when o star to cary out actions Long Live the Basque Country! Long Live a Socialist Basque Country! Euskal Herria, November 1999 EuskadiTa Askatasuna (ETA) (Source: Transiation by Olatz Arkauz for Euskal Herria Journal <htp:// . froespeech orgiehi>) Interview With Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) “At The End Of This Process, The Basque People Will Have Our Own Constitution” Comments On The Current Polltical Mo- ment (May 16, 1999) In this intarview between ETA and two Basque ewspapers’ edtors. the Basque organisation ‘oxplain s roasons for the coase-fre, the cur- ront poliical moment and future expectations. The Spanish Government has often said that ETA announced a cease-fire because of social pressures and its own weak- ness, 5o this Initiative has even been re- garded as a “trick-ceasefire”. What are the reasons for the open-ended ceass re? ETA’s cease-fre stemmed fom a poltical evaluation of the stuaton. At that time. conds- tions in the Basque Coulry seemed able o bring about a new poltical scenario. On the one hand, the Basque natonatst left had long climed that the judiciakpoltcal ramework in force was a faiure and then, other partes and Socal sectons agreed on that view. The Stat- ute was. o longer a means to meet our peo- ples Gemands or to stop our onging or fres- dom On the other han, thariks to the Basaue nationalist lef’s work, Basaue people had ac- epted the idea tha the confict shouid e re- solved democratcally. by providing Basque people wih the floor. The confict wasn’ to be resalved by securty solutions b by solutions. based on demacratc grounds. The forces thal had supported the Statutes of Autonomy be- fore then changed their mind: he Ireland Forum ~created by the former imprisoned HB National Executive - was then working out and devel- oping a new social plfical communication net- work. Al these aspects made ETA’s ntiatve possivle. “The PP [Partido Popuar, Spain’s ight-wing uing party ec.] Governmen. on the contrary. was bind to ths fact and il sought a poltical ang milary vitory over the Basaue independ- ence fighiers. Spanish authorites expelied ETA’s officialspokepersons fom Spain, mpris- oned the National Execulve, caried out an op- eration against Basque milants who were said to belong to an unlawul financial network, closed down Egin [Basque nationalst daily newspaper - ed ). elc. Just from the electoral point of view. this Govemment was sure that the “Basaue problem could be resolved that way. The announcement ofthe ceasefre took ‘Spanish Govermment by surprie and now. reaction to the cease-re is becoming a th rap for themselves. In the year 1952, ETA was for direct nego- tation with the Spanish state, with ETA being direct party to the process. Is there a change of strategy? I the last few years, our sirategy has been clarifed ratherthan changed. The Basque nationalist lefs strategy was to subordinate taks between ETA and he Sparish State. While waiting for negotiaton. we left asde the job of buiding our naton, and we had a posiion of resistance. I ths posibon that has changed rom being on the defensive, we took o the work of construcion. We’ve made no change n our way of thinking or methods. and we’e il actve i looking or new sections out of the Basque nationalst lef to work with us. ETA has aiways intended to resolve the confict through negoliaton. because daiogue between rivas is the mosi simple way (o](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 47.png)
![n - Winter 1999/2000 overcome a confict. However. after 1983, the Basaue nationslst lef reached a dangerous impasse. waiting for 3 solution which was thought fo be close but was coming behind tme. Meanwhie. we were not seting the nec- essary grounds 1o buid a county (regarding soci-economics, Basque language, educatin, land structuring, etc) Once we realised what we were doing, the Basaue nationalst lef staried 10 look for new forces and to work for national construc- ton. . now, he Spanish State came o be fora negotated solution, we would be ready for 1, butnot waitngfo it The Basque nationalistef does not wait any more but akes the intatve now. activatng s social and mitant network atal levels Since the cease-fire was announced, ETA no longer addresses the Spanish Gov- ernment but the Basque people. Why? Because ETA iniiative is thought 10 be forthe Basque people. I our opinion,the situ- ation s promising and the people are now strong enougn o achieve sovereignty Before the cease-fire, ETA evaluated and roflected on the situation. Do you think there was consensus among the mem- bers of the Basque nationalist left then? We think there was more than consen- sus. We see that the Basque nationalt left is actie, ready to fight mature enough to under- stand the current situaton and determined to underake the necessary work. The Basque nationalstlef’s detemination and consensus have always been the best guarantee o trig- ger this process. and to folow i thiough fo the end, because this group s a politcal force shaped by twenty years’ work and enriched by far-reaching experience. Who’s the one who’s taken more steps in this process? From the outset, i’s clearly been the Basque nationalst et aways moving forward. There’s some controversy on who has moved and who hasrit. What people percerve is that we all have done something. and we agree on that. However. what is important is the direc- ton of that moverent. For years,the PNV [main- stream nationalst Basave party - ed.] has moved i the wiong directon, towards a bing alley, in the wrong way to safeguard the con- struction of the Basque Country. Because as they defended the Statute of Autonomy, the point was not how i should have been imple- mented. but whether that Basaue Country could be free inthat way. The Basaue nationat lef thought the Statute was taking us down a bind alley. Twenty years lter. the Statue hasntbeen implemented and furthemare, our land dvi sion’s now deeger. The PNV maintains that the asque nationalst lef has come down 1o the “democratc valley” We thnk that al he people must come to this democratc valley. Even the PNV now immersed in the dirty sewers of the Spanish State, working for Spain. We all must . in this democratic valley: the PNV, the Basaue nationaist ket and the restof Basque people and forces, because s there tna ger- eral consensus must be reached Although ETA announced a ceasefirs, the ‘Spanish and French govemments still act There are two dfferent points of view. On the one hand. as an organisation. i spite of these governments’ blows. we find that the process is welk-conducted. But on the ofner hand, the organsation is made up of peopie. and there are very teridle situations, very dis- appointing and enraging actions. which are in fact aimed at bowing the process up. We must also say this: Madrd maintains ts war stra- gy, using diferent means, which are some- tmes apparently egal or even out of their own laws, ‘Take the example of our comrade, Tiotto “The Spanish miltay forces have never gven up war. and thus, we can’t say this murder 100k us by surprise. Killng Basaue miltants is ‘commonplace for them. We must bear in mind thatthe Civi Guards are st doing thei ob in the Basaue Cauniry. Therefore. we must re- spond o these actions. and aso, prevent them, 0 we must get the Spanish miltary forces out of the Basaue Country as soon as possivle. “Tott’s iing had a forceful resporse and, ‘when looking ahead. something should be done. 10 avoid these kind of actions happening inthe. future. If Geresta’s kiling was just regarded as. “another actvst kiling himselr. the Spanish State could do whatever they Hked in the fu- e And again, we want to pay our tribute to Joselu Geresta, as he commitied himse, as miltant and person, to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna and to the Basque Coutry. And aithough we. grieve for him, we proudly accet all he gave. After the last raids in Paris and San Se- bastian, police breaking into HB offices, Geresta killed, etc. What does ETA think about the political answer given by the Lizarra-Garazi groups with the demon- stration on April 10th and the hour stop- page on April 12th? These mifary atacks by the govemments. n Pars and Madrd are not considered attacks. against the ETA but against the process, that s, against the Basque Country. We’re not to measure whether this response was enough of should have been bigger. Basque people have clearly understood the underlying prob- em, and we must be happy about that Ifthese. attacks had been regarded as & proviem of ETA. it was ETA who should have responded; but it was considered an attack against the process and the Basque Country. 50 i s the Basque people as a whole who responded. PP and PSOE insist on the fact that ETA’ cease-fire is a tactical decision, some “military holiday” taken by the organisa- tion. If the process in course failed. would ETA braak the coase-fire and take to ams again? twould be good for al f twas the PP anc PSOE who took miary hoiday’. even f was a tactical decision. The process would then be enhanced. ETA encouraged the proc- ess because the siuation was thought to be ‘objectvely good enough o achieve democratic gosls. If ths process was hindered n such 3 way that there was o chance to go anead. 1 ‘wouldn’t only be ETA’sjob o analyze the situa- ton, but al the forces i the process should evaluate i and reach conclusions_ I he proc- ‘ess was 50 seriously attacked tha f was clear there was no way ahead and that we were ai another poltical tage. ETA would make 3 dec: sion then. And I’s ikely that other social and poltical agencies would make their own dec: sions too. The HB National Executive s in prison for spreading the Democratic Alternative. ‘What does ETA think about the trial at the. Supreme Court? The members of the National Execuve. are ot n jai for spreading 3 recarding of the. Democratic Atlenative. They’re i prison be- cause they warked for the Basque Country and speciically.for this process 1o take place. This is something the Spanish know very well. ‘They found that the work of the National Ex- ‘ecuiive was dangerous and decided togetthem out of their way. This is the result.these HB members worked as Basaue ciizens on behalf of freedom, just ke other Basaue ciizens work 1 other levels, and that’s the reason why they’re in prison now. We do not make any diferentation amongst the prisoners. Anyway. the work carned out by the im- prisoned National Executve is related 1o the curent stuaton. The National Executve and all the members in HB worked to bring about this process. After them, other miltants - top and bottom HB members - ook on this responsivi- ity when many steps had been areacy taken. and they promoted the process and got sub- stantial schievements. HB members then and now are doing good work. We wan to under- ine that previous work set the grounds. and present work is making the process move for- ward, The Spanish government has taken no steps after the announcement of cease- fire, and repeats that ETA has appointed o official spokeperson. What does ETA expect from the Spanish government? What should be first done to overcome ETA has aways had representatives. we’ve got them now and we wil have them in the future. ETA hasn been waitng for a state- ment fom the Spanish government to appoint their representaties and offcial spokepersons. On the other han, the President of the Span- 8h Government has publcy stated he is ready totalk with ETA. Regarcless of s aims, this](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 48.png)





![Freedom For Al Policical Prisoners Worldwide! Special Edition Vow We Must Find Ways To Be Released...” Interview With Political Prisoner Helmut Pohl On The Politics Of The Red Army Fraction (RAF) ATS Note: This interview was conducied i 1996, amost 2 years before the RAF announced its selfdissolution. We are including it here because it provides valuable insight nto the broak between the RAF prisoners and the RAF tsell. Pohi aiso engages n a wide-ranging discussion about the ailngs of the RAF throughout the diferent phases of s history, partcularly from the mic-80s onwards. There was a split between the RAF and many of the prisoners, and now the po- litcal prisoners no longer present them- selves as a united group. So, for whom are you speaking in this interview? Fist of il speaking for myselt, but | also know what some of the ther prisoners are thinking. We have all been solated from one anothersince the 1989 hungerstrike. There was possibiy to have an exchange about the ew situaton. Letters are not an approprate medium for sich a discussion. Why not? Our mail has been utiized by the authorl- i for well over ten years. The BKA [Federal Grime Offe] pours over every sentence. try- g to analyze the style - that makes discus- sions impossible. 11 ust not possible to com. municate exciusively by means of such a tedi- ous medium fike lettrs. It just not an option afer years o isolation and the eventual de- cine of contacts to the outside. But the collec- tve does st exst. We are stugging together for our freedom. How do you explain the fact that since the 1982 cessation by the RAF, which ended armed atiacks against persons, the pris- oners group has dissolved and the RAF itself has disappeared from the political scene? The cessation. a least a5 we envisioned it never came about. Our vision of the cessa- tion was meant tostand for a transformation of that which RAF once was into a polical force Which could influence new poltcal stuatins And that dian’ happen. Al that happened in 1852 was that actions were hated, and every- thing else ust evaporated. The reasons for this i in the fact that a politcal discussion about How things should continue on n the future never even got ot the groun. But there have been a series of texts, full of critcisms and selfcriticisms of the RAF and the prisoners... But hese papers fom the RAF, and the “self-citcism’, weren’t real criiques. It was just a rehash of the 1980s. putting 1t through the wash one more time. The so-called ‘new. poltic” of the RAF was ust an attempt to make 2 variant of “fevolutionary poliics” on 10p of the old foundation, a reproduction of the same, but this tme done the right way. S0 to speak. But there was never a complete break fom the old concept. I ine with ti, | hnkits important for those who are stil underground to an- nounce the dissolution of the RAF. Other pris- oners expressly tod me to say that i this inter- view. The RAF must be dissoived. then we can see what develops. How should the discussion have gone, in Your opinion? I order t expiain that, we need t look at the history of the cessation discussion. i 1887, the prisoners made mention of a cessation for the first tme. In other words, after the attacks on MTU manager Ernst Zimmermann, Siemens manager Kurt Beckurts, and the diplomat Gerold von Braunmuehi. Was there a con- nection between these attacks and talk of a cossation? Thoughts of a cessation had more 1o do with intemational developrents. By 1987, twas. lear o us that things were going to change. That meant, in our opinion.that the entre con- ept of the RAF up to that point needed to be put in question. But no discussion followed from this analysi. things just got stuck. That citiism s aiso apples to us, he prsoners: At that time. when it was.clear 1o us that we weren’t going 1o get any further, we should have stated clearl that things can’t go on in the same way. But at that time we thought we Couldn’ push that through. We Justdidnt have. ‘snough fundamental thoughts on this. W, far away i prisons, isolated from one another. weren’ in a positon to say what f all means. and how things should continue. But we should have said sometning nonetheless. But sl we. were some of the few people who had our fingers on the puise. 50 1o speak. In the 1989 hungerstike. we tred once again to introduce a fundamental recrintation We were pushing for the RAF 1o stops i ac- tions, then for a political discussion to start, then freedom for the poltical prisoners. That was an demand issued intenally? Yes. those were our ntemal discussions concerming the armed actions. How, in your opinion, did international de- velopments lead to armed struggle no longer being relevant? “The polics of the RAF are aways imime. distey associated wih armed struggle But i was. never supposed to be that way. and the facttha t became that way was a mitake. So the thoughis of a cessation had nothig 1o do with armed struggle per se. All across the worc 2 tendency towards marginaization couit be seen. One example from our discussions at thattime. In Central America, a war of destruc- tion was. being waged. but over here t was hardly taken notie of, on the contrary. quie 3 diferent image was being portayed. Here t was assumed that supposedly democratic steps were taking hold there, when in reaify entire areas were being destioyed. At the same time, the ruling powers were able to push through nearly al over theiprojects in Central Europe. Whether twas gene technoogy. aomic energy, Fortress Europe. or remiitarization there were qualtaiive changes taking place. | should mention that al of this became Cear to s then. but some non-Europeans sai 1o us thatthey had been discussing that back in 1980, that says something. Thats why it was of great importance to us that people come together from across the lefist specirum and discuss things. 5o as o understand the catastrophic direction things were heading in. It wasn just our way of mak- ng polics which had become outdated. ofher lefist groups. even bourgeais ones. had failed 1o find methods of dealing with the new stua- tons, That means, the decision to halt the at- tacks which had become characteristic of the RAF was of a fundamental nature. But how does that fit with your statement trom 1993, In which you said: “The things 1 have boen saying for the past fow years 1 1o longer say now. And the possibilities which the cessation gave rise to are gone. So ’l be damned if I’d ever ‘re- Rounce’ the armed struggle.” That seems more like the hardliner image which the authorities have tried o pin on you. twas certainy a mistake to formulate my anger in such a way in the conciuding para- graph of that statement. But f you read the. entire text, which was published i ‘die taz’ you can easiy see the message | was tryig to convey: | will ot be biackmaied by state propa- ganda. Al that tme. the state was demanding that we renounce violence and the politcs of the RAF from the very beginning - | am not wilng 1 do that The cessation was not meant n that way either, rather it was necessary so as to continue poliical work. When we first staring discussing the cessation, people who visted us and the RAF had no idea what it was all about. For exampl, people kept saying that We had 10 keep open the opton of an attack Personaly. | don’tfnd that o be convincing: *](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 54.png)
![Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide! Something s done right n the meantme. tnen i Goesnt mater -t option to atack s nolonger there". But even if people saw things difer- ently. anyway a new fom of attack reeded to be found. And 30 same thinking was done at his time - for exampe. nstead of shooting peo- Pl hgh-level acts of sabotage could be car- ied out.But that never nappened either. As for the hardiner stigma: That’s got nthing to 6o wih what we prisoners say or do. Unti 1981/ 52, al the prisoners were seen as “nardiners ~ despite our atempls to brng about some sort of social discussion. That brings to mind the Volmer/KasemannWaiser Infiatve of 1988 an attempt by the Greens to win amnesty for the prisoners]. W responded to tha, not s a tac- tical manoeuvre, because i was in e with our thoughts of a cessation. But the stae pre- vented this initiative. We were seen as “hardiiners” despite our efforts in the hungerstie of 1989, when we had talks win state authoriies and other persons - and de- spie the fact that everyone knew we wanted Something new. Al the ime, supposed attacks plans atiributed to us were discovered and Spread n he media. And this continued against the prisoners who were stil inside after the cessation. despite our public statement via Imgard Moeler that we weicomed the hatting ofattacks. Facts play no role when t comes to the state’s smear campagns 1fyou ook atthings today, you come o the following conclusion: Despite the transform tion of the RAF and the necessary poltical i cision with regards to the prisoners, @ it de- Veloped. atiiouted o 3 few of the prisoners and backed by “hardiiner” propagands. and ths has made i possibe fo the state to attempt to achieve wih those of us who remain wha t has sought o do for the past 20 years, namely bring an end o the prisoner problem What would be the state’s interest in this? s important for the state to continue to Gevelop s picture of a politcal enemy. and the state unde no circumstances wants 1 alow 3 poltical process to develop. 35 we propose. The istory of the RAF s 1o end with an ac- counting, with the burden fling on some indi- viduals, and not with a polical process. And that’s not just the case wih the RAF, rather s wha the authorites have in mind for society in general But the fact that the state can do this also parly the fault of the RAF, a group which was never very open to controver- al discussions, and which was a group which many people couldn’t imagine ex cept in the context of Killing people. Of course, i also comes back t the RAF. ftsefIn the 1080s, controversial discussions werent exactly a speciaiy of the RAF. It was the same way in other leftst groups. The causes for that, in my opinion. go way back to fundamental mistakes by us. but also n cther leftst groups as well, namely the fact that po- Iiical structures were hardly developed at sl Insteac. ideology and actionism prevalled. But the RAF concept aways siressed the prmacy of poltcs. the armed actons were supposed 1o aavance poltics. not replace 1. Lefist groups often criicized the fact that the RAF acted primarily on a military, rather than a politcal, basis. Yes. but only when i ft with thei poltical concept. That’s why these discussions aiways fala. | nink the fundamental mistakes made by everyone, ffom groups on the radicalieft in general o the RAF itself, was that we werent based enaugh n reaity and were 0o obsessed with deology. There were meeings, papers, concept discussions, events, campaigns - but these weren’ reaity. And the colapse of the radicallef at the end of the ‘805 and the begin- ning of the ‘805 was the hour of trth for this siruciue of polcs which had come out of the ’60s - f sometning had been won fom the strug- gle. which was what i was all about al along, then sometning should have been taken out of that. But that didn’ happen. Instead, seliis- Solution o running in place. And that bings us o the point tha its not any diflerent for the RAF. the German radicaklef, o the et n gen- eral, namely that we were never able 1o es- ‘cape from the cortradiction of ving nthe most developed socialsystem and not being able to ‘avoid the contracictions which arse from that fact. O the one had. you wan to escape from that systemto something different. on the other hand its the best of al places that are visie “This contradicton i our spectrum e o a theory and praxis of ideological thinking, character- ized in cycical actity and actonism. | cal that “replacement polics” Poltics means realproc- ‘esses. Not ideology. The whie European lef, and the German lef in particular, was more clover than ayone.No one read more o talked more than the eft here did. But that’s na pol- tics. That’s a signof a sationary process which remains adapted to social norms. An example of what | mean by “stationary”. Women have often noted that the never-ending so-called “sexism debate”, the men’s discussion o i has only ever resulted in the problem being endlessiy debated, seen as paltically tacked, and everything stays the way t was. And the ‘women are righ about this. I’s a sor of prob- lem-defeating mechanism The same s true for the anti-racism discussion During the ant-IMF actions in 192 in Munich]. the events served 5 2 repiacement for poitics And the RAF, in your opinion, is part of this stationary process? The RAF became a part of . The actons. which we carred out in the second af of the 1880s were fundamentally wrong according to most of the prisoners stl insde today. For us. armed actions ahways had a srategi func- tion. They were to make something clear. to ‘aovance something. The actons o the ate 805 were just a series of shootings. And when Jou get right down to . to thew poltical core. they were nothing but revenge attacks. And the RAF knew we would citcize these ac- tons. Ty knew.from e especaly. trat | as against things continuing to develop as they had, with more people gong nto legalty. When a concept no longer has any perspectie. you can’ attract new people. even on the basis of maintaining the abilty o attack. Peogle going underground envision continuing the siruggle Wwhich they had previously cared out in con- crete base projects. only now on a diferent level, but in realy they are enterng a vacuum 1 don’t want to create a faise impression here orto separate us from that We were al part of this process and developed . Im speaking now about the changes in the relationships i the unwinding the prisoners issue over the past few years. We kept it going because we wanted a continuty. from the infial outcry 1o the silence. We al agreed about the unavoid- able effect a total collspse would have. so we wanted to maintain some source of sirength, That kept us from the drawing the decisive conclusion. But arent you stating a contradiction: on the one hand a continulty, on the other hand being opposed o new people join- ing the illegal structures? twasn’t about a continufy of the RAF as. ithad existed before, rather a continuty of po- Itical content, The amed struggle was not the poitical content of the RAF. The poltcal con- fent of the RAF, to be bref, was fberation. You criticize the attacks and assassina- tions by the RAF in the latter half of the 1980s. What was better about the earler actions? What’s the difference, for exam- ple, between the failed attempt to Kill General Krasen and the shooting of the diplomat von Braunmahi? You are speaking there about an acton Where the diferent understandings meet one ancther. We were criicalof actons n the 305 such as the one against von Braunmuhl be- ‘cause the means andthe poitical goal were far removed from one anather. And that is true ‘even for those of us who experienced 77, the so-called "hardiiners". The action against Krssenor the U.S. amy instalaton at Ramstein were part of the conficts surrounding NATO milanzation. Both were sirategic actions, at- acks which, we thought, would help force the: globalcolapse of itarization nthe metropoes. Preventing milltaization was also a goal of the peace movement, which by and](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 55.png)
![attacks. Didn’t rge denounced the RAF’s that make you wonder? Wel. there were a ot o things about the peace movement that made us wonder. For ‘example. the peace movement akso had some very nationalstic slements. They were prima- iy opposed o a war being fought here, and this wing of the peace movement dd not cor- cem tself wih imperalisms interests o war But I you criticize the peace movement for having nationalistic tendencies, then you must also recognize that in older RAF texts as well. Thers, Germany s de- scribed as being a U.S. puppet and an oc- cupled country. Those ar tones from the ‘70s, based in an incorrect. shortened analysis: The fact that US. captal was dominant n the work, and the fact that U S. corporatons dominated German corporations, Ied 1o the conclusion that Ger- many was a USS. colony. That was faise. But in our poltcs, this thinking only piayed a minor ole. But the attacks of that time were mainly directed at U.S. miltary installations and USS. military personnel. Yes. but aways inconjunction with NATO ‘and miltarzation. Those weren’ actions sgainst ‘America as some occupying pawer. But | wil Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide! ‘admithatin the lef and in ourstrctures. here Wwere some weak areas. some art-American lendencies which went so far as 1o reject American cultre. But we. | was underground at the time, aways criiczed this ant-Amer- Canism cisguised as antrmperiaism is our dis- cussions and during our contacts. But we. weren’t ahways successful But | think there exsts a faise impression of our stuation and our sympainizers rom that tme. Al the begin- ning of the ‘80s. we it want 10 strengthen ihe RAF, ratner we sent people who came o s back into the local struggles. We wanted Structures and polfical processes, but all we. heard was the demand that we cary out ac- tions. We couldt change that pressure at that time. Its wrong to magine that things aiways. o the way one plans i 2 concept The same. thing faled later on during the cessation de- vate. For a long time, the demand was made to regroup the prisoners in one or two groups so that a discussion could take place among them. How do you think things should proceed today? At the present time, we need 1o gt the geman put back on the table that we need to be released. Now, as before, that i a poltcal question, not legal one. We’r notaking about some abstract prncigle here. We aren’ even that affected by the Justce Department i gen- eral, rather the BAW [Federal Prosecutors Of- fice] and the state security courts, and our On May 4. 199, at 4pm, Sieglinde Hofmann walked out the gates of Cologne Prison (JVA-Koin) ater 19 years of imprson- ment. Due to her aleged particpation in the kianapping of Jurgen Ponto, the murder of HannsMartin Schieyer, and three counts of attempted murder for the attack on Alexan- der Haig. an international warrant for Sieginde Hofmann’s arrest was issued in the late 1970 She was arrested in France in May 1980 and deported to Gemany on the conditon that prosecutors notsesk.a e term against her. Back in Germany, she was sen- tenced to 15 years in prison on fimsy evi- dence. and because 2 winess for the state responded to the question. “Do you want to Speak out in favor of Ms. Hofmann?”, with silence. In the words of Heinz-Jurgen Sch- neider, Sieglinde Hofmann’s lawyers since 1891 “Since the court ook no answer for an answer. they judged her guity in the Ponto Kidnapping case.” But the end of Sieglinde Hofmann’s prison term in the fall of 1995 dd not mean that she was free. Some former Red Ammy Fraction (RAF) members who had dropped outand resettid in East Germany tumed into winesses for the state. For my clent’ Sch- neider says, it meant that aformer RAF mem- I_w impicated her in the murder of Hanns- rin Schieyer.” That meant a fe sentence Sieglinde Hofmann Free After 19 Years Lawyers Seeks Freedom For All Remaining RAF Prisoners being handed down in the fal of 1985, ‘But even prisoners who are servig e tems must be given a chance at freedom”, says Schneider. At a hearing. statements from prison officals have to be given, and the prisoners have to detal their proposals for thei Ives after they are released * One such hearing atthe State Supreme Court i Stutt- gart i late 1997 came to the conciusion that Sieginde Hofmann must senve at least 19 years. In March, her defintive release date was set at May 4, 1989. “Despite my joy at the release of my client, we must not forge that there are stil Six other former RAF members in prison”, the lawyer continues. “Chiistian Klar. who has been in prison since 1982, is supposed 1o serve 26 years. For the ather fve. Rofl Heissler. Rolf-Clemens Wagner. Brigitte Mohnhaupt, Eva Haule, and Birgit Hogeleld there is no end in sight orther prison tems. “The rlease of Sieginde Hofmann s ess a poliical success and rather more an iso- lated case which shouldnt be generalzed upon, the lawyer points out. “To reach our goal of freedom for al potical prisoners, a polfical base has to be created. We need & social cimate of acceptance for this (Transiated by Arm The Spirt from junge Wl - May 5. 1999) Arm The Spirit Special Edition - Winter 1999/2000 cases are ail well known, Besides, mos of us e In very poor heaith. so the queston of us Spending 20 years plus 3 few more. depending on the individual. ’ not an option. W need ©> find ways now of being reieased. And to G this, there need to be a decsion which s more than words. & must be something visible. n our prsoners statute: What does someone do. who willbe released nthe foreseeaie fure? That person can bud up socal relations on the out- Side. Tne same must aiso be allowed o us. We must be able to star buiding the foundatons for how we want o Ive. There must be com- munication and projects o work on Right now. we have almost o contact to the outside. IS ke 10 stress that this interview today has been one of the few chances I’ve had to speak win someane from the outside for a long period of time. The biggest success of my time inside has been a 90 minute conversation. without the police walching over me. a few weeks ago Is this orientation towards communi tion with people on the outside a con- sensus among the prisoners? It depends. some think regroupment is more important 5o that we can make a public Statement together. | aiways thought it was more important o get out We alone are too fow to succeed. we need furthe reaching exchanges. We canjust Keep repeating the catch phrase “dicussion” for years on end. Of course we sesk discus- sions for our common interests, but commun- cation with the outside needs to mainly am at finding ways to win our freedom. “The worst thing that has happened to us and from it came the biter interal spis, was. the fact that long years of isolaton letus in 3 situation where we could not deal with this isolaton. The thngs which have happened over these long years needed 1o be discussed and looked at together wilh others. But we werent allowed o do this. Instead we came from isola- tion nto the vacuum of our sations a group of people in prison. a smal group who couldnt meet together inside and who were preverted from contacting the outside. Orce the first of us starting having health problems was when the isolation reatment realy began to Kick in “This isolation, which we have experienced wih our own bodies, needs o be struggled against at every tum. If someone has been inside for 2 ong time. aferwards something needs to hap- pen. you can’ ust take offthe I and then that person has to see where they re at. And when 1’say that as someone who has experienced 1 Tm no just trying to describe darkest mo- menis of our histoy, rather because tis sys- tematic solaton is now become charactersic of prisons in general. That which we were subjected t from day one is now being appied 1o other prisoners who are selecied to endure ® Endnote: Pohl was released from prison in 1996 (Transiated by Arm The Spirit from “Angehoerigen Info’ #162 - June 15, 1996)](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 56.png)





![There are nine former milkants from the struggle of the RAF st n prison. Athough the Siruggle for ieraton s far from over, s cor- fict has become part of isory. We support all efforts which seek o, get the prisoners from this confict out of prison upright At his me, we’d ke togreet and thank il of those who offered us saldarty on our path for the past 28 years. who supported us in various ways, and who struggled together with Us in the ways that they coukl. The RAF was Getermined to contriute to the struggle for - eraton. This revolutionary interventon i ths Country and in this history would never have takenplace i many people. not organized n the RAF themselves, hadnt given a part of them- Selves to ths struggle. A common path es be- hind all of us. We hope that we wil ail find ourselves together again on the urknown and winding paths of iberation Our houghts are with il those around the worid who ost their ves in th siruggle against Gomination and for beration. The goals which ey strved for are the goals of today and to- mortow - unt al relations have been over Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spi tumed in which a person is but a lowly object 2 downcast, abandoned. and contemptuous Being. 1 15 $ad that so many gave their ives. but their deaths were not i vain. They ive on n the struggles and the future ibecation. ‘We will never forget the comrades of the Popular Front fo the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) who lost thei Ives in the falof 1977 in an act of intemationalist soldarty. seeking 1o ierate the poltical pisoners. Today we would especialy ke to remember al hose who chose 1o.gie their a0 the armed struggle here. and Who st thei ves. Our memories and all our respect goes out 10 those whose names we do not know. because we never knew them, and to Petra Scheim Georg von Rauch Thomas Weissbecker Holger Meins Katharina Hammerschmidt Urich Wessel Siegired Hausner Werner Sauber Special Edition - Winter 1999/2000 Brgtte Kunimann Wiffed Bose Ukike Meinho! Jan-Carl Raspe Gudrun Enssiin Andreas Baader Ingrd Sehubert Wil-peter Stoll Michael Kol Elisabetn van Dyck Jukane Plambeck. Wollgang Beer Sigurd Debus Jonannes Timme Jurgen Peemoeller na Siepmann Gerd Aartus Wolfgang Grams. “The revolution says: T was lam il be 3 Red Army Fraction - March 1998 Interview ‘With Till Meyer, Former Member Of The ‘Second Of June Movement’, On The End Of The RAF In their communique, the Red Army Frac- tion acknowledge the “failure of the ur- ban guerrilla project”. Is this statement that armed struggle in general has failed. or is this only a concret reference to the. RAF? “The revolutionary intervention at the mil- tary level. in a highly-ndustrialized county e West Germany. can only be seen as a method ‘which was tested during a very particular his- toncal context. Historicay, using miltary means towards the foundations, goals, and proposals of the 68 movement - of which the RAF was e part - had o ail. Especialy once the global conditions or struggle had changed. When the. Gonflict between socialism and capitalsm ended n 1989 with the overwhelming victory of caph- taism, there was no basis for any longer. So 1t no surprise that the RAF has now drawn the consequences from that fact and cancelled the armed strugge. In Germany, n this form, in this tme, and wih thi strategy for revoR, t s fnished The dissolution communique had been expected for quite some time, and since 1993 there had not been any more actions. But when had the RAF become politcally finished with its armed struggle in Ge many? Only when East Germany ceased to exist? The RAF themselves, in thei text “The Concapt Of The Urban Guerrila’, once wrote: Whether amed struggle is possible can only be transmitted through praxis.” That means, afer a certan time, they shou have made clean siate. and based on their practical expe- riences asked themselves whether the uban querrla makes sense i this historcal period Whether €1 having an effect o achieving sorme- thing poltically. Ate all t wasn’t just about going around blowing things up and shodting people. ratner i was a pollicalmiltary inter- Vention. After ten years. at the most, there should have been some crfical poltical reflec- tions. Afe the disastrous action in Mogadishu n October 1977, the RAF should have ended their amed struggle The head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Peter Fritsch, has warned about premature celebrations of the end of the RAF, since they are stil an extremist movement which wishes to bulld "broad counter-power from be- low”. Its members want to “continue the political struggle for social liberation to- gether with others”. Is the new genera. tion of the RAF the PDS [Party of Demo- cratic Socialism], or do they still envision continuing the political struggle from il- logality, as Fritsch soems to indicate? When Mr_Fritsch claims, which i his right s haad of the ntligence agency. that people Wwho are actve poiticaly in a completey legal way are somehow more radical than every- thing else which we today call lefist, namely Joschka Fischer [of the Greens], who is sup- posedly the futhest on the lef wing - anyone eise is just 3 foolsh radical or a Staiist, he says - then of course he is mistaken. It s com- pltely legtimate and polticaly justfied, sven n his country. o place socil questions on the agends, and in a radical manner - of course in a clea, offensive, and legal potical confrnta- ion. It couid be ihat there are a few hundred thousand peopie to the lef of the PDS wha will Say thatthey wil perhaps organize themselves That s legitmate and legal. Mr.Frisch’s state- ment s trly out of ine. Will the RAF’s statement have a positive effect on the prisoners from this move- ment, or could it be that the prisoners, Who are now without the “froe the guer illas guerrila® of the past years, will sink into obscurity and be forgotten? We shouldt hope so. s a fact tha there are 9 people - some of whom have been in prison for over 20 years - stil n prison Now. thatthe RAF has offcaly deciared themseives disbanded, that marks an end 10 2 30-year is- tory which is unique 1o this country. SO the vicor - whomeve is in power i Bonn - needs 0 respond and draw this thing to a close by feting these people out of prison. t s Gefintely time for that, especially with the century draw- ing o close. Tns chapter i finished. With the RAF’s siruggle over, the ruing elte here can breathe more easily afer 30 years of watching their backs. They should at least be prepared 10 offer a gesture and draw this o 3 close by. releasing the prisoners ‘What’s acking, of course. is an operative guerila which can exert pressure for the pris- oners. Thi task needs to be taken up instead by a legal potcal movement. (interview by Rudiger Gobel. Transiated by Amn "The Spit from Junge werr - Apri 22. 1998)](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 62.png)

![tme in the 1980s there were re-polticization attempts which were made. hard discussions Whose nitators gave up on because they Aid ot trust themselves to 0o actions. ’And when the Cele prisoners sought sup- portduring ths exchange, here came the stae- Tent.“One acton, then the next one. Thats ow & goes Today, many people can sit around and complain about the hierarchical, authorarian. it structures of the RAF, but the issue of formcoats is by no means a aughing mater “The factremains tha. since the end o the 19805, armed siruggle - o mattr how i rans- forms or modifies fse - no longer makes any polfical sense. The conditons are all wrong. The points of eference sre lacking. The epi emic use of vioence at all levels makes this e of violence as 2 means i a poldical sirg- gle ineffective. ‘And now the fina point. “Following our defeat in 1993, we knew that we couldn’just keep going on a5 we had been Freedom For All Policical Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spirit Spe () We wanted to think things over one more Lime wih those who were i prison. and take 3 new step together. But in the end. the very Rurtul 5t of one group of the prsaners from s, who declred us o be enemes. completely erased the very conditions which had gven fise 0 he RAF In the it place - soicarty and the struggle for collectiuty.” Whats tnat supposed to mean? s important o keep some tnings stright Defeats, sure. there have been more than enough of those. But why in 19837 What was. Specialaboutthat tme? O yeah.the Steinmetz. Unit, that ahways seems to be quickly forgot- ten “The authors of the last RAF communiaue Gon’t seem to want to discuss thal with us. as far a5 we can tal. We were always confronted with their papers point blank. Our crcisms of this were seemingly just brushed off unt the next one-sided statement appeared We ceciared no one fo be our enemy, we never once spoke of a spit, rather we mater- 1 Edition - Winter 1999/2000 offacty separated ourselves from people WhG ad begun (0 advance ther partcular teresis agaimst us (and who now - such a tresome pont - spea of soidarty and collctty) The ‘uthors of the communique seem preoccupE with finding & way out of the vacuum which they got themselves into, and they came up Wih nothing better than to portray our Nistory a5 sometning which wasn’t. | think s legii- mate 1o refuse to allow that ‘And i there’s anyone who’s had to suffer a cefeat in all of this. then surely s us. the femaining prisoners. W stared the “opening Which everyone took ther turns at maripulat- ng. and now we are up to our necks in cor- crete thanks to the "Kinkel Itiatve” For 26 years. f necessary. Perhaps even a it longer RolfClemens Wagner ‘Schwaimstadt, Germany. the end of Apri 1998 (Transiated by Arm The Spirt from “Jungle Workd #20 - May 13. 1998) A Few Last Words On The End Of The Red Army Fraction (RAF) Somewnere.In March 1998, the Red ATmy Fracton (RAF) announced is dissoluton afler 26 years of armed siruggle. This step was an antrcimax. and one long expected. since notr- g had been heard offrom the RAF for months. Just ke the Left in general, the organization had lost ts socialrelevance over the past few years. and i could not be expected that the RAF would provide any impuises for a re-or- entation of the LeR But sighs and the shaking of heads are by no means called for For 26 years, the RAF was an atlempt to wage resistance o the murderous capialist system and conditons of explotation. It arose from the correct consciousness of bringing the antrimperialststruggle of the iberation move- ments around the workd back here, o the certer of power. It arose from the reaization that the. Social movements and the guertila movements. of the Trree Continents, which are confronted with U.S. and NATO interventions and the dity wars being waged by contra-guerrila forces raned by the BD [German nteligence agency] and the CIA, can only be successful i there s 0 peacelul cam i the metropoles, inthe belly ofthe beast. The formation of the RAF was the frstserious atiemt to ransform the ‘68 siogan “Creal One. Two, Many Vietnams” o a real ity. This was expressed i the early years mainly n the form of atacks on U.S. miltary institutons. I the eary 1970s, RAF actons, for ‘examplethe atack on the U.S. Headguarters n Heidelberg, where logistcs for af aids on the Vitcong were planned, enjoyed broad. i si- lent. support. At that tme. around 20% o the population were wiling o help shelter RAF mil- tants from state repression. So its no surprise that the repressive authorties in Germany did everything possible to create a socialcimate in which the RAF and the Lef in general could be isolated and defeated. This chance came dur- ing the confrontations i 1977. The surveilance State was prepared to make the most of s Searching metnods and isolaton torture. The polfical ertor of the RAF. to approve of the hiacking of a cuilian Lufivansa airiner by 3 Palestinian commando during the Schieyer Kid- napping. tipped the balance of pUBl OPIoN, aiready heated by media smear campaigns. aganst the guerrila once and for all. The po- rom-ke simosphere among the public against the RAF poliical prisoners gave the govern- ment’s Crisis Staf the signal # needed: The ‘alleged-suicdes’ of theprisoners n Stammheim were just a formay following the stoming of the aifiner by a GSGS police commando. “The RAF could never recover fiom s featin 77. The state had succeeded in creating a permanent gulf between the guerila and & maorty of the extra-parlamentary Left. and Soldarty fromthe general public was now com- pltely out o the question. The consciousness. that the actions of the guerila were only di- fected at the ruling structures, against those. fesponsile for explotation, war. and oppres- Sion, could no longer be proclaimed. “Anyone Who attacks people vacationing on Mallorca would eat their own chidren. * - wasn’t hard for the uling powers to make such notions. stck inthe minds of the peopie. Afer tis time. only a smal porion o the radical Let showed soldarty with RAF actions. Eventhe aempls by the RAF nthe 1980s, by means of the Front Concet, o ik up with radical socisl movements at he national level and wih Action Directe (France) and the Red Brigades (tay) st the West European level id ot make any new beginnings possible. These oniy exhibited the developments which the RAF- themselves criiczed in their issolution com- municue: The lack of 3 poltcaksocil organ- 2ation, which needed to have an equal impor- tance as the armed polfics of the RAF. The distance between the actons of the RAF, who were only becoming more isolated. and ihe repressive social realy of the class whose lieration the RAF propagaed became o0 great. Unlke the early 1970s. when social relationships played an important fole i texts fssued by the RAF (for example. with refer- nce fothe strke movements in 1671, and “Ur- ban Guerila And The Class Stuggle” of Apri 1872).th statements by the new RAF miitants hovered st the absiract.mitarist evel For peo- ple involved In concrete social confrontatons, like unemployed people,the Latin America s darty movement, or antifascists, there was Il common ground for discussion with the RAF. The attempts by the RAF in the 19905 (the execution of Treuhand chief Rohwedder, the destruction of the new prison in Weterstadt) to fenew a concrete relationship with the social Stuation in Germany and a dialogue wih the Lef came oo late. The lack of an organi: tional framework, poltcal-social organzation which would have made such a discussion possibie, was a major problem. This mistake was the faul of the entire radcal Lef. because. the RAF never had the chance t buik up such an organization while operating underground The dissalution of the RAF is a natural result of thei history. But 1 merely the end of the chapter on the RAF in the hstory of the revolutionary Left in Germany. not the end of amed siruggle for al tmes. As long as social conditions exit ‘in which a human being s rested a5 adiy,pitful, abandoned, and hated being’, solong as the heartof the beast contin- es 1o best, producing new capialst barbary wih each new day - he struggle for iberation wil ontinue. The means of ths struggle wilbe ecided on by the radical Leh, not dictated by their enemies. (Source: ‘Einsatz! #31 - July 1998 - Trans- ot il —k](arm-the-spirit-17-winter-19992000 64.png)
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) SN T (RS T O S Y G O §
YXtm The Spirit
Winter &
1999/2000 4
No. 17
Autonomist/Anti-imperialist Journal es: $5.00
Freedom For Mumia Abu-Jamal!
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide!
: The End Of The Red Army Fraction
Documents From Political Prisoners ,
In Europe And The Middle East
ETA Resumes Armed
Struggle In Euskadi
Freedom For All Pol
Spiric Special
ter 1999/2000
Page 2 Index and ATS Intemet Resources
Page 3: ATS InrocucionEoril
Page 4: On The Murder Of Horst-Ludwig
Meyer And The Arrest Of Andrea Klump In
Vienna andeter fom Andrea Kump
Pages 5-6: Aests And Raids Against The
“Revolutionary Cells (RZ)" and Repression
‘Against Anti-NATO Activists In italy
Pages 7.8 Acton Direce: ‘PolicalPrs-
oners And The Guesiion Of Vioence”
Pages 10-12: Collcive Biography Of The
Acion Dircte Prisoners
Pages 1317 Interview With The CCC.
Prsoners Colectve
Pages 18-20: A BrefHistory Of The Amned
‘Struggle Of GRAPO In Spain
Page 21: Fresdom For Francisco Brotons!
e 22: Interview With GRAPO Polical
Prisoner Eva Alonso Arce and March Bth
commuricue fomthe GRAPO women'spris-
onercoliective ‘Lina Odea
Page 23: European Poltcal Prisoner List
Page 24: Fomer INLAPOW Tony O'Hara
Looks Back On The H-Biock Struggles
[Pages 25-26: IRSP: Teach Na Naite Project
Page 27: ABref Inroducton ToThe Com-
munit Prisoners Collectve Wotta Sita”
Pages 28.28For The Leraton From Op-
pression And Captalst Explofaton! -2 -
ferromthe Wotta St coliecive
iges 30-31: Conference For The Free-
dom O Poltcal Priscners Around The Workd
Pages 32:34: Interview With Ahmad
Qatamesh
Page 36: Interview With George Habash,
GeneralSecretary Of The PFLP
Page 36: Interview With Lawyer Abmet
Yuksel, Tral Observer At The DHKP-C Pro-
csedings In Gemnany
Page 37: Statement From The DHKP-C Eu-
ropean Organdzation
Pages 38-40: Interview With DHKP-C
Prsoners
Pages 41-42: Interview With Former ETA
PolticalProner
Pages 43.45: ETA Ceasefre Communiaue
Page 8: ETACommunque Amouncng The
EndOfThe Coasefre
Pages 47-82: Interview With ETA - May
1990
Pages 63: Herri Batasuna Leaders Freed
Pages 54.56: Interview with RAF Poitical
Prisoner Holmut Po-June 1996
Pages 67-61: The Urben Guerila s Hi-
tory" - The Final RAF Communique
Page 62: Interview with Fomer June 2nd
Movement prisoner TilMeyer
Pages 63-64; We Are Not Poiticaldios"-
a leter from RAF prisoner Rolf Clemans
Wagner and A Final Few Words On The
RAF from Autonome Antifa (M)
Arm The Spirit Resources
On The Internet
‘E-mail: ats@etext.org & armthespirit@mailcity.com
. WWW: httpy/burn.ucsd.edu/~ats
ATS-L is a listserv which carres articies
and news items from A The Spirt and
other lefiradical organizations on sub-
jects such as poltical prisoners, antifas-
cism, the struggle against patriarchy and
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gles, armed anti-imperialist/ant-caplital-
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KURD-L is an English-language listserv
with news and artcles about the national
liberation struggle in Kurdistan. The list
carries translations from Kurdish and
Turkish news agencies, articies from soli-
darity organizations, press statements
from the National Liberation Front of
Kurdistan (ERNK), articles about the
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chives/kurd-1>
Berxwedan - Documents From The
Kurdish National Liberation Struggle:
‘This page is a collection of articles and
transiations of primary source documents
from the Kurdish national iberation move-
‘ment. Our aim in assembiing this page is
10 help create a better understanding of
the goals and poltcs of the PKK and other
Kurdish revolutionary groups, and to
thereby increase intemational solidarity.
<http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/
benwedan himi>
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA) Solidarity Page: This page con-
tains news, artcles, interviews, historical
‘documents and more about Peru's MRTA,
a revolutionary-left guerrilla movement
<htp://bun.ucsd.edul~ats/mrta. htm>
Freedom For Sabine, Axel And HaraldI:
Our solidarty page with the imprisoned
German comrades accused of being
members of the clandestine armed
groups, the Revolutionary Cells and Rote
Zoa.
<http:/bourn. ucsd.edul~atsirazzia htmi>
Publications Page: This is our on-ine ar
chive of various documents from
number of dfferent revolutionary struggles
and movements. At this time it is rather
sparse in content but we do have such
sections as: “Resistance Means Attack!” -
Armed Struggle In Westem Europe and
the important theoretical piece “Three Into
One " written by Kiaus Viehmann and
ranslated into engiish by us. In the com-
ing months we hope 10 include & number
of out-of-prnt books such as ‘Re-evalua-
tion Of The Urban Guerrilla® by Abraham
Guillen, "Strike One To Educate One Hun-
dred - The Rise Of The Red Brigades In
Htaly In The 1960s and 1970s", “Fire And
Flames: A History Of The German Autono-
mist Movement From 1968-1988" and
“Praiie Fire: The Poilics Of Revolutionary
Anti-Imperilism*
<http:/ourn,ucsd.edu/~ats/publicat htm>
Back Issues
Wo have compied th st 12 ssues over 100
Pages) of A The Spirt June 1990 - May
'1952)nto one set. We're saling for$10 (post
e included) Issues 13,145 and 16 are aiso
stil available and cost $4 each (postage -
‘lded). We iso published 4 issues of an nfo-
Bullti between 1994-5 and one issue of &
Kursan Solarty Bullein. Each one e stl
avalable and costs $1 (postage incuded).
Arm The Spirit
P.O. Box 6326,
Stn. A
Toronto, Ont.
M5W 1P7
Canada
Arm The Spirit Ten Years On...
A decade has passed since the first is-
sue of Arm The Spirt - For Revalutionary Re-
Sistance” was published. Ten years on and &
new millnium s 3 good a time 85 any o reflect
back and look at what we ve accomlshed wih
this project and where we hoge (0 go
In the iate 80s a small group of us had
‘been doing soldarty work around poliicalpris-
oners nthe U_S.. particularly around anitimpe-
rialst guerilas - the “Ohio 7 and the “Resist-
ance Conspiracy Case” - who were on tialfor
seditious conspracy and other charges. At that
time there was a few magazines (Resistance.
The Insurgent, Breakihrough. ) that published
documents fiom armed groups but they came
out nfrequenty and some were in he process
of ceasing pubication (indeed none of them
are around today). Also much of the solarity
Work around the trals mosty consisted of &
“right 10 a fai trial, denouncing repressive
measures in the courtroom, etc. We wanted to
G0 more than this in our soldarity work by
focussing on the poltical aspect of the armed
struggle by disseminating documents from the
amed groups and other related materal So in
June of 1950 we started with @ small 4-page
bulletin that quickly grew i size over the next
few years
“The aim of ‘A The Spirt was never to
place excessive poltical mportance on armed
struggle., even though the content of the maga-
zine was largely comprised of communiques
rom guerila organizations and discussions
about the aims and means of amed resistance.
But we el that there was a need. partcularly
in Notth America, for a publication which of-
fered a forum for such nformation. Althaugh
most clandestine resistance in North America
had been defeated by state repression by the
mic-1980, the armed left was stil very much
alive and well in Europe when ATS began pub-
fshing. Early ssues of ATS, for example, de-
voted a great deal of space o the srmed anti
racist actons of the Dutch organization RARA.
‘communiques from Germany's Red Ammy Frac-
ton (RAF) and the Revolutonary CelisRote Zora
(R2), the Basque organization ETA and the
Sparish guerrla GRAPO, and so on. We wanied
the left in North America to be nformed about
the actons by. the poliics of, and the
discussions witin such movements
__ But of course, we also provided
4 coverage of other forms of mil-
tant struggle, such as the
squatters' movement and ac-
tons against biotechnology.
for example, and we al-
ways placed a great em-
phasis on solidarty with
poltical prisoners and
prisoners of war,
In addition to
publishing the ATS
Journal and occa.
sional info-bulltins,
we aiso published
other materials on
certain occasions. For example. when the
Kurdish ieration siruggle led by the PKK was
at s peak in 1892:83, we publshed a sepa-
fate ‘Kurdistan Soldary Bulletn”. We aiso pro-
duced pamphlets on various guerila organ-
2ations, such as the RAF and the RZ. to disir-
ute at poltical events. Ou ideas have aiways
been much larger than our budgel, hawever,
and many projects never made it off our
hardarive and onto paper. Such unfinished
‘works include “Fire And Flames: A Hisory Of
The German Autonomist Movement. a book
which we tansated but were unabl to pub-
/sh. Several pamphiets as well were never
completed. usually due to a lack of funds.
Witnout dweling upon the collapse of the.
“real existing socilism’ and so on it goes with-
out saying that the polfical situaton changed
dramaticaly during the 1990s. This had an ef.
foct on our publication as well, i that most of
the movements which formed the bulk of our
content n the early-1930s had sitherdisbanded
or disappeared by the mid-1990s. Most of the.
armed lef in Europe gave up the fight, and
scores of national iberation movements signed
peace accords” which brought guerrila strug-
gleto an end n many partsof the wori. These
changes, as well as our eventual shift o online
publishing, brought about some changes in the
Wwork of Afm The Spirt.
ATS 25 an organization began uiizing o-
mail and the inteme for communication pur-
poses as early as 1982, and by 1995 we had
established a basic web ste and two oniine -
mail news ists: ATS-L., a general news st for
artcles and discussions concerning lef-ad:
cal poltical movements, armed resistance. po-
liical prisoners, and so on; and KURD-L,a st
devoted specically to the Kurdish national -
eration struggle and the PKK. We are proud to
Say that we have consistently maintained both
of these free news lst for 5 years now, with
all postings archived and accessible on the.
web. Several hundred peopie are subscribed
1o these ists, with more subscripton requesis
coming amost on a daily basis. (These oniine
projects were made possible by the generous
assistance of the comrades of the BURN! col-
lective n Calforia and the Etext coliectve in
Michigan)
twas never ourintention to become solely
anonine infornation colecive. There are many
contraictions and imitations invoived in using
the internet. such as the lack of access by
many groups and organizations outside the
metropoles. not to mention the fac that potical
prisoners cannot partcipate oniine. But being
consistenty actve on the intemet for several
years has helped us to establish new contacts
and soly others. And on some occasions.
the effects of our work have been felt well
outside the narrow confines of the radicakleft.
For example, immediately after the MRTA unit
“Commando Edgar Sanchez” took over the.
Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima in
December 1996, in ne of the most daring guer-
ila actons of the decade, we immediately set
~
up an Englsh-anguage soldariy sie. intend-
ing 1o provide news and updates on what we
expected to be a very shortived even. AS the
Wweeks went on. however, our its became an
important source of information and atiracted
tens of thousands of visitors. “thanks” in part
o exposure n the capitast media (CNN. The
Wall Street Journal. ec.). Now, of course, web
sites devoted to revolutionary movements are
i ver the Net, butat that tme such stes were.
st relatvely ew.
As ATS enters the year 2000, ouraim s to
continue on with our work as much as possi-
ble. We slowly have resumed hardcopy pub-
Iishing, while a the same tme maintaining our
onine presence. We are aiso looking forward
to continuing our cooperation with other
projects, such as Antia Forum, a collection of
groups providing information on miltant ant-
fascism
With this issue, the st in over 5 years
e had to make a hard decision of what (o
inciude. We easily could have filed a couple
hundred pages but that was logistically impos-
sible, 50 we decided 1o focus on a narrow
selection of documents and information on and
rom European poltical prisoners and uerrla
organizations. In a way this s & retun to our
foots as we're the only group to be publishing
thiskind of materal in North America. In partiu-
Iar we fet t s important to pubishthe RAF's
fnal communique and related documents, as
wellas ETA's retum to amed stuggle. We hoe
1o have another issue out by the summer and in
twe'l publish materal tha we had 1o leave out
of this one. This next issue wil focus on polt-
cal prisoners in the US.. the guerrila struggle
i Colombia, the spintering of the Kurdish na-
tonalIberaton movement and several perspec.
tives on the Irsh ‘peace process”
‘We hope that ou distribution and transla-
tion of news and poltical discussions is useful
forthe leftn North America. Informaton s only
power f i is put nto use. If movements con-
tinually pass on ther histories and the discus-
sions. then we can avoid having (o re-invent
the whee as new highpoints of pltical activty
ise. Most mportanty. we pian to continue to
provide a non-secarian forum for vriety mi-
tant movements and struggles, fom a variety
of perspectives and locations, based on the
Arm The Spirit - January 2000
siogan “Soliarty Is A Weapon'”™
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spi
Special Edi
n - Wincer 1999/2000
On The Murder Of Horst-Ludwig Meyer
And The Arrest Of Andrea Klump In Vienna
On Wednesday, September 15, 1959
Horst-Ludwig Meyer was shot and Kiled by
WEGA poiice units n Vienna and Andrea Kiump.
was amested. According 1o the media, mem-
bers of the publc were involved in the arrest
and murder. Inerior Minster Schiog! spoke on
TV of an investigatve success. and he heaped
praise on the winesses, the motorcycist who
‘aced I the chase, and the poice officers in-
Voived. According o offiialstatements on the
events. t was said that members of the public
hac reporied “suspicious” individuals to the
police. Caling people “suspicious” s a part of
Caminaiization. Anyone who does1' fit o the
Social “nom” can be “suspicious’. What was
suspicious about Ancrea and Horst was that
they often met each other on the same sireet
corner and were dressed in baseball caps and
Sunglasses. One winess told poice they was
afrad of being attacked by such people in their
home. For years now, media reports have cre-
ated fear among the general public wih taes
of “organized crime. ‘the East Bloc matfia”.
“Black drug deslers”, and “terrorsm”. The sate
response i Austria] has been more weapons
for the police, wiretapping. the Schengen
Agreement, and aining NATO. Athe same time.
ctizens are calied on 1o keep an eye on and
Genounce otners. Media headines which e-
port on the RAF [Red Ay Fraction) routnely
use such phvases as trai of bood” and “cold
blooded kilers”
Tne RAF was formed from the student
and oppositon movements of the 1860s. Dur-
ng demonstratons againstthe re-armament of
West Germany, againt the Vietnam War, and
against the Shahis regime in Iran, police used
uter brutalty against demonstrators. In the
'1950s and 1960s, iberation movements arose.
inmany countries inthe Three Continents against
colonial powers and attempts by the USA to
Secure ts own economic and miltary power.In
Vietnam, the commnist guerrla forces sirug-
gled since 1345 against the colonial French
Tegime. ..)1n 1958, the Cuban revolution suc-
ceeded against the USA. n many Latin Amer-
an nations, querrla organizations ook up the
struggle against miltary dictatorships backed
by the USA In Namibia, SWAPO fought against
the apartneid regime. In the USA tsef. a civi
ights movement arose agains racia discrim-
nation. Mass uprisings resuted. In 1966, the
Black Pantner Party was founded as a Black
selfdefense organzation. In 1971, the Pales-
tinian organization ‘Black September’ was.
founded. The RAF orented s intematonalist
Struggle against imperiaism and the class soci-
ety,and i attacked, n s own county, the eco-
“The Police Did Not Know Who We Were”
A Letter From Andrea Klump
| was very happy to see this text. The
women who wicte thave brough the ques-
tions and specations abou the shooting of
Horst and my arrest back down to earth po-
Icaly. Thi politcalrelationship s iso a very
human one: Horsthas not been steiized into
an icon. and | have not been put nto an un-
welcome situaton. | value tis a ot
Horst and | knew for years about the
“grop-out program [Aussteigerprogramm] of
the German nteligence agency and of the
efforts of one so-called M. Benz. Neither
Horst nor | ever had any intention of kissing
thei feet. That's how we interpreted their
offer. since they weren' really concerned
with who had or hadnt done what, partcu-
Iary after the breakup of the Soviet Union
For Horst and for me, that would have
been a betrayal of aur own, our common,
story. We dd't want o become complictin
the snaking of heads, deadened by hunger
and the yearning for another worid. Remain-
ing true o our own history s al that remains
for the isolted left. This posiion is also an
expression of the misery of the German lef,
d in istory, be-
vacuum in which polftical movement took
place. The problem s this was aiways quckly
tumed into ideclogy.
“The poliical climate offear and the will
ingness to denounce others is connected to
the problem of the modern mass media:Inan
age when the consumer society i filed with
the latest technological gadgets, like cell
phones and video cameras, which are avai-
able fo everyone, people have the means at
their isposal to be executies of the sys-
tem. The police cid not know who we were.
Horst was kiled in a shoofout which he ac-
tvely patcpated in. s notonly the Septem-
ber 17, 1999 edition of Standard which ‘cast
Goubt upon the sclual membership” of Horst
‘and me Inthe RAF. Those doubls are real.
“Never forget, now s not the time to achieve
victores. but rather o fight against efeats.”
(8 Brecht)
Andrea Kiump
November 1999
(Source: "So Oder o' the publication of
‘Libortact, Nr.5 - January 2000; Transiated
by Amn The Spint)
omiciosses. the NATO mitary, and the NATO
bases who were working agais: these ibera-
ton movements
Media reports on the actions and attacks.
by the RAF were designe (o prevent crivcal
publcty and soldarty. n order o soiate guer-
ila groups and amed resistance from the gen-
eral public and desiroy them. But we wil o et
ourseives be divided of muted. Al people who
dream of a ife infreedom, equalty. and solcar-
iy, all those who organize against sexsm, rac-
ism, and captaism, must consider the possbir
ties and contradictions of armed struggle and
milary actions. Several tings aboutthe arrest
and murder are unclear to us. Alegedy. one
person fimed “two suspicious persons’ for an
extended period of ime. This biack-and-whte
‘amateur video was broadcast on TV. We have
our doubis about the ongn of s fim. We can
wellimagine that this stuation was staged af-
torthe-fact. Newspapers spoke first of a fe-
maie winess, then of a male winess. The ques-
ton s, was there really a monih-ong observa-
ion of Horst and Andrea by someone from the.
general pubic. or were they beng cbserved
by the polce for a ong tme? Also unclar are
the reports of possible contacts with the.
Verfassungsschutz' the German iteligence
agency. known as the VS]. Accordng 10 the
media, Andrea supposedly contacted the VS in
1996. The media are unciear about whether
this contact was concerning a “feturn o legal-
ity" I there was a contact made to the VS,
then the murder and arrest can be seen as part
of the true anti-nsurgency efforts of the VS,
An aricte published in Standard on September
17 1899 mentioned one VS report which "cast
Goubt upon the actusl membership” of Andrea
and Horst in the RAF. Nevertheless, thei pho-
tos were on intemational wanted posters for
15 years. In this way. a “realty of the ruing
powers" has been consiructed o deceive the
publc. () Now Andrea is being made to pay
forher poltical convictons by being put behind
bars. Austrian authorities are preparing o
Charge Andrea with resisting arest’, “using &
fase D", and “attempted murder”. The police
are investigating unsolved robberies as wel
Wi the aim of pining them on Andrea. As part
ofthe poliical investgations, Ausran, Halian.
‘and German polce offcas held a summi meet-
ing n Vienna. () Andrea has efused to make
any statements to the poice. ) The police are
now checking into who Andrea and Horst had
Contact with. I ofher words. they will cbserve.
Who calls the murder of Horst wha it really
Was. 3 “murder’, and who supports Andrea in
prison. We must not et such repression keep
s from providing public soidarty.
in our daily Ives, we all experience the
viokence of economic explotation, sexism, rac-
ism, of isolaton, competiion, and desiruction
‘Some people have decided to fight against this
continued on the next page.
Freedom For Al Policical Prisoners Worlc
Arm The Spiri
n - Winter 1999/2000
Arrests And Raids Against
The “Revolutionary Cells (RZ)’
On Sunday. December 15, 1999, a large:
number o Berin police stormed the Mehringhaf
omplex n Kreuzberg. Led by ant-terorist units
ang backed by federal investgators a tota of
1,000 cops took partn the rad. The attemative
center was searched from 6:00am to 6.00pm.
Al the same time, prvate homes in Berlin and
Frankturt were raided as well and two men
and one woman were arcested. In the
Menringhl. police were searching for several
tons of explosives. but nothing was found. In-
stead, he police eft behind about 100,000 Ger-
man marks in damage to the center's wals.
doors, and s0 00,
Those arrested in Berlin were AxelH. (43)
and Harald G (51), both of whom worked with
projects n the MeNinghof complex. Sabine E.
(63) was arrested in Frankiur. Federal poice
are charging themwih ‘membership i the Revo-
Iutionary CelisRote Zora". Athough the statute
continued from previous page
situation with arms. (..) Despite the fact that
we may have diferent opinons about the aims
and the means of the struggle, we should dis-
cuss such things and lear how o argue about
them. As a part of that, we must see the
interconnectedness between base work n po-
tical projects and structures, public protests
and resistance, and miltant praxis.
We send feminst greetings, strength, and
soldarty to Andrea!
Freedom For Andreal
Freedom For All Political Prisoners.
Who Struggle Against Oppression
And Exploitation!
Freedom For All Social Prisoners!
Froedom For All Women Wno Killed
Raplists, Abusers, And Sex Tradors!
Let Us Not Be Divided.,
Let Us Be In Solidarity!
Let Us Struggle For Our Freedom!
Forminist Lesbians Against Racism, Sexism,
And imperiiism
Vienna - October 1999
of limiations has expired for more specific
charges. this did not prevent the authories.
from sesking 1o sirke & blow against the RZ.
Afer a court approved of their continued de-
tention. he three were dispersed to prisons in
Dusseldort, Frankfur, and Wuppertl. In add'-
ton to the charge of membership i a terrorist
organization, Haraki G. and Sabine €. are aiso
charged with partcipaton i the bomb atack
on the ‘Zentrale Sozialhilfestelle fur
Rsybewerber govemment office i Berin. Axel
H.. who worked as the building manager for
the Metvingn, is charged with having main-
tained an explosives depot
Serious Treason
The arrests and raids were the_resul of
reason. The search warrart used for the raid
on the Mehringhof makes i clear tha! stae-
ments given to e polce were the impetus for
the cops' actions. In November 1995, federal
police armested Tarek Mohamad Al Mous (40)
on charges of being a member of the RZ in
Berin from 1986-1996 and of having partc-
pated in several attacks. Already at this tme
there were eight homes searched, and polce
ooked for the explosive ‘Gelamon 40' as well
a5 biast caps, which the RZ had stolen from &
quarry in the 1980, in the Mehringhof. These
searches were aiso because of Tarek Mousi.
Tarek Mousi s alleged to have partcipated
in the October 28, 1986 attack on Harald
Hollenberg, a eading asylum poicy bureaucat,
and the September 1, 1987 attack on Gunter
Korbmacher, a federal judge. Korbmacher and
Hollenberg were wounded with shots 10 the
legs. But the staute of imitations on both of
these actions has expired. Then there was the.
February 6, 1987 bomb attack against the
Zentrale Soziahfestelle fur Asylbewerber
offce in Berin.
Tarek Mousii hag aready been arrested
back on May 19, 1999. on charges of ‘support
Ing the RZ" but he was released from custody
o July 7. His e-arrestin November seemingly
nad the desied affect: The police got their
hands on someane who would testy on be-
halfof the state against the Revolutionary Cls.
Tarek M. is not an unknown activist among the.
left in Berin. He's been known as an actvist
for years. For this reason. it can be assumed
that his extensive statements to poiice would
also touch upon people connected with the
Revolutonary Cels.
The Statute Of Limitations On
State Repression Never Expires
Atthoughthe statute o imiations on some.
charges may expire, th federal police operate
by the mofto that the state's amed attacks are
never out of date. Federal prosecutors now
think they have an opportuniy to investigate
the Revolutonary Celis. As withthe Red Army
Fracton (RAF). some investigatons of the RZ
date back over 20 years. Behind ti fact s not
only the long-term thinking of bureaucrats, but
als5 the notion that the state must win a victory
over each and every expression of fundamen-
tal opposiion. it doesn' matir i the actvists
from back then are stil active now o not.that's
justa lever the state can use to pressure peo-
pl. ofering a retur to normal e by tuming in
former comrades
The federal prosecutors are definitely
wringing their hands wih glee: Treason cre-
ates a situation in which there s speculation of
a chain reaction. Ifs obvious the cops never
expected to find any explosives when they
stomed into the Mehringhol, but 3 create a
broad echo for thei story that the part's over
for the so-called “freetime terrorists”. Accord-
ng 1o one goverment spokesman, quoted in
the magazine ‘Focus'. the recent arrests could
shed new lght on the Kary case. Kary was
the Economic Minister in the German state of
Hesse was shot (and accidentaly kiled) n his
sioep n 1981 The RZ said after nis Geath that
they had only intended to wound him in the
lege
Germany's Tumcoat Law:
‘Die Kronzeugenregelung’
One of the few election promises which
the Greens pledged to keep was the aboition
of the ‘Kronzeugenregelung'. a law created in
the 1980 to get people foturn state's evidence
and make statements against the RAF. Despite:
cres ofprotest from the police, the federal gov-
‘emment amnounced it would let the aw expre
at the end of the millennium. AL the very last
moment. literally. federal prosecutors were
handed two prime canddates to make one last
use of the ‘Kionzeugenregelung. In addion to
Tarok M. there's aiso Hans-Joachim Kiein, who
was arrsted a year ago in France and handed
over to Gemnany a few months ago.
The Retum Of Kiein
It came as no surprise that Kein was wil-
ing 1o cooperate with the repression authori-
ties in Germany. As eary a5 1977, with the
help of Spiegel magazine and the Frankfurt
<ponty anarchist soene (some of whom later
became government ministers), Kiein an-
nounced his retirement from terrorsm” and he
threatened to name names. Federal prosecu-
tors are now charging him with three counts of
murder relted to the 1975 occupation of the
(OPEC Conference in Vienna. The only question
was whether or not he would drag down his
old sponi friends with him. the people who
published his words and gave him financial
support for many years. Many people were
pleased when Kiein announced that his deal
With the federal prosecutors would only in-
clude statements deaing with events up 0 1977
~because these days s no longer proftae 1o
have once been actve against the RAF. From
continued on the next page.
Freedom For All Political Prisoners World
continued from previous page
the point of view of the Federal Prosecutor’s
Offce (BAW). a murderer is aways a mur-
derer - except forthe ones in your own fanks.
This indirect dealdid have is victims. of
course. On October 15,1999, Rudolph Schindier
(56) was arrested in Frankfurt. Kiein accused
im o being invlved in scouting out the OPEC
buding i Vienna. Rudoloh Schindle s now in
pre-tial detention in Weterstact Prison The
BAW have announced there wil be furher ar-
rests stemming from Klein's statements. The
trial against Hans-Joachim Kiein wil begin in
the spring of the year 2000 in Frankfurt. It looks.
T it wil e a ong tral, with the ustice author-
ties tying o close the book on one chapter of
the armed struggle of the 1970s. Witnesses
Who wil be called 1 testy include Ramirez
Sanchez, or “Carlos". who is mprisoned in
Pars, as well as Johannes Weinrich. who's
serving a Ife term in Berin. Both were former
‘comrades of Kiein. Despte what one thinks of
the poltics and actins of the “Group of Iter-
natonal Revolutionares”, beter known as the
Cartos Group', they atleast,n conrast toKien,
never sold themselves out by making state-
Arm The Spirit Spe
ments to authorties while in prison
Solidarity
In Berin. a soldarity commitee has been
set p 1o Support the three people who have
boen arrested An inial press conference was
held, and the 250 people took part inthe inal
Solidarity demo. The alternative projects in
volved in the Mehringhof protested against the
poiice raid and announced theic solarty with
the prsoners. Tne Berin refugee soldarey or.
ganization Forschungstelle fur Flucht und M-
gration is demanding freedom for Harald, who
Wwas one of the group's founders. Letters of
temational soidarty have been received from
Chie as well
The soldarity commitiee can be reached at the
following address: Sodartatsburo Mehringho!
Greisenaust. 2 10965 Bern, Gemany
Recert updates can be found on the Interet
3t htp I gib squat neUmh-razzia
(Source: So Oder So'#5- January 2000; Trans-
lated by Arm The Spint)
ial Edition - Winter 1999/2000
The Mehringhof complex after the raid
Repression Against Anti-NATO Activists In Italy
Totalitarian Democracy!
Arrests and house searches against partci-
pants and initators of the ant-mperialis sum.
mer camp and enomies of NATO in Haly
The ongoing persecution of enemies of
the terrorist and genocidical war of aggression
against Yugosiavia. waged by NATO and dec-
sively supported by Haly's ruling centre-ief
govemment, has reached a new height. On the
7ih of December three activsts of the Inter
tonalst Coordination Quemadar. nfiators and
partcipants of the ant-moerialst summer camp.
25 well a5 part of the ant-NATO movement in
northern laly (which is mainy drected sgainst
the mitary base of Aviano). were arested on
Charges of being part o the so-called “terroist
organisation Partisan Sabotage Groups (GPSY'
eld responsidle for a number of arson-attacks
against companies that worked in the NATO-
base of Aviano. Under the pretext of ties with
the GPS. a house search and a lengthy inerro-
gation was also conducted against a leading
comrade of the intemational Leninist Current
and is talian secton Voce Operaia
We reproduce pars of the poltical decia-
ation of Voce Operaia
“Our organisation will nct be intimidated
by the antitrrorist witchhunt. We wil con-
tinue to fight systematically against the policy
of aggression of NATO and the Halian govern-
ment. () To conduct s mperialst machina-
tions, NATO does not iy need highly amed
armies wih an inhuman potential of destruc-
tion, s of equal importance to eiminate every
inner oppositon. (..)
“This opposition during the sttack against
Yugosiavia has taken dverse forms in taly. In
particular the mobilsatons of the peaple on the
street were under attack by the DiAlema gov-
emment The anti-mperalst struggle was aiso
conducted with other methods. for example
arson attacks and attacks against symbols of
Haly's partcipation in the war. These attacks
have ot unike the bombs of NATO, caused
any casualties. damage was only done to cars
and nouse walls. Its extreme hypocrisy that
the war criminals condemn these actions as
‘terrost and ilegal” ()
No revolutonary wih selfesteem can be
against violence and sabotage on a principed
basis. Each and every action against the caps
talst system is a form of sabotage, also an
industial strke that is paralysing production
The oppressed are orced to defend themselves
agaist the attacks of the state bandits, which
ciaim for themselves a monopoly of viokence.
He who wants to change the world, knows
that this can only be done violenty, wih an all
encompassing revolution.
‘What is corect in principal, may be il-
timed, counter.producive, even plainly wrong,
polticaly. Violent acton is a poltical form of
struggle and therefore it has o be judged polt-
cally not moraly. (. What seems to be morally
correct may be paltically wrong. A deed of
revenge can appear correct 1o revolutionary
conscousness. But who is heading from theory
1o praxs. has to stan wih an analysis of what
is important and useful for a concrete poltical
strugole. Today's passivity of the working-class
movement has eeply rooled poitical and so-
cil reasons, i i not a result of @ bruta policy
of oppression by the capiais state. Inthis con-
crete framework, sabotage actions, with the
‘am of overcoming this passiviy. are n general
useless and therefore wrong. (..)
“This does not infuence our duty of miant
soldarty. W need todefend all comades that
have fallen victm of state repression. What-
ever may be the facts ofthe poitical accusa-
tions against the comvades. t s our moral and
polticaldutyto demand thei inmediate elease.
Immediate Release Of All Arested Comrades!
Inmediate Withdrawal Of All Accusaton Of Par-
ticpation In A Terrorist Organisation””
Freedom For All Revolutonary Prisoners!
(end of statement)”
s of nowa number of antimperiast and
intermationaist organisations have announced
their protest against the repressive actions
taken by the lalan government agains he ant-
NATO movement We call o everyone o voice:
their prtest, o demand the inmediate reease
of the inprisioned comrades and the end of the
wichhunt against the forces in oppositon to
NaTO,
Soldarty massages to the are
cuted comrades to
ted and perse
mandista@tin t and quemada@tn it
Executve Comitee of the International Lenist
Current
Vienna-Rome
December 10, 1989
Internationsi Leninist Curent (ILC)
Corrente Leninista Intermaciona (CLI)
PF325
1080 Vienna
Aust
TelFax +43 1504 00 10
E:Mai: io@comports.com
WWW hito: /v comports comilc
*
ter 1999/2000
Political Prisoners And The
Question Of Violence
“There is no revolution without violence
Those who don't accept violence can cross
out the word revolution from their diction-
ary." - Malcolm X
Working tofree poltcal prisoners is not a
neutral act. H never has been. It must prmarly
be a means of reappropriatng the concept of
revolutonary violence. To do sotoday i 1o chak-
lenge the sense of taboo and mandatory si-
lence that befel the movement afer the de-
feats and reversals suffered by the guerrila
and other hostie forces on this continent. The
bourgeasie has repressed the very idea of
violence
From Paris o Naples. from the workplace
o the ghetto sireets. a recompositon of the
revolutionary forces has begun. It cannot be
denied. Within this overall revival. the move-
ment shoukd now fnd the strength to stop re-
peating simplistic antterrorist denunciations
and chuming out watered down revolutionary
ciches. Because both of these betrayals main-
ainthe proltariat i the same state of impotent
submssion
“The years of reformist pacifism and sec-
tarian catechisms, ail about what the counter-
vience ofthe exploted and oppressed should
and especially should not consist of, have
clouded any emancipatory vision. Sure, some
St taK of icking up the gun but aways with-
out acting concretely to prepare the organisa-
tion f the revolutionary war. As far as they
are concerned. the time is never rght for revo-
Iutionary acton,
The big anti-errorist campaigns of the
eightes took advantage of these twin betray-
als of the fake revolutionaries. And now cam-
paigns for the freedom of poltical prisoners
are being organised based on the same col-
Iaboration: st ofthey ciamthat no good came
of the armed struggle ofthe sixtes to the eight-
ies. That i stugge represented nothing more
than a “Geath-wish” ate the barricades of ‘68
were defeated. Tnat t al originated n the badly
healed history of the fortes. Turning a new
page is what is most mportant for alof these
“supporters”. The obvious conclusion. then
nothing eise wil hapoen and their past and
present betrayals wil al b justfied
For others, the faiures of the eighties all
il down to the simple defeat o the guerrila,
and are mystifed by the maniras of the offcai
protester. Al of ther favourte emty formuias
are called out the absence of 3 Pary. of 3
class union,ofan organised autonomous move-
ment.
Within these rearguard campaigns the ib-
eration o poltical pisoners becomes the ult-
mate way of rewrting the revolutionary history
of our coninent since the sixties. It amounts to
the partal sectarian citaue carried out by the
new taking shops.
We, Who have for years been held hos-
tage benind these prison bars, refuse 10 have
any partinthis or to be tumed into the objects
of these underhanded operatons.
(One does not work o free poftical prison-
ers out of a sense of charty or humanism.
Denouncing the conditions in which politcal
prisoners are held should maily be a matterof
agtation and propaganda. It shouid automat-
cally overstep the boundaries imposed upon
and confront the fundamental questions of
revolutionary process n our era. It i thus 3
polticalact and a class positon. A way o fight
1o reappropriate our memary and knowledge.
o empower us and destroy bourgeois power
By fighting for Iberation we reapproprate our
hidden history and experience of siruggle. But
more than anything else, we reapproprate the
very concept of legiimate “counter-violence'
For years this concept has been atacked
disorted and dragged through the mud
“The class struggle, however, i constanty
creating and reproducig this counter-viokence.
tis inherent n the violence of the capialist
system self. The first violence is that o ex-
plotation. routne, the discipine of the factory
barracks, misery and forced labour. The vio-
lence of profis. Witin this mode of production
the exploted naturally engage in this counter-
vilence: i s the unavoidable resul of the vio-
lence of capital rlatins of production. It i ts
condemnation
During the movement againt the closing
of the Renaul factry in Viorde a worker re-
minded us of ths, remarking that ‘the violent
ones are those who shut the factory and throw
the workers int the street”
“The violence is the whole system. The
least of s social relations is vioent Violence
is the logic of mperialist subordination and im-
poverishment that condemns humanity n the
periphery to_ misery. Violence is. the
fascstization of the monopolies' power. It is
the apartheid of institutonal racism, the rise of
reactionary poliies. I s sexist violnce.
Daly Ife leaves the mark of vioence on
the body of every man and woman who is
‘exploted, oppresse, pushed around, forced
o struggle just o survve.
To resist and rebel against this violence is:
a ife instinct
e exploters monopolise violence, which
is concentrated in the mechanisms and rela.
tlons of the State. The confrontation between
State and Class s thus at the heart of all con-
ficts, but in a difierent way than in the past.
‘Wnat with globalisation the State is no longer
simply the govermment apparatus of the na-
tion-state of the State system. The relations.
and mechanisms of State express themselves
aiferenty within the global conjuncture of thei
D
contradictions and poltical crss. The State s
the refiecton of mulinavonal monopoly ter-
ests and also refects their contradictons in @
compelitve war without mercy.
“The cops and antterrrst laws are the
‘armour that protects these local, national and
‘continental mut-State powers. They miltarse
them. The more violent power becomes. the
more violence becomes power. The more they
are taken over by the real econamic power of a
handful of monopokes and manageril eltes,
the more they insiston the spectacular manpu.
Iation of democracy” wih s Gbsessive, ever-
present and one-dimensional seltlegitmising
propaganda. This show has become the dicta-
toral means by which the viokence of every-
day ife is managed.
Those in power have ahways accepted
“protest’ as a perfecty tolerable ghetto - more:
than that, today it is a subculture parasitcally
tied to the surviva of the bourgeois regime. I
has guaranteed tsel this status by going along
with the manipulation and denuncition of evo-
Iutionanes, out of fear perhaps that even si-
lence could be construed as tacit support for
“terrorism”
“The protester' pacifismis bound by what
‘over the powertu wil make of i
Tne social movements only threaten the
established order when thei actions contain
the possibilty of stepping outside of the reguiar
framework of struggle. They are only a threat
inasmuch as they appea 1o be abie to tum to
revolutonary acton raisingthe question of revo-
lutionary violence. But 1 clea today that the
card-carying activists have intealised the
maniras of offiial aterrorsm o the paint of
caricature. They stitch the slogans of order
‘and moraity in the praines of submission.
‘At the p of thei lungs they repeat tha it
is the aggressor who is weak one and the
victim who is sirong, that those wh rebel are
fanatics and those who explot are legitmate
‘spokespeople, partners n ‘democrati” recon-
ciiaton and republican antifascist fronts!
“The offcial commemoration of May 58] *
I Edition - Winter 1999/2000
Was a true victory for these pseudo-revalu-
tonaries. Their f0ad to Damocies had been
blessed. By condemning violence, the sanci-
monious ones justiied the fact that they had
etumed to the old of the bourgeas elte.
Sixty-eight was recuperated because it
‘coud be. Everything about that was. charac-
terti of protest i the metropole and that i
never managed to completely escape allowed
1 Pistory o be taken over. The nsurrectionary
autonomous movement tht ollowed in 77 hat
1o be dealt with iferenty. From the insurrec-
tionary demonstrations in Mian and Rome to
the acts of anti-NATO resistance. to the
“asambleista” movement n Spain, and from the
grassroots rebellons of the working class to
the guerila attacks, 77 was autonomous and
amed and ripped a hole n the consensus of
the mperalist centers. Faced wih this st
tion the repression could not aford any hal-
measures These events had to be wiped from
the collectve memory and those who partc-
pated were 1o either repent or ot in specal
prisons.
The movement of ‘77 had pushed the au-
fonomous atermatve (0o far. and so il of the
system’s various forces unfed in attacking 1.
making i pay with every ounce of s being
Yel revolutionary viclence remains on the
agenda. al the more so because the monopo-
lies have taken over and fenced off al poltical
‘space. Revolutionary violence defntely car-
ot and wil never take the archaic form many
imagine ort.For the t s nothing more than a
memory. a fantasy or @ dversion
They should explain to us how we are to
Subvert and destroy the monopolies and their
militarism. how we should sabotage the
fascistzation of globaisaton.
0 all senousness, who st baieves that
we can win by reading ffom our prayerbooks.
of pious wishes, by fighting for e reforms.
by signing petiions and going or long walks?
For having merely asked such obvious
questions we can already hear the regular n-
sults: adventurists. substitutionists.
immediatss, anarchist.
Backn 1671 Lotta Continua aready knew
exactly what to make of such atacks: “Those
who get scandaized and yell about terronsm
and romanticism are usually Just trying o hide
their own cowardice before ther revolutionary
dutes”
‘And ths s exacty what s going on tadsy.
“The violence that poltical prisoners sym-
bolise i not just ancent history. It s more than.
justthe human legacy of the past two decades
of struggle with its successes and faiures.
Anyone who st cares abou the emancipation
of the proletariat and who takes the time to
understand it within s historc contex! knows
thatt s much more than that,
1t shows that armed violence is neces-
sary i one wants 10 subvert the management
of our neoleral societes today. That f i and
willcontnue to be necessary o use t in order
1o break out of the straightacket of the fake
protester. This straighiacket is necessary to
maintain submission, with some diferences but
st essental the same submission to dicta-
torshi's future. Only armed violence can tear
away the banner of citizenship's "g00s
wishes”. of new “New Deals” of a retur to
the welfare state. of antfascist undy with the
“progressive" bourgeaisie
‘A minor sidenote. Lots of people demon-
strate every week against Le Pen. against Fin.
alongside the very people who maintain the
wall of sience that surrounds poitical mprs.
onment in our European countries. As far a5
the prsoners from the guerila are concerned.
the social-semocratic managementofhe prison
systom has nothing o lear from authortarian
regimes. They use the same methods such as.
crminalization, white forure [soltary confine.
ment], arbiary reatment and beatngs. andhde.
them all behind a fabade offoolproof arrogance.
I France our comvades Groix, Ramazan
Alpaslan and Pello Marinelarenari have died i
their cells. Many other comrades suffe from
incurable diseases that were caused by the
conditons of their mprsonment
Two hundred polfical prisoners are rot-
ting in the French prisons, and yet those in
charge of this “slow death’ st want to lead
the ant-fascit struggle!
Those who 6o not want to talk about im-
periaism and State repression should aiso re-
main guiet when it comes to fascism.
To aise the question of potical prisoners.
and revoiutionary violence is to relentlessly
work o revolutionise the “revolutionaries” in
the metropole.
Firs of il because this question reveais
the degree to which an aliance has been buit
Wih the “lefi-wing managers during two dec-
ades of campaigns for chart or establshment
antiascism. When these do-gooders were in
the government they enthusiasticaly defended
the trumph of neaiiberaism and were respon-
sile for a leap forward to unprecedented in-
‘equalty. They wiote the laws ofthis new apart
heid and proportional representation for the
FrontNational
Futhermore. used properly the question
of violence and poliical prisoners shouid siso.
be a 100l o fight agains th graduais radition
that was inherited from the opportunistic okd
“Communist” Parties. Al those concepts of
peaceful coexistence that are repeated out of
a sense of habit “the mass e and the rejec-
tion o the minory aspect of vioence, every-
thing that has been used to indefiitely post.
pone any revalutionary action
Decades of “responsible” actions. ap-
peasement, electoralsm, routne, reducing revo-
utionary aciiity and ideas 10 a set of ciche-
idden platiudes... this has made the move-
mentlose sight of one of the key points ofMark.
ist theory.that the transtion from captalsm to
socialsm wil be ull of revolutionary violence.
t cannot happen any ther way.
o raise the issue of revolutionary vio-
lence is thus 10 regain a sense of the revolu-
tionary goal. 1t means reconnecting our present.
day struggles and resistance 1o the possible
destructon of the system e, tying a sense
of daily combat to our historic class intrests.
Imeans acting in the spit of past strug-
gles and rediscovering the red thread thatruns.
rom June 1848 o the Paris Commune, rom the.
Revoluion of 1905 o the European Revolution
o11917-1523,tothe Spanish Revoluton in 1636
toBarcelona’s Mayo 37, o Chna's Long March
ang Cultural Revolution. 1o al the anticolonial
siruggles, 1o Che Guevara and the Cuban Con-
‘golese and Boivian guerrila; and fiom Europe's
May piu senza fucie of 1968 1o the automous
offensives and movements of 1977-78,
It means putting tneory back on s feet
The lessons and experiences of past sirug-
gles and the ente revolutonary process. are
part and parcel o the practcal problems. the
resolution of tasks. the drect acton of evol-
tionariestoday. Gravediggers and talking shops
will never own the theory of stuggle. Wher-
ever struggle breaks out anew it s mperative
tobreak through all theItanies and spectacuiar
raffic and reappropriate the practical theory
Today as in the past, communism is the
language of preparation and applicaton of revo-
Iutionary violence. s the wl 0 incarnate times
of [working] class power. With o theory.
memory or violent praciice, proetarian ci-
ists will never be able to afford a consistent
strategy to buld ciass power
“This i all the more tue now tha the key
subject is a highly margialsed proletarat. in
fact, the revolutonary subject capable of rans-
forming society is no longer a professional
worker. of even the mass-worker of he post-
war era, but rather the impoverished worker
Wwho i sufferng the intense vioence of worid-
wide expiotation. The same subject from Ja-
Karta to La Courveuve, from Los Angeles to
Lagos. but at the same time subject that re-
fects sirong social ersiy. The homogenss-
tion and polarsation of nisier conditon has
rearranged the context of the class struggle. It
is obvious that the proletariat can no longer
recompose el wit the same means ofstug-
gle and organisation as I the past. These his-
torc methods have actualy become obstacies.
that aggravate hisier economic and social
marginaisaton, wih all the assocated poltical
and cultural consequences. The super-ex-
ploted proletaniat wil no recompose el s &
revolutionary class through sirkes or trade
uion poltics. nor even by joining this or that
poltical party whose tak is more radical than
its neighbours. These are o longer optons.
Instead, helshe wil lear thiough direct acton
and in the flames of revol. The misery in which
e lives and the repression sihe faces from
those who represent captalism in crsis con-
stanty force nimher into violent confrontations.
o prepare for armed confrontation i to
work fo the recompositon of the class, for the
unty and poiticisation of tis global super-ex-
ploted proletariat. It is to show that i repre-
sents the only wordwide class capabie of car-
ying the revolutinary process to s ina con-
clusion. A class which is made to il thi role,
it historc and collective nature being to de-
stroy ts present indvidualised postion as an
economic and poiticalsiave of captal,
This i a long-term process of conscious-
ness raising and organisation. a class war in
which sporadic batties wil spread nto an
surrectionary confrontation.
To face up to the question of vilence im-
plies organising it along revoluionary nes. 115
an intal collective and practical atiempt 1o
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
Arm The Spi
ter 1999/2000
rearm the proletarat wit the desite to am -
self and wage revolutionary war against capi
1al i the concrete applicatio of the ques-
tions af the heart o the struggle for poliical
autonomy
I tme the [working) lass will once again
take up both t flag and fs gun, in one burst, as
they are inseparable. It wil cary forth s own
interests and the war 1o make them trumph
Through thei interaction class interesis wil
‘guide the gun and the gun wil cear the way to
eveal s uncompromising global iterests.
n conclusion
Wrat does it mean o aise the question of
ames violence on ths Inemational Day of the
Revolutonary Prsoner?
From the back of our pison cells we can
already hear the sighs ofthe intentioned. No
comrades. the question of armed viclence is
ot the only revolutonary issue we care about.
ors it the only pressing issue that needs to be
addressed. Some people have aays disorted
the guerria's posiion by caiming tha ths s all
e think about This is a ready-made argument
that il 100 often serves as an excuse for not
cartying out any real discussion about the ne-
cessity of viokence and s organised practice
It has aways been the trump card used by
those who wish to silence the debate.
We prisaners from the guerila are simply
rying 1o examine some basc elements of this
auestion. s actual nature and the contradic-
tions with which it conronts actvists in the
imperalst countries
‘Amongst the latter there are many who
support a guertila somewhere in the world
Few, Rowaver, take the next step and go from
support n this paricular stuation onto the glo-
bal nature of the issue. and 5o on to the con-
crete impiications concerning where we Ive.
Because supporting the dea of a revoluionary
guerrila automaticaly raises practcal potical
questions Todo all you can so that the guerrita
wins i Mexico, Turkey or Asia demands
us thought about what action revolutionaries
should take in the “belly of the beast” n the
fotress where the monopolies keep thei loot
Wnere the owners and technocrats who carve
up the whole planet ive in prosperty. Where
the exploters and oppressors of over 90% of
the global proletarit ve.
In 1572 Andreas Baader, Urike Meinhof
and the other comrades from the RAF offered
an intial answer to this question by estioying
the American miltary computers that were be-
g used o plan the bombing of Vietnam. This
action overstepped the boundaries of mere
Support, becorming instead a concrete act that
united the anti-capitalst and antrmperiaist
struggles here wih the struggle for freedom
on the periphery.
Forthree decades the giobalisation of pro-
ducton and exchange has undergone an un-
precedented qualtative advance. Not & day
passes thal even the least of things does not
reming us of ths fact. But this globalisaton fs
first and foremost the globalisation of class
struggle. the globalisation of poblems and the
globalsation of solutons.
AL ths point, who can seriously clam to
understand why people take up ams in the
‘Siera and simultaneously condemn those who
o the same in the forresses of the imperiaist
order? Who can ciam tha the specic factors
dominate the generalconfict o tis pont? That
this is a air and revolutionary position?
“The search for unity is the revolutonary
projectin of the giobal proletarat.
Wherever they find themseives revoiution-
aries should reinforce and direct this “long
march”. They should work towards the
poliiczation and recompositon of the class in
the framework of this era’s dominant space, in
al s dimensions fom the local to the global
Everywhere they should destroy obstacies and
imits that aways reduce struggles 1 the rues
and boundaries o the system's natiol and
nstiutional organization. The two are now
rectly connected. And in the imperialist
metropole, the national an the insttutional are
all the more reactionary. as they become
mechanisms in the process of fascistiation of
the monapalies
“The vast amnies of poor workers, the big
monopolies’ new siaves and the disinheried
slum dwellers, consttute the majorty of hu.
manity. This super-exploted proltariat s the
axis around which the questions of wealth re-
distrioution and the appropriaton of the means
of producton must be resolved. Its the only
Way. No other ciass or subclass can be sub-
stituted for it in the revolutionary process. Least
of all the representatives of local and ratioal
metropoltan classes who aways end up de-
fending “progress”, the reforms of imperialst
clizenship and the sacred charties
How can anyone believe that there s even
a grain of hope to be found in the netherworkd
of the “eft of the lef” and the other foms of
metropoltan protest? In the end al they wil
ever 6o is work to protect and manage the
minor local advantages. They can not escape.
this bureaucrati destiny.
Futhermore, they know very well that
these itte reforms are oniy granted on cond!
tion tha they divide the [working] class and
mbiise i around ssues tied foits own backyard
Which is protected by borderguards and
Vigiirate plans (tansiators note: “vigipirate” is
an antiterrorist pan that especially targets -
migrants). Behind thei facade they are col-
Iaborating with apartheid
For more than fity years, the trumph of
“social democratc” thought in the European
metropoles has revealed fself o be a shar at
both the level of nstitutions and protestgroups.
The half-measures of populist programmes.
have not saved the proetariat fom monopoly
‘captalism's legal claws. On the contrary, they.
have made the caws more dynamic. The chasm
between stolen wealth and poverty has never
been 5o violent. Not only increased productv-
ity and the infernal mythm of producton, but
also precarty and the insecarty of millons of
proletarians have all aggravated the aiready
intense level of explotation.
As far as the proletariat is concerned in-
sttutional poltics offers a choice between the
lesser of two evis, or simply quiting the garme.
Around the wori the proietarian class is
alone faced wit the altamatve of socialsm or
barbarism that s comes from the development
and decompositon of capialsm.
From e streets of Gaza tothe barricades.
of Bogota, from Chiapas to the ghettos ang
slums of our own European megacities, whe-
ever it revels 1t must take up arms. . every-
where the masses are overstepping the roten
boundaries o the od structures. The poitcal
parties and instiutionalsed trade unions are
today reduced to impotence and inadequacy
when faced with the new spaces and their
globalisation. Everywhere the proltarit s so-
Calising new resistance, i selleducation and
selforganisation. n the quest for s poltical
autonomy. Of course this doesnit come about
‘wihout many mistakes. Faise belefs and real
fundamentalism are spreading like a new
plague. Yet the winds of reedom are biowing
and they are stronger.
Wnerever proletarians rebel they recover
the sense of revalutionary violence. Where
there are no guns they use stones. And yet
‘some people nsist that the guerrla’s tme has
pas, hat armed struggle s ancient history!
We are told that ll oftis changes nothing
for revolutionaries here. That we mus faith-
fully continue 1o go through th ridiculous mo-
tions of revisionist gradualism. That we must
perfect our boted jargon on imaginary insur-
rections to come and remain patient whie ge
ting ready fo them. The only way to eally get
ready for he revolution i by engaging i revo-
utionary action. Legalism, pacifsm and daily
‘compromises have never come ciose to bing-
ing about revoluton. Only fim revolutionary
action. the resalutin of tasks as they actually
arise and the subversion of barracks rules will
‘awaken the revolutionary spir.
“The precondiions of the coming revols-
tionary surge show e centralty of the per-
fect i binding together the struggles for class
autonomy. armed Iiberation and proletarian in-
temationaiiem. I's ony a beginning,
It is Right To Rebelt
Dare To Struggle, Dare To Wint
June 15, 1998
Joelle Aubron
Nathalie Menigon
Jean-Marc Roulan
Note: A second theorstial pollical contribu-
ton by the AD prisoners, entiled Do la fausse
alternative entre nealiberalisme et neo-
reformisme et de fimportance den ot was
reloased during the Day of the Gand. The
APAPC ang ABC willsend a copy of this docu-
ment to inerested comrades.
Freedom For Al Policical Prisoners Worldwi
cer 1999/2000
Collective Biography Of
The Action Directe Prisoners
We. members of Acion Drecte, have been
incarcerated since February 1987. When the
four of us were amested it became a symbol
forthe government o ts figt against he guer
rila on this terriory. It brought s propaganda
and counte-revolutionary methods to bear o
us.isoating us by reorganizing, for example, &
secton of the Fleury-Merogis Maison darret
des femmes [women's prison - ed.] The frst
rals were meant to show off the omnipotence
of bourgeois justice. Cerain cases. for which
other comrades had areacy been ncarcerated
for years, were a last closed in the delinum
thatsurrounded our “partcipation” n this show.
On December 1. 1987. we began our fist
hungerstrike to be reunited together and for an
end to soltary cofinement Before t ended on
Aorl 15. 1988, two of us had appeared in fve
rial after more than two montns on stike. i at
ease, sem-conscious. put on a drp behind the
scenes, it didn' matter the Special Sectons’
Show had to go on.
Everyday. the powers that be deploy their
forces against many hoste reaites. Athough
there were actvsts from the organization or
from other ealfes behind bars, t was our ar-
rests. trals, and detention thatthe State made
into the perlect expressions of s monopoly of
violence. of s wil 10 trumph and to trumpn
quicky atthat
A perfect example if there ever was one
of this show of force was the trial of January
1883 Dealing with the “Pierre Overney” Cor-
mando's action against Georges Besse, the fi
il act n this rama just ad o be in step with
the hateful barrage of propaganda that had for-
lowed our action Named President Director
General of Renault by the socia-democratic
government. Besse speciaized in brutal fe-
structuring, laying off tens of thousands of
workers at 3 time (34,000 at PUK-Pechiney,
25,000 at Renau) Despt the siander by the
bourgeoisie’s media lackeys and trade union
collaborators, the action met wih sympathy.
amongst the workers (2). So the trial had two
objectves: to maintain the e put forward from
the beginninng that the atack was nt a polt-
cal act, and 10 take yet another opportunty to
hammer in the wonders of neciberalsm. We
were treated o the speciacie of both a minister
and an ex.minister paying homage 1o the per-
fect technocrat G. Besse: Edith Cresson, who
had assigned Besse (o Renaut whike Miister
of Indusiral Restructuring and Foreign Trade
and then became Minster of European Afairs
in the new socialist government in 1988, and
Andfre Giraud who was Minister of Defense in
the previous ight-wing goverment. Whatever
contradiction there was in two such high-rank-
ng polical figures testiying at the tria of “four
criminal fanatics” was simply buried under the
Violent consensus of the media and polfical
establshment They enthusiastically haled our
frst sentence of e pius 18 years (3 as if 1t
were theit own personal victry, the crowning
glory of thei strategy to anniilte the revolu-
tonary lefwing struggle
We called off our frst srike without hav-
ing most of our demands met. Any siight rem-
edy to our isolation would prove to be only
temporary. Two months after tis tria the four
of us were once again subjected to the torure
of soltary confinement.in Apri 1989 we again
‘wentnto bttle with the same demands, namely
an end to solfary confinement and the
feunificaton of poical prisoners. In Jly 1989
our detentin in saltary confnement was off-
cially ended and we were partaly reunited
we were furthermore promised thai
accomodations would be made S0 we couid
speak with one another (a promise that was.
never kept)
in fact that fall we found ourselves in
partalsoltary in a secton specially buit for us.
“The right we had won to be grouped by sex,
w0 women and two men. was not wihdrawn,
and yet neither was the State's strategy of
Gesiroying revolutonary hostiy on this terr-
tory. as expressed thiough s actions against
In January 1991 we began a new battle
Once again our demands were to be reunited
together and for an end to salfary confine-
ment. A the same time we were trying to buld
2 Resistance Front to class justice and prison.
0 for two years. up unil Aprl 1993, we took
tums going on hungerstike for a week at &
tme each
In May 1995 we received our second ife
sentences. Before the tral had even started it
was clear that all over the worid a cycie of
struggle had petered out. Whatever is errors.
o ths terrtory Action Diecte was without 3
doubt the most advanced expression of this
cycle. This explains the extreme symbolzation
that sumounds us.
Time wiljudge our contribution o the pro-
letariat’ long march towards poltcal autonomy.
the proletariat being the only class tht s fun-
‘Gamentally revolutinary tothe end. Like many
others throughout history and in our own gen-
eration, we have made choices that demanded
2 total commitment of our Ives. We have no
regrets. Our indiidual paths are intertwined
wih an important era or the proletarian move
ment on this continent at a tme of growing in-
ter-relatedness between the ant-capitalist and
ant-mperiast struggles.
Jean-Marc Roullan was sixteen years oid in
1988, From a leftwing famiy, he was nev
theless. not very poliical. He has suggested
that this might be what enabled him to engage
nthe revolt against totalarianism with o hes-
tation. He was active wih the CAL (Comite
action Lyceen - Student Acton Commitee)
‘events n e neighborhoods norh of Toulouse
He then joined the anarcho-communist move-
ment, notably the Autonomous Libertarian
‘Groups (iansiator's note: Groupes Autonomes.
Livertaires -t mporant o note hatn Europe
the word “ibertarian’ is not assocated solely
wih anarcho-capialism as n the United States.
but aiso with leftwing anarchism and antr-au-
thortarianism). These months were a tme of
intense learning where direct action was &
common occurence in the many struggles
within the reviaized revolutonary movemen.
Occupation committees in the factories. rent
striks in the Gltes, struggle against the poice
state
Given that the city was gty considered
the capital of antifrancoist Spain. he then be-
‘came involved in support work for the revolu-
tonary sinuggle against Franco's dictatorsnp.
n 1570 he was a member of the frst nucieus
of the Movimente lberico de Liberacion (MIL),
the armed organization of the Barcelona
(Catalunya) underground workers movement.
The MIL scqured funds for the soiarty
Chests and lent s poltcal and technical sup-
port o the sell-organized groups and the d-
ferent fighting assemblies that were growing
on the ground. I functioned as a network of
antifascist resistance (the GACs, Groupes
‘Autonomes de Combat - Autonomous Fighting
(Groups) but t also developed an ant-capiaist
praxis tailored o this perod: pitical autonomy
for the working class, radical critaue and ant-
revisionism, against il colaboration with the
“democratc” forces hat only wanted to shep-
herd Francolsm into a new authortarian bour-
geois regime. The MILGAC was destroyed by
fierce repression. One of ts members, Salva
dor Puig Antich, was the las poltical prisoner
1o be sentenced to dealn by garrtting (March
2,1974). Back n France, Jean-Marc worked to
bring together many iertarian and autonomist
‘roups willng to carry out intematonal armed
siruggle against the dictatorship. Out of this
came the GARI (Groupes GAction
Revolutionnaie Interatonalistes - Internation-
alst Revolutionary Amed Groups) which were
active at ths time in many European countres.
Jean-Marc was arrested in 1974, but when
Franco died he was amnestied and released in
spring 1977.
He then started working to bring togetner
the post-May 68 autonomist movement with
the new expressions of autonomous working
class struggle that came out of ‘68 and the
battes of the late seventes. and which found
most of thei inspiraton in the various laiian
theses. He worked to set up underground
groups Iike the Coordinatons Autonomes (Au-
tonomous Coordinations) and to generalz
Freedom For All Policical Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spirit Spec
actions and resistance Tne frut of ths labor
Wwas Action Directe (Drect Action), borm i early
1978
‘Nathale Menigon was born in 1957 in a
warking ciass famiy. In 1975 she began work-
g ata bank. joined the CFDT trade union after
a'strke. She was then kicked out of the union
and joined the autonomous communst group
“Camarades” (Comades) Like te talian roup
Autonomia Operaia (Workers Autonomy)
“Camarades’ called for ant-capials and ant-
imperialist social revolt and lent s support 1o
the kalian guerrila movement Nathalie took par
in discussions and demonsirations in the Parss
autonomist scene, and at the same time con-
templated the necessiy of armed comba.
In 1876 she and several comrades, in-
Cluding Jean-Marc. founded the revolutionary
ommunist organization Actin Directe. I was
‘about concretely ighting the system and pro-
moting the organization of the working class
and s strategy: armed struggle. Both she and
Jean-Marc paricpated n the firs action caimed
by the groug: the machine gunning of the French
chamber of commerce on May 1. 1979.
'AD launched s fst campaign of armed
propaganda in the fall of 1979. i wou ast uti
1580 From the very beginning AD attacked
those piaces where the State's most importart
policies were thought out, decided upon and
put into practice. AD chose s targets based
on those questions that t descrived as beng
decisive at s stage (resiructuring of the fac-
tones and neighbourhoods: miltary nterven-
ton in Tunisia, Chad and Zaie). More globall,
AD was throwing down the red e that i in-
tended to defend o the end: uniy of the anti-
captalit and ant-imperalst struggles. AS an
example of this unity AD also attacked those
Involved in the explotaton of immigrant work-
ers.responsible for the conditons they ved in
‘and against which they were sirugging.
Nathalie and Jean-Marc were arested in
September 1980 folowng a firefght wih the
police. After the electon of Miterand (1881)
and the first social democratic goverment, @
polical batte erupted in the prisons. Soidarty
movements were formed caling for an amnesty
of poltical prsoners and for an end 1o the spe-
cial cours. The massive mablisation and the
contradictions among the new powers led to
‘the release of all commurist and anar-
chist prisoners and the abaltion of State
Securty Court. Jean Marc was freed in
‘August 1981, Nathalie in Septomber
‘Acton Directetook action again
in November and December of that
Year. I participated in the occupa-
tion of sweatshops in Sentier
and buildings in
Barbes. Over a hun-
Turkish
foreign familles were
thus rehoused. At the
same time this cam-
d by sever
ons and domonsira-
{ ons against swea
‘shops and fo hous-
g, It was siso @
matte of supporting Turkish comrades who.
7ad fled 10 France stter the U -supported
Coup detat n their county i 1980. The recon-
Structon of underground structures continued
on atthe same e
I dune 1982 AD led an important mobiza-
ton against the G-7 Summitin Versailes. twas.
a decisie siep towards the integration of the
Imperiast countnes along the lnes elaborated
by the Reagan administration
'On the last day of the Summi, June 6.
Israel attacked Lebanon. One of the ines of
imperialst redepioyment was thus ilusirated in
the most concrete way possible. There olowed
the invasion of Lebanon by Israel troops, with
alhat followed for the Lebanese and Palestin-
{an people. This led to AD reorienting isef to-
wards new targets. ciaming responsibity for
the machinegunning of the car of the Iscael:
embassy's chief of securty and a number of
actions against Israi companies. Afer @ mas-
Sacre-atiack against @ Jewish restaurant
(Goldenber) on Rosiers street in Pari. the
powers that be orchestrated a counterrevo-
Iutionary propaganda campaign throughout the
media. In an nterview with the newspaper Lib-
eration, Jean-Marc _defended the
Mmachinegunning of the chief of securty and
Condemned the massacre atacks. At the same
time as the Counci of Miniters tied to isolate
the organization's miltants by ordering the dis-
Solution of Action Directe, 3 series of raids.
were carried out against squats and known
revolutionaries. Nathalie was stil recovering
froma serious car accidentthat had taken piace
when she was binging posters against the G-
7 Summit back from Brussels. Nevertheless.
both she and Jean-Marc went underground
Georges Cipriani was born in a working
class famiy i 1950. I the late sixties he was.
millng machine operatorat the Renaut art-
lery", 8 machine-tool factory. He was working
a5 3 revolutonary actiist n the base commi-
toes at "Devi's lsand” (a part o the Renaut
site at Boulogne-Billancourt) when Pierre
Ovemey. a communist actist, was assassi-
nated by a secury guard whie passing out
pamphiets n font of the factory (February 25,
1972). Afer the large mobilizations that fol
lowed this assassination. Georges left for Ger-
many where he lived for ten years. partcipat-
ing n the antrimperilist movement there. He
{00k partn the organization's actites betwoen
1982 and 1987
Today. Gearges is o longer a member of
the Action Directe prisoners' collecive. n the.
‘summer of 1963, ater years o otal and partial
soltary confinement, Georges had {0 be com-
mited 1o the Villjuif psychiarc hosptal After
our two hungerstrikes of several monis each,
our hungerstrkes of one-i-four weeks from
91 to°93 cerainly must have contributed o his
weakened psyche.
Joslle Aubron. | was born i 1959. My family
‘came from the tradtonal French bourgeoisie,
but Ived in a working class neighboumood in
Pari. | leamed quickly that socil equaity was
just & word engraved over my public school
doorways.
ion - Winter 1999/2000
“The other even mare mportant factor was
the renewalof the revolutonary movement that
100K piace nthe sxtes. s ant-captalsm ant-
{mperiaism and ant-revisionism infused the at
mosphere of that penod
By the late seventies very radical levels
of confrontation had aiready been tried out and
were st aking place. the Black Panther Party
n the Unied States. the guernila movement in
Latin Amenca. the Paiestivan sruggle. Closer
10 home. in faly and Germany ofner guerriias
were hiting the system at the heartof s cies
‘Whie there were many dfferent struggles win
specificdemands. they al existed within a com-
mon dynamic against the system. So | ived in
squats, in working class neighbournoods in
Pars that were facing real estae development
There was the ant-nuclear demonsiration in
Malvile in the summer of 1877, where a
demonstrater was was Kiled by a cop's gre-
nade. In October. at the same time in France
was getting ready to extadit the lawyer Kiaus
Crosssant to Germany, the RAF prisoners were
‘executed at Stammheim. | was niota member in
any group, but at these times | was going 1o
Gemonsirations armed with molotov cockials
and took part n minor actions (against Ecus-
Gors embassy after the bloody repression of
sugar workers in Guyagi. the truck that was
rigged 1 look ke twas booby-trapped and lef
i frontof the Minister of Justice followng the
sentencing of revolutonary actiss...) Revo-
Iutionary vioence was integrated into the eve-
ryday praxis of activists, guerrilia attacks
Showed us that we 100 would have (o engage
in'armed struggle n our class warfare, # was 8
period full of discussion about the armed ex-
beriment. specifcal the Halan situation
"To give a very short summary. one of the
things we discussed was whether of not it
was necessary to have a polticabmiltary or-
ganization, In 1980, even though the autono-
mist group that | was a par of participated in
AD actions and lent our logistcal suppor, ts
members were not members of Acton Direct.
| was arresied with a comrade from AD in
1882 while leaving a place where there were
‘ams. | did not deciare mysel 1o be a member of
AD. 1 continued to think about things whie in
prison. It was a period marked by the coward-
ice of the French extreme left in general and
the inanty of the French autonomist movement
in partiular. Imperialsm advanced in al ts
splendor. the Israel intervention in Lebanon,
Thatcher in the Malvinas, the French bombing
of Bekka in Lebanon, Reagan's atack on Gre-
nada. the mining of Nicaragua's narbours... The
supposedy lefi-wing French goverment's
policies revealed the sociakdemocrats’submis-
sion to the neolberal ine that was dominant
around the wortd. A the same tme the former
revolutionary movement was going to pieces.
On the one hand were those who woukl ump
at any chance of acauifing power,on the other
those whose who did nothing but recte the okt
formulas that left the proletariat just as
defenseless against the attacks of the bour-
gecisie. | now saw not only the usefulness of
‘armed struggle, but aiso the necessiy of the
strategy of having guerrita organizaton. De-
pte this, when | was released from prison
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwi
Arm The Spi
1984, at st | only engaged in legal actites:
Support for the organzatio's prsoners. book
disirbution, newspaper Even though | had de-
cided to get back with AD | did not wart to go
underground as soon as | got out of prison. It
was aimost year later, when the repression
was intensiing. that | went underground.
We identfy as revolutionary communists
Between 1962 and 1987. the organization de-
Veloped it actions folowing two related strat.
eges. he Unity of Revolutuionaries in Western
Europe and the Ant-imperiaist Front
For us. connecting the strategy of the
Antiimperialst Front o the queston of capital
ist rul in Western Europe and the changes in
s power relations meant estabishing and ac-
tualzing the unity between revolutionary ciass's
struggle and nterationalism. as 3 Iving pol-
tic” (4) This corresponded with the
reinvigorated proetarian intemationalism that
had come out o the revolutonary wave of the
sixtes. It was aiso based on changes in the
system of captal accumulation, which had ac-
celerated since the Versaillo Summit This new
take on the antcapiaist struggle was neces-
sary as European integraton became an es-
sentia teran of struggle. as important as the
local or nterational terains.
The West European bloc was both
source of logictcal support fo the imperiist
rollback and a competing pole withinthe imperi-
alst triag and s adopion of the new liberal-
toyotist model of accumulation. On the other
hand. the workdwide threat of war resulting
from the miltaristc poiiies of Reagan and his
friends underined the urgent need to buid 3
proletaran front n ail the parts of the move-
ment from the guerrilla o the neighbourhood
groups o the factory cells, with the goals of
revolutionary sabotage and construction. Atthe.
heart of these factors that carry within them
the spark of communism - that movement
whose praxis abolishes the existing order of
things - the Front embodied the united atack on
imperialism's core polcies, notjust o the com-
munist forces but of il the revolutuonary and
antimperalst reaities. In January 1985 Action
Directe and the RAF issued a jon text, signed
by both organizations.
The dozen actions ciaimed by the organi-
zation duning s first offensive as a nified West
European guerrila included attacks on NATO
structures. arms factories, the nerve centers
of economic and miltary power, and the as-
sassination of Rene Audran, the Ministry of
Defense's director of International Affais, who.
was thus responsibe for French arms sales.
abroad. In November 1986, at the end of the.
second offensive, the ‘Pierre Overney” Com-
mando put an end to Georges Besse's career.
Today. after ten years of mprisonment,
ourincarceration i not so much marked by the.
projectof destroying us as by the wish to bury
s Several factors should be noted when a
Iysing this strategic recrientaton on the part of
the State_ First of al, our struggles in prison.
‘The partal success i breaking Georges should
ais0 be taken into account along with the con-
tinuing weakness.of the French revolutionary
movement as well a5 the need to resoive the
contradiction between excepional detention
and an offcial clam that there are o poltical
prisoners.
(One way in which the syste ties o con-
stantly maintain s legitmacy is by denying the
existence of revolutonsry prisoners. f things.
were as they should be no one would Know
howtoresist s jucicil or economic aws. Nec-
essary adaplation o globalzation’ or buiking a
forress Europe 1o protect against “the whole
worid's problems’, as barbaric and unjust as
they may be inthe eyes of the growing number
of people who are marginalzed, impoverishes,
deporied on charter fights, reduced 1o beg-
ging... these laws must be respected by those
very peaple who they explo, oppress and ai-
enate. Erasing the revolutonary prisoners flom
the picture of contradictions wracking our so-
Gities s a central element in the process of
preserving this submission to Capials pres-
tige.
Our arrests followed many other attacks
by the forces of repression. They put an end fo
Action Diect's poitico-miltary activiy. In the
late eighties an undeniable historic break was.
made. This observaton s not at al apocalyptic
when understood within our continent's revo-
Iutionary history. What s obviously much more.
serious are the widespread and unreasonabie
criicisms of the accumulated experience of
twenty years of struggle. especialy of the guer-
ila struggle. Instead of a crtique of our actual
ertors, there is only 8 Iany of confusion. In-
stead of buiding bridges towards new per-
spectives it only leads to the iquidaton of the
anti-capitalst and antimperalist ef i Europe.
We belleve that this revolutionary experr-
ment can only be supassed by a new revolu-
tionary experiment taking nto account and dis-
tiling the general intrests of the entire ciass.
We know on which heritage we ourselves
based our search for new pathways. Nothing
we see leads us to doubt the maxim *commu-
nism or barbarism’, because never before have
the ‘projects” of capitaism with @ human face"
seemed more vain. Thus we have no reason to
recant. Despitsthe conditons in which we find
ourselves we continue our poitical work, dis-
cussing things wih other revolutionary prsor.
ers in writing. participating in a pudlication
(Front) transiating discussion texts o actions
especialy those regarding the European revo-
utionary movement.
Joelle Aubron, July 1996
Notes:
1. The distinc charactenstics o these Special
Sections come into play in two ways: 3) Frst
regardless of where the actons were comms-
ted the cases are heard by judges working n a
special secton of the Public Prosecuters de-
partmentin Pars. the 14th secton ) Secondly.
the Assize court jury is made up of -pofes-
sional jurors” This means that 1s not a “pec-
ple’s jury” but rather magistrates chosen by
those n power. who are supposed 10 judge
according to thir “innermost convictons” Set
up in 19865, this special jurisdicion s meant to
e the sentences directly o the leve of con-
frontation while simutianeously depolticizing
them as much as s possive
2. Discussions between workers at the fac-
tory gates. which included threats and hopes.
of an action agains! Besse, were reported in
the cour records. In 2 smiar vein, there were.
the union delegates who threaiened their
bosses that they would end up lie Besse. or
the poster that appeared that winter with &
Photo of the new President Director General
with a buliseye on his forehead and the words
“After Besse whose tum is 17", also handed
out as a tract by the workers at Renault-
Vivor
3. This means we are supposed o spend eight-
‘een years in prison. It i only atr these eight-
‘cen years that ur sentence wil become a-nor-
ma" fe sentence wih the hope for possibie
release. Sot 1 that we could be roleased after
twenty five years of prison
4 Tria statement - 1991
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n - Winter 1999/2000
Interview With The
CCC Prisoners Collective
Introduction From The Anarchist Black Cross In Gent, Belgium
The CCC_(Cellulues Communistes
‘Combattantes - Fighing Communist Cells)pis-
oners have been long forgatten. In the decade
since ther convicton in 1988 they have been
lef without suppor, except from the “Parents
and Friends of the Communist Prisoners:
(APAPC) and some groups and indviduals
3broad. The anarchist movement never dig
much for he prisoners of the CCC, neither to
better thei situation nor to work for their re-
lease. There are a couple of reasons for this
that are worth mentioning
Firs, the hostity of the entre classical
ettt spectrum, siso from self-defined revolu-
tonary groups. There is 3 widespread theory
that says t the CCC - together wit the “Gang
of Niver - was part of a estabilzation cam-
paign by extreme right elements inside. of in
Cooperation with, sate agencies. This thesis
was systematical spread n papers and maga-
zines and other publications. and a ot of anar-
Chists believed this theory.
There are lots of elements painting to-
wards.the fact that “a strategy of tension”
raged n Belgium i the middle of the 1980s. We
think the idea that the CCC was part of this
“strategy” to be nonsense. There is no evi-
ence whatsoever 1o support this. And there’s
aiso this: What about the fact tha four miltants
were arrested, brought before the courts, and
‘Convicted? These people never rencunced their
belifs and are st poltically actve. Those who
‘spread hese stones (and ets name them these
rumors were especaly spread by the Maoists
from the PTB - the Workers Party of Belgium)
showed which side they are one ((he side of
the bourgeoisie) and to where sectarian logic
leads. Atacked in thei claims for power and
truth, they threw overboard the most funda-
mental revolutionary principal: the defense of
and soldarty wih victims of stale repression
Secondiy, there s the position of the CCC.
concerning the FRAP arrests, who they see
as “anarchist adventurers”. possioly manipu-
lated by Action Directe. Plus, at the trial they
acted as ‘sntches” Though here is much more
that can be written about ths. we dor't con-
sider ourselves aualied to make statements
This because of the lack of background infor-
mation on the interal affair of the armed un-
derground resistance groups, and because we
don't have the documents of the tial sel. We
hope n the end tha allpersons concemed give
clear answers about this mattr.
Finally, there i the Maist-Leninist ideol-
ogy of the CCC, which we think is the main
Cause for thei isolation. Because this entais a
ather fundamental (theoretical, poitical. and
ideclogical) discussion, we have chosen to
answer on this ater n a direct answer o the
CCC. which we wil publish. We state clearly
Supporting the CCC does not mean we defend
ther politcal ideas. We have few lusions about
those ideas and the concrele consequences
they have (fr us).
Supporting the CCC prsoners paints at
one of the main purposes of the ABC: non-
sectarian support and defense of revolution-
ary prisoners, this means those who carried
out acts of resistance against a system based
upon inequaiy ofrace, gender. class,etc. and
Who are heavily prosscuted because of that
The CCC prisoners have been victims of isola-
tion, ddnt have fair tria, and suffer even 1o
this Gay under exceptional measures, and they
are kept in confinement only because of ther
poiticaldeas
tdoesn' matier ftheirchoice forthe armed
struggle s right or wrong - moraly or empir-
cally poltically o stategicaly) - what maters
5 the factthat people had the courage to actin
conseguence with theirigeas and convictions,
i other words people had the courage o be
froo. Lot not forget that those who have cho-
From October 1984 untiltheir arrest in December 1985, the CCC
carried out 26 actions in Belgium. The Cells considered them-
selves an “organization of milltants fighting for the communist
revolution”, and in a communique from 1985 entitied “To The
Workers and Comrades in France,” they explained their pro-
gram of armed propaganda as carried out over the course of
three separate campaigns: “The October First Anti-Imperialist
Campaign’, *Karl Marx Campaign” and the *Pierre Akkerman
Campaign”
14 ans: Basta!
Liberté pour 18
militant(e)s 48
Cellulles
Commumstcs
Combattanttes'
sen to go underground in the resistance are
fuly aware as an ever present probabilty that
one day they wil be arrested. or possioly kiled
(there are 28 dead RAF miltants to femind us
of ths fach),
We have an impression that those who
condemn the CCC because of this (he vio-
lence) are ofen the same ones who close their
eyes 1o the massive structural viokence which
marks our sociey. and to the col cynicism of
those in power who use the most brutal and
gruesome means to maintain ther postions. and
forthe enormous interests behind this all. Ay~
one who faces this. who in ather words looks
the dally realy of class strggle, oppression
of women, racist vioence, the destructon of
nature. elc. n the eye. loses either courage
and hope, o every lusion that this system can
be changed without vioence.
n genera,in our democracy. unwelcome
ideas are being fought by silencing them to
eathn I this doesnt work - because the si
lence is being broken by some hard biows -
they are being fought by locking up peopie, or
more thoroughly” by kiling them. As anarchist,
we dorit believe that thi is a soiution_ Ideas
are efeated by open arguments and debate,
and by putting your own ideas in practice. We
are well aware that anarchists dont own the
tnth. We are convinced that we st have a ot
o leam from those who fought the struggle to
it bitter consequences. and from those who
continue doing this. Therefore we are wiling to
discuss with the CCC, and we invite others to
dothe same.
Anarchist Black Cross - Gent, Belglum
) "
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide!
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ion - Winter 1999/2000
Q: Since the 1980s, the armed revolution-
ary struggle has almost disappeared in
Europe (except for the IRA and ETA). Ac-
tion Directe, GRAPO, the Red Brigades (BR),
and the CCC ail ended their activities. The
RAF first announced it was suspending
its political-military_operations and has
recently dissolved itself. Are you aware
of this evolution? What do you think about
this? Does this point to a new direction
for the revolutionary left?
Of course we keep a close eye on the.
evolution of the revoluionary movement n Eu-
fope, but we don't tink that things are as sim-
ple as your question may suggest. Different
groups have stopped for diferentreasons. The
CCC and AD. for example, because they were.
miltary defeated. The BR because pottical re.
organization was made impossibie by repres.-
sion. The RAF because they have polically
degenerated and dissolved themselves. The
PCE(1) and GRAPO are st aciive, and commu-
istand antimperiast guerilas are very strong
in Turkey and Greece.
“The revolutionary struggle never devel
opedin a uiform and inear way. s a phenor-
‘enon of great complexty, subject to conjunciuri
‘and localinfluences. etc. At ihe end of the 605
and the beginning of the 70s. a big wave of
struggle emerged in Wester Eurcpe. although
tstaried 10 collapse since the mic-80's, thats a
fact. But we do think that the next wave fo
come will be stronger, because of a more
favorable socio-economical context as well as
because of the rich heitage of experiences.
ang reflctions from the previous wave.
“The most important mertt of the trugle of
the RAF inthe 70's, of the BR, the PCE(]) and
GRAPO, and of the CCC., efc., s the fact that
the first steps have ben made towards the
poltical rentaton and the revolutionary stra.
gy that are presently needed in the imperialist
Gountries. Only by relying on a ciical and con-
structive balance of these 15 years of strug-
gle. and by valuing this decisive contribution,
Wil be possible for the revolutionary move-
mentto resume the offensive for the overthrow
of capitaism and the fiquidation of the bour-
geoise.
Q: What makes you think that a new wave
of armed struggle is on its way in Eu-
r0pe? This, considering - again - the s
dissolution of the RAF and the peace ne-
gotiations in Northern Ireland which seem
to indicate the contrary?
These two examples divert our attention
from the subject. The RAF already lost sight of
the revolutionary objective 15 years ago (and
turned in the direction of radical reformism),
and the goal of the IRA has never been social
revoluton but the end of Brtish domination in
Northern rland. We are only talking here about
the amea struggle as an expression of the
revolutionary contradictions withi the capital-
ist sockty
‘We are Manxists, we think that social and
historical phenomen are dictated by the evo-
Iution of objective circumstances, and in the
last resort by the contradiction between the.
development of the forces of production and
the mode of producton. These conradictons.
dictate the necessly today of the overthrow
of capitalism and the amval of sociaism.
“The central questionis: Howto bring about
the step from captalsm o socialism? Historical
study and Engels answer. “Vilence s the mid-
wie of the eniire ol sociey that bears a new
Society within. It is the means by which the
Social movement wil make t and by which 1
‘smashes fossiized and dead poltical forms.”
“The practica question is: Which strategy
has to be appiied for the struggle to accumu-
late the necessary forces to attan iberaton?
The experience of the class-struggle i this
century and the characeristics ofthe situation
answer. the continuous revolutionary war, of
Wwhich the first phase is amed propagand.
Once there exists a revolutionary way out
(sure i ths case. very difficut) i stuation
which seems {0 be furter completely blocked
one can be sure tha this way out wil be used
one day or the ofher. Firs of al, this wil be.
one by the avant-garde elements, laer, once
the r0ad is Iaid, by growing paris of social
groups which have an inerest in ushing past
captaism
Al his, 1o say a couple of things very
quickly, because the queston i very complex.
Among the tendencies where people tink it
opportune 1o take up weapons only when the
masses have already done so and the part-
5ans of "here and now” without any prepara-
ton (without a program or organzation), one
finds a diversity of analyses. Our analysis is
siusted on a level in between, and one can
also quote those who set the foundation of a
real Leninst party as a condton to tigger oft
the amed struagle. We invite the comrades
Who are interested in our vision on tis subject
and in the various conclusions we made to
take notice of the documents we have ex-
changed wih the French fevolutionary organ-
2ation Vaie Proletarienne” devoted tthis ques-
tion n he debate.
Q: Can you give a short history of why
and how you made the choice for armed
struggle? Are you still convinced of the
choice and the analysis made at the time?
The struggie of the CCC s stuated i the
spin-off of the break wih Sovit revisonism
hat emerged inthe 60s. I this period. the Ch-
nese revolution and the struggle for iberation
in the Third World stmulated a new revoluton-
ary trend inthe imperalst countres Thi trenc
convicted the Communist Parties who walked
behind the banner o the Sovet Union,and every
other reformist onentation A the start of the.
705, thefrst movements carme forward in West
‘Germany and then n laly. who openly ques-
tioned the use of revalutionary violence and.
the polical-miltary practice to overthiow the.
power of the bourgeoisie. The CCC are the
inhertors of these first experiences. wih the
advantage of the roads already travelled i the
70 and they have tned to go even futher by
taking up the task of giving thei share of the.
answers 1o the questions which are only put
forward by the revolution. In ths respect s
Worthwhie 1o state that b theoretcal acvances
often emerge from efeats: Bolshevism is the
crtical inhertance of the Paris Commune. the
cultural revoluton is the criical inhentance of
the vicory of the bourgeois powers in the So-
viet Union of the 505, etc
Sofar as mitant commiment s concerned.
we've never been atiracted by violence or
rmed struggle in and of tself. Communism
means peace. brothehood. and it this knd of
world we fight for_If we really want a workd
wiout war and without weapons, a world of
brotherhood, then we have to begin fo defeat
the (fuly amed) bourgeosie in a cass war.
“The rest is ony hypocrsy
One often hears the remark that the CCC
came out of nowhere. This is in contr
diction with, for example, the milltants of
the RAF, who chose the armed struggle
only after a long evolution among the
ranks of the radical non-parliamentarian
movement. Your answer is so abstract, it
brings only forward purely theoretical
considerations. Could you be a bit more
concrete?
It s true that the cells aren't the aimost-
spontaneous. empirical outcome of the
radicalzation of a non-amed movement, non-
parliamentarian or ofherwise. But why does 1
always have to be lie that? The hitory of the
intermational communist movement s not cha
acterized by the eteral repetiton of aiways
the same processes but. on the conlrary. by
assimiltion of the lessons from former exper-
ences - and tis is only for the better!
To be able o talk expicitly about the foun-
dation of the Cell, we have to state precisely
one person (with this political background)
mests anther (with a dfferent poliical back-
ground) who knows a third person (with yet
another poitical background), etc- We consid
this of minor importance, but i you really insist,
we can present things i the following order
Plerre: This is the r0ad | travelled as a miltant
Informal particpation in several struggle and
protest movements ffom 1872 onwards; agfa-
tion in secondary schools and with students,
the denunciaton of the coup in Che, 0ppos’-
*
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Winter 1999/2000
ton o the mitary budgets. the reaction against
the last crimes of the Franquist regme, support
of the workers of Glaveroel, etc. In 1975 we
took part in “le Collectit pour la Liberte
Expression’ (struggle againsi the proect Van
den Poorten) and the frst pollical rials. Co-
founder n 1976 and sherwards the dving force
bening“Comite de soutien aux prisoniers de la
RAF" (which changed it name ina ‘Comite de
defense des prisonniers poltiques en BRO’)
‘Organized the occupation of the Dutch emassy
in Brussels o protest against the extraditon of
three RAF miltants to the BRD inthe spring of
1678 Arested in Zurich i the summer of the
same year because of the acquisition of am-
munition and pronibied from resking in Swit-
2erland under suspiion of ‘support for a ter-
st organization" (i this case: the RAF)
Founder ofthe miitantpress “Georgi Dimirov
Co-founder in 1981 of the magazine “Subu
sin (Revue Intemationale pour e communsme)”
and in the same period of the organization
DOCOM (Documentaton Comimunste) together
‘with mostly mittants o Acton Directe who had
Just been released from prison. Actively en-
gaged in soldarty with French revolutionary
Frederic Oriach who was imprisoned again in
1982 Co-founder of the magazine "Ligne
Rouge". Participation n the praciical and polt-
cal preparations for the construction of the
“Cellles Communistes Combattantes’. Exclu-
s engagement in this struggle since 1983
Begining in 1984 | went into complete can-
Gestiniy. B months before the star o the frst
policalmiltary campaign of the organization
Armed artest on December 16. 1985.
Bertrand: My istor is somewhat shorter but
ilusirates clearly what we said in the begin-
ning. | was fiteen years oid when the RAF
Kidnapped H M. Schieyer and sixteen when the
Red Brigades kidhnapped Aldo Moro. The ques-
tion of the armed struggle poses tsef i other
terms for a miltant of my generation than for
the miltants of the ormer generation. They had
1o think frst of the armed struggle in an imper-
alist country as a hypotheses, and then they
ad to take the st steps. For me, the urban
querila was already part of the poitical land-
scape. | took partn 1978 in the Comittee For
The Support Of The Prisoners Of The RAF. sat
p by Pierre; in 1962 | went ito revolutionary
clandestity
Pascale: Detais about my miltant and poltical
career (which starts also in 1972 with my par-
tiipation n the movement o secondary schools
against the project VD) will not add anything
o what just has been explained. | want though
to make clear, i thisinteresis you, that | did not
take partin the construction of the Cell. I fact
1 oniy joned the Cells and ther structures in the
autumn of 1985 During the time of the con-
Struction and the frst actons of the organiza-
ton, | was an open iltat i the collective of
the periodical ‘Ligne Rouge” which made propa-
‘gandsa for the amed communist groups. With
“Ligne Rouge" we. among cther actvites, re-
produced the communiques of the Cels in
form of pampriets which we then distibuted
them dunng demonsirations, gatherings. etc
In your communiques, the CCC describe
themselves as a vanguard. Many people
have criticized this vanguard concept, the
leadership of your organization. The CCC
wore always willing to accept criticisms,
but did you ever seek a real dialogue with
the movement (Iike the RAF eventually
did)? Do you stil adhere to the principle
of the “correct line"? Do you still think
I’ trus that power comes from the b
rol of a gun? In other words, doesn't the
danger exist that the popular revolution
could become dependent on the armed
struggle and a polltical line chosen by a
minority of people?
There are a ot of misconceptions here
The CCC never failed to cany thei respons:-
bilties, but they dd not ciaim o be the sole
authorty. the eaing party in the sense of Len-
nism. The name of the CCC sel points to a
decidediy diferen reaity in which it i impos-
sile 10 take on the unitying task of such an
organization. Also, the CCC sought to empha-
size one of the prioites of the revolutionary
movement, which we contributed to. namely
refecton and working out polical theory.
We think that revolutionary success re-
quires a vanguard organization. What do we
mean by that? A fihting structure which brings
together and strengthens the best forces from
our camp, and this is o be t the head of the
proletarian forces within the ciass struggle. The
fevalution is not an arwork, # is an historcal
task in which pecple must appear as winers.
We need o gve ourseives the objective, mate-
rial, and deological possibilies o achieve vic-
tory. and t s the revolutonary vanguard party
whieh pens the firs door towards this. Se-
cause organizaton is superior to non-organ-
zation. consciousness is betier than uncon-
scousness. and s0 on
But the CCC were not tnis party, aithough
they wanted 1o work towards buiding f even-
tually. The goal of this organizatonal attempt,
the practice of armed propaganda. and the
‘search fo poltial confrontatin with all goups.
wih respect to the class struggle. ail of this
brought the CCC to conclude that they were
the ai the most advanced position n the coun-
ry - when viewed objectively with respec to
the vanguard - both theoretically and pracii
Cally. Andwe st believe ths today. even tough
we were defeated
e poltcal-mitary campaigns ofthe CCC
in 1884 and 1985 took place within geat popu-
lar and proletarian mobilzations. They were
supported by an important theoretcalpoitical
production which called for struggle and cril-
cal debate and the trumph of orrect analyses
and ideas over faise ones. For example. the
statoning of American missies in Florennes in
1985 was descrived by the CCC as imperiist
war and a crass manifestation of captalsm,
and the group crtiized the illusions of petty-
bourgeois pacists. But there was no debate.
‘Some silence, some protest. and even attacks
by groups waving red or black fags were the
answers we received
“Power comes from the barrel of a gur’,
yes that's rue. But et notget everything mixed
Pierre Carette
Gp. This truth s an exact reflecion of human
deas and values in the objective workd. Trth
is the correct interpretaton of realty. some-
thing which gives us the possibilty of acting in
an effectve manner. Mandists do not operate
on the basis of dreams o follwing thei sub-
jective preferences. They strve to know a his-
torcal and social stuaton as it s, o fnd the
best method to intervene i it and control (the
“correct ne"), and i 50 doing o bing to move-
ment towards sociast revoiution, the aboition
of paid labor. and to come closer o the end of
explotaton and mjstice.
Why do you never react on actual themes,
for example the struggle of the Zapatistas
in Chiapas, the congress of the
‘Autonomen’ in Berlin, or, hers in Bel
gium, the wave of strikes in the Forges
e Clabeca, Renault-Vilvoorde, and s0 on?
s a general ruke, when comrades ask us
o react on 8 cerain event or ask some advice
on a certain subject, we do answer on the
given question. But we don't see why we
shoud express ourselves about everything and
more. Our imprisonment - and the length of i -
removes us fom the struggle and from the spe-
cific ealties, and that s 3 serous Imiation on
the knowledge we have and on our abifty to
contributein s creative and orginal way. Search-
ing for a common ground (even revolutionary
ones) in an ilusionary theater and inevitably
always reacting 100 late on the events isn't
really motvating
But we sure donit absent ourselves from
the socal actualty and struggles. For examle,
if we consider i “La Fleche et la Cible” the
question of syndicalst acton and the revolu-
tonary perspectes of & of f we write about
the strategy fo the struggle or the accumua-
tion of the proletaran forces, efc. then we are
intervening in the core fsef of the questions
brought to the fore by the conficts such as
those in Clabeca or Viivoorde.
Tsnitthis the ony serous way 1o act, and
*
al Edition - Winter 1999/2000
the most construciive, aiso the only posside
one today for us in ail? We can deplore this
estiction. try to overcome it as much as pos-
sile. but 1. there. and with the years always
heavier to bear.
“The merger of the militants of the CCC
with the collaborators of the "FRAP" is.
particularly false. The Fighting Commu-
hist Colls and this ‘FRAP" are complete
strangers o each other (this Is, by the
way. confirmed by the police investiga.
tion) and are even political enemies. This.
merger is a manoeuvre by the powers.
that be; they want to depoliticize the strug-
gle of the CCC by tying it to the adventure
of the 'FRAP, that is by insisting on the
common point of one similar penal in-
fraction. Moreover, this merger gives the
authorities the guarantee that two pre-
clous collaborators are present on the
scene of the court. How can the farce oth-
erwise be played?" This paragraph is an
extract from the pamphlst “Freedom! n-
formation For The Liberation Of Pierre
Carette, Pascale Vandegesrds, And
Bertrand Sassoye”, distributed by the
APAPC. The CCC did distance themselves
several times from the FRAP, can you give
once more the main reasons for this?
This is 2 question that we have had to
ome back to on many occasions (we even
editeda complete document n 1990, "Le FRAP
provocation et repenti) This tory s of minor
Interest et us just recap the essential Starting
1985, three attacks took place in Brussels.
climed by a ‘Front Revolutionnaire dAction
Proletarienne’. In fact ths “Front”didnt really
exst, it was 3 satelite of the French group
‘Action Directe The aim? To gve the lusion of
real existing West European Guerrila Front”
35 called for by the RAF and AD some tme
earter. and to which the CCC in Belgium (and
‘GRAPO in Spain) had refused tojoin. When the.
police searched the bases of AD i Brusses,
they found documents of the FRAP and they
artested two people. They ciaimed to be anar.
chists. but confronted with the repression,they.
deny thei Itte acventure and made an agree-
mentwih the Departmentof Justce. They were
rewarded for this with minor sentences and
were soon freed. End of the FRAP.
Why did the CCC refuse to take part in
the “anti-imperiallst front” called for by
the RAF and AD? This seems. strange,
especially when one knows that the CCC.
were very close to AD (aspecially via
Frederic Oriach) and that your orga
tion appeared for the first time with the
“October First Anti-Imperialist Cam.
paign”.
A small orrection o begin with: Frederic
Oriach was in prison for 2 ong tme in France
as a militant of the Noyaux Armes Pour
TAutonomie Populaire (NAPAP). the heis of the
miltary oganzation of La Gache Proletarienne
(GP). which was founded long before Action
Directe, and on totaly diferent poitical basis
He was only “close” o AD in poice consiruc-
tons (and 5 scnoes in the media) which ook
Care 11 hi was jaled fo 3 second tme n
882, 1n 3 long mterview i 1983, in which he
ges detais about s rch histry 35 3 fihting
internatonaiist communis, Fraderic summa-
rzes. Sa s easy 1o undorstand that | have
nothing 1 do. nea o ar. with AD i contradic-
lon wih tnose udcrous constructions 30 .
ten made vp."
-8 famous pice of 1916, mperilam
The Hahest Stage Of Captalsm. Lo cortn-
ues the ingenious hisorcal analyses of Marx
and defnes the naure ofthe “parastism” and
decay of capitalism. For the Cellules
Commuistes Combattantes te term “mpers
alsm’ s siuated n ths Mandst-Leniist con-
{ext Forthe RAF and AD i the beginingof he
19805 “mperialis” mainy Gescries e rea.
tonsip between dominant counires and dom-
nated countries. a bit ike how the Third
Wordss see thngs. So the iference s very
big And thi is ony one of the many dfe
ences above ots of tner diferences on a
shiosaphica leve. n connection wih he hi-
{orcal and sconomictheay.n connecion wit
ie poltcal e and the sirategy to falow. For
example the sirtegic concept o the fron
ooks wiong 1o us. e believe in 2 pary o the
Loniist type as most th imporiant natonal r.
ganizationalprinciple, and an ‘terationale of
e Comintem-ype as the ransnatonalorgan
zational princile
I ourwork of 1993 "La Fiche et Cvle’
we have ted to work out ou cricism on the
Concepts of the RAF and AD. I essence we
Toject s subjectvist characer, ther tension
{owarcs e ragcarefomism and to mitarsm
Beyond this we can remark hat e RAF
‘Who were the crving force behind the Front
nas disalved e (which made big headines
in he pagers. of course). whie GRAPO, who
rejected the concept on basis o fightng com-
munist crcs last month di an daring amed
propaganda operation n the hear of Madnd
(Which was the subect of a toal media biack-
out. of course)
Did you ever have the impression of be-
ing manipulated? We ask this question
because it is often sad that the actions
of the CCC, together with the “Gang of
NijveI", were part of a “strategy of ten-
sion” organized by the extreme right? In
this case roforences are made to Pierre
Carstte’s brother and to weapons found
in CCC safehouses, otc.
From the very start the CCC was sub-
jected 10 a ot of fitny and contradictory sian-
Ger from aiferent comers. from the extreme.
gt (CCC=KGB) o the extreme-#ftCCC=CIA),
and L has stayed that way unti this day.
For some i was necessary, and sl is
thatthe struggle of the CCC - where the goal s
crystal ciear - s nterpreted as something sus-
picious, with an obscure ground and myster-
ous objectives, and this s to stop refiection
‘about the poltical questions and revolutionary
strategy. As long as one keeps on talking
torms fom bad spy novels, ke “manipulations”
Pascale Vandegeerde
ang “destabilzator. one rejects the central
question which really interesis the proltanat
Wrich offenswe strategy s best fo the class
struggle? One darkens this decisive truth
namely that the armed struggle s essental
‘when restartng the revolutionary process. and
they solate these fihters. I's 2 well-known
ik, and one finds the same lies about the Red
Brigades i Haly. the GRAPO in Spain fc Inthe
early Gays they said Lenin was ‘German spy
1t has been asked before why we don'
systematically deny this siander. Lets tak about
the examples put forward in the question. Wel.
wha s there to deny? Yes. Pirre has an lder
brother. So wnat? Yes, the CCC (and Action
Directe and the RAF) were in the possession
of arms taken from the attack on the amy bar-
racks in Vielsam in May 1984, So what? Wel.
stictly put. absolutey nothing. In the end "one
beleves who one wans to believe’.
“Pierre Carette has a brother”. Yes, but
there are also rumors that he was a
member of the secret service and that
Pierre Carette was a militant together
with his brother in extreme right groups.
We must leave guit by biood relaionship.
tothe cassical ragedies, and to the media ars
of the PTB. We are ot n a posiion to inform
you about miltary careerist Henri Carete, who
was related with extreme right growps at the.
end of the 60s at the University of Brussels
because Pierre has got the least contact with
. it was ther total and defntve ieclogical
contraictions which was the ground for them
breaking off all contact with each other.
Why did the actions of the CCC stop after
your arrests?
‘Simply because the objective vulnerabilty
of our organzation didn't allow further resist-
ance against the blows against our group and
totake the nfiative again
“The polce offensive of the winter of 1985/
86 was not imited to our arrests. 1t was fo-
*
lowed by the discovery of our operational
bases. of garages and ciandestine apartments.
by the sezure of important material. and the
paralyzing of comrades. etc. This certainly
oesntconcern a polcal deciion. Realty has
shown that the Celis were badiy prepared for
repression. on the level of simple structural
Securty. and on amore general polical-organi-
Zational level. Here we make an allusion (o the
itansic devston that has party contaminated
the CCC. a devation we have admited and
crticzed n "La Fieche et Ia Cible” and in the
dedate with Voie Proletarienne.
But even more than our defeat, where we
have to learn our lessons, the experience of
the CCC in Belgium has show how the practice
of the armed propaganda can be an enormous
upif: for revolutonaries
Can you give a more precise explanation
about the split between you and Didier
Chevolet?
D Chevolet was a miltatof the Celles:
Communistes Combattantes and after that 3
member of the collctive of prisoners uni the
Summer of 1995, At that tme he fet us know of
his decision o leave the colletive and his
choice 0y to b released in an apolical way.
We have tried, without success. o make him
reaize that his step was ingiduaistic and in
contradiction with our common interest, and
thatthe “apoltical character of his positon was
an ilusion, because i came out of an objective
polfical skuation. We regret this schism very
much. We have ost a comrade. and by losing
our unty much more than a comvade.
How is the treatment in prison? Are you
being held in under special conditions (for
‘example “high security")? Do you have
contacts with social prisoners? How are
those contacts?
At the time of our arrests in December
1885, we were put i total solaton, a treatment
never before seen in Belgium and this was
condemned as torture by the welkknown hu-
mantarian organizations. In MayLJune (1986)
we held a firs collctive hungerstike, lasting
43 days. but without real results. We were
eld in scation forthree years, even unt ater
our tia, and we only suc-
ceeded io reach a dscon-
tinuance afer & sacond
long and hard
hungerstrke
From then on we
were integrated in the
prison popuiaton, but we
were sil hekd under ex-
ceptional imiations (for
example. non-stop
sunvellance, opening
of mail, mitation of
vists, etc). We must
also poin outthat we
are not dependant
upon the adminstra-
tive authoriies of the
prison. but upon an
Arm The Spirit Spe
obscure comitise that works under the De-
panment of Justice
Our contacts with social prisoners are
pririy insolidarty. We try 1o answer i a pos:-
tve way on posed questions and systemat-
cally we support the common demands and
protest movements. Duing these exchanges
we defend the proletarian interests and the
principles of the communist morale. We ry to
Geveiop jus relecton upon the nature of the
System an the crme i bings, we fght racism.
Sexism. etc. But s stiljust a drop of water n
a desert o misery
In prison you did several actions. Which
and why? In the media there were no a
ticles, the lef didn't react. s the left sus
picious about you? Or you against the left7
Were you (better) supported by foreign
groups?
We held two important hungerstikes. in
1886 and in 1988, to get out o solaton and to
gain the possibilty of proonging our collectve
paltical work. The mainsiream media were
atherdiscrete about thisstruggle. What s there
o wonder about? They are part of the system
Tne extreme lef idn' react. This needs a dou-
ble comment Firstofall his st all thatsurprs-
ng coming from he insttutoaleft (PCB, POS.
PTD). i's proof of the profundity of their poltical
‘and ideclogical cormuption. Secondy, we were
surprised by the genera efist moverent. The
ball s intheir camp: Why is there no solidarty
apart from polfical diferences. with revolu.
tonaries confronted with criminai repression in
their own couniry? Isn' this a sign of a territle
weakness?
During the hungerstrikes we were actively
supported by the *Association des Parents el
‘Amis des Prisonnier(e)s Communistes” On an
international level we were supported con-
cretely by groups and comades from Germany.
Swizertand, Denmark, etc But the more spor-
taneous soiidarity was clearl stronger on a
European level. Once again: Who should draw.
ther lessons?
What can people do for your release?
A this time i is clear that the authories.
are not prepared to release us and they wil
only be prepared to elease us when they fear
‘2 growth nthe mobilzation fo our cause. They.
‘Could be worried about the growing interest in
the experence of the Cell. In a message on
the occasion of the interational day of revo-
utionary prisoners” we made following state-
ment
“Thero are two important reasons why we are
held. Firstof ail 1o hold back from the commu-
nist movement fighting milants who have
proven their dedicaton. Secondly they want fo
temonze those who, tred of reformist deadend
Stroets, want fo go on the revolutionary pah.
We wil leave prison when these politcal mo-
tives are unmasked and the protest i 5o great
thatthe powers that be wil see it more adis-
abie to rolease us than o appear i thei roal
| Edicion - Winter 1999/2000
Bertrand Sassoye
Torm, rather this than o afractthe atention on
the causes that force them o this hardness
towards us, who aro ony tree with many years
n prson behind them.
This wil be 3 ong struggle where ail good wil
s welcome. This struggle wil be won, which
il please us of course, but this above al will
sorve the general suggle of the proletarial
Without the last we woul' afford ourselves
such publi cals for soldanty. But this soli-
Ganty fils us with force, trust. and enthusi-
‘What neecs o be done? I s necessary to
evelop a publc miltant agiation: set up local
committses, organize information gatherings.
make dynamic and wel-sounding interventions.
etc. Everything which can break the wall of
silence, buit and maintained by the powers and
their accompiices, will put us 3 step further
towards freedom
(Source: Anarchist Black Cross - Gent <htip/
I xs4al bo/~ance/abc-gent>)
Bertrand Sassoye
Rue des Aubépines. 2
4450 Lantin
Beigum.
Pascale Vandegeerge
Place Joseph Andre, 7
5000 Namur
Beigum
Prerre Carette
Bd Winston Churchil, 24
7000 Mons
Beigum
Association des Parents et Amis des
Prisonnier(e)s Communistes.
86
Saint Giles 1
1060 Bruxeles.
Beigum
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
Arm The Spirit Special Edi
n - Winter 1999/2000
A Brief History Of The Armed
Struggle Of GRAPO In Spain
The Fist of October Ant-Fascist Resist-
‘ance Groups (GRAPO) were formed inthe sum-
mer of 1975. AL tha time twenty members of
the Re-Constiuted Spanish Communist Party
(PCE-1) an underground pary formed five
months before, carried out their first amed
action against the fascist securdy forces. On
August 2. 1975 two Guardia Civil (Civil Guard)
members were shot in the centre of Madrid
One died and another was seriously njured
This was th fist srke back of GRAPO against
the wave of fascist-nspired terror known as
“the summer of terro”
The PCE(1) had its own “technical sec-
tion" created to carry out expropriations of
banks o support the revalutionary siruggle and
punish police informers. From the core of ths
Seclion emerged GRAPO.
On October 1, 1975 fve different GRAPO
ommandos executed four policemen and ser-
ously injured anather ane in Madnd. Ths was
thei answer o the assassinations of five ant-
fascists (two members of ETA and three mem-
bers of the now defunct FRAP organization)
Kl on September 27, by poice firing squads
applying Geath penaltes ordered by the miltary
authorties.
'GRAPO gt claim responsiily forthese.
actions until July 8. 176 when 60 bombs.
blasted fascst targets thoughout the county.
Itwas the 60th anniversary of the beginning of
the Civl War won by the fascists
in January 1977 the police arrested 40
PCE(1) and GRAPO members in Madnid and
Barcelona and succeeded in freeing Lieuten-
ant-General Vilaescusa and a member of the
Spanish aigarchy Orol. who had been kept
pisoner by GRAPO commandos for 60 days in
order to exchange them for polical prisoners
and to force the government to agply an am-
nesty. A few days before two GRAPO com-
‘mandos had executed two policemen and one
Gl Guard in Madrd and injured three more
Civil Guards in two separate attacks on the
fascist forces as 4 reaction to the Kilings of
v lefist lawyers by a paramiltary gang act-
ng under Civil Guard orders.
On June 4. two Civil Guards were shat
dead in Barcalons, tis was the day of the frst
general electon since 1936 and the reformist
farce was going on. This action was a clear
5ign that showed that the revolutonary organ-
Zations would not accept the renewal of fas-
clsm under any “democratic” mask.
On September 27, 1977, Captain
Herguedas.ofhe Natinal Polce was shot deac
by aGRAPO commando n Madr. He had been
one of the fascist volunteers who executed
five ant-fascits just two years earler.
1n 1877 and 1578 GRAPO actons contin-
ved, mainly bomb atacks against amy and mil-
tary quarters but also against govemment fa
cies. Some selective assassinations were
also carmed out. On March 22. 1978, the Gen-
eral Manager of Prisons was shot dead near
his house In Madrid. He was responsidle for
the kiling ofa anarchist prisoner in Carabanchel
Prison, who was beaten to death by guards
Wh ted to get nformatin from him about an
‘escape plan of GRAPO and PCE() prisoners.
1879 was the year in which GRAPO car-
18 out s most acions: on January 9 a judge
from the Supreme Court was shot dead. on
March 5 an Afmy General was executed when
his car was attacked by a GRAPO team
on a centre street of Madri. and on
Apri, achief o he “Antterrorst”
Brigade of the Natonal Plice (NP)
was executed in Sevile. Alto-
gether 20 members of the fascist
police were executed that year in
a combination of actions by the
urban guerrila throughout the
country, and there were many
bombs attacks that year as well
On the other hand GRAPO
and PCE() miltants payed a high
price for this: 100 people were
Jaied - accused of membership i
these organizations. (Police claimed that the
PCE(() and GRAPO were the same thing and
many PCE(1) miltanis were arrested wihout
any evidence against them. The Party was
banned again, just as t had been under the
miltary dictatorship). Seven members of the
PCE(] and GRAPO were kiled by the police
that year. On June 28, Martn Eizaguire and
Femandez Cario were assassinated by 3 spe-
cil tear of the Sparish miltary secret service.
in Paris. They were members of the Commitee
of Foreign Relations ofthe PCEI() and were in
exile. On April 20, Juan Carios Delgado de
Codes. a member of the Central Commiiee of
the PCE() was shot dead by the poice i Ma-
i - e was unarmed and didn' belong to the
guerrila. Between Aril and May GRAPO car-
ied out 30 amed actions in response to the
King of Delgado de Codes. This was later cr
cized by the Central Commando of GRAPO and
the PCE() as a aling into bind miltarstctac-
tics. From that moment on GRAPO aimed all s
effots at maintaining the armed struggle and
qving 1t a protracted character, assuming that
Lis not only possible but aiso necessary 1o
follow a Protracted People’s War strategy and
that i is possible to develop this stalegy in &
doveloped European country.
On December 17. 1978 five prisoners of
GRAPO escaped from Zamora jai through a
tunnel dug for months by GRAPO and PCE(r)
prisoners (some of them were miners). I was
a real snock fo the goverment, which tned to
recapture them atany cost. Three o them were
finally kiled by the police (in 1980, 1981 and
1882) and the other two were recaptured
shortly afte they rejoined the struggle
In 1980 and 1981 GRAPO was a weak
organization due o the repression carred out
against ts supporters. In these years GRAPO
carmied out eight executions,incuding o Army
Generals and one Colonel o denounce the role
played by the army in the difty war and coun-
termsurgency. A few policemen and civil
guards were aiso executed. GRAPO, 35 an
organization that aims at becoming the core of
the future People's Ay has never targeled
innocent civilans nor used dangerous devices
againstcivilans n s miltary acions and sabo-
1age. In 1980-81 nine members of GRAPO were
Kl by the police in a ciear shoot -kl pocy.
One PCE() mittant died a5 consequence of
torture in 1980 and on June 19, 1981, Crespo
‘Galende, PCE(7) prsoner, ded n hunger stike
(he lasted 94 days) against the poicy of tor-
ture, isolation and anniniation of the poltical
prisoners. The government was forced to
reunity the prisoners and allow thefn 1o keep
theirCommunes inthe as. (The Karl Manx Com-
mune - 80 prisoners of PCE() and GRAPO - in
Soria Prson lasted unt 1989 when the social-
fascist government dismantied 1)
In October 1982 he PSOE (socialfasciss)
came to power. The PSOE began by kiling Juan
Marin Luna, leader of GRAPO, who was shot
sixtmes in Barcelon n an undercover-opera-
ton. He was unarmed. and some years later
three poicemen were charged with murder,
but they were acquitied_On the eve o the
elections, (October 28). GRAPO planted 30
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldw,
Arm The Spi
ter 1999/2000
bombs in Madrd. Barcelons. Valencia and
Twelve other pars of the country The blasts
were simed at promoting 3 boycoft and to de-
hounce the electora farce
101983 and 1984 GRAPO recovered fom
ts previous weakness and carfied out many
‘amed actons Duringthis tme GRAPO carned
out about 70 bomb attacks - aimed at police
targets. in support of worker's stikes, in sup-
portof cther countres revolutionaries. etc. and
ais0 against the bourgeois mass media (eg.
bomb attack against the German consulate in
support of the RAF prisoners, bomb against
the Employers crganzaton)
During this tme GRAPO aiso carried out
some executions. In April 1983, 3 Lieutenan of
the National Polce and a Civi Guard were ex-
ecuted in Valencia and Coruna. the fst one by
2 bomb in i car and the second one was shot
desa
On January 2. 1984 two policemen were
shot dead in Madd. 1984 saw GRAPO make
frantic effots to support the proletaran strg-
gles throughout the country (46 bombs attacks
that yean. o strike back agaist the repressive
forces and to collect the revolutionary taxes
needed o keep the struggle aive (100 busr
nessmen paid the revolutionary tax that year)
On September 5 vee separate GRAPO com-
mandos launched an offensive to force the
exploters to pay the revolutionary tax. In Mz
a1 a businessman who had refused o pay
was shot dead and in Sevile another GRAPO
team executed Manuel de la Padure. 3 wel-
Known businessman and chairman of the Em.
ployer's Assocition. In Coruna the head of the
National Radio Broadcasting was seriously in-
jured n etaiation or his counter-revolutionary
propaganda. This was a warning 1 the reac-
tionary mass media which continually discred-
s the revautonary siruggle. One of the GRAPO
miltants who had carried out the action in
Coruna was kiled by the poiice some hours
later and another one was injured and cap-
tured when the GEO-Squad (NP special as-
saut squad) raded the house where they were
hidden
The repression launched against GRAPO
and the PCE() that year was very harsn. In
June, Manuel Perez Martinez “comrade Are-
s " secretary general o the PCE{() ef prison
afir having been jaied since 1977 accused of
unlawful association’. He, as many other
former prisoners of the PCE(r), had to go un-
derground again as the only way of developing
the struggle away from police control. Since
the 70's some ofthe PCE(r) and GRAPO leac-
ership and clandestine organization has been
based in France, and the Spanish police have
never been abl to desiroy .
On January 15, 1985, the Spanish poliical
police succeeded in capturing most of the
‘GRAPO miltans i Spain 19.of them were cap-
tured n ine difierent provinces, the police d
covered 17 apartmens. lots of weapons and
ammunition and money collected through the
revolutionary tax. This cisaster was possile
due o the breaking of many securty and clan-
destine rules by GRAPO i s aim of carying
outtoo many actons in supportofthe people’s
struggies. Thestrct comparmentaizaion within
the organization had been broken and this ai-
lowed the polce to carry ou this strong strke
in only forty-eight nours.
“The reorganization of GRAPO was siow
and diffcut in 1985 it amost ceased 10 exist
but the spirt of sacrice of the new miltants.
most of them without any previous guerrila
experience. allowed the siruggle 1o continue
1n 1985 and 1986 they camied out some bank
expropriatons. some went wiong and seven
‘GRAPO members were captured. Money had
become the main problem sinc they were not
strong enough to collect the revolutionary tax -
they neede aparments, cars, and facltes to
develop the urban guerrila successfuly from
the underground. Weapons were aiso desper-
ately needed
1687 was a smalltuming point. n that year
they carred outsix amed acilons according to
police sources. There were some successful
bank expopriations (smal ones) and a head-
auarters of the local poice in Malaga was at-
tacked to obtain weapons. Three constables
were disarmed and tied up. (They were not
executed 35 they were not considered proper
targets. The local poice are mainly concemed
wih motor venicle traffic and play o specil
fepressive role). In another operaton, a GRAPO
‘commando ed to atack a National Poie st
tion in Valence to seize blank identy cards
there was a shooting and a policeman was
seriously injured
in 1988 GRAPO carred out some armed
actions 1o collect the revolutonary tax again
On May 27 the President o the Bank of Galicia
was shot dead in is house; he had refused to
pay the tax and had alerted the polce about
GRAPO activi. He was 8 wel-known exploter
Who had impoverished many pecple (especially
poor famers). and he was aiso responsible
forthe closing of many factories due to bank.
ing speculation. Two months lter another busi
nessman was shot and seriously wounded
On October 4, GRAPO succeeded n sez-
ing 800 blark identity cards from a poiice st
tion inthe centre of Madra. A polceman was.
shot dead and his weapon seized. (Most of
GRAPO's weapons came from ts actions
against the police and securty guards).
On March 10, 1989 GRAPO executed wo
CivilGuards in Santiago, the same day that the
TREVI group was having a meeting in Madric
(TREVI was then the visible head of repres.
11ABAJO
EL ESTADO
| TERRORISTA;
| \
sion in wester Eurcpe). In July 1989 GRAPO
Soved their money problems by exproprating
48 millon pesetas (one millon dolars) from a
bank in Castelon
In November the politcal prisoners of
PCE() and GRAPO stared an indefinie hun-
ger strike demanding an end 1o isoation and
heir reunifcation i a single prson. (The o
cal prisoner's communes had been dismantied
by the PSOE government in 1987) To support
the siruggle o the prisoners GRAPO launched
anoffensive in December.Onthe 13th an Army
‘Commander was shot in Magid and serously
injured; on the 15th an Amny Colonel was shot
three times and seriously njured in Valencia:
onthe 18th a member o the secret polce was
Shot dead near Barcelona whie he was leav-
ing his nouse. and on the 28th two Civi Guards
were executed in Gion whil they were guaro-
ing an offcial buiding_ The governments re-
sponse was o arrest mittantsof the PCE(?).jal
them and biame them for hese armed actons.
(One of the lies spread by the mass media s
that GRAPO mambers are recruted only from
among the miltants of the PCE(). $0 trying to
present tis clandestine revolutionary party as
the “political branch of GRAPO).
'As the hunger sirke went on many pris-
oners were moved to hospitals where they
Wwere chained to thei beds. isturbed by poiice
and forced 1o receive ‘forced feeding’ i a des-
perate and torturous measure by the goven-
ment to avoid the death of these revolutionar-
fes at that very moment (prefernng instead to
annihate them siowly and sieatly i the pris-
ons).
O March 27, 1990, 3 GRAPO commando
executed doctor Muncz in Zaragoza. In their
statement GRAPO called him a torturer” ready
1o follow the goverment's instructions 10 sub-
mitthe prisoners o the agony and torture of the
forced feeding. He had refused orders fiom
Judge tostop this kind oftoture and was- fim.
Supporer of the govemment plans of extermi-
nation. (As well he was 3 cousin of the Span-
ish Attorney General). As a consequence of
theforce feading the hunger srke became very
prolonged. On May 25, Jose Manuel Sevilano
Martindied afer 177 days on hunger sirke - he
Wwas 3 member of GRAPO and had been impris-
oned since 1987. GRAPO decided 1o avoi en-
teing into a tor-tat batte - because this could
only benefi the already alet securty forces
IRESISTENCWA
. ARMADA
Arm The Spiri
Special Edition
Winter 1999/2000
Inthe dawn of Apr 7t an active com-
mando of our organization, the First of Octo-
ber Antifascist Resistance Groups
(GRAPO). has demolished by means of &
powerful explosive charge the interor of the
Vale de fos Caicos Basica, he funeral monu-
ment where the morta remains of he main
heads of the Spanish State are buried and
which was inaugurated by the dictator
Franco forty years ago.
“The Vale de los Caidos Basiica i one
of the most clear examples of the persist
ence of he fascist regime and has aiways
aroused the hatred of the masses since
represants the sweeping away of thei demo-
cratic nghts and berties. The fascist regime
15 stil standing and ths s also proven by the
fact that, after more than twanty years of
“democratc” reforms. the men and women
that fought against the mast are stil i the
prisons. Many of them for more than twenty
years - even when they have aiready served
thei sentences. It s also proven by the am-
nesty gven to those who were responsidle
for the GAL [so-called Ant-Terrorst Groups.
of Liberation, n reaity government death
squads responsible for the Kiling of 27
Basques between 1983.87 - ed ] whi st
e same tme t mprisone the Natonsi Leac.
ership of Herr Batasuna and continues the
[First of October Antifascist Remstance)‘\
Groups (GRAPO) Communique
diny war with ther pracice of toture and po-
tical assassinations such s that against ETA
member Jose Luis Geresta Muika.
s action agains ine Valle d los Caidos
Basiica joins others recently caried out by our
9roups of which we highigh the following
- Placement of explosive devices in the faci-
ties of the Cope Racio Broadcast in Barcelona
on August 5. 1998, in the Temporary Employ-
ment Agencies “Ata Gestion” in Vigo on No-
vember 6. 1998 and Adecco’ located in
Marques de Vadilo in Madrid on November 25,
1998,
- Bombing of the Temporary Employment
‘Agency “Unitrab" located on Lenda street in
Madrid on November 12, 1998, and the National
Insitte of Labour, Healh and Securty in Cudad
Lineal, Madid on November 13, 1986,
- Bombing of the central offices of the
Catalonian Employer's Assocition i Barcelona
and of the Young Businessman Associaton of
Baix Lisbregat in Cornela, both on December
30,1998
it s clear that under this regime, we, the
Workers. cannot expect 3 solution 10 the many.
problems that affect us diectly and that the
captalist economic criss s sharpening more
and more each day. Neither can we expect
the least economic. social or poltcal con-
cessions of the Spanish oigarchy in apeace-
flmanner. The ones tha have imposed them-
selves by means of arms and teror and are
st maintaining themsives in power by arms
must be overthrown by arms. For ths re:
son, we have to figt resolutly. uniting the
popular masses and increasing the resst
ance everywnere.
‘There s No Truce Against Fascism!
Join The Resistance!
Let's nite Our Forces!
Forward With The
People’s Resistance Movement!
Central Command of the First of October
Antfascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO)
April 12, 1999
and after a retalaton action (e execution of
an Army Colonel on June 15 in Valladoid)cen-
tred themssives on carrying out an offensive
1o take theiniiative again in September.
In September 1990 GRAPO planted six
bombs in Madrd, Taragona, Barcelona and
Gion. On the 6th thee bombs went off n Ma-
i (one inthe Stock Exchange, ancther one in
the Supreme Court and te last one inthe Min-
istry of Econamy). None of these actons re-
Sulted in any cviian casualtes. On September
8,2 bomb blasted petrl aciities in Tamagona
causing damage o 3 milion doirs: and on the
101h the PSOE central office in Barcelona was
bombed causing damages valued at 100,000
dolars. September ended with a GRAPO ac-
ton in Gijon in which 8 commando raided an
offia buding seging one thousand biank driv-
ing licenses and then planted & bomb that
biasted the faciiies. In November 1990 two.
more bombs rocked two offcial buiings in
Barcelona
In 1891 and 1992 GRAPO continued with
it bombing campaign against offcial buidings:
in April 1962 GRAPO bormbed the National nsts
e of Industry and the Minisry of Employment
in Madrid, two Civi Guards were injured. One
year earier n February 1991 a GRAPO bomb
cut, for six hours. the miltary NATO pipein
that supplies the U.S. air bases in Spain. The
intent was to sabotage this pipeine which wi
being used by the US. B-52 Superforresse
that had devastated Iraqi cies. There wers
also sabotage actons against the faciites of
the energy monapolies in 1991 and 1952 as
well as bank expropriatons.
In 1983 three GRAPO miltants died in
Zaragoza n an attack on an armoured car that
was blown up with explosives o expropriste
the funds tha t contained. One securty guard
g and oo wer ey e Tt
seven bombs exploded n official buid-
1158 in Mace nthe Empiyers Associaion.
PSOE offces, and other offies involved in the
industrial reconversion which had (8 of thou-
sands of workers)
In 1984 GRAPO actions were ntended to
seize funds that were desperately needed
‘Some expropriations were carned out. In Janu-
ary two bombs expioded in Madiid on the eve.
of a general strie. a Tax offce and an Unem-
ployment offce were bombed. In July and De-
cember two armoured cars were attacked and
money was expropriated (about a haff millon
dolars),
n 1995 GRAPO caried outone of he most
important and decisive actons of the last few
years. On June 27 they kidnapped Pubiio Cor-
don, wealthy businessman and presiden of
the insurance company PREVIASA; he was.
freed on August 17 in Barcelona aflr paying
400 millon pesetas (about three millon dolas).
He had o pay ancther 800 millon pesetas after
his ieration but he decided to fies (nis bus-
nesses are not very clean. he was also consul
of Guatemala and has important business in
that country) In November the polce arrested
three GRAPO members in Barcalona and Va.
lencia but they could not recover the money.
Nowadays it seems that GRAPO is under-
going 3 new re-organization and one thing is
very clear. the fascist Spanish state has lost
the bate i the sense that t has not been able
0 anniiate the amed organizaton no the revo-
Iutionary pary. the PCE()
I the past 21 years, 3,000 people have
beenarrested by he polce nrlaton to GRAPO
andthe PCE(), of which 1.400 have been aied
Nowadays there are 54 prisoners of PCE(1)
and GRAPO n Spanish k. From 1875 0 1995
‘GRAPO has carried out 60 execuions, more
than 300 bombs nave been planted and over
3,000 armed actons have been carred out
(The Spanish goverment recognizes 545.)
‘Twenty GRAPO miltants have ded by po-
lice action or 35 a result of premature explo-
sions. Seven PCE() miltants have been kiled
by the police and paramiltary gangs. Accord-
ing 1o police sources there about 100 PCE(r)
and GRAPO members inclandestinty.
We hope this bref history of the armed
struggle of GRAPO - unique due 1o the Pro-
tracted People’s War strategy folowed by the
PCE(7) and GRAPO - has been useful and inter-
esting
Association Of Relatives And Friends Of
Politcal Prisoners (AFAPP)
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
Arm The Spi
Freedom For Francisco
Brotons Beneyto, Now!
Francisco Brotons Beneyto, Communist
22 Years In The State Dungeons,
Kidnapped By The Regime
He was bor in Petrel (Alicante) n 1944
His father was a wood lathe operator and his
mother was 3 shoe trmmer. When he was 11
years old he entered a technical college in Ma-
i, where he leamed the trade of de-stamp-
ing adjuster. At the same tme he studied in the
‘evening high school courses. and later he en-
tereg uniersity where he studied the frst two.
years of Engineering. In order o pay his stuc-
fes he worked a5 3 mechanic, administrative
assistant.teaching in schools and giving pr-
vate classes
By the end of the 19605 he started to be
poltically active in different organizations of
the communistlef. In 1573 he foned the OMLE
(Organization of Marxist-Leninists of Spain).
He participated in the preparation of the
Reconstiutve Congress of the PCE(1)in 1975
I January 1977 he assumed the responsibity
of leading GRAPO. He partichated as a de-
egate in the 2nd Congress of the PCE(r) whe
e was elecied to be 3 member o the Palfica
‘Commission of the Party. He was arrested or
‘October 9, 1877 in Benidorm together with
‘Central Commitee ofthe PCE()
Together with Enrique Cerdan Calixto, Bist chag
Abelardo Collazo Arauxo. Femando
‘Ghomon and Juan Martin Luna, on Decert
17, 1975, he regained freedom through s
el whih they dug over 8 months using
vised toois and avoiding the constant searche
which, at thal tme, were made by the police .
themseives inside the prisons. Once out
and ater geting in touch withthe comr
the underground. he sssumed again the
v of GRABG (Frtof Gcber A Fasct
Groups) unil his e-arrest on September 20,
1880. Since then, he has been in fourieen pris
ons. He i now is the Sevile-l prison.
He has particiated in more than twenty
hungersiies.Strikes o solidaty, to denounce
the poltcal manouevres of the regme, and
mainy. hungersirkes to achieve decent iving
conditons n the prisons. We can highight two
ofthe lattr:that o 1981 against he extermina-
tion regime of the Herrera de la Mancha pison,
thatcost the fe of Juan Jose Crespo Galende,
and the one tha lasted from December 1989 15
February 1991 n which Jose Manuel Sevilano
Martin died. During this latter hungerstrike
Brotons was repeatedly transferred from jal to
Jail and from hosptal o hospital handcuffed to
is bed forlong periods of tme and submited
1o harrassment by the policemen who guarded
im.In 1980 he suffered a heart attack, escag-
ing death only by the factthat he was already
in'a hosptal and under medical care. When he
started the hungerstrike he was 72 ks, when
e finished it e was under 39 kios.
“This comimunist should have been released
four years ago according to the regime’s own
Taws. However. notsatisfied withthis proloning
of is sentence.the PP [Partido Popuiar-ruling
pary - ed] govemment pians to keep hm in
prison for ancther four years: penitentary in-
Sttutions and thei frends, the judges. refuse
o apply to him the sentence reductions that
correspond to him by law. For tha, they assert
that these reductons are annulled by his es-
cape from Zamora prson in 187 together with
four comades, even i ths is not provided for
in any judicial sentence.
“The truh of the mater is that they do not
forgive i the audacty of having broken down
the wals of their dungeons and even less that
he did 0 In order to undeniake the reorganiz:
tion of GRAPO, who at that time were deci.
mated by poiice repression. n fact. the polce.
declared a death penalty upon al the fugitves:
Avelardo Collazo Arauxo, Enriue Ceran Calcto
and Juan Martin Luna were assassinated in
palice ambushes; only Brolons and Femando
\Fierro Chomon saved the ves since they were
crowded places at the time of heir aests.
Neither do they forgive him the fact that
in the conditons of isoation and disper-
years, he and his comrades have
‘denouncing the fascist and teror
r o the Spanish State. giving an
f rovolutionary commitiment and
‘ahways in the front line of the strug-
carried out by the poltical pisoners against
repressive onstaughts of the regime.
We st have in our minds his skeletal -
% age nthe ngertunger sk mariained ity
rment, 440 days and nights; mages that
) Seditose ofthe Naz concenraon
xposed the cruel and paranoid
Cararess s oot e PO gou
‘emment. The hungerstikers only demanded to
be regrouped in the same prison in order to
carry out an ordered Ife in accordance with
their communist policy and ideology. It was 00
much dignity for the cowardly vermin of the
‘goverment
Brotons is i pison because he has fought
for the peaple’s and working-class nterests.
These are the real reasons for his never-
‘ending kidnapping: the class hatred of the Fa-
langits disguised into ‘democrats of the par-
ament of his gracious majesty and their fithy
spirt o revenge.
The proloning of his imprisonment s aiso
meant to be 3 lesson or all those who struggle
against the system.
It i the duty of al o support him in the
denouncement of his siutation.
We Have to Stop this Fascist Revenge!
Immediate Freedom for Franciso Brotons!
Amnesty for All the Polltical Prisoners!
(Source: Published by the Communist Party
of Spain (reconstituted) - December, 1999)
ter 1999/2000
AFAPP Statement
Francisco Brotons Beneyto has been
imprisoned for 22 years. He was arrested
before the so-called Amnesiy of 1977. This
leader of the PCE() and GRAPO is one of
the polical prisoners that were excluded
by the regime fom that achievement of the
People’s Movement. From that moment he
became one of the vctms of al the repres-
sive plans carred out againt the imprs.
oned revalutionaris by the diferent gov-
‘emments of UCD, PSOE and PP. addressed
o infict an additional punishment and o
achieve their renouncement of their ati-
fascist and democratc beliefs
Brotons has already served his sen-
tence - no pisoner can remain n pison for
more than 20 consecuive years. In spite
ofthis, the PP government s prolonging the
imprisonment and punishment o this revo-
Iutionary. This is mainly for two reasons.
because they have not sucoseded n crush-
g his spint in spite of all hei repeated
attempis to make him abandon his comm-
st beliefs and because they are using the
prolongation of hs mprisonment as a re-
Venge for his combative stand. Through-
out these years of imprisonment, Broton
has always been one of the poifica prs-
oners who have headed the resistance to
the repressive pians apoiied within the ais.
He has suffered isolation and has taken
part in many and prolonged hungerstikes.
n defence ofdignty and o his belefs. Only
a fow montns ago, Azmar's goverment
i not allow him (o see his father when he
was dying and afterwards did not allow
im o attend his fathers funeral o say his
last farewel t0 him.
“This special punishment inficted on
Brotons shows the cowardly, cruel and
fascist nature of the Bourbonic Monarchy
‘and shows it n s ful brutaly, # we dont
lose sight of the reatment given to the GAL
Kilers and the corupters of the system.
Who were freed immediatey after having
been sentenced to tens of years o impris-
onment by theit own courts
“The Spanish regime s punishing nthe
person of Brotons the workers, the youth
and all those men and women who rebel
‘against injustice and truggle for the demo-
cratc Ibertes.
For alhese reasons, AFAPP, besides.
denouncing once again the stuation of im-
prisonment in which this revolutionary re-
‘mains, calls upon the workers, the youth
and their rganizations to make this sirg-
gle theirs and to adhere (o the campaign
that we start o achieve his immediate re-
lease. since his dignity and his stand of
resistance are our own dgnty and resis-
ance.
Stop The Injustice! Amnesty!
Association of Relatives and Friends of the
October 1995
Poltical Prisoners (AFAPP)
Winter 1999/2000
“Repression In The Prisons Is Actually Greater Than It Was 20 Years Ago™
Interview With Eva Alonso, GRAPO Political Prisoner
Eva Alonso Arce was arested May 26, 1979 at
a Spanisn Civil Guard police checkpoint near
Valencia, During the ten days tnat she ro-
mained under arest in Madrid she was bru-
tally tortured. Today. sha has been in prison
over twenty yoars in the prisons of Yeseras.
Carabancnel, and Sovilla 1. from which she
wil be roleased in June 1999
Over the past 20 years, what have been
the worst and best moments you have
had to go through?
It is dfficut to choose, but perhaps the
nardest experiences that | have ived through
have been the two hungerstrkes (o the death
thatthe pisoners of the PCE (1) (Spanish Com-
munist Pty - econstiuted) and GRAPO have
had o carry out The first was in 1981, agaist
the extermination regime n the prison of Herrera
de la Mancha and the second was in 1990
around the regroupment of the prsoners. The
deaths of Kepa and Sevi were the worst mo-
mens inside a very hard siuation. and st to-
day. justthe memory of it makes me temble. As
for good moments. | would emphasize small
To Working Women'
We are fify-six prisoners from ETA,
two fom the EGPGC and foureen from the
PCE(1) and GRAPO, held i the risons ofthe.
fascist State. We are well acauainted with
the tings they try and forget - their weap-
ons. their umilatons. their ays and nights
of torture and darkness.
We have rebelled against the capiaist
system that exploits and oppresses us twice
over. We have said “Enough’” - that s why
they keep us in prison. That s wny they try
o slence us behind their wals and cages.
We have said “Enough” and, ke every
other day, on March &th we also intend to
Struggle with you against discrimination in
the workplace, against lower wages for
Working women. against layoffs
“Enough” o unemployment, o starva-
tion wages, tothe bosses and governments.
that explot us, that oppress s ust as they
o our class brothers
We have said “Enought” and we intend
0 struggle with you against the inequaity of
opportunty, against sexual harassment,
against he fact that we are treated like ob-
Jects fated to fulfl men's needs. “Enough!”
because they continue to deny young women
the rght o a free and secular education. to
dignified work. to housing. 10 future, for
they continue to develop their distress.
We have said“Enoughr” and we intend
o struggle with you to seze the right o con-
Communique From The Women
Political Prisoners Of GRAPO
but very imporant, things. such as famiy vis-
ts. meeting comrades again ater years of dis-
persion, oractivtes that | can do nthe commu-
ney.
Is the suffering greater for women in
prison, or, as militants, are the attacks.
and responses the same?
The repression s maybe one of the fow
areas in which we reach true equalty. The key
is that we are not women or men, we are -
prisoned mitants. The repressive sirategies.
are the same for everybody as are the targets
that they are after with them. Of course, we
conront this n a mitant manner. and ths de-
pends on your commitment. not your gender.
Have there been, over the course of the
past 20 years, many changes in the meth-
ods of repression In the prisons?
They have been perfecting them, overal.
after buiking the maxtprisons and the policy
of ispersion. They have been exploting all he.
possibiltes o isolation and have been doing
0l our own bodies, to be done with the hu-
millatin of oulrageous serences that con-
demn we women rather than those who rape
and assault us. “Enough’® o thei laws and
thei ascist court, of their crminalzation of
the right to strike, to demonstrate, 1o free
expression and free assembly.
We have said “Enough” and we infend
1o struggle with you to seze our liberaion
and that of our peoples. “Enoughr” 1o those
Who continue to trample the rght (o self-de-
termination. to those who by iron and blood
stop peaple from freely deciding ther future
inEuskal Herria, n Catalonia and in Gaiicia
We have said “Enough” comvades, and
We have embarked upon the road of revolu-
tion and socialism, the ony road that wil bring
us iberation. as women and as workers
Because of this they keep us in prison and.
mistreat us n every way to prevent ouf tebel
yel rom reaching you
But today, Iike every day, like every
March Bih. we are with you in struggle to
see an end o the fascist prisons, (o seze
our rights and those of our class, o destroy
all the rusted chains that are binding us.
For A March 8th Of Struggle!
Amnesty For The Political Prisoners!
Female PolticalPrisoners romthe PCE(() and
‘GRAPO, "Lina Odena” Commune, Soto del
Real
March 8, 1998
thei utmost against our movement. Allhs. to
gether with the standard searchs. beatings
‘and provocations. is doing in that the repres-
sion n the prisons s growing in vieness com-
pared to what we had 20 years ago. The war-
ens. on the wnole. aiso take par. but. ind-
Vidually, there are some that make your fe el
some that merely do their ot and less often
those that ty to make your e a bt sweeter
How important is it o be grouped to-
gether in one prison?
‘Absolutely everything.tis important poit-
cally 1o be able t organize inside prison. o be
able 1o increase your actwities wih your com-
rades. to defend yoursel! againt repression
and to undertake the struggle effectely. It is
important on a personal level as well because
You have people that see the word as you do.
with many things in common with which You
can aways support yoursel. Prison s hos-
e environment, the only things nt hostie are
your comrades It has been proved that i s
possible to survive years and years without
them, as a person and as a mitant,and tat s
a great vitory, but t s iniitely harder.
What is the role of family and friends in
giving support to the prisoners, and es-
pecially around their dispersion?
I prison, any amout of suppor, soldar-
ity or consideration has an incredible value.
and i is worth much more than on th steets.
Itis not what makes your want o resist. b
makes it easier o v in prison. To get some
mall to get a vist flom somebody, these are
things that can make you smil at tme when
you are foeling sad of lonely
How were the peace talks between the
Spanish government and GRAPO viewed
from prison?
With certain expectations. but e worry.
because there were very impartant matters on
thetable. Butbeyond the expectatons. | viewed
1Lwith distrust towards the State, i 5 Gbvious
that s intentions o solve the problems peace-
fully are void. They trust in the repression and
n force to extemninate any struggle of groups
that faces them, and that fact makes this kind
of process aways unsuccessful. In our case
this was clearly proved. There was never ne-
gotiaton, only taks towards negotaton, and
when the government had 1o put foward s
Intentions, only tried 1 bring us to surrender
What is the situation of the GRAPO pris-
oners, especially those who are ill and
have already served 3/4 of their sen-
tence?
We have four comvades who are tying to
continued on the next page.
e
n - Winter 1999/2000
e v ersns EUFOpean Political Prisoners
the saverity of their il ATS Note: Tis is a vasly incomplete s o te polical prisoners in Europe. Due 1o lack of
nesses. Two have been im- space ang information we are unable to include the many Insh and Basque prisoners as well
prisoned for 17 Years and many more revolutionaries fom Turkey, Kuristan. etc. that are n various European prsons
the other two'for 14 years
50 they are not going to be France (Clara Cerici Rosario Narvaez Temero
e 10 o e movement Ferara Prson Do Avia
much when they get out. Nathalie Ménigon 2173 CPp Breva
With regards o freedom for Joelle Aubron 2174 K Gloria Argano. Apartado 206 - 05194 Avia
those who have served 34 Contro do Détention Jospehine Abdo Sarkis
of their sentence. there are e Bepaume Mana Capelio Jesus Cela Seoane
Quite a few of us who have Quartier Femmes Anns Cotone Prson De Badajor
exceeded that years ago | Chemin des Anzacs Rosela Lupo Carretora Livenza. km. § - 06008 -
accomplisned that in June 62450 Bapaume Vincenza Vaccaro Badsjoz
1854, None of us i this situ- Rebbibia Femminile
ation have ever been re Jean Marc Rouilan Via Bartol jongo, 92 Francisco Javier Ros Diaz
leased on parole. 9698202 00156 Rome Franciso Cela Seoane
B 166 Guilermo Vasavez Bautista
What do you think of the 65307 Lannemezan Notake Lges Joaguin Calero Arcones
support that the Basque ssine Jose Jimenez Femandez
Poobie give o the pris. aly Via C Valeria 2 Gazzi Juan Jose Donoso Puldo
oners? 98100 Messina Luis Cabeza Mato
Susan Berardi Prison De Herrera De La Mancha
The struggle tosupport Caria Bianca Francesco Aosa gl
e prsoners n the Basque Tizana Cherubin Marco Camenisch 15200 - Manzanares - Ciscad Real
Country nas auays seemed Barbars Fabrizi GorgoCota
aamiabieto me do natthnk Saivatore Colonna Laureano Ortega Oriega
that we can ask for more Nicola De Maria Prson De Madrd Il (eco)
courage and intiatve then what our peopie Marina Sameli Cesare Di Lenardo 28880 Alcala De Henares - Maorid
have wit ther prisoners. Neveriheess, | do Calerina Spano Daveide Fadde
ot nink that th tme for iruggle and sacriice Latina Pietro Guido Felce Jose Ortn Martnez
is over. and | fea that we wil have to restat Via Aspromonte 100 Maurizo Ferar Rogelo Vasquez Gomez
stongly all so of iiatves to approach the 04100 Latina Daniee Bencii Prison De Macid (1) (Vaisemoro)
prsoners o the Basaue country. or befteryet. Franco La Maesisa 28340 Vaklomoro - Madnd
Get e ree. The Spanish sate doss not seem _ Abera Siato Stefano Minguzzi
o have any ntenton ofsoving thi poically, . Aurora Bett Mauro Mereo Javier Calcerada Forieles
leaves us win the siruggle as ne only way. Opera MaroMira Leoncio Caicerada Fomieles
Via Camporgnago Marcelo Grirngheli Prison De Gcana |
After these long yoars, you must have ¢ Quintosole Ao Pzzarel Martres de Ocans, 4
felt low at times when a personal way 20090 Opero (M) PacloDorigo 45300 Ocana - Toledo
out of prison and suffering might ha Armed Al H. Sereya
been a prioriy. Marco Venturini Novara Jaime Simon Quinela
Sollcciano Via storzesca 49 Prison De Puerts e Santa Maria I
No_ never.Of course. over these past 20 Carcere 28100 Novara Apariado 600
years | have had very tough moments, when | 50742 Solicciano () 11500 Puerto De Santa Maria
it 100 weak to stick to my own commiment Francesco Caviglia Codte
but aways knew hatthere was a ne | woud Nicola Abbatangelo Carlo Garavaia
ot cross. a line that situates me alongside the Giuseppe Amnante Rebiobia Maschile (G12) Eia Dieguez Sivera
pecple, and to cross that line would be to put Renato Bandoli VReftasla Maieti 158 Enrique Cuadra Etxsandia
myselfn fron ofthem Loyatyto my deas and Vitorio Blognese 00156 Rome Francisco Brotons Beneyto
o he peaple gave me the strength to resst, Lorenzo Calzone Joaquin Garrdo Gonzalez
and now | wil leave prison having a cear con. Pietro Coccone Giovani Gentie Schiavone s Baimon Castel
science Gluseppe DCecco Michele Pegna Prison Do Sovia 2
Francesco Donati Stefano Scarabelo Camters tomeplanca Mairena del
How do you imagine your Iife outside of Luciano Farina Caroina Alcor Km.3
prison? Antonio Fosso S Biogio, 6 Sevila - 41071 - Apartado 711325
Franco Galloni 81030 Camola (Ce) 41080
I entered prison when | was 17 years od, Buno Ghiardi
and | am eaving prison 20 years ate. Mosty. | EnzoGli Maria Pa Vianale Concepcion Gonzalez Rodrguez
want to meet my people again. | have a ot fo Ffanco Grli Uaine Josefina Garcia Aranburu
learm. Afer that. | wil s Fiavio Lot Via Spaieto 30 Teresa de Jesus
Fausto Marini 33100 Udine Gonzalez Rodriguez
Machele Mazzei Prison Soto Del Real
FabioRavali Spain Apartado 200
Giovanni Senzani 28791 - Solo Dol Real - Macnd
Aemo Virgii Anna Garcia Rueda
Trani Encamcion Leon Lara Afonso Gonzalez Cambero
Via Andria 300 Maria Jesus Romero Vega Manuel Carmona Tejedor
70059 Trani (88) Mercedes Padros Comminas Prson Do Topos
Oiga Oiwiera Alonso 57796 Salamanca
*
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
Arm The Spi
Special Edition - Winter 1999/2000
Former INLA POW Tony O’Hara
Looks Back On The H-Block Struggles
March 1999 saw another anniversary of the
beginning of the H-Block hunger stnke in which
10men dled. Tony O'Hara, IRSP Ard Comhaire
member. ooks back on personal memories of
the causes of the prison protest.
The Britsh government passed legisiaion
in 1975 doing away with Special Category sta-
1us (poltcal status) that was o come ino ef-
fect on March 1, 1976. This was to coincide
wih a major policy iniative for the six county
stateletcalleg ‘Uiserisaton". The main face of
this policy was 1o say o the world the war had
nded and that Brtain no longer had any polt-
cal prisoners.
Since 1971 all the major towns nthe nortn
oked lie war zones, with ciy conires sealed
off with highrse fencing and gates manned by
securty forces. personnel that searched eve-
fyone who wished 1o enter these “control
Zones” These were rioped down (o gie the
appearance of nomalty (‘Normalisation”), and
thus further enhance the effects of
“Uistersation
S0 to the workd after March 1. 1676, the
conflct had ended and the ones responsivle
for the continued attacks on the securty forces
were criminsls and mavericks lead by faceless
godtathers. To make this world a conveyer bel
of justice was set up. Arrested people would
be taken to nterrogation cenires, totured into
confession. then tred before a non-ury court
(Dlock cout with one judge presiding, and
be sentenced to engthy sentences, taken then
102 new controlled prison H-Block, where the
staffwould infict mental and physical torture in
attempt to break the will of the prisoner and
make himher confor to the prison system
e frst prisoner to come up againt this
was Ciaran Nugent. He was sentenced to five
years n October 1976 and was taken to the H-
Blocks where he was asked to wear a prison
unform. where His famous retort was uttered
I wouldn't wear it i you even naied i to my
back " So began the ‘Blanket Protest”
1 was sentencedto five years in May 1677
and transfered to the H-Block 4, where i the
reception | was 10id 1o sirp naked and then
given a uniform to wear. | refused and was
dragged down onto a wing and thiown nto a
cell. The next day, the govenor came around
and tried me (kangaroo cour) and sentenced
me to tree ays soltary confinement. | was to
leam that the oy diference between this and
the norma Ife on the bariket was the removal
of the matress for three days. as we existed in
soltary confinement or 24 hours a day, being
refused access to reading materials, radios.
TV. witing materals, and exercise. We wers
allowed (o receve only one letter per week. |
managed to get a total of the letters during
the four years. four months of the protest, de-
spite having letters and cards sent weekly from
family and friends. We were sllowed only &
half hour visit per month, that was later ex-
tended to weekly. Al this was o foste ci
mate ofisolation and deprvation from the out-
side worid
1 pointed out to the screws that | was en-
tled 10 exercise one hour per day. They told
me | could have al the exercise | wanied i |
wore the prison garb, 5o | was being punished
doubly for refusing 1o be crminalised. For the
next few years, unti 1879_ we ved in the mo-
notony of cellvar confinement naked except
for a blanket or towel wom around the waist
My frst visit was with Miriam Daly. Chairper.
son, IRSP Ard Comhaire. She was shocked at
my conditon. ashen-faced, gaunt. with a hyper-
nervousness due to me being outside a cell
door for the fist time in 8 months. This led to
the beginning of her oganising prisoners' ela-
tives ino forming the “Relatves Action Comni.
tee” (RAC). Al that stage. the only ones nter.
ested in helping the prisoners were the rela
tives and the IRSP. Sinn Fein ignored f unti a
meeting in Dubiin drew a crowd of over 5000
and they jumped on the piatform (Wiriam Daly
told me this),
My next visit was even more of a shock
with my brother Patsy, he ddt recognise me
and walked passed me unti | called him_ By
then | had long hair and a bushy beard and
buging bioodshot eyes.
Five demands were drawn up that would
end the protest
1. The Right not to wear a prison uniform.
2. The Right not o do prison work.
3. The Right of free association with other pis-
oners.
4.The Right to organize their own educational
and recreatonal facities
5. The Righ 1o one vistt. one letter and one
parcel per week.
Patsy 0'Hara
Prisoner of War.
Hunger striker.
John Nixon came on the bianket in 1977
and we formed a staf for the Republican So-
calst POWS on the protest. Up unti then we
were facing abuse and mumidatn from some.
members of the IRA's POWs and treated as
second class ciizens. something that was 10
Iast the whole duration o the protest. With our
staf in place we established contact with the
RSP outside on a weekly basis, and held dis-
cussions amongst ourselves &t mass a5 o how
to approach the strategy on the protest. We.
decided to folow everything the IRA did 50 as.
ot to cause more bad feeing and due to the
fact that we were small in numbers and had
dificulty maintaining more than weekiy con-
tact
We decided from day one that it would
take a hunger strke to end this nightmare and
had set up the structures in motion fo such a
protest,but agreed o give t a few years to see
how things developed. As the protest esca-
lated and more and more sentenced prisoners
Joined we esabished a chain of communica-
tion by smugging leters out on visits. Most of
these went 1o the Bellast office where they
were typed up and fed intothe partcular POW's
foder.
n 1578 we upped the ante by refusing to
siop out or wash. Ths was due to the fact that
men got badiy besten everyime they it thei
Gells. So by refusing the above, we would be.
making working conditons unbearable for the
screws and make them reluctant o enter cels
1o carry out the sytematic beatings. We
smashed the fumture and windows o signal
the beginning of the new form of protest The.
prison regime reacted with it usual brtalty.
beating everyone bady that day!
The windows were {o become a mini bal
teground ove the next tree years. Perspex
replaced giass, being unbreakable. Afer a few
months we burned them out. They then buit
screens around the window openings. the bot-
tom of which was uncovered allowing the
ments to determine the cals temprature. The
heating pipes were turmed on full i the surmmer
and switched off in the winter, | remember
waking up on New Year's Eve 1980 wih my
top banket covered infrost and sif 35 3 board!
Needless (o say, we managed 1o bur the
screens also by making wicks from towel
threads and margarine
“The NIO and the Thatcher government di
it best 1o keep the situation quiet s0 as not to
uffle the flow of the Criminalsaton policy. But
as the numbers inthe RAC increased sodid the
protests. Two events occarred that would bring
the plight o the bianket protest to word aten-
tion. Frank Magre MP for Fermanagh/South
Tyrone was allowed to enter the biocks to visit
his constituents. The stench was so over-
Whelming that he was sick a few times but
managed to get around. Trree days later he
Issued a statement about what he saw.
A few months later, Cardinal Tomas
*
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
ter 1999/2000
OFiach entered on a siilr visit and compared
the conditions inthe H Blocks to the ‘sewers of
Caicutta. The word was fnally out. and the
press fell over themselves to interview rela
tives and the poltical.representatives of the
POWe.
In 1980 a press corps was allowed to
enter the prison and fim the conditons, as we
geared up for the frst hunger strike. As the
attention increased. so dd the attacks on, and
Kiings of. leading H-Block/Ammagh personnel
on the utside. Maiam Daly who was then Char-
person of the H-Block/Amagh Commites was
snot dead in 1979 Ronrie Bunting and Noel
Litle were so0n 1o follow. Bernadette Mc
Aliskey was lucky 10 survive a January 1980
attack. despite Brtish solciers lying in wait
outside herdoor The Nationat community was
n o doubt that hese attacks were sanctioned
by the Thatcher goverment
“The nunger stiike began on October 27.
1880 with seven men beginning the fast.Each
man represented a county in the 6 occupied
counties and Sean McKenna represented the
st of Irslang. The statement starting he hun-
ger ke was:
“WE. the Republican Prsoners of War in
the H-Blocks, Long Kesh, demand. as of ight
polical recogniton and that we be accorded
the status of polical prisoners. We clam this
ignt as captured combatants in the continuing
struggle for national iberaton and selt-dete
minstion
We refute most strongly the tag of ‘rmi-
nat with which the Briish have atiempted to
abel us and our siruggle. and we point o the
dsive partonist insttutons of the six coun-
ties as the sole crminal aspect of the current
struggle.
We eclare that polical satus s ours by
ignt and we deciare that fiom Monday. Octo-
ber 27. 1380 a hunger strike by a number of
men representing H-Blocks 3, 4 and 5 willcom-
‘The statement should have read Republi-
can and Republican Socialists POWS. No ex-
planation was gven s to why the latter was
left out_ Four weeks later 28 more men and
three women from Armaghal oined the fast in
an attempt to ncrease the momentur for the
final push as the heath of the first seven dete-
rioated_ As the Tnatcher government negot-
ated behind the scenes she issued 8 hardine
statement: “There 's no such thing as poltical
‘murder, poftical bombing or poltical violence.
‘There s only criminal murder, criminal bombing
and criminal violence. We wil not compromise:
on this. There wil be no poltcal status.”
As the hunger strke entered it 53th day
Sean McKenna had fallennto coma. The Bri.
ish government offered 3 28 page document
that seemed 1o grant us the mast of the de-
mands we sought. On December 18th, the pro-
test was calied off i good fath. The no wash
~10 810p out protest ended lso, and we walted
10 have our own ciothes delivered. During this
period. Bobby Sands had freedom to ravel
around the blocks meating various IRA OC's
and Patsy O'Hara. INLA OC. Patsy had tred to
have access to consull wit the INLA POWs
but was refused We felt we were being
pushed into a corner and ignored as unimpor-
tant despte having John Nixon representing
our movement in the first group of seven and
five others among the 28 that lter oined.
Bobby came nto meet Patsy to el him hat
the hunger strke was called oft. A majo row
occurred over the IRA leadership having no
authorty to cal of the INLA hunger sirkers.
The document was read and Bobby explained
that it meant we had won 95% of the demands.
Patsy was not impressed and seen nothing in
the pages but clever word playing that was so
ambiguous as to mean anything. He stated that
fthis el through, “the INLA would hunger srke
on it own', but was prepared to wait and give
the agreement chance.
‘As the Bitsh stalled and then reneged on
the agreement, we prepared for another hun-
ger stike with the INLA going alone. Ten days
afer the meeting. Bobby returned and threal-
ened that i the INLA went alone, “they would
be alone forever mor in the rison”. This didnt
change anything and suddenly a week later
Bobiby tod Patsy of the IRA's inention o join &
second hunger strike. This time we were (o
have one representative for every three IRA
men. An agreement was made to stagger the
hunger strke
Patsy was 1o join the fast the tirg week
‘and the Provos put Raymond McCreesh on the
‘same day without our knowledge 50 35 to min-
mise the effecs of the frst INLA hunger stiker
joining the fast. The reasoning behind it was.
“in case. O'Hara doesn' go thraugh with 1"
Even then we were stil second class POWs
We knew that hs time men would prob-
ably have to die or face serious risk (o their
health. The Brits wouid push this 1o the brink.
and plans were made for a second string o
oin the fast i the event of a prisoner dying. 5o
that there wouid be aiways four POWs on ast.
This time around the women in Armagh were
‘asked not 1 jon the protest as t was thought
that he focus would be taken away from the
blocks. The next five monihs were 10 be the
‘most heart-breaking and inense n Ireland since:
the executions following the 1916 rsing
(Source: Irisn Republican Socialist Party
<ntirsm o)
IRSP: Teach Na Failte Project
Teach na Faille <House of Welcome> is an
undertaking by the Irsh Republican Socisist
Party o assist in reintegrating former prison-
ers of war back into their communty, their
class, and actve poliical Ife. Formed by ex-
prisoners for ex-prisoners. Teach na Faite is
‘an important stop forward in meeting the needs
of Ropublcan Socialst POWs under prosent
circumstances. Below is a report on the
progress of the project Contributions in North
America for Teach na Faile can bo sont in
caro of the IRSCNA, 2057 15th Sireet, Sute B,
San Francisco, CA 94114 USA. Please make
checks to “Teach na Faile.”
Project Officers Report
For Teach na Failte
Strabane Teach Na Failts Office Established
Funding was acquired from the Strabane
Dictrict Partnership Board, SOPB, for the rent
of an office and to fully equip . This offe wil
now be used as the head offce for Teach nia
Faite nthe 32 Counties.
Initially there were a number of problems
getting the office up and running. This was
mainly due to office equipment, statinary,cor-
necting phone lines etc. arrving much later
than expected. The office has been fully
equipped and functioning properly since the
November 29, 1995
“The estabishment of the Teach a Faie
office has ciearly demonstrated, even at this
pontthe Project i gaining momentum and has
instilled a greater confidence withn the catch-
mentarea, not ony in Szabane but further afld
n Belfast, Derty and Dublin, that the objectves
of Teach na Faite. as outined in the Develog-
ment Pian s achievabe.
Even though the local management com-
mitiee has been functioning for qute some tme
they were very much hampered by the ack of
a proper focal pointand the avaiabilty ofproper
‘squipment which led to the lowering of moral.
However since the establishment of the offce
there has been a signifcant increase in inte
estinthe Project and morale amongst the local
‘commitiee has been subsequently boosted.
Usage of the ofce willbe monttored by use of
a visiors book with the relevant data included
in reports
Marketing Of The Project
There are thirty two ex-INLA prisoners in
the Strabane area and al have been informed
of the Project through visis from the Project
officerand localchairperson Eddie McG as well
2s some members of the management commit-
tee. These visits were aiso expanded outside
of ex-prisoners and included many comnecting
family members. During December 1999 and
January 2000 3 number of information sessions
took piace in the local affice and were wel
attended. Al received information packs about
the Project and how developed. It s intended
1o have these information sessions on a regu-
lar basis with minutes taken and al nformed of
developments as they happen.
T has led to increased support for the
Project by those participating to date wih of-
fers of services on a voluntary basis. It i x-
pected that pariciation within the catchment
area wil increase as the Project develops and
concerns have been replaced with optmism
‘A number ofournalists. Befast Telegraph.
Derry Journal and the Stzabane Chroricie. have
been conacted and al have promised to do
Interviews wih Teach na Faite about the Project
*
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwic
Establishing Links With Other Groups
Since Teach na Fate was establshed inks.
have been formed with a number of groups in
the statutory and voluntary sector. including
the rsh Department f Foreign Affais, th Insh
Prisons Department and the Northern Ireland
Offce. Recently Teach na Faite has aiso be-
came afflted 1o the Organisation of the Un-
‘empioyed Northern Ireland. OUNI, and to the
North West Community Network
Teach na Faite has also been in contact
wih the lesd partner n the Strabane Distict
New Deal Gonsortium and requested 1o become
memoer of the Consortum, which is sl un-
der consideration
Links with 2 number of other prisoner
groups such as Ex-PAC in Monaghan, Cairde n
‘Stabane, Tar steach n Belfast and the oyalst
Group EPIC have aiso been established Amest-
Ing did take place with a representative from
EPIC and representatives fom Teach na Faite
1o explore estabishing efther formal o informal
lnks with each other. The management commi
tee of Teach na Faite are in favour of such
Iinks with loyalist ex-prsoner groups, or any
other group which wil futher the aims and ob-
Jectves of Teach na Faite, and informal lnks.
wil be maintained and hopefully expanded on
s tme goes by.
Links have alsobeen estabished wth TEA,
DHSS. HE. NIACRO and he Unemployed Cen-
tre. Formal ks have also been established
with a number of community groups i the
Strabane area. One ofthe advantages of those
Who have expenenced long-term imprisonment
is the fact that t has a tendency to raise the
“Street crediviity” o the ex-prisoner wihin the
comemunity particularty amongst the youth. This
fact has areacy been used 1o the acvantage
of community groups in the Strabane area in
setting dispues within the communty and even
between the communites as already experi-
enced in the Carlton Drive area of Stiabane
duing the yeary Drumcree criss.
Teach na Faite are considering seting up
a formal mediation service to work on dispues
wihin and between the communites because
of the successes of the past
Greating A Databas
Of ExINLA Prisoners
There s an estimated 500 ex-INLA prison-
ers. The creation of 3 database of ex-INLA
Kevin Lynch
Mickey Devine
prisoners is well
Gnderway. A great deal of
travelling ana nterviews.
wih ex-prisoners trough-
out the 32 Counties was
andis stil necessary i or-
der to compie the proper
information and create 3
comprenensive database.
This work is stil ongoing,
Creating A 32 County
Teach Na Faitte
Infrastructure
Again fack of funding
has been the major prob-
lem in creating a 32 County
Infrastructure parculary in
the 26 Counties. However
aftera number of meetings.
o\
Patsy OHara's Funeral Procession
between Paddy Logue, the
Cross Border Project Oficer for Peace and
Reconcliation, and Teach na Faite, and atter
discussions with Martn O Fanim, Irish Foreign
Affas, an appicaton for funding to progress
the Project n the 26 Counties was successful
“Tnis recent funding acquired from ADM/
CPAwill enable Teach na Faite o buid a proper
infrastructure in the 26 Counties. which has.
been very poor todate. A ot of work has et fo
be done n this catchment area. A number of
mestings took place In the Strabane offices.
during ate November and December 1998 with
representaties from Beffast. Derry and Dubiin
Teach na Faite wit the sole purpose of con-
Soldating and expaning the inrastructure ai-
ready n place
"The infratructure aiready in place in the
North of Ireland i in & much more heathier
posiion than that which exists i the South of
Iretand. This s due to funding aiready being
acquired in the North which has enabed the
Project to progress at a much faster rate. How-
ever, with funding now recently acquired
through ADWCPA s expected that the Project
wil develop, much mre rapidly i the South
Organising Residentials and Capacty Buiking
Training Courses
Four residentials has been organised
through a Technical Development Faciltator, for
January. March, April and May 2000. The for-
mat of these residentials are: January - com-
munication and presentation kil fund-ais
ing. sustainabilty and new po-
il structures. March - posi-
tve public image. ltening and
‘ommunicaton kil and confict
management. Apil - womens
health and empowerment and
presentation sils. May - project
management and evaluation. A
report on “Way Forward” wil be
launched by Brd R on May 30,
2000 afte the conclusion of the
avove resicentias
“Training providers have been
contacted in relation to provid-
ing training courses. We are sl
waiting for the detailed pro-
grammes from them. These
training programimes are to be
‘given tothe Deny Distric Partnership Board by
the end of January 2000
Work Involving Serving Prisoners
During Novermber and Decemoer 1998
Teach na Faifie was in contact with the Sen-
tence Review Commission, Northem Ireland
Offce and th Irish Prisors Department n rela-
tion to problems concening serving INLA pris-
oners. Three INLA prisoners in the North were
excluded from the Xmas parole scheme and
this was brought to the attention of Jackie
Jonnston, NIO. at a meeting in Befast. Even
though 1 was a polical decision o ree alprs-
oners from Long Kesh over the Xmas period it
is believed thal the representations made by
Teach na Faifie secured the release of those
prisoners mentioned. Teach na Faite was also
nvoived in negatiations with the NIO and INLA
prisoners on operational matters within Long
Kesh wih a satsfactory outcome.
‘Teach na Faite have also been in contact
with the SRC on benalf of the famives of serv-
ng prisoners wit satisfactory outcomes in all
“There has been reguiar contact with the
Irish Prison Department on behalfof botn pris-
oners and ther famites with mixed resuls. All
INLA prisoners in both Long Kesh and Poriaoise:
have been flly nformed of the Project since ts
inception and are reguiary informed of il d
Velopments. They have been taking part in
Courses within the prisons such as Wefare
Righs, computer training courses efc. wih
View of using hese skils o progress the Project
afer rolease.
During the perod of December 1999 Teach
a Faie assisted representatves of the POW
department n Beltast. Derry, Strabane. Dublin
‘and Dundak i raising funds forthe famifes of
seving INLA prisoners. 100 pounds a piece
Wwas given gen to 22 families for Xmas
RSP
392 Fals Road
Belfast
812
Iroland
- BRGHTER
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide!
A Brief Introduction To The Communist
Prisoners Collective “Wotta Sitta”
The Colectivo Communist Prigionier Wota
Sita (Wotta Sita Communist Prisoners Colle
tive) conssts of comvades mprisoned in var
ous specal prisons coming from the iffeent
Halian guerrila experiences (Red Brigades. NAP
- Armed Proletarian Units, Red Brigades-Guer-
fila Pary, COLP - Communists Organized for
Proltarian Liveraton, Resistance).
s prisoners (we are al nai for sbout 10
years. and some of us for 15) we have a wide
Knowledge of struggle nside the maximum se-
curty prisons, n unity withthe struggles of the
social prisoners,
Itis mponant - nstead of speaking about
our specifc experiences - 1o talk about our
common hertage. that s, the simiar character-
istcs typical of the whole revoltionary move-
ment in Western Europe at he end of the 60's,
which are the background for the bith of the
guerrila n Europe as well as in tah
In the early 70' the guerrila developed in
order o re-buid a evolutionary perspeciive -
clss perspective - of the proltariat in order
o te-open a power confrontation in the heart
ofthe imperalstsystem, Particulary n aly. e
guerrila has bult a fighting experience deeply
rooted inthe class and socialstructure and n
the struggles of al the proletaran sectors: a
fighting praxis which has developed in direct
opposiion and attack agaist the state
At the beginning of the 80's everybody
(therefore us as wel) understood the coming
into being of a change affecting the e nter-
national realty and the rise of a new movement
re-designing the revolutionary perspecive. In
Europe this meant the beginning of the buiding
up of a revolutionary anti-mperiaist Front.
through the iniiative of the RAF and AD, and
BR-PCC, and involving most of the Eurcpean
resistance
S0 during the summer of 1985, when we
worked out our first collctive paper as prison-
ers - enttied Wotta Sit” - that is in Affican
the tme is rght - we stared fom the deep
conscience that it was tim 1o stat bulding a
wider communication process among the revo-
utionary experences and the ant-mperialist
movements exstig all over the world, i p:
teulat in Wester Europe. It was tme fo realy
overcome the idealogica atudes towards in-
temationalsm in order fofocus on the common
class iterests that bind together the proetar-
ians ofthe workd in the common struggle against
the “new imperialst order'.
Butour otjective, since the beginning, has.
also beento give a poitical answer o the coun-
ter-revolutionary sirategy which gained ground
afer the defeats and arrests suffered by the
guerrila organizations n 1982, particuary in
ay,
“The capialist goverments tried to put an
end to the struggle and resistance of the revo-
Iutionary prisoners in Europe in oder to rans-
form thei struggle into a weapon to point at the.
communist perspective and the ants imperialst
fight.and to play against the fightng organza-
tions.
Our ntention is to confront the ntegrated
counter-revoluton with the poliical and fight-
ing unity of the revolutionary prisoners inside
the wder uniy of the revolutionary movement.
The counter-revolutionary sirategy
against the prisoners s a common realy of all
the European states, thrsfore aiso the stug-
gle of the revolutionary prisoners and the soli-
dartty movements must move forward and
Velop a common and unfed realty. They a
ot a dfferent thing apart from the internation-
alst soldarty.
I this sense, the experience of struggle
carried out by the mprisoned comrades of the
RAF and resistance n the FRG has been very
important, as wel as the struggle of the impris-
oned comrades of PCE(r) and GRAPO in Spai.
We would e to say aiso that inside the
talian prisons there are some Arab and Pales-
tinian prisoners and In the last few years we
have made many soldarty intiatives wit them
against thefr segregation
Regarding ourjaifs conitions we have to
say that together with all the other alan pol-
cal prisoners (about 150), we are spread out
n different special ats: Novara, Cuneo, Marino
del Tronto, Carinoa, Rome-Rebibbia for men
and Opera-Miano for women
They are allmaximum securty prisons with
control untsfor polfical prisoners. establshed
with decree by the ltaian goverment n 1677
in the framework of the *stuggle against ter-
rorism” for a number of prisoners reaching 800
persons in the early 80's. Some comiades (a
fow in fact) as well as some ArabiPalestinian
prisoners are in general papulation jats.
“The State's policy s based on continuous.
pressure through the adaptable use of segre-
gation and dispersion. though the stict conrol
of vists and mal diectly by the inteligence
forces by means of the prison departmert,
through the investigations nto the polical de-
bate inside prisons, the periodic criminaization
camaign against the revolutionary prisoners,
and the prosecutions against the soldarity
movement and people supporting the prison-
[55E
ter 1999/2000
ers and sometimes aiso against the relatves
(with charges simiar t 1283 in the FRG).
In laly every activy of the revolutionary.
prisoners ot controlled by the sate's pacifica-
tion policy s considered "a threat against tate
securty” because for quite 3 whil the bour-
geoisi has tried to enforce a poitical soluton
to armed struggle with the actve colaboraton
of many ex-revolutionary people, once miltants
in he various fighting organizations, in order o
recompose the break between the state and
the class movement of th st ten years and to
depolicize the whole experience of armed
egy, the reformist and revisioist parties are
very actve, above all the PCI, which wih its
recent ransformaion into the PDS (Democratic
Party of the Lef) has fulfled &t move towards
the bourgeois area which t began in the post
World War Two era, and has reinforced s role
s enemy of any revolutionary infiatve i this
country.
In conclusion the State polcy onthe revo-
utionary prisoners - in laly as well s in any
Wwest European country - aims at redefining the
Contradicton represented by the exstence of
guerila pisoners inview o the European proc-
‘es5 of aconomic-polcal miltay integration. of
which the *1952 united market s a very Sg-
ificant step. We see in every European coun-
ry many diect attacks against the prisoners
and the sttempt 1o use them against the gue-
rila, as s now happening with the amests of
the ex-RAF miltants in the DDR.
s imprisoned fevolutonaries we have to
confront the same counterrevolutionary stra
gy of imperiaism i every European courlry
‘and aware of being an integral part of the revo-
Iutionary process here, we see In the unity of
the prsoners in western Europe a possidie and
necessary siep in our fighting experience.
Collectivo Communisti
Prigionieri Wotta Sitta
(writen in 1952)
Freedom For Al Policical Prisoners Worldwide!
Arm The Spi
Special Edition
Winter 1999/2000
“For The Liberation From Oppression And Capitalist Exploitation!
"
A Letter From The Comrades Of The ltalian Communist Political Prisoners Collective ‘Wotta Sitta’
Dear comvates.
s revolutonary communist pisoners, we
send greetings to the struggle of the “Commit
toe fo the End of Administative Detention” in
Ramallan Palestne. Administrative detention s
a weapon of repression uiized by the Zionist
miltary. It means arresting and detaining i
tants of the Palestinian resistange movement,
wihout evidence or a ria,the duration of this
“adminitrative detention” can last anywhere
from six months to an undetermined length of
tme.
This “agministrative detention’, together
wih the ‘massive physical pressure” (in other
words, torture) declared constiutional by the
Israsi Supreme Cour, are notonly expressions
of the cruety of Zionism, they aiso represent
the interests of imperalism i this region and
the reason by compliciy of Mr. Arafat's Pales-
tiian Authorty_ (It is no concidence tha e
thousands in agminitratve detenton consist
aimost enirely o actists opposed to te Oslo
Accords )
These tools of repression are a further
Gevelopment o the Zionist counter-revolutin-
ary srategy. adapted to the actual phase of the
confict, which is characierized in Palestine by
a radical crtique and struggle by the masses
aganst the Oslo Accords. which have only
instutonalized the repression against and made
more unbearable the ling condition of the
proletaiat and the Palestinian people.
These “Osio Accords” - a product of the
imperialst Gulf War - were presented as a nec-
essary pacification of the Palestinians, accom-
panied by a massive media campaign directed
by the imperialss. In eaity. for the proletariat
and the Paiestinian resistance they mean ‘ad-
minitratve detention'. the legalzation of tor-
ture, the existence of a further 5,000 poltical
prisoners (a figure recognized even by Israe),
Who are denied the most fundamental ights in
the prison camps and Zionist ais; the planning
and construction of Zionist setllements, to-
gether with the plans for miltary control over
the terrtory ofthe Palestinian Authorty.
Al of this s taking piace at a time when
Israel s camying out dangerous manoeuvres
together with the amy of the fascist Turkish
stat; the counter-revolutionary rangle of the
USA-srael-Turkey against all ant-imperialist
processes of tiuggle is being anchored in tis
region, accompanied with open threats of us-
ing atomic weapons in the event of a confict
wih neighooring peoples. The increasing and
continuing adaptation of counter-revolutionary
instruments o repression i Palestine as n other
part of the word lusirate the deepening of the
class war between the intemational proletarat
and the mperialst bourgeoisie:
“The material base of this process, of
ourse, does not e in the extraordinary cruelly
of this or otherforms of repression and explor-
tation. Rather i i the depth and dimension of
the cisisof captalistproduction, which s struc-
trally reducing the areas for movements eve-
tywhere. In the present phase of nec-ibersl-
sm, every region of the earthis of ‘val inter-
et for the various mperilist fractions and
‘overywnere the revolutionary movements, pro-
letanans. and pecples are being attacked in an
anempt to weaken and divde them
“The model of preventve counter-revolu-
ton s the way in which the bourgeaisie reacts
to projetarian antagonism during the ciss, in
that it continually adapts s methods of atack-
ing the revolutonary movement and ciass in
order to prevent any revolutionary intiatives
from developing No struggle which represents
the main interests of the proleariat gainst the
bourgeoisie s allowed o express fsel for any
length oftme. In this sense. the model s used
against al expressions of polical lass strug-
gle. in an effort o prevent them, no mater at
Wha level they manifest themselves. The im-
perialst bourgeoisie. i s stategy of proven-
tive counter-revolution, does ot have as s
main goal o struggle against “crimes”.rather to
break aad destroy the identty of the antago-
nistic and revolutionary class.
imperiaism and counter.revolution. Each
imperiaist state must defend ts monopoly on
vilence and negate the polcal value of the
proletarian resistance and the revolutionary
Struggles. In the end they launch counter.revo-
Iutionary campaigns which make use of all avai-
able means (o spread Ideological poison, in-
Crease repression. and “sbsort the resist-
ance, to thereby destroy al soldarty. all or-
ganization, all revoluionary class conscious-
“This war has a psychological lement to
as wel (especaly after 1989, when the "end
of communis” was said to mean the “end of
history) by which any struggle of resistance,
whetner directed against the ruling powers ai
the national level o an intermationalstruggle. s
dismissed as terrorism” and al factions of the.
imperilit bourgecisi are Ined up behind tis
deady effor. It no coincidence, therefore,
thatthe G7 powers organized a sumiit(nLyor)
onthis very topic, and that the G7 plus 1 summit
in Toronto gave the go ahead for the brutal
murder of the comrades from the MRTA who
had occupied the Japanese ambassador's s
dence n Lima.
‘Atthe inemationalevel,preventve coun-
ter-revolution in the imperiaismirevoluton dia-
lectic has reached 3 istorcal stage whereby
€ adapts to forms which fi the contemporary
reaity. Each mperialst sate has s own pre-
Ventive counter.revolutonary practices. which
are tested curng explosive moments of class
struggle. Its worh taking a bref look at ths
In the USA. the baston of interational
counter-revoluton. the methods used against
antrmperiaist movements and oppressed na-
tionalties have always been especily brutal
From the Red scares of the 1950s to
COINTELPRO o the new “Anti-Crime BIll
legisiations, mass criminalzation has aways
been the aim. The resultis mandatoryIfe rison
terms for three-ime repeat offenders. the ex
panded use of the death penaty, and a reduc-
tion in the time between the verdict and the
actual execution
In Chiapas, where the stats made a pudlic
Show of negotiating wih the Zapatistas after
thei uprising, an entre region is being mil
rized and the amy is harassing indganous v
Iages, atthe same time ‘advisors rom the USA
are organizing ant-insurrection and parami-
tary groups comprised of colaborators, in or-
Ger to destroy the mass rebelion of the Indig-
enous peogles. These paramitary formatons.
with the prtection of the police. the army, and
state autnorites, are threatening. terrorzing.
detaining, and massacring the indgenous popu-
laton in an attempt o destroy ther strengh to
fight and their uniy
In Peru, the dictator Fujimori - the
“wonderchi of neo-iberalism - abandoned
i facade of legalty i the face of a sing cvi
war and proceeded to massacre polical pris-
oners and chose the continue on the path of
Some Wotta Sitta comrades: Lorenzo Caizone, Vittorio Bolognesi, Giovanni Gentle
Schiavone, Giovanni Senzani and Luciano Farina
*
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
ter 1999/2000
war which had been started on by his pres-
‘ecessor. the “socials president Garcia. Fuimori
Sent tanks to close down the pariament, in-
salled miltary tibunals where masked judges
handed downs hundreds of years in prison
terms, meaning hundred of comrades and pro-
letarians were sent to prison for e without
any chance of defense. Fujimor rued by
croe. and at he same tme passed laws grani-
ing leniency to colsborators.
In Turkey. the fascist state has legalized
terror. censorship. banning. and repression
(Law No. 413)n s effort against the Kurdish
revolution and the Turkish revolutionary move-
ment
nthe heart of ‘Gilzed Europe”. the impe-
iast states follow an amost unfied counter-
revolutionary polcy n oppositon o the revolu-
tionary movements and lberation movements
of oppressed peoples n France, Belgium, Spain.
Northen lrland, and so on. Laws, courts. and
special psons. Torture, solaton, and the dis-
persion of revolutionary prisoners. “Death
Squads” to elminate miftats from resistance
movements and revolutonary organzatons.
in Gernany, the siate develope s atack
on the antagonistic movements by means of
Articie 1293 (which has been used against
Coutiess comrades). which gives the intell-
gence agency a blank check in s repression
against 3l those who arganize in oppositon to
the ruiing system. The authorities do every-
thing possible to destroy salidaty and the re-
sistance
Even in lay. due to the deep roots of the
urban guerrli and the autonomaus tendencies
in the Class struggle. the preventive counter-
revolution of the past decades has reached
such a level that i is now aimost a mode for
others
Haly combines the most brutal forms of
repression (mass arrests, torure, special pris-
ons. planned execuions, like the Via Fracchia
incident [On March 28, 1980, Carabineri police
aided a Red Brigades (BR) base on the Via
Fracehia in Genua, due to information from a
BRtmcoat named Patrcio Peci Polce general
Dalla Chiesa warted no prisoners. Four BR mi-
tants were murdered. They were Lorenzo
Betessa (Antonio), Anna Maria Ludmann
(Ceciia). Riccardo Dura (Roberto), and Piero
Panciareli (Pasquale). - d] with a very re-
fined system of ‘rehabittatng” people (special
aws for Dissociatf and 'Pent collaborator.
s well s periodic campaigns forreduced sen-
tences and amnesties. which are carried out
by the state and is lackeys).
In Western Euope, the presence of a
deeply rooted and progressive revolutionary
movement and an urban guerrila, which
tacked and took apart the war and restructur-
ing projects of the imperalsts, was met wih
the intemationaization of power relations and
the development ofa madel of repression which
has been sdapted by the indvidual imperialst
states. Also, repression became increasingly
centralzed into supranational organs, which
consolidated the preventive counter-revolution
efforts against the European melropoltan pro-
letariat at the highest evel
n the 19705, this process was repre-
sented by tne formation of the TREVI group
and the “Anti-Terrorism’ Commission witin
NATO. Inthe 1980 the TREVI expanded and
the Schengen Agreement was passed
(tnereby insttutionalizing European racism
‘against immigrants and refugees). meaning the
Courter-revolutionary integration o the imper-
alist bourgeoisie in the hunt or ‘domestic” and
“foreign enemes’
On ‘the foundations of TREVI ang
Schengen. a European forress is being bui,
‘equipped with the counter-revolutionary func-
tons of controling the population by means of
a comprehensive databank. computerized den-
tifcaton, the redefintion of poliical crme. and
the procedures of deportation and the abolish-
ing the right 1o asylum.
“The Maastricht Treaty of the 1990s has.
Cleared the path for the formation of a joint
police organization - Europal - and perfected
TREVI, the network for police cooperation, as.
an insirument for repression n ail European
Union memoer countres
As the class war, in which the intern
tional proletariat and the imperiast bourgeaisie
stand opposed to one anather, deepens, the
levels of preventve counterrevolution are in-
creased by imperiaism in conjunction with his
of that “serous incident” in some part of the
world. The preventive counter-revolution is
oW 3 stable factr in the power struggle be-
tween the classes at the international level
Wherever it is employed. it marks out a“pointof
0 eturn” and is contnually adapted.
“Therefore. there can be no greater mis-
take than to think that the various ‘serous inci-
denis” which have characierized the poltical
repressive counter-revolution in taly o eise-
where for years now were facts in and of
themsalves. And nothing i more disarming for
the proletaiat than the series of Itanes about
the end of the cycie” or the
time for pause and historical
reflaction” or “emergency
xits” or the good oid days’
‘And bastards of worst kind
are trying to tear apart the
legacies o the siruggies and
revolutionary experiences.
which grew from the fires
of the clashes between the
class and the ruing powers
Making the freedom of
the revalutionary prisoners.
apartof thatprocess is noth-
ing more than a counter-
revalutionary operation.
The liberation of the
revolutionary prisoners is
closely tied to the struggle
against the strategy of pre-
ventive counter-revolution.
that's why it is and will al-
ways be an unneglectable
goa forth intemational pro-
letariat But t the same time,
his must not be the center
around which the revoluton-
ary perspective for emanci-
pation and iberaton turms.
Every revolutionary
Mors Wotta Sitta comrades (clockwise):
Susanna Berar, Caterina Spanc, Anna Cotone and Rosa Murs
and every antagonistic projetarian Kknows tn
repression never ends at ail tmes (and in all
places) i is organized and seeking fo desiioy
curent struggles. by means of denunciaton
layofts, beatings.the closure ofpoltcalspaces.
arrests, prison, isolaton...all the way 10 tor-
ture, execuion. and "state-assisted sucies’
That's why the struggle against repres-
sion and for he Iieration of the revolutionary
prisoners can be nothing eise than he siruggle
for beration from oppression and capitaist
explotation. And tha’s why i must be inierna-
tonalzed, o increase s strengths and cap
bilties, to make advances inthe casn of power
betwesn revoluton and imperiaism.
For this reason, we send our inlemation-
alst soldarty 1o al the prisoners i "adm
rative detenton’ in Palestine and to alrevolu-
tionary prisoners across the workd, who are
fighting against isolation and physical and psy-
‘chological destructon. Soldarity belongs to all
revolutionary prisaners who are struggiing for
the defense and development of ther revolu-
tionary identiy and for their iberation
Freedom For Ahmed Qatamesh And For
All Palestinian Prisoners In “Administra-
tive Detention'!
Freadom For Mumia Abu-Jamal And For
All Revolutionary Prisoners In The World!
“Solidarity Is The Tenderness Of The
Peoples” - Che
Solidarity Is A Weapon!
Aoril 1988
- some comrades from the commurist poltical
prisoners collective “Wotta Sita”
Vianale (standing),
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
n - Winter 1999/2000
Conference For The Freedom Of
Political Prisoners Around The World
A Gathering Of Losers, Or The Beginnings Of A New International Solidarity
More than 300 people took part n the re-
cent conference “Paciication,Or Liberation?
Perspecives For Intemational Soldarty For The
Freedom Of Poltcal Prisoners"during te Easter
Poiday in Berlin. Alihough at east haf of the
people attending were from Germany, people
rom some 30 other countres also attendec.
from South Afrca to Sweden. from Chil 1o
Palestine. 50 difierent organizations were rep-
resented: human rights groups: relatives of
poliical pisoners in Chie, Mexico, Kurdistan.
Euskadi, Germany. and Peru; poltical pisoner
Support groups from northern Ireland, Pales-
tine, and South Africa; the lawyers for pltical
prisoners i laly, Chike, Turkey and Kurditan,
the USA, Cameroon, Denmark, and Catalonia:
and poliical organizations, for example the
FARC guerila movement fom Colombia and
the Basaue organization Herti Batasuna. The
cenral deman of il these individuals and or-
‘ganization is freedom for poitical prisoners.
The conference featured six working
groups which held thee days of ntensive dis-
cussion, and not afew arguments. The themes
of the working groups were: “Poltical Justice
And Defense’ “Arrested, Taken Away, Disap-
peared”, "Women And Prison"."Human Digniy.
Resistance, And Organizing In Captty”, “Stats
Repression And Resistance From Below'. and
“The Struggle For Soldarty”. Plenary discus-
sions and two open events rounded out the
conference program.
Despite th intentions of the Interational
Preparatory Commitee (Euskadi, haly. Paies-
tine, Kurdistan, and Germany), most of the
Working groups were put together by German
members of the arganizing commitiee. That led
0 some ciaims of Euro-centrisim on the partof
the organizers. Athough ot entirely unirue.
this accusation was sometimes voiced 100
quickly. But the atmospher i the sessions was
characterized by the desire to exchange expe-
rences, buld lnks, and learm abou the cond'-
tions of struggle and prison conditons in var-
ous ather countries. This was no easy task,
given that at least 7 different languages were
being spoken st the conference
“The Identity Of The Political Prisoners
Must Be Defended!”
Incountries e Euskadi, Palestine, o Tur-
Key and Kurdistan, where there s a high per-
centage of political prisoners with respect to
the total populaton (Palestine: 2,500; Euskadi
500; Turkey: more than 10.000), t is natural
that saidarty with poltcal prisoners s carried
out by a broad spectrum of botn organized and
unorganized segments o the population. In
countres like France. the USA. o Gemany.
however,there s aimost no soldariy with the
politicalprisoners. When atiempting to answer
why that s, the discussions also touched on
the subject of what should happen with the
polticalprisoners once thei oganizations have.
disbanded (1ke with the RAF prisoners n Ger-
many. for exampl).in oher cases (Colombia
Porthem Ireland. and Palestine), organizations
have started peace talks or already signec
peace agreements, athough the prisoners have
received It benefts, or hey can only beneft
ifthey state ther ful acceptance of the peace
agreements. There was another situation in
South Afrca, where poltical
ners were freed to some degree following
the “Gemocratc change” i 1950, thre are st
poltical prisoners being held, imprisoned to-
gether with the “new” poltical prisoners cap-
ured since 1990
Without justice, reedom from oppression
and explotation. and theright o sefelermined
development,there can be no freedom for po-
continued on the next page.
Statement From The International Meeting For Political Prisoners
Bearing inmind the unjust and diffcut st
ation which poitical prisoners around the workd
face. the volaton of their mast basic rights.
because they are the victims of absurd e
dicts which in 7o way correspand to the sim-
plest princpies oflaw, and in some cases they
are sentenced by faceless judges, as in Peru
We, members of humanitarian organizations
Who are commited to defending human rights.
gathered in Buenos Ares, Argentina fom Sep-
tember 12-14. 1998 to exchange information
and experiences and to debate altematives.
and to come together i the struggle on behall
of poltial prsoners
Bearing in mind our common realy, we came
tothe conclusion thatthe politics of neo-bers
ism suppress with prison terms - o deatn - all
forms of action which are aimed against the.
plans for hunger and misery for the peoples of
ths work
In the face of tis, we strengthened our
resolve o resistthis inustice and we amved at
the following proposais
1. In cases of emergencies regarding poltical
prisoners, we must remain n the highest phase
of aletness (‘Red Alarm).
2 We must address siuation o specic cases,
such as people suffeing with serous and in
many cases fata inesses who are mprisoned.
as i Chile, Peru. Puerto Rico, and Spain
3.To organize a delegation consisting of iter-
national organizations 1 visit Peruto check on
the situation of the 7.000 poliical prisoners
there
4. To create an organizational ffort by which
Iawyers from our organization are able o in-
tiate work by means of interational law.
5. To mobilze suppor for and partcipaton in
the Intenational Mesting on Poitical Prisoners.
which will be held in Berin, Germany in Apri
1699,
6 Coordination and information
7. A set day each week is o be set aside for
Iasting communication. By means of an Intemet
website. it wil be possile to reach the whole
world
8.We have agreed upon December 10th as the
“Intarmational Day of Struggle for he Freedom
of Poltcal Prsoners”
Freedom For All Political Prisoners!
Dolores Lopaz und Veronica Brito Castro.
ODEP - Organizacitn de Defensa Popular
(Chile) - Mikel Korta, Gestoras Pro Amnistia
(Pais Vasco - Espana) - Gabrielle Hanka, In-
titive Libertad (Alemanis) - Teoflo Aparicuba.
Casa Andina de Solidaridad (Peru) - Dres
Aurea Rodriguez und Luis Nieves Faicon.
Comité Pro Derechos Humanas de Puerto Rico
(Puerto Rico) - Brono Aliman. Maria Rodriguoz
e Assis Azevedo und Estala Aranha, Comits
bor la Liberacion de los Presos Pollticos
Internacionaiistas (Brasi). Daniel Azevedo
und Gabriel Noronha Araujo, Conselno
Estacual de Defesa Dos Dervitos da Pessoa
Humana (Brasil)- Gustevo Garcia, AFFAP.
(Estado Espanc) - Lila Diaz Herrera, Rep. de
las Prisoneras de Chile (Chile) - Nenina
Boullet und Nelida Rodriguez, Comision
‘Argenita por Ia Libertad de s Prosos Poltcos.
{Argentin) - Carios Zamorano, Graciela
Romblun, Hector Trajtemberg, Liga Argentia
por los Derechos del Hombre (Argentia) -
Maria Baraido und Carios Orzaocos
Comissign Liberad a los Presos Pollzicos -
Buenos Ares - September 14, 1998
i
*
Freedom For Al Policical Prisoners Worldwide!
Arm The Spi
n - Winter 1999/2000
Pacification Or Liberation? - International Solidarity And Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide
International Conference: “Freedom For All
Political Prisoners Worldwide!”
April 15, 1999 in Berlin, Germany
Perspectives Of International Solidarity
How many trade-unionists wil be left on
garbage dumps today with a bullet in their
heads? Which courtry has punished those, who
tortured with lecirodes and other means thou-
sands of members of the opposition? How
many jouralsts have “disappeared” Is there
a place where people, who fiht fo freedom
and ustice, don' get Genounced and jaed as
“terronsts"? How many poliical prisoners are
imprisoned today - in the-year of human rights?
And the intermational community. what il they
know about them. what would they care to
Know?
Fifty years atte the passing of the Gen-
eral Deciaraton of Human Rights. taing of hu-
man rights has become a general issue. Not so
the human rights themseives. Three quarters
of humanking suffer exproprition every day
and societal wealth becomes the property of &
fow. Definton and enforcement of the human
fights are a question of power. The pant that
really matters s Who does what. Bashing in
heads of poltical prisoners in Turkey serves
as “counterinsurgency’. the possible Ive cov-
rage of executions on U.S.television as “crime
prevention. the massacres of landless Brazik-
1ans as “property potection” the offcally sanc-
tioned rght o torure i Israel serves as sup-
portfor the “peace process”. And the Geneva
Convention for Refugees gives less protecton
than ever before
We are human rights organizations, sok-
darty commitees and revoiutonary groups from
Palestine, Kurdistan/Turkey. aly. Euskadi and
Germany. in our countries torure is practiced.
People have “disappeared” and there s an or-
going "ty war”. There s forure through iso-
lation and high securty pisons. There exists a
‘special polticalustice system and manifod cor-
cepts of so-called “preventive counter-nsur-
gency”. In our counires we have atogether
almost 20,000 poltical prisoners - wordwide
there must be up to 3 100,000
During the st 15 years, uneashed global
capialism has spread its power even 10 the
last comer of the word. s power and economy
are defined as “the best system of the work!
Alegedy, 15 supposed to bring peace. free-
dom and prosperty. But or the majorty of the
workds populaton ft means only poverty and
oppression
1 Palestine is mentioned nowadays. there
s no talk about occupation but about peace.
But what kind of a peace is this, f there are
3000 poltical prisoners? What kind of a democ-
racy i this, i Kilers like Pinochet hod lfelong
posts and honours whie those who stood up
resolutely against the guns of a dictatorship
are st incarcerated? The trade-urionist 0ppo-
siion in Indonesia and the froedom.fighers in
East Timor have stil not been set free as 3
fesultof the abdication of Suharto. Why?
Pacifcation o Iberation? W say. There
Wil be 1o peace without justice! And peace
means more than the mere absence of war
The aboltion of the death penatty, an end o the
torure and the diy war, freedom for al poit-
cal prsoners, punishment forthe orturers and
continued from previous page
iical prisoners. A bier example of this s the
“peace process between Palestine and lsrael
Bearing in mind the deep divisions among Pal-
estiian organizations and the conduct of the
Palestinian Authority against the Palestinian
opposition, one can only conclude that the
peace agreement: has led more 1o the weak-
ening and divison of the Palestinians than to
freadom and justice. Without socialsiruggle on
the streets. said one former Basaue poifical
prisoner atthe conference. s hardly possibie
for the poltical prisoners to develop their own
poltical struggle n the prisons. And the oppo-
ste s also rue: Disunty and igeclogical bicker-
ing among prisoners weakens the poltical and
socil struggles in the sociey.
“The fina plenary session decided that a
‘permanent Interational Comiise shoud be
et up. s task will be o gather information to
be publshed n theforn ofanintemational news-
paper, 1o buil up a network of communicaton,
"and to coordinate practical support for the ree-
dom o poltical prisoners around the word
“Here sit representatives of the forgofien
iberation struggles fom the entire world.” said
one conference paricipant. One cannot deny
that there have been defeats, massive repres.
sion, toture and repression. expuisions. and
continuing explottation. And yet, tis confer-
ence did exhibit conduct as described in one
leter from a prisoner in Chile: “Tell the com-
rades at the conference of the intemational
Soldarty movement tha the peple i the pris-
‘ons.inthe vilages and ciies, in the felds of the
South, carry with them the hope of being on &
path to a humane future. s that evolutionary
romanticism, a vain cry i the wildemess? O
isn't i rather a breath of fresh air, which gives
power to our cold and choking hearts?
Karin Leukefeld
(Published in ‘Kurdistan Report’ #95 - Sum-
mer 1999; Transiated by Arm The Spirt)
murderers - our objeclives are justified and
they'e not realzed yet. If we agree on this.
there is only one conclusion: The reasons for
the struggle have not become less but even
more. We don't tel anybody how to fiht but
we say. Human nghts wil not be given to us.
we have to fight to gt them.
We are united by experience: On our own
we are not strong enough to achieve real
changes and tofree the poical pisoners. We
Know the courageous example of the Perwvian
MRTA guerria. They risked their ives for the
froedom of the prisoners - and they los i be-
cause they stood alone. alone against he ter-
torism of Fujmori and the support for i flom
the international communty of states. But we
also know the power of ntematonal soldarty.
Rwas strong enough o ge through to the death
chambers of the world power USA and save
the Black revolutionary and journalist Mumia
Abu-Jamal from the whte executioners up to
now
‘Soldarty committees and associatons of
relatives, grassroots and iberation movements.
fevolutionary organizations and oppositonal
groups, human rghts and lawyer associatons'
International cooperation. support, help and
soldarty is the prereuisite for the freedom
and the protection of poltical prisoners. Uniil
now. our cooperation has often been coinci-
dental and sporadic, and rarely coordinated.
This weakens us and makes our opponents
sirong. An intematonal stuggle requires.dis-
cussion. We want to start wh this in Beriin
Let' bring together our analysis, experiences
and perspecves
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Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwi
Arm The Spi
ter 1999/2000
Interview With Ahmed Qatamesh
Definition of Administrative Datention: the
zionist practice of locking up a Palestinian for
an indefinitely renewable six monts period
Without formally charging them with anyihing in
court.
Introduction
Ahmed Suiayman Musa'Qatamesn has.
earned himself a reputation as one of Paies-
tine's foremost poliical actvists and prisoners.
of conscience. A wter by vocation and a evo-
Iutionary by nature, Qatameshs invoivement
with the Popular Front for the Liveration of Pai-
estine (PFLP) prompted his Zonit interroga-
torsto prociam victorously upon hs capture n
1952 “There s George Habash on the outside
and Anmed Qatamesh on the inside’!
After 17 years in hiding, Qatamesh was.
1o spend neary ix years in prison without tal
as the Zionits'longest.held adminisrative de-
tainee. His plght eptomizes that of al admiis-
tratve detainees, while his char, ntellect, and
optimism color 2 thorough interview that the
Free Arab Voice had the opportunty of con-
ducting wih him.
‘As is frequenty the case with deposio-
ies of the Palestinian experience like Ahmad
Qatamesn, the interview turned out ather
longer than our average FAV issue. Howeve.
we trust that the valuable insights Qatamesh
provides on the sate of the Palestiian psy-
che, the htorical mpact and context o Oslo.
the status of the PFLP, and his ole as an agent
in his own destiny will make for some very
good reading. SUl, the longer unedited version
of the interiew s available upon request.
[Thisinterview with Ahmad Qatamesh was con-
Gucted for the Free Arab Voice (FAV) by Fadia
Issam Rafide].
Even though you have lived in Palestine
your whoe Iife, one could conclude that
your imprisonment In the early '70s fol-
lowed by 17 years of life underground
and another 6 years in administrative do-
tention means that you have been ‘re-
moved" from the Palestinian community
at large for almost three decades. Upon
your release, what environment did you
find yourself in? How do you think our
“shaab” (Palestinian people) have
changed?
Though | was not directly a part of the
mainstream, | was not away from the poltical
scene because | was working underground
and engaging in potical actvites. Madrid-Oslo
happened and their impacts were drastic on
the whole society. They cannot be reduced to
the fact that the Palestinian Authorty is in
“charge’ f 4% of the West Bank and Gaza. Our
eople were psychologically affected. Before
Osio, the Palestnian people used to have an
‘agenda and a common slogan ofberatin; now
we have o agenda and no siogan. They have
gone on diferent path. The Palestinian people.
in Jordan became a part of Jordan. Their
agenda s now a Jordanian one. In Lebanon.
the Palestinians are on thei own, There i noth-
ingto unte them.
Our shaab is dispersed now and they
have been swallowed up in the environments
of theiDiaspora. Every segment started think-
ing on its own and this led to isolationism. a
very different envionment from that which the
older generation grew up in when they were
united toward common goals.
Many have begun to look at the struggle
completely diferently than before. For exam-
pl. they are now considering akermative ways
that in my opinion are not very eflective. In the
past, we used 10 say the more you put pres-
Sure on the enemy. the greater your ikelinood
of succaeding. Now many people see negolia-
tions s the way 1o bring us our rights. The
phenomenon i that peaple are waiing to see.
what will come of Osio, looking passively and
thinking thatthe future will magicalybring them
something,
have noticed that the youthful generation
now pines only for recreation, happiness.
uxury, fun, and entertainment. The reason for
this i ihatthere is no evolutonary atmosphere
anymore as a result of Osio. I you compare.
his with the atmosphere of the Intfada, you
would find. as you would expect, a drastic
change. Now there i no Intfada, no revolu-
tion. There is only the aftermath of Oslo
nthe 70, people wanted 10 be cutured
and well-read because f was mporant for the
cause. After Oslo. they do ot care for that
much anymore. But without intelectual aware-
ness, we cannot continue to manufacture evo-
Iutionaries. Only 2% of our people read the
press these days and even fewer read books.
according to a recent poll. If ur poltical stua-
tion were difirent, this 2% would be much
higher. There is a direct relationship between
the ack of a revolutionary environment and the
lack of peopie's desie to be intellectual and
‘aware. Instead, many people have justtued
toreigion.
In my opinon, the majorty of people are
searching for a revolutonary altemative. Be-
cause there is none, people are frustated.
angry, and negaive about tings relating 1o
polic. The prevaiing misconceplion s tha he.
confict with our enemy s over. Oslo defeated
ourwil o struggle and o sacrfice. People use.
o be wiling 1o be martyred of jailed for the
sake of iberation. Now, people are questoning
themselves. Why should | Gothis? s tworth 17
Instead, they begin 1o tend to thei personal
affirs: how o Ive. wha o eat, wht o buy,
and how to find individual ways 1o suvive
‘Some people are even ready to sel thei co-
‘science for money with 1o regard o the ideals
of the previous period. They start looking for
rewards whether through a ministry or as &
miniser’s assistant. They are thinking: s tme
for us to get what we deserve money-wise,
fame-wise, and profi-wise. We have fished
our struggle: it s time o collect some of what
weire owed
et regardiess of what | said. or what | 6id
ot say, the contradiction stil exsts between
s and our enemy. befween our shaab and our
occupier. The larger contradiction is between
s 85 an Arab nation - wih s objectives and
Visions - and the zionis abjectves i the area
The contradicton i stil aive but the way 1o
express i 1 not represented revlutionariy
Our enemy's victory does not mean the loss of
our program for beration. We did not lose out
ights 1o continue the struggle. Al the same
time, tis does not mean that we lost our per-
speciive of being one Arab ation agais! the
Zlonists. Even i they have won now. tempo-
Fary, that does not mean we lost strategically.
Al this stage, we have suffered a poltical fal-
ure. We are in a state of retreat. This is not
catastrophic nevertheless. s temporary. Pec-
ple in other struggles have gone through this:
Victories and relreats. As long as we Nave &
just cause, this shazb demands s ight of re-
tum even in the 1948 areas. The subjective
condiions thatspurred ourrevolution are st in
place for people to use as a springboard for
Fevoluton. But they need a revolutonary mecha-
fism to upift them again
1 predictthat i the future,the peaple wil
‘explode again because the condtions are stil
there for them to explode again. There are ex-
‘amples to foretel of this. One is ‘meseeret e
‘mellon” [the Palestinian milion persons march]
Wi people going down 10 the streets f0 ex-
press their dream for Palestine, including the
land occupied in '48. Another is the events of
digging the tunnel [beneath Al-Aqsa Mosaque]
creating many martyrs and inficting many injo-
ies on people who were willng to sacrifce
Recertly we have even the police rising up in
Gaza 1o face down the army of occupation.
‘The capabiltes of our people wil never dry up
They are waiing for an incident or a spark to
energize them sgain as well as a leadership
they can trust
on Oslo
The polfical strategy and philosophy of
the US. i to manage our present crisis not to
resalve it. They want to prolong i years and
years 1o gain tme so that they can change
reaities on the ground. Oslo dd not prevent the
“Israelis” from exproprating 320,000 dunams
of ourland aflr the so-called negatiatns. Now
they are expanding Jerusalem. Every time they
‘expand i, they take extra and from us. Since
1967, they wanted a ‘unted’ Jerusalem Tneir
project o expansion s til existent, even after
Osio. The settiomens are growing 30% annu-
ally. This s despit the fact that 30,000 apart-
ments buit on the settements are st vacant
They do not need more apartments; they just
want to promote expansion. This expansion
has the objectve of creating a demographically
lopsided area of predominantly Jews. East Je-
rusalem now has 170,000 Jews and 160,000
Arabs,
“They want to compartmentaize our er
itones sothat we dont unite The West Bark s
ot connected to Gaza. W need thei permis
sion to connect them but we cannat even have
an economic unty without access. This s their
pian. They want our.regions to be isolated so
thei hegemony s mare easily éxecuted. They
want more realties on the ground and they
want 1o see more Paiestinians full of despair
and hopelessness. People are Iving in shock
and despar.
“Tne question i: whats next? We are stil
ocking for 3 place under the'sun and we are
il looking for our rights. For people to con-
tinve. they need an infrastructure of leader
ship. 50l preconditns the freedom to fiht,
democracy. and the Arab factor
Israels wil not give you these!
In some ways, your release from admin
istrative detention was a surprise,
bitrary as your imprisonment. In other
ways, it seems that it was your inaller
able right o be released and that no ‘mira-
cle’ took place that we should be in awe
of. Would you comment on the factors
that led to your release and, through ths,
mention the role of the “Israeli” left in
making this possible?
Let me pant out thatthe current adminis-
rate detainees are 90% from th Islamic move-
ment. Leftists comprise 7-8% and 1-2% are
from Fatah
There is no change inthe mentaly of the
Israsis toward agminstratve detention. They
st belive in that way of practicing ‘sate se-
curity” But. the people detained are smaller
quantiy-wise. In the event of a miltary sftack
however. | assure you that they will detain hun-
dreds. They do that to reassure the “Israel
people that they are on top of things and that
they should have confidence nthe secret serv-
ice. etc
One of the roles of agministratve deter-
ton s thatof a propaganda ool fo the purpose
of assuring the “lsrasls” that ther government
is tough on securty. The queston has been
asked why dd they release us (the PFLP mem-
bers). particulary me? When they arrested me
6 years ag0, they tred to give the impression
that | was the leader of the PFLP a that time.
From the beginning, they tred to exaggerate
my case so that they coud show offthei domi-
nance over the PFLP. allegedly because they
had captured whom they thougnt was s most
important eader nthe West Bark. They claimed
that| was par of the poltouro of the PFLP, that
they captured milions of dolars with me, etc.
In reaity, they only found $1000. At that
time, they had not even captured anybody be-
side me. | claimed that | was only an individual
that 0 not represent the entre organzation.
“They wanted me o admitto much more so that
the media could nte the ‘capture’ Now. after
they released me. hey tred o give the mpres-
sion that they have struck a deal with the PFLP
thiough me. If they proved that we are PFLP
members, they would have convicted us. They
6 not convict us because they never proved
that we were
What is 50 great abou si
under inerrogaton s that you do ot el them
You are s member and they never prove i. This
is the meaning of being steadfast during nter
togation. For someone o be steadfast. sie
has to grin and bear i, sacrfice, go through
el and endure them and survive.
We force them to deal with us as adminis-
iratve cetainees indidually. As detainees. we
had our own legal agency in the matter (of
advocating for our release). The detainees
conironted the miltary occupation with acts of
protest for one year through hunger sirkes,
Gemonstrations, putting fire (o the blankes on
which we siepl. singing siogans. writing on
the walls.
Then we boycotted the appeals courts
because we were not getting anywhere
through hem. We used to talk back to the army
officers. We even refused their sacred cuty of
daily ol call. When they called our names tobe
counted, we simply did not answer back in
objection. As a resut, they fred tear gas on us
twice. We used to breathe realy hard 83 tough
We were rabbits i a research lab. Thero were
100 of us in our section and they threw 240
tear gas canisters a us during that perod of
confrontation.
S0 in that sense we raised our own
sues. As a result, thers was scidarit from
Some lmited Palestinian institutions: Ra'i
Mandsia, ADammeer, and ikewise The meas.
ures wer ook inside made & humaritarian is-
sue and forced & onto the lsrel sseets. Four
undred “araeir intellectuats signed a petiion
Galling for our release. Amnesty Intermational
0 & eport on us Wi pictures and iterviews.
Bselom, the “lrael” Human Rights Organiz
tion, wrots ancther very detaied report abot
our siuation. As a resuk, our issue was put on
the table and people could not deny or grore .
People inside the ‘sraei” justios system
started questioning the legaiy of detaining us.
The justica system does not have an independ-
ot leadership role; £ goss siong with wha the
government warts. Even i they discussed our
situation, itwas not in thei hands. L was in the
hands of the govemment. Hashm Mahameed
was the frst Knessel member o visit us i jail.
Afer that vist, i took three to four years to be.
introduced as an issue in the Knesse. Seven
o eignt members visted. They used to reques,
“Anmed. wte alettr o the lsraels saying that
you are against violencer”
“The question became: do | wite s eterto
reflect my convictions o to make the state
happy? Their other option was to not mention
Oslo (since they knew | rejected i) but 10 re-
quest that | at east call or a two-state soltion
1old them, are you asking me to write what |
believe, or what you want me o wrte for the
Israel” public?
My jallrs claimed that my past i violent
and my future wil be violent.In interrogation.
they said they would stop interrogation If |
agreed o leave the county for two years but
1 refuse. | refused again when they tred to
cuta similar dealtrough my lawyer. 1 0d them
W things: | have no plan to leave the country
and | am not involved in any kind of violence as.
an individual 1 | have a relationship wih vo-
Jence. then ry me based on that eveence. | o
them i you could not prove | engaged in voient
actwies, then you are being the violent one by
tortuing and detaining me. You put me n ai
You hamed me physicaly. you interrogated me.
You put my famiy through hell.. 5o you'e the
ones who commited violence agaist me’
“This postion thatyou took proves thatyou
are racist Your am i fo mprson me because
13m 3 Palestinan and not because of the secu-
ity ofthe sate o ‘srael” You knew you couldnt
prove anything as far s violence was con-
cened but you stil wanted e inside. This s
racism, Try me if you have something agaist
me. The only thing they charged me with was
wrting. In the end. no matter how hard they
tned. they knew | refused to be a spoxesman
for the PFLP 50 they could not ty to convince
me to take concilatory positons ike some oin-
ers nthe PFLP.
“They wanted me to give them a statement
that 1 was against miary operations and vo-
lence. My answer was that hs is a big ssue
relevant to the internatonal laws of what con
stutes violence and what consttute terrorism
and whether our ight (o struggle s ths or that.
This is not for me to decide. The international
commanity should decide f our struggle s ter-
rorism or freedom-fightng
Take one thing fom me: il nct condemn
anything my people do to id themseves of oc-
cupation. Do not expect me to condemn any
guerria wartare against you by my people. |
am not here to do that. As far as | am con-
ered, | id not commit violence against you
but | wil not condemn my people f they did If
you want to make deals wih the PFLP. ether
gotoDamascus o the PFLP's offce n Ramalah
Do not come to me. There shoud not be nego-
tiations between someone n ailand those who
Jail him. How Coul this uneven relationship be
termed negoliatons !
“The last option they gave me: you do not
want 1o epresent the PFLP or b thei spokes-
men._ How about being the spokesman of the
sdministratve detainees? | refused. The de-
tainees were not a miltary threat to you. They
were in their houses and offces. They were
ciians. None of the administiate detainees
engaged in violence because ofherwise, you
Would have tried them for that
“The second facto that led to my release
was protest acton by a group of lsrael nt
lectuals who had infuence. They were mer-
bers of the Knesset who defended us not as &
matter of principle but because they did not
‘want the democratic face! ofIscae to be ble-
ished. We consider taracst, occupying power!
They were with us on one flem oppositon to
administrative detention. We had our motives
‘and they had their motives. Do ot try to il us
the idea tha you are democratc | say to them.
f you were truly democratc, you would
ot be occupying our and in the frst pace.
Occupation and democracy are not com-
pative. Raise your voice against occupaton,
Settiements, our right of retum, etc. and then
we'll agree with you. Yet even ff we disagree
on all those issues. we stil welcome you to
fight with us against administratve detention.
Freedom For All Polici
ter 1999/2000
There is no continuing threat s0 why 6o
You put us n jail and then release us? Up untl
ow, 5 unciear why they let me go. | cannot
tell you exactly why.
But | can tell you the only reason they
imprisoned us was {0 suppress our activity
because we are act o support of our people
and they want 1o prevent us from continuing
the struggle
When they asked me about Arafat, | tolg
them we are united against you_ Even if our
Vison i differen, we are not going [0 give you
the pleasure of seeing us fight against each
otner
Mahmoud Abbas tried an ntiatve (a main
PNA intiatve) to tellthemto release me. Thatis
ancther factor. Since my name was brought up
in the Knesset and on the Israsli streets.
Mahmoud Abbas fet comfortable addressing
the issue because it was already in the air The
PNA took it upon ifselfto ask for my release
afer al of that. Allthe factors | mentioned cul-
minated n my release.
Comment on the common perception that
the PFLP as a party has been dissolved.
Tnere st exists an historical task fo the
PFLP. The role of the PFLP i not over yet Its
special. We should have a different way of
hinking, bu I should existwith a new form and
new approaches. The people are going to say
that we need an atemalive (o the Palestiian
Autnorty. That is why there is a need for the
PFLP. Tre religous project also has s agenda
and approach. I has s vision and project. In
between these two camps. there is a large
constituency and the PFLP should be con-
ermed wih winning them over. Neiher o them
represents he needs and desires of he shaab.
St within this framework, we'l find instances
where we can ally with the PA to tackle some
issues, and with the Islamists 10 tackle other
Issues, whi remaining autonomous. There are
daly baties that we can fight alongside both
‘camps, butthis doesrit mean we melt o them.
You need your own front to continue the sirug-
ge
They say tha religion solves all conficts
inife. f wereto address Isiamists, | would ask
them, where is your development plan? Where.
is their vison of how democracy fies into soci-
ety? Where do they see the role of the iber
ton and aciwities of women in sociey as part.
ners in e with men? Where isthei clear pol-
cal program? Where are thei poltical tactics
‘wheneverthere s an ncidenthappening? What
is their postion with respect o the unty of the
Arab nation and the united aims of the Arab
nation? How Go they look at the status of ofher
reigions? What is their position on class strug-
gle? 10% of our people are hal-hungry and the
other 90% are really hungry. How are they go-
ng o approach this? What s ther positon on
imperialism? Sometimes they are against
America, sometimes they are with them. Their
postion s not clear.
You need a vision and a program that the
people can be convinced of. These are big is-
sues and the Islamic front has to answer them
50 we can analyze them and work wih them.
Whoaver gives the right answers to the people
to convince them will win over the masses.
Taking in foggy generaities wil get you no-
where. 1 1sam solves al problems. then what
about the countres in the word that aren' Is-
lamic but which flourshed i Japan. the U.S.
China, etc? It s not enough o preach a solu-
ton; you must go nto detai how you are going
to achieve a solution.
The PFLP is 3 necessity and i is needed
but it has a crisis wihin fself organizationaly
and this should be dealt with 1o I t out of s
cisis. s criss s not I 1t vision but n s or-
ganizational aspects. If everything in life
progresses. the PFLP should progress too. The.
PFLP lost many members as a fesult of Oslo
and it needs to reevaluate how i's going to
approach people n the future
We should resiructure the PFLP 1o put tin
a better stuation This is the main question the
PFLP is facing. If they can o the transiton’
estructuring el they will be the true leaders.
of the future. We should have a restructuring
that does ot ony accept the theoretical tink-
ing we had before; i has to renew self to
Cope with the new realities. in structure as.
well as leadership
What should the shaab's relationship
with the PA be?
The PA's historical choios for velinood is
America and it depends on for everything
There should be anather phiosophy instead of
just depending on America. There is los of
Cormuption going on in the PA now. There s bad
‘adminisration People are lostand do ot know
What ey want. They are ot enthusiastic bout
anyihing. They are ready to accept anything. If
Wwe are to present an afermatve, shoukd be a
Clear one. It should be & different vision flom
their vison. The relaionship does not prevent
us from joining forces on @ daly basis on is-
sues that relte to cvi society. We should mo-
bize our forces with hem in attacking hese.
issues. We should not llow the Palestiian
Authority to contain us and prevent us from
having our own entty as the PFLP. Lam against
any poliical discussion with Arafat. [he di-
gressed a bit in private abaut the Arafat meet-
ing with Habash and Hawatmeh]
Using his program/agenda wil legitmize
him and his polical thinking more than helping
us achieve uny. Any group wiling to dscuss
an altemative to Oslo would be benefcial to
engage n.Every meeting s called or the sake
of poiticalunity but we should not e callng for
that right now. What s needed now is not poit-
cal unity that we used to raise as a siogan
the past; we should be asking for people’
unty. The instfutions in Palestine should get
together and promote a program for the im-
provements of sacity. Unity among the people
through thei nstutions mstead of the poltical
eaders should be our objectve. It s beter for
the PFLP to unite s forces, fiht occupation
help the masses .. not fo sit wih Arafal. The
PFLP should have ts priortes. There are many
more issues 1o discuss. Arafat aready made
s line clear and we know i $0 why bother?
Some PFLP leaders nvolved themseives n the
Labor Ministy (wizaret ek-aamal)
“They snouid not have_ They snouid not
have joned the police. the Information ministry
and the securty department.If peaple were
confused about the PFLP's position n the past
because of these things.let me make t least
that pont clear.
Araat chose a certan path through the
US.and some say ne wil achieve hs goals
He depends on the U S.to suppor him finan-
cially and every decision should be agreed to
by the U.S. Anything he wans o 6o i related
tothe United States. The ther deology s notto
e one's sef 1o America because twil ot give.
us the solution we need. My solution entaiis
depending on ourselves and buiding a good
relationship with the Arab masses and con-
tinuing the struggle without dependence on
America.
Many FAV readers are living in the
Diaspora. What advice or suggestions can
You give them to be involved in the strug-
gle?
Each person regardiess of place of resr
dence has hismer own ole and they should
‘complement the role of people eisewhere be-
ause our siruggle is nt over and the condi-
tions we fiht against arestl there. They should
ot be competing with each other they shouid
be complementing each ofher. There are cer-
tain issues that are st in common between
those onthe inside and those Iving outside. We
Have 2 batte: they are tryng o get us o forget
about ouridentty. We should attack this batie
ity
Since peaple are in Gaza,the West Bank.
Jordan and eisewnere, our enemy i rying o
make this division permanent, not temporary.
50 that we wil not ever be unified. They wart
each segment o soiv it problem thiough the
area it is in 5o we should stand against that I
they succeed in tackling us as shoe-boxed
Palestinians. i wil be easier for them to over
‘come us. I they try to tackle us as one people.
they wil fai. Regardless where our people are.
they beiieve in one people and one common
‘cause and thisis what urites them and makes
them work together. We have a ot of capabil-
ties. Our peopie need to understand our his-
tory, atampt to preserve our anguage and cul-
ture and, besides that, hey shoukdkeep in con-
tact with the people back home though visiting
them 80 tha they kee the elationship srong.
Septomber 16, 1898
(Source: Free Arab Voice <www fav net>)
Free Arab Voice Iniroduction: In ths issue
of the Froe Arab Voice we present an exclu-
Sive inferview with Dr. Habash, the General
Sacrotary of the PFLP, on his oppositon 1o
dialogue with Arafal. and his future plans. in-
cluding i forthcoming resignation from the
General Secretariat of the PFLP (the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palesiine)
Prelude
It an unfortunate facttha n our struggle
against Zionism. we tend to pay more atention
1o ongoing poltical miltary. or Ciandestine Z-
onist efforts against us, and less attention o
the Zionist long-un effort to bring about our
psychologicaldefeat by tamishing the symbols
ofthe Paiestinan and Arab struggle. Even the
continuous humilaton and daily mistreatment
of Yasser Avafat by “lsraef”, in spie of all his
senices rendered. serves the same Zionist
purpose of biinging about Arab psychological
defeat. It s crucil therefore that ALL those
Who work for Palestnian and Arab causes re-
alze that when they sell out or buckle under
pressure. they do not only compromise them-
seves, but a e part o the cause as well
This i true regardless of the actists rank in
the struggle, because the activst's unoffcial
public office is a rust bestowed by the people
Who are the first ones o be let down should 8/
e betray that trust It is specically that be-
rayal that oppressors wil seek. notjus or the.
sake of neutralzing the particular actiist in
question. but to demoraize other actvists as.
well and o shroud the cause in despair.
Osio s defeatist mentalty, and the inst-
tutons t generated on the ground are not only
an oppressive status quo for the Palestinian
and Arab people; they are a test in which you
either cross or do not cross the ine between
patrotism and treason. o between justca and
njustice. The later are morally charged words
frequently subject 1o ridcule of course, as i is
in the best interest of oppressors anywhere to
blur that I for those who might ever think of
challenging existing power amangemens. Yet,
when the DFLP and the PFLP cross that ine,
they don't anly compromise themselves. but a
piece of the Palestinan cause and the Arab lef
wih them as well It i in such crcumstances
that Dr George Habash, an entrenched symbol
ofthe Palestinian struggle, has to make his stand
for the sake of Paiestine and for the sake of
hope.
Much confusion has surrounded the posi-
tion of Dr. Habash, otherwise known as I
Hakim, regarding his real position on his rgani-
zation's dialogue with Arafat and is setting of
one foot n the track of the Oslo process. Thus
the followng is nat an open-ended Interview.
but ather a serious attempt o clarty where Ei
Hakim stands now.
1 the following. you'l see that E1 Hakim
remains E| Hakim. He emerges unscathed. With
‘wisdom and carty. he dispels the mystifcation
surounding his postion, while inserting what
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide:
Interview With George Habash,
General Secretary Of The PFLP
ocks like subtle messages between the ines
a5 well. Read all about .- The Free Aab Voice
[This interview was conducted for the Free
‘Arab Voice (FAV) by lrahim Alloush]
Wnat is your position on dialogue with
Arafat? Why has the PFLP changed its
position on such a dialogue? Is that re-
lated to the election of Barak?
Dialogue i tis crical phase that the Palestin-
ian cause is going through can't be rejected by
any rational person, as a matter of princple.
But we can't tackle his question only on an
abstractlevel. Dialogue inprinciple s one thing,
and dialogue with Arafa is ancther. We i the.
PFLP called for dialogue with everyone with-
out exception, including dialogue with Avafat,
when Netaryahu became prime minister sev-
eral years ago. Such a cal for dialogue had is
Justfcations at the time. We called fordialogue.
with Arafat enthusiastically then, but Arafat
gian' care much for ialogue. He took the whole
thing with ndiference.
So when Arafat becomes o eager now
fordislogue with us, we have to ask ourselves.
why he was 0 much less eager for dialogue.
before. | asked myself how we may under-
stand this shiting positon of his. My answer to
myself and to the Poltbureau of the PFLP was
thatine U.S. Govemment now realzes thathere
s to be some kind of soluton for the Palestin-
fan question. Given their knowledge of Arafat's
Character, they most kel resoived to gve him
sometring that may be called a stae, regard-
less of the content of such a state, of course.
In such a case, Arafat has to accept funds
mental clauses o give to “Israer” n return for
this state, or cal 2 educed state’ f you wil
n exchange or ths stat, Avafat wil have
10 acquiesce to very fundamental concessions,
from the point of view of the Palestnian peo-
pl, specifcally o the issues of Jerusalem and
the right o return of five millon Palestinians
abroad. “Israer” wil not at this stage make any
concessions n these two crucial reas. Other
areas i settlements, water, and the borders
of the reduced state' may be on the negoliating
table. Whereas Jerusalem and the rght o re-
tum ofthe ive milon to Palestine are not. Arafat
Knows that his acceptance of such conces-
sions inthese two areas is equivalent {0 com-
miting a crime against the Palestnian people
How could the Palestinian people give up Jeru-
salem and the night of return?!
‘Thats why Arafat suddenly became en-
thusiastic for dialogue with us: he wants a
cover for commiting such a crime. That's why.
1 oppose dialogue with Arafal at this point. He
Wants us 1o become a cover to legmze his
concessions
But if you were against dialogue with
Araat, why don't you try to change the
position of the PFLP on such a dialogus
especially given ail the weight you carry
inside the PFLP?
1 am currently doing my best to change the.
postion of the PFLP on dialogue with Arafa. |
‘am going through a dificul phase i this perod
of my ife. There has been inside me a furous
contradiction that needed to be resolved be-
fwoen the poltica Ine of the PFLP that elped
deineate since the estabishment of the PFLP
on one hand, and the queston of democracy
inside the organizationofthe PFLP on the othe
hand. Because inthe final analysis the majory
of my comiades inside the Central Commitee
of the PFLP accepted the call for dialogue wih
Arafat. They have their premises that | donit
Subscibe to. This led 10 a sharp contradiction
wihin me: should | give pririy o democracy
{majorty ule] or o the established poitcal ine:
of the PFLP? Tne latter mind you is no less
important han the former. Evertualy | went with
thelattr. the poltical ne of the PFLP, ourscru-
pulous positons. and the constanis of the Pa
estian struggle
Hence. some comrades n the Central
Commitee suggested the following to me. ‘Dr
Habash. since you say thal you o longer want
10 be the General Secretary of the PFLP. and
Since that will e setled n two o tree moniths
when the PFLP's Sixih Convention meets, we
will gve you your perfect freedom 1o present
your point of view on dialogue wih Arafat in
public In return, you remain General Secretary
until the Sixth Convention meets.* And tis i
what | chose to do, and am doing rght now.
So it s true that you decided to retire
from politcal activism? What are your fu-
ture plans?
Leaving the positon of General Secretary
ofthe PFLP is one thing, and retiing from polt-
cal activsmis another. | want o resign from the
General Secretaria for a number of reasons:
1)1 want 1 set an example that s not neces-
1y for anyone to remain General Secretary
forever. 2) | want o fnd the tme o study and
draw the lessons of my poitical experience
and to write them down for the benefit of fu-
ture generations. I've tried to do that i the re-
cent past. but | couldn' find the tme really, and
continued on the next page.
e
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
“Are German Courts Helping The Turkish Regime?”
Interview With Lawyer Ahmet Yuksel, Trial
Observer At The DHKP-C Proceedings In Germany
At the end of November 1999, Iihan
Yolkuvan, a member of the Revolutionary
People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C),
was sentenced to Iife in prison by a court
in Hamburg, Germany on murder charges
attor a questionable trial. Other trials
against DHKP.C members in Germany are
set to get underway in the near future.
Members are also facing repression in
other European countries. How did this
situation come about?
At st it semed ke the usualtype of repres-
sion, but the realfty soon became ciear. In the
summer of 1997, Serafettin Gul.the head of the
DHKP-C in Germany. and two other comrades
were arested in Germany. Shorty thereatter
came s major sweep against DHKP-C support-
ers in France. Around 50 front members are
facing charges in France at the moment_10
party members are n prison in France. In Ger-
many. 9 DHKPC sympathizers are in prson.
How is the situation in other European
countries?
I the past, the authorities in other coun-
fes were more restrained. But in France, there
have been state attacks on the DHKP-C in the
past In 134, the French polce arrested the
Chaimman of the front, Dursun Karatas, and the
people with him at a border crossing. A few
mnths laer, the authorties were forced to et
him go. After the chairman of the front fled
abroad. French courts charges dozens of fo-
lowers wilh crimes. At this time, Gemman au-
thorities were working very closely with the
French police. Step by step. the repression
spread to other Eurcpean counties. In Swi-
zertand, 1 member s in prison,in Belgium there.
are 4. Even in Austria, DHKP.C supporters are
threatened and ntimidated by the state author-
ves
Is a central strategy hidden behind this?
In France, imprisoned DHKP-C members
have been jointly questioned by poiice from
France, The Netheriands, Germany, and Bel-
gium. That shows an intemational dimension.
But it seems that everything is being directed
oy Germany. In October. shorty after alleged
DHKP-C functionary Nuri Eryuksel was d
tained in Swizeriand on a German arrest wi
rant_ German inteligence agents from the BND
and ried o recrut
spies. The BND agens assumed that the entire
leadership of the party was now in custody
and that the DHKP-C would be defeated
The involvement of the BND seems to
suggest a possible involvement by NATO
as well,
The DHKP-C wages an armed struggle
exclusively in Turkey. In other counres. they
‘abide by egal, demacratic means. This point s
emphasized in many publications by the front.
The German authorfies know that this party
presents no danger to Germany's domestic
securty. The epression against the DHKP-C s
based on foreign poicy nterests. We assume.
thatthe USA and Germany are waging repres-
sion against the DHKP-C in order (o aid their
NATO partner Turkey.
Until the recent wave of repression, Bel-
gium had no confrontations with supporters of
the DHKP-C. The DHKP-C is ot banned in Bel-
giumas ts in Germany. Now, sudden)y, pudlic:
mestings have been banned without reason.
ang people have been arrested. Beigum has
seemingly been old to carry out repression as
‘continued from the previous page
3) 1 want to estabish research center con-
emed wih the study of the issues pertaining
1o the Palestinian and Arsb struggle.
I shor. there's a big diflerence between
leaving the General Secretariat and leaving
polical action. Leaving the later is not poss-
ble.
Does your health have anything to do with
this decision?
No.my crterion for heatth considerations.
hinges on my abilty to do work. and o my
health is st in good shape.
Are you going to leave the General Sec-
retariat only o the PFLP?
1 worit leave poitical acton. and | won't
leave for heatth reasons... 1l be making 3
speech in the Sixin Convention of the PFLP
explaining why Im leaving the General Sece-
tariat, and the new tasks that Ul be devoting
mysel to
One final question, what was your posi-
tion on Nayyef Hawatmen's (the General
Secretary of the DFLP) infamous. hand
shake with Weisman?
My positon was very ciear.
Which was?
ts complete condemnaton’
October 15, 1999
(Sourse: Free Arab Voice <hitp /e fav net>)
well There is a link between the repression
againstthe DHKP-C in Turkey and Europe and
the triais in Germany. In charges rafed by
federal authorites in Genmany.th front's strug-
gle against the Turkish regime is often men.
oned. It goes sofar as to legtimize te repres-
sion being carried out by Turkish fascism
But here, only crimes which are said to
have been carried out in Germany are at
issue.
That's the offiia reason for the repres-
sion, yes. Nuri Eryuksel, who was arested in
Switzertand and is awaiting deporation o Ger-
many, spent 11 years in prison in Turkey fo-
lowing the 1980 mitary coup. Now this nearly
bind man s being denied urgent medical care
Nuri Eryuksel s in isolation custody in Swizer-
land. because the German federal authoriies
in Karisrune have described him as very dar
gerous. And the DHKP-C's European spokes-
man, Mesut Demirel, who i facing charges in
Hamburg, has been questioned by the court
about his work in Turkey as edtor of the news-
paper Mucadele’ This jourmaistspent more than
10 years inprison n Turkey. Now hs legiumate:
polticalwork as aefistjournalst and a spokes-
person are being defamed as terrorism” That's.
absurd
Why is the DHKP-C facing such attacks in
Europe at the moment?
The DHKP-C is par of the fundamental
opposition. Despits heavy repression, the move-
ment has been able o further develop s sirg-
gle in Turkey and has been gaining support
among Turkish and Kurdish migrants i Europe.
Turkey is a neo-colony of the Western nd
lized nations, who wish o pursue thei
nter-
ests inthe Middle Eastat al costs. Turkey s of
sirategic importance s a bridge 1o the Near
East and a launching pad for possible NATO
attacks inthe Caucasus. That's why al revolu-
ni-mperiaist perspeciives in Turkey
be crushed
(interviow by Jorg Hibert, Published in Junge
Welt, December 30, 1999; Translated by Amm
e s o DE,
oF 9,
Freedom For All Policical Prisoners Worldy
Winter 1999/2000
The Victory’ Of Our Death Fast Resistance
Statement From The DHKP-C European Organization
For 63 days resistance to German imperi-
alism was winessed both inside and outsice
prison
ihan Yelkuvan esisted such German prac-
ticas as soltary confinement,atempts to make
im surrender and fo Germanise him, e waged
a battle using the cals of his own body by
convertng s hunger strike to a Death Fast
‘which began on November 30t 1999
Alltne DHKP-C prsaners in Germany par-
tcipated in this resistance wih soldarty hur-
ger strkes for an indefinte perod, and some
non-poltical prisoners joied in wih soiarty
hunger srikes.
"Aiso the Cephe (Front) prisoners in Bel
gium and France joned in the resistance.
More than 1.000 Party-Front prisoners in
Turkey inially partcipated in 3-day hunger
sirikes, and from Janary 24, 2000. they con-
verted them into indefinte hunger strikes win
the siogan of "one for al and al fr one”
‘Aot prisoners from TKP(ML), TKPAAL.
TIKP, Deviimci Yol TIKB, PKK-Revolutonary Line
Fighters were on 3.day soldarity hunger sirke
in'several prisons. Also our supporters and
people paricipated fuly in the resistance tnat
the prsoners extended on a daily basis
“Tnousands of fax messages and letirs
were sent, posters were hung, press releases
were distributed and our resistance was an-
nounced to European public opinion. Demon-
stations took place i front of all German Em-
bassies i Europe.
“The buldings of Amnesty Intemational and
the Goelhe Instiute in Engiand, as wel as the
Goetne Institute in Holland, the Cologne catne-
ral and SPD offices in Germany and the office
of vade union in Swizerland were occupied
The Holand-Germany fronter was blocked for
3 hours. a 60 km-long tailback was formed and
the resistance was announced o the motor-
ists. Marches were organised in Hamburg. Co-
logne and London (0 support lian Yelkuvan
German imperalism wanted to prevent the ac-
tvtiesofthe DHKP-C by banning i, by pressing
charges against tens of Front supporters in
accordance with Aticie 1293’ of the Criminal
Law, by arresting people and forcing them to
co-cperate with the authorites against the
DHKPC.
‘Al of this was ot enough. They prac-
tised a wide-ranging policy of repression
against our prisoners in an attempt to make
them surrender. Ihan Yelkuvan was placed in
soltary confinement and al i rights were taken
‘away from him because he dd not give up the
thought of being a member of the Front. He
was banned from seeing other prisoners by
using the pretext that he might spread propa-
‘ganca among other people from Turkey.
“Tnis is clearly a denial o reedom of thought
ang racism. This means that you are not -
fowed to speak your mother tongue of con-
tinue 10 ve according to your own culture, you
will be made to give up your poifical thoughts
anc be subject to Gemnanisation. These prac-
tices are an insuft and an attemp to denigrate
the peoples of Turkey
tis 8 o 10 say tht there are human right.
freedom of thought, democracy. equalty and
justce in Germany. The attacks against our
pecple and prisoners in Germany are the prac-
tices of the hers of the Nazis
“The decision to inflct arbtrary confine-
ment is a elberate and poitically motvated
decision. Ths decision was reached in he in-
torests of fascism in Turkey. Germany is co-
operating with Turkey both economically and
poltically and therefore is seling Turkey Leop-
ard tanks and ther weapons.
‘Germany also supported fascits of the
MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and the
Hizbulah supporters who are strving for a
Shara state
“They are also esponsiblefor the Hizbulah
Kiling felds. They are an accompice of the
‘Susuruk state. The peoples of the worid have
ot forgotten what the Nazis did. Nazism is
‘condemned by the peoples of the entre worid
Tnerefore Gemany's curent attacks wil not
be forgiven either. We represent justice, free-
om and democracy.
We are waging war against the fascist
regime in Turkey and imperialsm_ Our struggle
s ot directly againt the German state but
against fascism in Turkey.
In the Ulucaniar prison 10 prisoners were
massacred just because they demanded an
extra ward
ihan aiso was denied his rights and letto
die over the last 10 months because he woukd
ot change his thoughts
‘These attacks are a part of the poliies of
imperalist countriesled by the U.S. to make the
revolutionary movements surrender. They are
in fear of the struggle or revolution wherever
it may be. The resistance of revolutionaries,
the hope of people’s iberation o all sieges and
policies of surendering, maks imperilism feel
uneasy. This s the main problem.
‘We 6id not choose to be refugees and to
five apart from our county. Our minds and hearts
are always with the peopie in our country. We
never see ourselves as being outside of the
war despie being behind the frontine. They
see us as ‘Diack heads" in Eufope, make us
Work in the most menial jobs. they deny us our
cultures and values, they attempted to make us
forget our language and they tried to drag our
chidren into the swamp of drug addiction. For
30 years they tred to Gemmanise s, destroy
ourpeaple and their cuture and applied a poicy
of assimilation. Today a large section of our
chidren cannot speak their own language. This
is the result of 30 years of Germanisation and
of racist polices. 11 the legtimate right of the
e peoples of the worid o fight against rac-
ism and violtion o fréedorm of thought
We deciare to the whole world that we
wil aways sacrifce our ives, whenever i is
necessary. for the sake of our thoughts No
matter what they have done. we wil never
give up seeing the problems of our people In
Europe as our own and fightng fo our courlry
and peopl. Ratner han ing e a siave, ratner
than having no home and oot we prefer (o
fightfor our reedom and fo de or ourthoughs.
Therefore we resisied German mpera.
{smis bans, sftacks and policies aimed at mak-
Ing our prisoners surrender. Our resistance
which was extended by our prisoners and
combined with those outside the prisons on a
dally basis ended in vicory
- lhan Yelkuvan's isoation was ended and his
demands were accepted.
han Yelkuvan will be transferred to ancther
prison and stay with two other prisoners from
Turkey i the same cell.
- He will have the same rights as the other
prisoners.
- He wil be llowed to work.
- He wil be allowe to exercise and his cel
door will be kept open for two hours in the
evenings.
The German sate has reslised how much
power we have. For the last 30 years no one
ould place 3 ban on aur thoughts and neither
can the German state
From now on, whenever there s an at-
tack against our prisoners or Ihan Yelkuvan's
gains are neutraised or the Gemnanisation poi-
Gies are targeted aganst our peopie, the Ger-
man state wi come face to face with the Front
We willkeep an eye on the gains han Yekuvan
has made. Our sruggle agains the denial of
reedom of thougnt will continue.
We thank al those who made efforts to
crown our resistance with victory. We thank
those who were in soldarty with our struggl,
those who took part in occupatins and dem-
onstrations, our supporters, our peaple and
‘comrades from other organisations. our pris-
oners who were on hunger sirke and ready to
sacifice themselves, German revolutionaries
and democrats and our riends all over Europe
who supported us with their ntemationalst
consciousness.
Down With Imperialism, Bans On Freedom
Of Thought, Racism.
‘We Wil Resist To The Deatn, We Wil Never
Give Up Our Thoughts Or ur Part In The
Revolution In Anatolia..
Long Live The DHKP-CI
Long Live Our Leader Dursun Karatas!
February 2. 2000
DHKC European Organisation
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide!
Interview With DHKP-C Prisoners
“The hungerstrike uncil deagh from 1996 has, because of is results, achieved the character of a policical victory
n the summer of 1996, a hungerstrie by
politcal prsoners in Turkey kep the Whole.
Gountry in s grip for months, detemmining the
poliical agende.
risoners from ten revolutionary organi-
sations partcipated in the hungersirike unt
eath, which lsted for 69 days. and 12 prison-
ers died Aygun Ugur (TKP(ML), Attan Berdan
Kerimgiler (DHKP-C), linc Ozkeskin (DHKP-
©). Huseyin Demircioglu (LK), All Ayata
(TKP(ML)). Muidat Yanat (DHKP-C). Tahsin
Viimaz (TIKB). Ayse Idi Erkmon (DHKP-C),
Hicabi Kucuk (TIKB). Yemina Kaya (DHKP-
). Osman Akgun (TIKB) and Hayati Can
(TKP(ML).
Last summer, co-workers from the “Rote
Hilte” (Red Aic) from Kiel (Germany) con-
ducted an inferview with DHKP-C prisoners in
Turkey. Two years afer the hungerstrike unti
eath, we want to hear from them about the
present situation and how their siruggl is go-
ingnow.
How has the prison situation boen since
19967
Before answerig this question. maybe
we should explain what was the goal of the
Pungersirike of 1996 and what a vicory this
action was. Then the answer to your question
is easir 1o understand. The hungerstrke i
Geath of 1996 was not held for the recogrition
of imited rights in prison. Because of i re-
sults, the hungerstrie also has the character
of polticalvietory. looking at the fture of he
fevolutionary struggle. where the heart o the
struggle is formed by the existentil struggle of
the revalutonares againt fascism
In those days. fascism did everything to
cary out s plan of beating back the revolu-
tonary struggle and repressing the demands.
of the people or rights and justice. Their plan
was directed against all segments of society.
As ther frst level of attack, they chose the
prsons and the revolutonary prisoners. I has
been mporant to beat back fascism at s frst
step when i increased s attacks in prison in 3
deadly way. The hungersirike unti death then
transformed into an existentia struggle, de-
stroying the core of the fascist pan. siencing
the people and the revoluton
I short we can say our action cannot be
reduced to the demand of closing the isolation
prison in Eskeseni and giving back the rights
for defence and medical veatment. The acton
besides pushing through the demands (albei
atthe cost of 12 deatns), aiso brought a poit-
cal victory which in a very short e revealed
the true face of fascism in Turkey 1o all the
people in the workd. Furthermore, the attempt
1o take the revolutionary struggle hostage was.
stopped and beaten back.
“The action found a lot of resonance. it
developed new values and new possbilties
for the revolutionary struggle and thus it
reached s goal
Turkey is a country which i ruled by fas-
cism. Under the conditons of fascism, the ex-
Istentalstruggle between fascism and the evo-
Iution continues, even though the intensy of
the struggle might ifer from time to time. The.
prisons aiso constiute one of the many places.
where the struggle is waged. From ths view,
the revolutionary prisoners thus are a favour-
e taget of fascism The prisoners try to gain
thei righs through several actions, fascism
tres to curtail these rghts and then the prson-
s resistthis and struggle again. Fascismakes
3 step back and prepares for new attacks.
This law is in existence since the beginning of
the revalutionary struggle and it wil remain in
existence for as long as fascism exists. So s
o mistake 1o keep this aspect in mind in evalu-
ating the phase e the hungersirke uni deatn
of 1996.
As the frst demand of our ac-
tion. the isolation prison in
Eskesehir was closed. The de.
il of our rght o defence and
medical reatment.the atacks
against our families, artesting
them, it all learly decteased
Howsver, after this period the
attacks took another forn and
they occurred on several lev-
el Fornstance,they nolonger
taked about a central isolaion
prison as in Eskesehir. now iso-
Tation cells were buit nthe indi-
vidual prisons instead. They
alsodenied us the right of medi-
caltreatment. Because of that
we have had more deaths e
cently as a result of lacking
mecical care. We calthis sient
anninilation afterwards. The
relatives and famiy members of
the prisoners are being amested again. their
viis are being preventea by all kincs of pes-
tering and nagging. And then there are aways
the provocations. or something i thought of to
create provocatons.
Severe atacks occur again and again On
March 30, 1998 forinstance. n Buca, 10 DHKP-
C prisoners were kidnapped from prison. But
this attack as well was beaten back because
of the detemined resistance of the prisoners.
Even though circumstances migh dfer in the
individualprisonsfrom time f ime, most mpor-
tant s our determined resstance agaist the
attacks and assaults of fascism, o beat back
the attacks. making every sacifice necessary
Because this wil be a factor which wil make
fascism retreat permanenty. creating a basis
at the same time for a fertle ground for our
achieved successes
How do you organize your activities and
your life?
The reason why fascism chooses prison
5. permanent targe or ther attacks is on the
one han the fact that we have transfomed it
into a place of the revoluton, nto schools of
our party.that we don't give up our sruggle in
Jail, that we o not lose our fath i the revolu-
fion, and that we succeeded in becoming a
moral nstiution in the eyes of the peaple. Our
Iives and our actviies must be seen and judged
in that context_ T question is who poses the
question of powe in prison, the revolutonar.
ies of fascism.
However circumstances in prison might
be, we determine ealty and the issue of power
in the prisons. What we do and how we Ive is
Getermined by thi alone. We do not allow fas-
cism 1o enter here. We see our ne of lfe as 2
part as an ideological, poltical and practical
Support for the revolutionary struggle. n that
sense we also have a wrtten statute which
determines our communal fe, our poiticaledu-
cation,our elations with our reatives, our pi-
Giles and rules i al details. This statute was
discussed and approved by all members of the
DHKP-C, s vale for all mprisoned members of
the DHKP-C. n al prisons.these common pin-
Gples form the basis for our ives and our ac-
tivites. naturally considering local circur-
stances. The common frame of mind develops
in eal Ifethe collectiviy on the basis of revol
tionary principles. On the other hand. the
collectivy strengthens our mental and moral
uniy in ral ie. I fundamental in our ife to
pemanently pracice revolutionary discipine.
collctiism, poltcal education, productiay and
an atttude which prevents the dissolvment of
the revolutionary struggle
On that basis, we are fing in a commu-
nity, we pariciate n jont poltcal education.
and we aiso are aciive cuturaly and in sports
Besides that there are of course the indiidual
activies which support the strugale i a posi
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
Arm The Spi
Winter 1999/2000
Edition
tve way. For us. such a e constiutes a shield
which protects us against the attempts of fas-
cism 1o destroy us. 10 break our Conscious-
ness. Our socialist conviction. our love for our
people and our courty. our responsivilty for
il our pecples, i reflected n out entire e and
€ strengthens our consciousness. That's why
fascism tres 1o isolate us. and If that doesnt
succeed. saotage our ies. Is not mporant
whether we are with 300 people or alone. our
ves and our activites stem from this con-
It cannot be ignored that the people are
organizing on al levels. Students, work-
ers, civil servants, the people’s councils
for instance. How do you see your place
in that?
The struggle inside the prisons signified
important phases.of the revolutionary siruggle
in our country. We might even say that one of
the special characterstics o the revolutionary
siruggle n our country i the ole ofthe revolu-
tionary struggle n the prisons. The practice of
the revolutionaries n the prisons has tme and
3gainplayed a determining rle. on the one hand
forthe future of the revolutionary struggle. but
on the ather forthe future of the individual po-
tical prisoner as well. I our country. the revo-
Iutionary prisoners are infuenced by the stug-
gle of the people, and vice versa the struggle
influences the people. Our struggle inside the
prsons has become stronger and broader, not
for realzing mare agreeable condions o if.
butratheron the basisofthe revolutionary stug-
gle and the problems connected with that. in
their30 year hisory. the DHKP-C prisoners have
aiways interpreted imprisonment from these
aspects s mportantthat mprisonment, keep-
ng the body within four walls, does ot ail the
mind. Under those circumstances, prisoners
with 3 free mind can overcome imprisonment
anc s cansequences and they can become
part of the siruggle of the people. Then they
are able to fufl e given tasks n the struggle
Wih success. In our counlry., there were times
when the struggle nside the prsons was deci-
sive for the struggle outside. For example dur-
ing the period of the coup. The junta had tor-
tured huncreds of thousands of people o
side. thousands were arrested. All - revolu-
tionares, democrats and intelectuals - were
Griven together n prison and under those ci-
cumstances, every fight for rights. every stug-
gle for freedoms. transformed into resistance
against the tertor of the junta against the peo-
ple. A struggle which served as a barricade
against althe repression and aggression could
only develop inside the prisons. Aftr the junta
had sienced the unions. associations. even
the bourgeois opposiion, with repression and
bans, ttured against the pisoners. I the revo-
Iutionaries and their consciousness could be
broken inside the prison. the road would be
paved for hei system of explotaton.
Tnerefore they started with forcing the
prisoners to wear prison clothing to destroy
theirndividualty and digniy. but the prisoners
did not allow that. In January 1984, three of our
comrades and a comrade from the TIKB lost
thei Ives auring a 75 day long hungerstre.
but the junta's pian was siopped. The poltical
victory of 1984 has, besides gaining existential
basi ights, made an mpression upon the peo-
ple and t became a propeling force i the sirug-
gle against fascism_ As our example shows.
prisons and revolutionary prisoners can be-
come o strategic importance at certan tmes.
In that sense i consttutes an important part of
the struggle n our country The level of impor-
tance can vary. increase or decrease. from
time 1o tme, but s never without mportance.
That means that the prisoners have 1o resist
under al circumstances, they must never sur-
render to fascism. they must be part of the
struggle. As we have said afer your first ques-
ton. the prisons were attacked at 3 moment
when hundreds of thousands of people on the
outside took to the strets: the polticizing of
the peopl. the increasing level of organizing
and the poitical struggle as @ whole had to be
stopped. The baricade struggle in 1995 when
three of our comrades fell n Buca, or January
4 when four comrades were murdered during
an operation of the securty troops and when
we counteracted these atiacks with barricades.
and taking securty officers as prisoners, must
be seen in that context,
Looking at the present siuation, the role
of the revolutonary prisoners and the prisons
inthe struggle hasn'tchanged intelf. The pis-
oners are an actve and inseparable part I the
struggle and the organizing of the people. This
fole can come 10 the foreground from tme o
time, depending on the itacks by fascism. But
just as the students, the workers and the civi
Servants they are oganized and function as a
part of the peope’s struggle. The only dfer-
ence is thal the prsoners are confined within
four wals Nothing changed In ther responsi-
bily towards the people and the couniry n the
struggle against fascism. That is to say that
they are a part in the struggle for power.
The state tries to lock up the prisoners
in isolation cells. What will be the reac-
tion of the prisoners in such a situation?
Maybe we should start wih carfying why
the state wants o implement such 3 poliy. To
begin wih it has to be clear that wha the state
‘wants to force upon the prisoners, whatever
they cal it whateve the form. indiffeent when.
15 10 take them hostage. Taking them hostage
means to separate them from their convicin.
from theic ideology they have fought for unti
ow. where they have been tortured for, locked
up in pison for years, lost their comrades..in
short they are supposed to belray themseives
and their peaple
“This hostage-taking is ot something physi-
cal, and its not the giving up of the revolution-
ary struggle by an individual or by one hundred
prisoners, s rather the sffect o such 3 proc-
ess, that i 1o say the effect of the persons,
driven to betrayal. not wanting 1o know.
‘anymore of thei ideclogy and convicton, this
effect upon the people and upon their com-
rades. When you think about that s perectly
clear that such an effectinfuences the strug-
gle negatively and that these peple are being
misused to destroy the sef-confidence of tne
people. Forthe sate. the most imporiant goa'
n ths are 1o spread mistrus. the giving Up of
the conviction and the goa, the breaking of
theiown identy. Revolutonanes have become
moral standards who. whatever the form of
torure and repression, willnot break their word
o the people. who will not hestate to die for
their convicion. thus giing the people convic-
tion and determination as well This constiutes
5 danger to fascism, tnerefore one attack fo-
lows the other. The demand for buiding S04
tion cells, since 1977, time and again on the
agenda, consttutes the continuation of these
atacks.
As you know. an isolation prison was,
opened in Eskesehir in 1996, Present poicy s
1o bui isolaton cels inall psons 5o that they
allbecome ‘Eskesenis” Spreading the atiacks
aims at spiting up a given resitance because
Simultaneous resistance in several prisons
gives a stronger positon of negotiaton towards
the stae. Wih the decentralization of s isol-
tion policy,that s t Say with ntroducing S0l
tion cells in al the local prisons, the state aims
atbreaking a centrally organized resistance. at
the other hand they aiso want to win the pubic
opinion for this policy by putting non-poitical
prisoners i the isoation blocks 2s wel But the
realty of fascism and the fascist poicies are
manifest.
Tnat' the state's calculation. The polcy
of introducing isolation blocks, constantly re-
‘appearing, aims at separating the poltical pris-
oners. at weakening the resistance and. in
course of tme, making the poltical psoners
into collaborators. But ntoducing the separate
isolaton cels i theprison a iferen:tmes wil
ot change anything about our central o-ordi-
nation, that is 1o say the simulaneous co-
ordinated resistance in sl the prisons. Even
‘when only one of our comrades s put nto so-
Iation, hundreds of prisoners wil ise up n al
the prsons. That was shown on March 30, in
Buca. Our comrades were kidnapped gang-
storstyle so their whereabouts would be un-
Known but al the DHKP-C prisoners reacted
wih actions ke taking the guards hostage.
buiding barrcades of efusing 1o be counted
Tne state tried o test the reactons inside the
prisons but when it became obvious they
Couldn' act ke they pieased, the state with-
drew. As mentioned before. such a reteat is
oniy temporary. of course. and when the prepa-
ations are finshed. or when a sulable siua-
tion oceurs,attacks wil be launched again. But
our reacton il be swif. None of us wil dis-
appear into a isolation cell We wil resis, if
need be we'l de. We will break down these
cell with our hands and toeth. All the DHKP-C
prisoners are that determined. Given such a
Stuation, the full attention of the country wil be
on the prisons, the resistance of the revolu-
tionaries, again
There are several forms of reprossion in
Turkey. Which s the most problematic?
Of course there are diferet forms of -
pression in our country. I not aiways possi-
b, or even necessary. to diferentate ac-
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
cording 1o thei importance because they are
2l based on the same. fascism. Fascism s
pressea in all s cruely n our country. Explo-
{ation and barbarism rui on all levels. Tnis tate
s 3 conra-guerita siate which wages a war
‘against the people. using the methods of the
Contra-guertila. Oppression.tyranny. explota-
ton, dsappearances and murders
ties against the Kurdish people, the burning
down of vilages. forced deportatons. torture.
fascist terror attacks, etcetera. We coud st 3
dozen ather forms of repression, from mass
lay-fts o provocations at demonsrations. To
See the fascist tactics on all he levels of ife
st diffcultat al. The crueltes which occurred
I the gas chambers of Hiter are reflected in
our country in the colectons of the cul-ofears
of the revolutionaries s f possidle to make a
diflorence between Hiler-fascism and fascism
n our country, ateast n the way it appled (o
ndviduals, when we Iook at the way our com-
rades are massacred? This s the naked
we have 10 face. Turkey is ruled by fascism.
Fascismis a way of government which is based
on repression and that nfluences al the prac-
tices and polcies which are appled. When we
spesk about the diferent forms of repression
n Tutkey. we speak about fasciem n Turkey,
Arm The Spi
nothing eise. When we apply your question to
he prisons n partcuiar, we can see many par-
allels. Wha is mplemented now s a fascist
poicy we call “sient destructon”. How i this
done? Let us give a concrete answer. AS you
Know. the survivors of the hungerstrke unti
death of 1996 suffered serious physical and
psychological damage. Already during the fst
Phase. the justice department refused medical
reatment in the Bayrampasa prison. The doc-
tors were refused entrance in the ot pris-
ons as well. Even the treatment in hospita of
the prisoners which were near deatn. shorty
after the hungerstrike unti deatn was ended,
was hindered. Athough even offcal forensic-
medical instutons regarded the continued im-
prisonment of severely handicapped prisoners.
35 iresponsibe - they are stl incarcerated.
Prisoners who are unable to move without help.
who cannot cary out their dall acivites, were
given medical stalements which said. there are
%0 objections to continue imprisonment. Tis
ot only applies to the partcipants of the
hungerstrike unt deat, t applies to allpison-
ers. As 3 consequence of this policy of annini-
lation, several prisoners have died lately like
UmitDogan (..} inthe prison of Aydin, Kalender
Kayapinar in Canakkale, Yunus Yaman in An-
Attached s a st of DHKP-C prisoners
Who urgenty need medicalhelp, most of them
a5 2 consequence of the hungersirke unil
deatn. Al of their linesses are backed by
reports of recognized hospials. The iinesses
vary from leuksemia, hepatiis B, tuberculo-
sis chronic lung inesses, paralysis to neu-
rologicalinesses. Mostofthem can o longer
carry outthe most elementary needs without
help. There are lnesses lie the Wermike-
Korsakov syndrome as a consequence of
the hungerstrike untldeath
Bayrampasa Prison (Istanbul)
Al Yalcin: Hungerstrike until death (HS)
Werie Korsakov.
Mehmet Yaman: HS. Generalweakness, hy-
persensitve for ight and sounds, hearing
Ioss, equiforum disorder, provlems wih sight
Mustafa Goek: HS, Wernike-Korsakov.
Metmet Goevel. HS. Generalweakness, equi-
librium disorder, dizziness, problems wih
signt
‘SengiMert: Chronic bronchits. No reply to
s request for treatment
EinaiiSarieimas: Severe bronchis.
Oktay Karatas: Deaf in both ears since the
attack on the Urraniye prison in 1995, Not
reated because ofack of money
Yazgi Goender. T8
Garze Mimarogu T8
‘Seyjan Dogun: Hepattis 8
‘Gencak Karabulut Hepattis 8
AiiSimsek Hepatiis B
Cengiz Bayir Epiepsy. At present two at
DHKP-C Prisoners Requiring Medical Aid
tacks weekly.
Bursa Prison
Iorahim Dogan: HS. Memory loss. Wermike-
Korsakov.
Bartin Prison
‘Abdulaziz Nakci: HS. Cannot rememberim-
portant events ofthe past and present.equi-
lirium disorder, hypersensive for sound.
elmani Ozcan: HS. Equillrium disorder,
speech disorder, tremors.
Cankiri Prison
‘Serdar Gel HS. Memory lss, generalweak-
ness, motion disorders
Maximum Security Prison Of Ankara
Zeynap Goengfuermez: HS. Memory loss,
‘equilbrum disorder.
Aydin/Buca Prison
Al Teke: HS, Can no longer function inde-
pendenty
Bernar Satar: HS. Not capable of carying
outactivites of everyday Ife.
Tamer Cadirc: HS. Leukaemia, prison author-
ties prevent reatment
(Souros: Role Hi Magazine #4/1998 <Nt/
v, nacir orgadicintatiuiote-hife>)
ter 1999/2000
Kara, Kazim Tunc in Nevseni and Poat Iyt in
Sagmalciar
“Ancther dmension of this practce is that
medical treatment of prisoners. or as far a5
they are brought to extemal hospials. ' pre-
vented by soiers on the spot. It even goes as
far that priscners who should be medically
reated are being beaten and tortured
In short, this polecy of slent destruction
can be regarded as anciner form of the policy
of hostage.taking. Thus fascism states “when
1 cannot kil with bombs and bullets. 140 t by
means of ilnesses’. Prison conditons create
the physical causes for diseases. epidemis.
‘Completing this polcy. That fascism breaks ts
own laws is i its nature, but this poicy cr-
ates condions which makes al shver.
How can the struggle of the political pris-
oners be supported by institutions in
Europe? What can we do?
o begin with, we want to emphasize that
all have to make the antrascst strugge ther
own, apart from the fact that this s of course:
the task of the people which are govemed by
fascism. More than ever. s important tha i
termationalist consciousness and intematon-
alism are kept alive. On the one hand ths will
give us the opportunity to keep aive our mutal
elation, on the other hand we can make con-
crete out responsibilty towards the other peo-
ples of the worid.
We as DHKP-C are and aways were an
intemationalist movement and dozens of a
tions and actwviies resulted from that. Com.
rades fell during these actons. As prisoners
5 well. we have kept intemationalsm aiive
nside the prisons. We have realsed resist-
ance and acton on an intemationaist level. In
the future as well we keep high this conscious-
ess which gives us strength and pride. There-
fore every form of support from people i cther
countries, from revolutionaries. democratic
groups of ndividuals, is important to us and
really valuable. It ciear thalthe more we are,
Sooner we'l achieve freedom, the sooner
we'l achieve a workd in which we can lead a
dignified lfe. There are concrete ways in which
insttutions in western Europe can support our
struggle. We have aiways considered these
Kinds of intarnational actions (o be of great
value, At this moment there are comrades, iso
from other revolutionary organisations. who
have survived the hungerstrke unti death but
Who can o longer survive under prison condi-
tions. So there could be actons to demand the
release of these prisoners. Besides that, ma-
terial support is needed for the treatmen of our
comrades. There are so many comiades who
‘cannot be operated on because the state wil
ot cover the costs. The peaple in Europe could
als0 unmask fascism n Turkey.
Finally we want to emphasize again that
we were very glad wih your compassion and
Soidarty.
s of the greatest importance that you
‘support our struggle, that you have chosen the
side of the peoples i Turkey.
We thark you and wish you good luck
wih your work. x
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldy
n - Wincer 1999/2000
Interview With Former Political
Prisoner Joseba Uranga Gastesi
Interview by Manfred Ostrowski
1 am Joseba Uranga Gastesi.bom in Tolosa.
Gipuzkoa on January 26, 1964 On January
15, 1984, 1 was arrested by the Civil Guard i
my native vilage. fo being a member of ETA
‘and on March 10, 1998, 1 was released by the
State after having been though & number of
prisons - Carabanchel. Alcala-Moco. Herrera
o a Mancha. Sevila , Granada and E1 Puerto
o Santa Maria 1.1 am now ving in Toloss, the
vilage where | was bom, and perhaps soon /1
move in wih my gifnend Leie o 8 smal apart-
ment
The Situation Of The Basque Political
Prisoners And Solidarity
With The Prisoners
What would you like to say about the time
you spent in prison?
1t was realy hard. The cruely of the en-
emy has supassed all standards. especialy
afterthe polcy of dspersion was put o force.
‘and his had erre efects on the polical pris-
oners; considerable physical and psycholog'-
cal effect. Notwinstanding, during 3 long time
spent in prison | had the opportunity to meet
good people; worthy peaple. It goes without
Saying that the beraton sruggle - i he srees.
i he prisons - also has some positve exper-
ences which | carry with me_ One mus take
into account that torture s not applied n prison,
but when you are in poice custody. I the pis-
s, l-reatment (beatings etc) are a normal
thing for the ordinary pisoner as well as for
the poitica, but this has.to be undersiood as &
revenge 3 revenge carred.out by the ward-
ers. This is made evident for example, by the.
reports of il-reatment that we hear afier an
ETAacton.
What media did you have access to7
- Before dspersion stanies. every weekwe
4983 (0 read ha rewsoRpers snd-magazied i
from previous days. Later, they did not even”
alow us 10 receive EGIN. and fny yéard™
pasied before we were, guaranteed, more or
less, the gnt t nfomaton. Nowadays. each”
prison uses s own crieia. Generaly, EGIN
Comes i wihou prolem. But ot the media
he state consigers to 5o “cangerous”. And
aimost anyining coud be abelied dangerous
How i the prisoner resistance today? .
Prisoner resistance takes place now in a
dispersion. the Abertzale Lef long ago decided
10 pen the prison ront and. consequenty, take
it from inside the prison walis ino the streets
o, the duty t face prison s not only n the
hands of the prisoners; resisance takes place
n al areas where the Abertzale Leftis present
Inside. the prisoners go on hunger strkes. lock-
ups, soppages. and do what they can accord-
ng to e possiiltes avaiable 1 them. Out-
side.resistance is proposed to every level ac-
Gording 1o the actiies of each organzation.
and every member of the Aberizale Left
[Basaue nationalst ef)
What value has the solidarity for the
Basaue prisoners?
thas an enomous value, since soldarty
is conveyed in two ways. On the one hand, it
is conveyed in human terms and, on the othr,
2s a poltical expression. No matter how you
look at. the Basaque prisoners are polical pris-
oners. Solarty has made possive, for exam-
ple. the achievement of many things in the
prson: for example, and this i no smal acheve-
ment, that being i a cical situation, th pres-
Sure from the street has been able (o repel
repression. Soldarty has improved situatins.
Besides, the prsoners apprecate alth infia-
tives whole-heariedly the solidarty. which is
conveyed in the two ways mentoned
Which is the way for bringing the prison-
ers back o the Euskal Herria?
ways_The precarious situaton of the
prisaners does not allow any pseudo-solutons
o proposals. I ti sense, it seems to me that
all proposals 1o biing back the prisoners to
Eusial Heria arelogitmate, ahough | ot er-
ity myself too much with some ofthem. But tis
“clear that populas pressure wil bring back the
prioners and. therefore, | consider very .
“Potant the iniatives put forward by the peo-
plrunted.by tre WelTo bring the prisoners to
Eustal Hema. There we find platforns, com-
s, etc. €ackongworking i ts own way.
BUas | have said-t must e people’s imagina-
on what il dacide the foad to folow.
Cafi the Basgue ‘canflict éome to.an end
_without amnesty? Is the Basque nation-
Lt e Tooking for e to achi
nesty? N
No. Aranesty.does nct suppose the mere
release of the prisoners, but a good solution to
Ane problems thal brough people 10 prison. In
the road to political nsgoliation, the issue of
wider context. Taken into consideration that a ~-arnesly i a paint 1o e agroed by ETA and the
prisoner in isolation cannot do much against
‘Spanish state. Once the prisoners and refu-
Gees are freed. wil be possile 1o develop a
Popuiardebate i freedom and wi al the demo-
Cratic guarantees. On the other hand. the
Aberizale Lef is notlooking for an opportuniy
1o et the prisoners out. I hey are freed. fine’
But the prisoners themselves. in many occa-
sions have said tha theic iberation wouid be:
the consequence of a negotating process and
thus. ot to think that the poltcal confict would
be overcome with the release of the prisoners.
e state in 1977 granted amnesty but after &
very shortperiod of e, the prisons began to
get filed again with new miltants. The prison-
ers. a5 members of the Abertzale Lef are in
agreement wit this obective.
Basque Socialism And Participatory
Democracy: Attainable Aims OF A Mere
Dream?
they choose it?
Yes, butt doesn't seem to me very appro-
prite to make the offer in ths way. Nowhere
has the peopie adopted socialsm through an
election - the case of Alende di not happen
lie that - but through a revolution, hiough a
struggle. People can choose the siruggle and
altnough much could be said about this, the
level of struggle in Euskal Herria offers good
perspectives.
What socialist model is. being propased
in the Abortzale Left, beyond particip:
tory democracy?
tseems to me ussless to propose models
since every nation would have (0 create its
‘own. History changes, every day we are faced
with new emerging elemens and. therefore.
would be absurd to start working on an en-
Glosed model. Time wil tel us which 10ad to
folow: which road to choase. Then we &l will
be taking about The Basaue moder”as we!
“the Basaue models”.
D0 you think tha Her Batasuna (HB) sore
day Wil give up s proposal for a partici-
patory democracy.in order to, for exam-
Pl achieve poace or faciltate coopera-
tion with the Basque Nationallst Party
(EAD? - e
= No.To o hatwould be aonserse palfica
because the eas that unite the people in'tha.
Aberizale Left are very sownd and incthis
sense, there are certain points which we hate
- veqy,clear, among them, 3 distrust in formal-
poltics. In my opimion, Herf Batasuna has to
Worldwide!
n - Winter 1999/2000
work out 1o the maximum the cooperation Wi
EAJ but using reason. tnal s, adapng self o
the variabie moments and occasions but a-
ways wihout losing its own identty
Regarding participatory democracy, do
you think there are enough possibilities
to spread this great idea? Does a major
ity in the Euskal Herria knows what this
concept means?
“This s relative. Most media ill ever help
us 1o spread the dea therefore, 1 is diffcult to
reach people massively. In any case. the
Aberzale Let learmed long time ago that ac-
tions are much betterthan the projection of the
declogy. ather than getting los talking about
the ideology. We will continue as we have.
since s our best method of expression. And
the poltical pedagogy cannot be anything but
the same. With words and wih actions, but
specially with actons, we have the lead.
The Basque Conflict And The
Politcal Possibllities For Herri Batasuna
What importance have the relations be-
tween Herr Batasuna and the Basqus la-
bour unions?
They are very imporant. Defiely. the
poltical isolaton that the Spanish state wants
toimpose on us has been broken by some spe-
cific problems - the prisoners. etc. - and be-
sides this. 1 is clar that cooperation among
lefist organizations s totally necessary in or-
der o chalienge an imposing neo-iberalsm; all
s auays within the dynamics of a nationai
siruggle. Those relations have to be solid and
am sure that Herr Batasuna would make ef-
forts 1o move them foward in the right direc-
tion
How would you dsfine the ‘third political
space’, and how would you Judge or value
this third space?
Oihartzuna: Basque
Media Workers Against
Dispersion Of Prisoners
Oinartzuna (the Basaue word for
“echo’) s a magazine whose aim s o try
and buid a bridge between Basque pris-
oners and the media. This magazine ries
1o bring media workers closer 1o the real-
e of prson ffe. But not only that, t also
endeavours to favour communication be-
ween prisoners and jouraliss, overcom-
ng the heavy mistust the issue of prison-
ers sts up in the media. Oihartzuna aiso
points out and crilcses the lack of con-
rast that 5o frequenty occurs with news
‘about Basque prisoners stemming from
official sources; and publishes news th
have gone unhesded in some media
Onartzuna: nttp:/www olharizuna.netl
Jazaindexen hm
I recent years. many people in Eus
Herra have waled away from petly paliical
quarrels and dvisions and joned the struggle
against specifc problems. On the one hand.
this. On the other hand. a wide sector emerged
Wwih people coming from two sides: there are
people in the Basque nationaist lef who after
many years of sruggle have sunk into despar
Who are nationalist and n the Left and Basaque
nationalsts and lef-wingers who have sunk in
despar. and also there are many people close
o the pact of Ajuria Enea (the ant-terrorism
pact of the poliical paries in Bascongadas]
Who 4o not believe anymore in a mittary solu-
tion. n any case, the “third space appears (o
be unstructured, but t seems that the majorty
are nationaists and in the Left and that there-
fore, see the necessty to have a poliical ne-
gotiaton for overcoming the violent parameters
of the conflct
Do you think unity among the Basque na-
tionalist parties EA, EAJ and HB, and a
common line of work, would ever be able
to function well?
As 1 said before, we only value actons.
Until now. EAJ and EA have not made cear
what is that they want. They may say nice
things once in a whie. But in practice, tme
afer time. they obey Spanish nationalism at
iferent levels which are fundamental to our
homeland. Euskara (Basaue language], educa-
ton. infrastructures... When they show more
than the wil to act, and go ffom words 10 ac-
tion then EAJ and EA wil gain, as poltical par-
ties. lgitimacy before the Abertzale Lef. Tme.
wiltel us.
Do you think Herri Batasuna in the future
could reach an agreement with the United
Left [Spain’s Izquierda Unida] in Euskal
Herria o that together could demand the
right to self.determination and promote
a project of the Let?
Yes, but forthis o happen. the Urited Left
Would ave to keep a more posite atitude
regarding the confict, especial, o be able to
join in the construction of the Basque nation
from 2 Basaue perspectve. So far they have
damonstrated theirsubmission to Madn, ideo-
fogicall and politically. Forthe tme being. i is
very difficul o think of any kind of agreement.
Bt in any case, the Abertzale Left aiways.
and specially now. has called on people who
Support a negotated solution o the confict to
join in and work together for tis. The Unied
Let can have s place in this task...but s in
thei hands.
Can you imagine the independence of
Euskal Herria without Navarre? What do
you_prefer, _independence _without
Navarre o the unity of Bascongadas and
Nafarroa without independence?
It very, very difficult for me to speak of
Basque independence without Nafarroa. I or-
der for ths to happen, the Navarrese wouid
have to decide o go by themseives, caiming to
& SENIDEAK
Basque prisoners
relatives association
be aferen from the rest o the Basques and
ths today is unthinkable since none of us have.
the nignt to salf-determnation. And it is ciear
that | prefer Euskal Herria totaly independent
The other possiiities do not seem to me a5~
proprate
New Forms Of Struggle And
The Future Of Armed Struggle
In many people’s opinion, the Abertzale
Lef cannot achiove victory through ETA'S
rmed struggle, but through sensible and
skillful politics. How do you see the fu-
ture of ETA's armed struggle?
1am not amemberof ETA and. herefore. |
cannot know the analyss that the organization
is making towards the fuure. I any case, any
analyst could see that the miltary actons of
ETA are impregnated wih s politcal content. In
fact, it takes responsiily for al of s actons.
through documents impregnated with poliics
Andthe poltical credibikty hat ETA has achieved
in Euskal Herria cannotbe denied. fac that s
accepted by fts most vinlent enemy. I facing
the fture. ETA. in my opinion, should invest-
gate how the poliico-miltary strtegy can be
understood today by Basque socely. begin
ning wit the polfical line establshed by the
reportof the 'KAS Bloke Gidara' [the coordina-
torof the Basaue nationslberation movement]
nany case. ETA, through s Democrati Ater-
native, made very clear that f the condiions
for a truce were given. it would give up armed
struggle. And taken into consideration that ETA
leaves 1o the Basque people the finaldecision
ina democrati process, i can be said that ETA
will do what Euskal Herria. with words and
actions but necessarly in freedom, tels 110 do.
Do you think ETA is the most important
part of the Abertzale Left?
Historically, the Abertzale Lef has been
structured around ETA and aiso, the harsh-
ness of the siruggle has created very deep
affectonate relatons with the collectve sub-
Ject that ETA supposedy represents. Bu the
‘Aberizale Lef is much more, much more than
ETA. and | am sure that given the moment, ETA
would know how to make its contributions
through organizationstoaly poltical Being that
independence and socialism are the axes of
the Abertzale Left movement,the structures of
the movement are the instruments. And of
course, ETA iselfcannot be more than that
ETA tries to kill its opponents and the
‘Spanish nationalists can ask for “the unity
of all democrats against violence” with-
out greater diffculties. Being that money
the most important thing (in Spain and in
the entire world) why, in your opinior
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n - Wincer 1999/2000
has ETA never attacked important eco-
nomic targets in order to cause the state
greater economic losses?
In my opinion, ETA has worked for many
years mainly agaist repression. Along with
this, has ht directy and with great strength
the juridicaland poliical sructures o the state.
Besides that i would be dificut o achieve and
maintain an infrastucture capable of creating
materal losses. in my opiion, ETA has setasile
the economy because i thinks it was more im-
portant 1o hit other targets raiher than the
economy. which is also mporiant may resut
more abstract o people. Altnough ETA does
ot touch economic targets, knowing how im-
portant these are. is the resul of s own analy-
s of the process, and perhaps it tinks these
are targets fo another phase: an nterpretation
of s poltico-mitary drection
What can we learn from the Irish peace
process, if Basques nationalists want to
demand the right to self-determination,
and wish to free Euskal Herria from the
repressive forces?
There are manythings thatcan be learned
but.in summary. | wouid ke to meniion the fo-
lowing: first. that armed struggle. aiong with
otner forms of struggle. can change the jurd-
calpoltical structures; second, tnt a truce is
ot a condition to begin a process of negotia-
tions; thid, that a poltical agreement on min-
mum crierion is necessary between the poit-
cal pares and al Abertzale forces [nationalst
forces] to build strengt for dealing with the
central powers: and finaly. to make ths bref
that peace can be achieved even when ail 3p-
pears gloomy, as ong as there i the wil o 6o
for it
What possibilities do you see for the
Abertzale Left if it would make use of
new forms of struggle? In the fight for
independence and socialism, which new
forms of struggle you would like to ses
are employed?
Wahout any doubt, wha | would like the
most i to develop a siuggle without blood-
shed. You should take into account that the
poitica, cutural socal economicntiates and
activites of the Abertzale Leftare by far rcner
thana mere projection of ETA's poltico-miary
actwites. In caly . the Aberzale Left em-
ploys a ot of non-vilent means of sruggle -
the streets. through the instiutons, in enter-
prises and factones... And one also must take
0to account that we have a great experience
n organiing ourselves unti we become a drv-
ing force within the social dynamics. The
Abertzale Lot has a great uture. il now we
practically have not worked on our poliical
project. because what we are proposing and
cultvating i the struggle for the fundamental
ights of Euskal Herria. Ourtur wil come when
we have achieved the Democratic Atematie.
[Mantrod Ostrowski, a German inguist and
wrer, nterviewed Joseba Uranga in Tolosa
(Gipuzkoa) this summer]
Euskal Herria Journal - August 20, 1898
(Source: Euskal Herria Journal - hitp.//
i freespeech org/eh])
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
Communique Announcing Ceasefire
By means ofthis communique. Euskad Ta
Askatasuna wants 1o let the Basque people
Know abaut our analysis on the situation and
istorcal moment in our country and the deci-
sion we have taken accordingly
Afer twenty long years. once again, we
have a good chance to take decisie sisp in
our way towards independence. W frmiy be-
lleve we now have the same opportuniy we
ad twenty years ago. in the so-called period
of “transiton’, in such a diffcul period. But
now, our job must be o tum this poltical stage
into the stage of sovereignty. The chance we
lost at thattime must become true today.
ETA enters into this new stage i a spirt
of hope. Hopeful. above all, because we think
the mistakes commitied i the past wil be 3
good lesson today; hopeful, because we be-
Ileve the work, experiences and strength gath.
ered for all these years are enough guarantee
for this new polical stage o succeed.
However. we should not be binded by
this new chance and generated expecations.
We shouid not cose our eyes to the alaming
stuation in the Basaue Country. Whichever
way one looks at . the siuation n our counlry
s deeply worrying. The two States have al-
ways used al ther nstruments - miltary. polt-
cal. econamic and cutural - o destroy this n
ton's resources 10 be free in the fure. As &
esult of that tenacious iniiative of Spain and
e, our people have been seriously nured.
Ttwill not be easy for us o st free. I s obvious
thatthere is not the shghiest movement on the
part of the two repressive states. They con-
sider us ther enemies instead of neghbours
and prefer to oppress this naton rather than to
respect the voice of Basaue pecple i a peace-
ol way.
‘Regardless of the attacks and prodlems,
and led by the determination to fight and sur-
Vv, the Basque Country is now on th thresh-
00d of the 21st century. We are not actually a
free country, but we have an extraordinary
opportunity 1o be free in the future. By now.
everybody knows we are able 1o stck 10 our
laims and fight for them,. Let's now prove we
are able to have our ighs. wishes and capac-
ity o organize our home as we want
Before we go further. we would like o
put forward two important questions and o
‘answer them. On the one hand. how can the
Basaue Countrybe on the threshaid ofthe 21t
century with the chance to become a free
Country?. And on the other, why is not the.
Basque Country stlfree aimost in the year
20007
“The first question has an easy an-
‘swer. Easy and even hon-
ourable. We are atthe be-
ginning of 3 new ea of
freedom thanks to old
Basque peoples d
mined struggle and
chefly, thanks to the
generous work of
thousands of brave.
men and women
for the last twenty
years.
Their dedi-
cation and commitment
remain ave inthe hearts and minds of the mer-
bers of the Euskad: Ta Askatasuna organaa-
ton. We would ot be entering into this new
siuation wihout the work of those comades
and cizens who died as a result of the en-
‘emies’ miltary attacks; wihout the sufferng of
those comrades and cizens who are totured
and constanty humilaed in poice stations and
quarters. both n Spain and France; wihout the
endeavours of hose comrades and citzens
Who have aways rejected foreign Spanish and
French laws in force and had carried out a
sient, dangerous and commitied dally work in
favour of our culture, language, fnancial nel-
works and social customs; without he resist-
ant strength of those humble comades and
Ghizens who have been and sil are ighting the
Basques’ way towards freedom from prison
cals. ull of dignity regarciess ofthe thousands
of years prison sentences behind them
‘We would Iie 10 pay our warmest hom-
age o those people now, because s thanks
0 them that we can experence @ hopeful and
historical moment at present. We have to thank
them for the fact tha they have never stopped
stiwing 1o open allthe locks n the huge doors
closing our way to freedom. If they had not
mace s ietime commitment the Basaue Cour-
try would have a much harcer task"
“The second question.on the contrary. de-
mands a bitersweet answe. In such mportant
moments, it is essential that we evaluste what
each one has done. We should thus take into
account not iy what we have advanced inall
these years. but what we could in fact have
advanced. The formula proposed by the Basaue.
Nationais Lef twenty years ago, that s, deep-
ening Basque democracy, was nt shared by
others. Tnerefore, the Basaue nationalists’
worid splt in two: one, those who accepted
the law imposed by Spain on us without resis-
ance: two. those who deemed it necessary o
break lnks with Spain and belleved that was
legitimate for a Nation to use allmeans st hand
1o face impostion and to defend iseil.
“The fist view, supporting the constiutonal
autonomous system. furthered nternal dvision
of a Basque Country just coming out of Fran-
co's dictatorship. n addition t the parton im-
posed by the two States. then we had a new
autonomous division. This first view got the
Basaue Country “closer to Spain and France”
and condemned us to ive completsy depend.
et on Madrid and Paris. Instead of making de-
Gisions on our own. we have been compelled
toask perissionfrom foreigners, and o il the
‘cowardly pro-Spanish fving in our country with
pride. The supporters o the autonomous sys-
tom strengthened domestic fronies, promoted
clashes among Basaue people, and pushed
‘some peapl - for mstance the Basaue autono-
mous policemen of “sepoys” - to accept and
defend Spanish law against other citizens'
wishes.
‘Tnose who made the second chaice, fe-
‘garciess of our lack of resources and mistakes,
have maintained the project of a united free
Basque nation. Confident in our people's ca-
pacity to work and create, we have focused
on overcoming institutonai and statutory div-
sions, and on bringing peace on the basis of
Justce and democtatc rghts for our County.
Thus, our endeavours to shape a Basaue so-
cial project have seen many gains. The fist
one. we have succseded in showing the biinc-
ness and futlty of the dividing autonomous.
system. And this s not minimal.taking nto ac-
ount the remendous effors of Spain to make
this autonomous system become a grave for
the Basque Country.
“Those who enthusiasically and honesty
backed the dividing autonomous system at the
outse are now becoming aware of the fact
that nothing was moving. up or down. in the
steps of autonomy, and that nfact hose steps
were not taking the Basque Country towards
freedom. As ar as the supporters of ndepend-
ence are concemed. we are ready 1o forget
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
Arm The Spi
the recent past and to walk to-
getner wih these people n a new.
hopeful project
Why Do We Have A New
Extraordinary Opportunity?
As we have already men-
tiones, the Basque Country s on
the hreshold of s future.Is only
our aim o believe that we are en-
tering into 3 “new” situation?
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, afer ex-
amining the main changes of this
Situation indepth, presens the as
sessment upon which fs decision
is based
‘On the one hand, thanks to some Basaue.
‘paople's non-stop struggle, there are new sec-
tons of people who now supportthe opton of
independence. We thin we should explain the
changes n the last six years. First of all. we
must say it is the generosity of the Basque
Supporters of independence and their orgar-
ized struggle witin socety that have brought
about this “improved siuation” In view of our
finsl goals. the work for all hese years s just
smal step of our work ahead. Nobody should
think that our responsibities. working methods
and others should not be improved. But some-
times, even f the Basque nationalst left does
ot ike eulogy or fatery, it s very healthy to
recognize thal our work has been productive
and that we are o the right path towards free-
dom.
On the other hand, it was a really impor-
tant intiatve o spread the “Democratic Ater-
native” i the place of the old 'KAS Atema-
tive". By means of this peace proposal,a fun-
damental conclusive concept has been spread
n socety for the ast three years: Basque peo-
ple must have a say, regain a voice, and have
thei opinions respected. Once again, we have
been bl o spread the view tha the root of
the confict between the Basque Coutry and
the Spanish and French States s poltical. We
have put under question the “democratc” le-
gitimacy of the Spanish and French authorites
and we have sowed our kitchen garden with a
positve concept Basque democracy. There are
Some demacratc principles that any demacrat
should defend: Self-getermination and land
unity. These principes are stronger now. More.
people think now that aer entering ito demo-
cratic stuation. everybody would be in a posi-
tion of equality to defend their own project
And the Basque natonaistlet s ready 1o put
their poltcal and socia projectinto practice.
“The insttutional structures imposed on us
by the two oppressing States has always been
an obstacie in our way towards freedom. One.
ofthe changes ofthe new stuation s hat more
people now begin o reaize that those struc-
tures have failed. The Basque institutional
framework in force is drained. The Spanish
and French imperialists are now the only sup-
porters of the present nstutional‘status quo".
The Statute of Madrid, the Navarrese Foral Law
and the fack of institutions in the Northern
Basque Country (under French jurisdiction)
cannot meet the needs and wishes of the
Basques. Today. those who believed in the
potentiaiy of current institutional structures
ow acoept that freedom cannot be achieved
n this way, and thus agree wih the view ai-
ways defended by the Basque nationaist lefi
alone. Forthe frsttme, we have a true chance
1o find a solution for the Basque County.
In addiion to the nsttutional faiure, the
“Pacts’policy" is iso drained. This poicy was
enforced by the Spanish to distort the ruth of
the Basaue poltical and socialstuaton. and to
destroy the project of ndependence. The only
thing these Pacts brought about fo the Basque
Country. f any, was more and more sufferng
"The supporters of the autonomous sys-
tem (the EA and PNV natonalist partes. ELA
rade union and many honest supporters of
Independence) have become aware of the fact
that this autonomous way is o longer valid
Now. they seem to be determined 1o start a
new way. They have finaly decided 10 leave
the Spanish Way of the Cross and take the
foad of the Basque Courtry. 10 support the
Basque Country bravely. by breaking wih the
Spanish mposition and ties. SpainfFrance of
the Basque Country, that's the question. And at
least in words, they show a clear determi
tlon to work for the Basaue Country. At this
new crossrosds, we all have to act bravely
and conerenty n this historical moment
The Spanish and French powers that be
have no halfway poiical alematives. Not at
least without the help of such partes s the
PNV and EA. There is no way in between past-
present “dividing autonomous system” or to-
morrow's Sovereignty based on Sel-determi-
nation and Land Urity. Al they could do s, for
‘example, to present another trfing pseudo-of-
for 1o avoid 3 real solution, for nstance, for
ancther twenty years. But 35 we have aiready
Said, tnis ha-way solution would need the help
of the EA and PNV.
“Europe” s being bult as a poftcal, soc
and economic structure, with power 10 take
decisions regarding the most important ssues,
consuting Madrid and Paris, but geting futther
from the Spanish and French stale-structures.
fwe had no effecive project o independence
orf we had no atematve or resources to face
the huge international cultural and economic
projectof the ‘union" the Basque Country could
be even more dependent and shatered.
Finally, most Basaue people now share
the view that i is urgent o fnd a soluion for
the confic. and tht this solution must be nec-
essarly poitical. Basques wish 1o achieve
jide! - Arm The Si
ial Edition - Winter 1999/2000
peace. a soluton. iakogue. talks. with o witr-
Gt ETA's operations, i actually news It has
othing to do wih the forme “aseptic claim of
peace Its widely shared that a factual polt-
cal soluton shoud tesul from alks. It is not
only hat 1 impossible to “end” with the ETA
above ai, Basque people have succeeded in
Showing that he rootof the problem i poltcal
n designing new ways of stuggle and firmiy
Saying stop"” to the atacks agaist the Basque
Country.
I bre, this isthe suation in o country:
there are two clearly opposte projects con-
cerning our nation. Firs, the plan to buid the
Basque Country. It is possile (0 get farer
society and peogle must ight or it Second,
the plan 1o o on with the process of integra-
tion, swallowing cultural impoverishment
staried by Spain and France many long contu-
ries ago. According to this plan. the Basque
‘Country s just a region without persoralty in
the workd_ There are clashes in the Basque
‘Country regarding language, education. difer-
ot views of approaching reaity. or buiding 3
socio-economic network through labour rela-
tions. There is nothing new about these
ciashes. The only change is that there s a new
chance 1o take definitve steps; there s a new
Situation brought about by the co-relation of
forces
‘And that is in fact our chalenge in this
istorical moment: iow t set he Basaue project
i motion alltogether. If there is goodwil and
honesty on the part of Basque poltical party
leaders.there s enough strength and imagin
tion nths nation o keep on going.
What Wil Basque Forces Do?
Once again, lef’s bear in mind that the
Basque Courlry is on the threshold of s fu-
ture. We approach this historcal stuation in a
spirt of hope, aware of the alaming stuation
here and deeply worred. The key 1o resolve
our future depends on the yes/no answers to
a signifcative auestion
What are the Basque nationalsts going to
907 Taking ino account our recent history, we
must think about this question in depth. As a
matter of fact, tweny years ago, the other
Basque parties yielded to Spanish State's de-
Sires. Theit excuse was that they were afraid
of the “sound of the swords'. as they 10 us.
Thus. the Spanish authorities decided in
Moncioa and Zarzuela to the further parttion of
our County, and o keep on denying our right
selt-determination by arms. From then on, the
Basque nationalst lef has never stopped co-
herenty defending Basque sovereignty. even
i they had 10 pay for t with suffering. Mean-
whie. the other forces came to become part of
the progressively stronger network.
‘Anyway. we lock ahead with hope again
There is 3 clear dfference betwoen ftle a
rotten fruts collected in twenty years and the
Sunrays in the path towards freedom. These
years have been long, but 1 very pleasant to
see that others also come to realze the right
way 1o acnieve independence. Future freedom
il Sways be better than present subimission
This dos not mean that our way ahead is
ot dificut or isky. Our challenge demands
that ai the supportrs of independencs. lef:
Ists and democrats, must actnonestly and hon-
urably against Spanish and French blindness
and narrow-mindedness.
Our objective s ambitious. Then. the
Basque nationaist ef should not work alone to
achieve it However,f that would be the case.
Wwe ourselves would go on fighting as happy.
and determined as before. folowing the way.
started by thousands of Basque citzens and
fighters.
Our Challenges Ahead
As we have aiready said at the beginning
of this communiaue, ti i the main chalienge
‘and coreofhi poltcal tage: he Basque Cour-
iy, 55 & whole, must be free, by overcoming fts
autonomous and state borders. We must set
the grounds for the future. We are not in the
same place now. We shouid not oly regain the
hance we lost wenty years ago, but we must
take a more imporiant step: we must set the.
pilars fo the future Basque Country. Our chal-
lenge is to clearly defne the place where we.
Wil buid our house. Because there are not wo.
or three Basque Countres. There is only one.
ful of dferent features and reaities - inguis.
tic, social. economic and regarding customs.
That's a country in fact
Never forgetting differences among
Basque nationalsts, democats, and progres-
sive people, we must fead the work to buld @
new polical framework inciuding althe prov-
ncs of the Basque Couniry. And in tis iea
ing work. sl the Basaue people have a piace. a
say and a task
Achievement of Basque soversignty
clashes with Spanish and French biassed and
party nterests_ Al the meeting places and pacis
to collaborate with Spain must end. that s,
must be the end for secret diry deals {0 keep
our natin economically dependent.
Our first task is to start “thinking’ as
Gountry. All together. And to honesty analyze
our actual economic, nguistic, cutural and so-
cial situation in our country. Aflerwards, we
must promte gobal poject taking nto accournt
all the Basque Country, regarding Inguistic
rights. land organzation, economic development
or socal rights. The forces in favour of a free
Basque Country must reach agreements on
fundamental principles
Al the same time. I is everyone's task to
confront those who are and will aiways be
‘enemies of our project At the outset of this
communique , we have said we cannot Gose
our eyes to the Basque current stuaton. In e
Basque Country, many people ive in a ‘sua-
tion of emergency’. The Spanish and French
seem to be against a given poltcal option. but
matier o fact s the flure of the Basque
Courtry which is endangered. If we foster a
projectal together. s obvious that Spain and
France will react against t and that we wil
have tosuffer s consequences. With nodoubt
We will have to be ready for that. We wil have
o be brave 1o say that all the foreign poiical
forces are not needed In our country. and we.
Wil have to carry out al the big and smal ac-
tons to get them out from here. Time has come.
bad. but to note what we have not done but
must do.
‘Wnat ETA's Step s Not
Before we present our decision and make.
a specfc cal we deem i necessary o speciy
what this new poltcal stage anead is not ue
o the confusion provoked by speculation. ex-
pectations and siztements in these days. Pro-
fessional policians shouid not deceive peope
with thei plays on wors.
We must say we do ot agree with the
“pacifcation” proposed by Ardanza in his bi-
assed scheme, afer he has defended coming
Closer to Spain fo ten long years. Furthermore.
Wwe o not wantto “ease our minds” o deceive
ourselves by giving that paciication” a poli-
cal “shape”. This moment reauires a braver
benaviour. We are entenng into a completely
new situation
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna is about to give a
significant siep. Some wil ry to fool Basque
pecple by relating ths step to “nomalizaton”,
1o the strengthening of the present framework,
ot ofer of a faise peace with no changes.
These are not but ies. There have been many
other les.forinstance, that the ETA deals with
tne Basaue problem by fghtng the enemy with
the amed stuggle. This is ot the core of the
probiem. The key is that Peace wil only be
‘achieved when the rights of the Basaue Cour-
ry are recognized. This i the reason. root and
key of the current confict righs are denied to
the Basque Counlry. We cannot take decisions
on how we want 1o organize our nation on our
own.
ETA has taken ts main siep. t s the oth-
ers’ tum 1o il this gap, and in a brave and
dignified way indeed. AS we have said, ts not
time for doubls, seffsh decisions or vested in-
terests: it s actually the Basque Country that
Announcement
Bearing in mind the aforesaid argumentatons
ETA - Basque socilstrevolutionary organ:
tlon for national lberaton, publicly announces.
the folowing to the Basque people and in gen-
eral,to the international public opinon:
1. Building the Basque County requires every-
body's work. However, i was the Basque na-
tonalst lef alone who resclutely undertook that
. It has been a long. compikated and wind-
ing road for us. In retum, repression and al
ot of attacks. Anyway, thaniks to our endeav-
ours, today, we can say there is an unprec-
edented opportuniy to create new meeting
places and settiements. so as to work together
and share efforts and responsivltes. in the
way towards independence. ETA, for i part.
wanis 1o make 1 cear that 1 is determined o
foster agreement and tha t expects such great
steps are aiso taken on the part of the other
partes involved.
2 Tnersfore. ETA publicly cals on poliical par-
s, trade unions, cultral representatives, so-
cial groups and on all the Basaue peopie in
1o make this new poltical stage be-
Freedom For Al Poliical Prisoners Worldwide
come that of sovereignty. to take on defintive
commitments and specic steos.
3.0ur main goal s related tothe curent nsttu-
tonal and state partion. We must start 10 ook
for solutons to overcome It to that end. we
must star taking steps now to create one sov-
ereign instiutional structure including Araba.
Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa. Lapurdi, Nafarroa and
Zuberos
4 1f il the poitical and socia forces sharing
this goal come together, i order o achieve the.
nstitutional structure we wan, Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna publicly commits tsef 1o welcome,
protect and promate every initiative to over-
come current inttutonal and statute partion
Butat the same time. we ask the others o take
the same commiment. endeavour and wort.
even i they were uninerested or cowardly as
regards this claim before
5. The forces supporting democratc rights and
constructon of the Basque Country must pro-
mote dynamics and agreements around funda-
mental and basic cams.
6. The project supported by the Basaue Coun-
ry and by Spai or France are compietel op-
posite. A long-standing conflict has ciearly
Shown us that there is o room for hallway
solutions. The point is whether 10 go on Iving
as Basaues or to be eiminated by Spain and
France. Thus. we deem i essental o calon all
those people who agree with the points sbove.
We suggest they should get away from ties
and agreements defended and promoted by
the repressive Spain and France s high tme.
that we all openly and completely undertake
the fight for reedom. It s hgh tme that we ail
destroy the links and agreements with poltical
forces which aim o desiroy the Basaue Coun-
try. Hence. i is high tme that we al abandon
settiements promated by polticalpartes, sty
tuions!structures and repression to favour the
construction of Spain and France and the de-
Struction of the Basaue Country.
7 Taking into account the siation of the
Basaue Country. as wel as the present oppor
tunity and longing for freedom. Euskad T
Askatasuna announces an indefinte compiete
cessation of miltary operatins. ETA's actons
will be imited o providing ourseives wih Sup-
plies, to maintain our structures and to defend
ourseives in hypotnetical confrontatons. This
Complete ceasefire il star on September 18
1998
8T sim of the Basaues i o have the Basque
Country's realty. nghts and free ecisions re-
spected. The aim and wish of Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna is that Basque people face Up 1o
ther responsibiles and achieve independence
for the Basaue Counlry. We really hope the
Basque people's answer wil be as sgniicant
25 the step we have taken. Finaly. we want to
let everybody know tht it wil be future events
and atttudes that wil determine whether this
ceasefie wil last forever or not
Euskal Horria, September 1998
ETA’s Communique Announcing Its
Decision To End Its Unilateral Ceasefire
The following text is an unofticial transiation
rom Basque of the ETA communique announc-
ing its decision fo end ts 14-monih ceasofire
and (o esume its armed siruogle. The onginal
toxt in the Basque language was pubished in
the Basque newspaper Gara on Novembar 26,
1999,
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna's
Communique To Euskal Herria
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna wanis 10 tel the
Basaue people s opinion and decision. Given
the seriousness of tis decision we wil at-
temp o explain as brefy and cleary as poss-
bl the reasons which made possible to begin
the polfical process,
In September last year, the mechanisms
used by Spain and France to piace obstaces
1o our freedom failed. and Euskal Herria was
on the eve of a new siuation:
“The Moncioa Statute (Baskongadak's stat-
ute of autonomy] and Nafarroa's special aws
aid not satity the desie of the Basaue people
for freedom. at he same time, a desire for st
tutional recognition was present in Lapurdi,
Baxenafarroa and Zubero.
“The stategy of crushing us falled: the pro-
Independence Abertzale Left maintained its
option fo 3 free Euskal Herria, in spte of the
repression exercised against s poiticalforce
the poitico-miary boards of Madrd. Ajura Enea
[in Baskongadak). and Iruna [in Nafarroa] did
ot offe altematives 1o the Democatic Aler-
native of the Abertzale Left
A desire for peace based on a polfical
solution was present in Basque sociey.
‘And finaly, the various (Basque national-
is] poltical forces (PNV. EA. ELA) who in 20
years were satisfied with th it bit agreed
by Spain and France, and collaborated with
them. started to show a desie for changing
the siuation.
“That s, we tink that the opton t replace
the 0ld politico-urdical framework designed
during the reform of the dictatorship and in
existance forthe last 20 very long years, and
the decision to take steps in favor of a new
poltico-uridical ramework based on a demo-
cratc opton for Euskal Heri, is pe.
“This context made possive for Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna to propose an agreement (0 the.
PNV and EA n the summer of 1998,
According to this agreement the signato-
ies [PNV. EA. ETA} agreed to take steps that
would bear fruit in suppor of a sovereign and
unique institution comrising the entre Euskal
Herta. I this sense, they agreed o seek some
minimum point that woud support the righs
ang interests of Euskal Heria and the basic
needs and interests of the Basque people.
(On the other hand, PNV and EA agreed to
break of relatons with Spanish polical forces.
against Euskal Herria. and Euskadi Ta
‘Askatasunak would announce an indefinte i
temuption of s actions. This was 3 secret ac-
ord that set a via period of four months.
PNV and EA accepted and signed the ac-
cord. Taking their signatures as the starting
poit, ETA guided the intiative n eflect during
s year.
“The maximum qualties of the Iniiative are:
new hope and energy emerged in Basaue
- the Accord signed in Lizarra on the 121h of
‘September 1998] by poltical. socil, and labor
union forces. identied the poltical 0ot of the
conflct between Euskal Herria and Spain/
France, and proposes a methodology entiely
democratic for s soluion
- the creation of the fist natonal nsttution of
moden times comprsing the entre Euskal
Hema
That s, to manfest the pofcal nature of
the confict and to design s soluton, by act
vating the various forces In Basque socety
During the first months of the Intative. a
basic change nthe poica iuation ook piace.
But ater four month. things started to change.
and the Iniative was facng an mpasse. In our
opinion, the reasons for this change are as
follows:
- the poliical tempest afer the good results
achieved by the aberizale left [Euskal
Herrtarrok inthe October [municipal lectons.
and the first meeting of Udabiltza [national
Basque assamby) highighing the viabilty of
the Intiatve, tuned on he red hght of the Span-
ish and the French goverments who then ried
10 510p the process with 3 epressive reacton
detentions, torture. and the murder of [ETA]
fighter Tiotto
the sirategy of the PNV and EA hghighied the
partes: inerests in the June [regional] elec-
tions.
‘Spai's pressure on the PNV and EA at-
tempted to change the nature o the Intative
ion - Winter 1999/2000
Tney tried to turm a process of nation-
buiding 1o 3 peace process without content,
ana to crown the averizal left in the polical
‘nomalty.” Wit the obstinate and evi ntention
of wming he “provisional iterruption of ETA'S
actons o “permanent” and “Ireversile.”
During last summer it was noted that the
process was blocked and poisoned
ETA nad. and st has. the firm intention of
taking this process (o the end when i started
out the Intitive last year. Therefore. we pro-
ceeded to indentlt the dificlites and pro-
lems of the Intiatve:
- on the one hand. the secrt nature of the
[PNV. EA, ETA] accord generated confusion
wih s content and the functon of the Lizarra-
Garazi Accord. and at the same time it had @
negative ientfication.
- and as we stated areacy, the attempi to is-
or the content of what was signed by the
PNV and EA. and 1o presen the process of
nation-building 1o the Basque pecple as 3
“peace process for the disactivation of the
mechanisms of the struggle. used in the de-
fence of the aberizale lef
In ETA's opinon. tis atiempt was mani-
fested i the lack of wil by those paricipating
inthe process tobring the crical mass in Euskal
Herra o a democratic stuation and to actvate
al the forces.
‘We made an analysis of the process and
saw that the accord sgned in the summer of
1888 has not been implemented (i respect to
the concrete steps to be taken, and t breaking
of elations with the Spanish polticalforces)
and deliberated over the interruption of actons
thatwe propased in Septermber 1998: and [ETA]
ok hs to the PNV and EA in the summer of
1895, aready four montns ago.
t was made clear that the process was
facing an mpasse, but no effectve poitcal pro-
posalwas made. PNV and EA gave importance
tothe curent framework.stckingto the Moncioa
stalute, and not o the intiates for a new po-
Micorudicil framewor.
‘Seeing that there was 1o poltcal proposal
or concrete sirategy at time in which the fu
ure of Euskal Herria was on the table. ETA
highighted the need fr poltcal proposals. and
came up with one.
Brief.this is ETA's poltical proposal:that
the people of Araba, Bizkaia, GipuzKoa, Lapurd,
Nafarroa and Zuberoa choose fealy and demo-
cratically a sovereign consttutonal pariament.
n one unique circumscription encompassing
all Euskal Herria. That s, that the vote cast by
each Basaue ciizen ought to count the same
Value inall of Euskal Heria
i this context. and considering the
strength and stabiy of the various instiutions
that would emerge from this constitutional
processs. ETA would make the decision o end
s armed siruggle. used in the defense of the
rights of Eusial Horra
‘Many of the poiical, social. and labor un-
fon forces in Eusial Herria know this proposal.
Moreover, the polce have hadthe texts of ETA'S
debates. which were given (0 the media and
the leadership of the polticalpartes. Thus, ETA
proposed to the PNV and EA to reach & new
accord based inths democratc proposal. PNV
and EA have not yet given a concrete re-
sponse.
Euskal Herria has made some progress
walking the road o froedom As aways, the
Key to thatprogress has been the struggle. the
aulet work. and facing up oppression with al
the means we have.
However, during this last year. the
aberizales [Basaue nationaists] are again tak-
ing and working together and we must con-
tinue to o t but, in the meantime. Spain and
France continue wit their 0CEupation. atacks.
and repressive dominance; and th forces in
Euskal Herra are not suffcenty actvaled o
face that atack and to continue walking the
foad to nation-bulding.
Therefore, the process that started last
year is blocked and poisoned, and in that con-
ext, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna has made the de-
Gison to reactvate its amed struggle given its
ompromise on the defence of Euskal Herria
‘More concrete intiatves are needed. as
well a5 more sirengih, o end the process i
ated last year, and we call on the Basque peo-
ple to continue therr work of naton-buiding
facing up the enemy and re-enforcng the ba-
sic pilars of our nation
The ceasefire that was in effect since
‘September 18, 1998, i over
‘Beginning on December 3, 1999, it wil be
up to Euskad: T Askatasuna to inform s 0p-
erational commandos when o star to cary
out actions
Long Live the Basque Country!
Long Live a Socialist Basque Country!
Euskal Herria, November 1999
EuskadiTa Askatasuna (ETA)
(Source: Transiation by Olatz Arkauz for
Euskal Herria Journal <htp://
. froespeech orgiehi>)
Interview With Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
“At The End Of This Process, The Basque People Will Have Our Own Constitution”
Comments On The Current Polltical Mo-
ment (May 16, 1999)
In this intarview between ETA and two Basque
ewspapers' edtors. the Basque organisation
‘oxplain s roasons for the coase-fre, the cur-
ront poliical moment and future expectations.
The Spanish Government has often said
that ETA announced a cease-fire because
of social pressures and its own weak-
ness, 5o this Initiative has even been re-
garded as a “trick-ceasefire”. What are
the reasons for the open-ended ceass
re?
ETA's cease-fre stemmed fom a poltical
evaluation of the stuaton. At that time. conds-
tions in the Basque Coulry seemed able o
bring about a new poltical scenario. On the
one hand, the Basque natonatst left had long
climed that the judiciakpoltcal ramework in
force was a faiure and then, other partes and
Socal sectons agreed on that view. The Stat-
ute was. o longer a means to meet our peo-
ples Gemands or to stop our onging or fres-
dom On the other han, thariks to the Basaue
nationalist lef's work, Basaue people had ac-
epted the idea tha the confict shouid e re-
solved democratcally. by providing Basque
people wih the floor. The confict wasn' to be
resalved by securty solutions b by solutions.
based on demacratc grounds. The forces thal
had supported the Statutes of Autonomy be-
fore then changed their mind: he Ireland Forum
~created by the former imprisoned HB National
Executive - was then working out and devel-
oping a new social plfical communication net-
work. Al these aspects made ETA's ntiatve
possivle.
“The PP [Partido Popuar, Spain's ight-wing
uing party ec.] Governmen. on the contrary.
was bind to ths fact and il sought a poltical
ang milary vitory over the Basaue independ-
ence fighiers. Spanish authorites expelied
ETA's officialspokepersons fom Spain, mpris-
oned the National Execulve, caried out an op-
eration against Basque milants who were said
to belong to an unlawul financial network,
closed down Egin [Basque nationalst daily
newspaper - ed ). elc. Just from the electoral
point of view. this Govemment was sure that
the “Basaue problem could be resolved that
way. The announcement ofthe ceasefre took
‘Spanish Govermment by surprie and now.
reaction to the cease-re is becoming a
th
rap for themselves.
In the year 1952, ETA was for direct nego-
tation with the Spanish state, with ETA
being direct party to the process. Is
there a change of strategy?
I the last few years, our sirategy has
been clarifed ratherthan changed. The Basque
nationalist lefs strategy was to subordinate
taks between ETA and he Sparish State. While
waiting for negotiaton. we left asde the job of
buiding our naton, and we had a posiion of
resistance. I ths posibon that has changed
rom being on the defensive, we took o the
work of construcion. We've made no change
n our way of thinking or methods. and we'e
il actve i looking or new sections out of the
Basque nationalst lef to work with us.
ETA has aiways intended to resolve the
confict through negoliaton. because daiogue
between rivas is the mosi simple way (o
n - Winter 1999/2000
overcome a confict. However. after 1983, the
Basaue nationslst lef reached a dangerous
impasse. waiting for 3 solution which was
thought fo be close but was coming behind
tme. Meanwhie. we were not seting the nec-
essary grounds 1o buid a county (regarding
soci-economics, Basque language, educatin,
land structuring, etc)
Once we realised what we were doing,
the Basaue nationalst lef staried 10 look for
new forces and to work for national construc-
ton. . now, he Spanish State came o be fora
negotated solution, we would be ready for 1,
butnot waitngfo it The Basque nationalistef
does not wait any more but akes the intatve
now. activatng s social and mitant network
atal levels
Since the cease-fire was announced, ETA
no longer addresses the Spanish Gov-
ernment but the Basque people. Why?
Because ETA iniiative is thought 10 be
forthe Basque people. I our opinion,the situ-
ation s promising and the people are now strong
enougn o achieve sovereignty
Before the cease-fire, ETA evaluated and
roflected on the situation. Do you think
there was consensus among the mem-
bers of the Basque nationalist left then?
We think there was more than consen-
sus. We see that the Basque nationalt left is
actie, ready to fight mature enough to under-
stand the current situaton and determined to
underake the necessary work. The Basque
nationalstlef's detemination and consensus
have always been the best guarantee o trig-
ger this process. and to folow i thiough fo the
end, because this group s a politcal force
shaped by twenty years' work and enriched
by far-reaching experience.
Who's the one who's taken more steps
in this process?
From the outset, i's clearly been the
Basque nationalst et aways moving forward.
There's some controversy on who has moved
and who hasrit. What people percerve is that
we all have done something. and we agree on
that. However. what is important is the direc-
ton of that moverent. For years,the PNV [main-
stream nationalst Basave party - ed.] has
moved i the wiong directon, towards a bing
alley, in the wrong way to safeguard the con-
struction of the Basque Country. Because as
they defended the Statute of Autonomy, the
point was not how i should have been imple-
mented. but whether that Basaue Country could
be free inthat way. The Basaue nationat lef
thought the Statute was taking us down a bind
alley. Twenty years lter. the Statue hasntbeen
implemented and furthemare, our land dvi
sion’s now deeger. The PNV maintains that the
asque nationalst lef has come down 1o the
“democratc valley” We thnk that al he people
must come to this democratc valley. Even the
PNV now immersed in the dirty sewers of the
Spanish State, working for Spain. We all must
. in this democratic valley: the PNV, the
Basaue nationaist ket and the restof Basque
people and forces, because s there tna ger-
eral consensus must be reached
Although ETA announced a ceasefirs, the
‘Spanish and French govemments still act
There are two dfferent points of view. On
the one hand. as an organisation. i spite of
these governments' blows. we find that the
process is welk-conducted. But on the ofner
hand, the organsation is made up of peopie.
and there are very teridle situations, very dis-
appointing and enraging actions. which are in
fact aimed at bowing the process up. We must
also say this: Madrd maintains ts war stra-
gy, using diferent means, which are some-
tmes apparently egal or even out of their own
laws,
‘Take the example of our comrade, Tiotto
“The Spanish miltay forces have never gven
up war. and thus, we can't say this murder
100k us by surprise. Killng Basaue miltants is
‘commonplace for them. We must bear in mind
thatthe Civi Guards are st doing thei ob in
the Basaue Cauniry. Therefore. we must re-
spond o these actions. and aso, prevent them,
0 we must get the Spanish miltary forces out
of the Basaue Country as soon as possivle.
“Tott's iing had a forceful resporse and,
‘when looking ahead. something should be done.
10 avoid these kind of actions happening inthe.
future. If Geresta's kiling was just regarded as.
“another actvst kiling himselr. the Spanish
State could do whatever they Hked in the fu-
e
And again, we want to pay our tribute to
Joselu Geresta, as he commitied himse, as
miltant and person, to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
and to the Basque Coutry. And aithough we.
grieve for him, we proudly accet all he gave.
After the last raids in Paris and San Se-
bastian, police breaking into HB offices,
Geresta killed, etc. What does ETA think
about the political answer given by the
Lizarra-Garazi groups with the demon-
stration on April 10th and the hour stop-
page on April 12th?
These mifary atacks by the govemments.
n Pars and Madrd are not considered attacks.
against the ETA but against the process, that
s, against the Basque Country. We're not to
measure whether this response was enough
of should have been bigger. Basque people
have clearly understood the underlying prob-
em, and we must be happy about that Ifthese.
attacks had been regarded as & proviem of
ETA. it was ETA who should have responded;
but it was considered an attack against the
process and the Basque Country. 50 i s the
Basque people as a whole who responded.
PP and PSOE insist on the fact that ETA'
cease-fire is a tactical decision, some
“military holiday” taken by the organisa-
tion. If the process in course failed. would
ETA braak the coase-fire and take to ams
again?
twould be good for al f twas the PP anc
PSOE who took miary hoiday’. even f
was a tactical decision. The process would
then be enhanced. ETA encouraged the proc-
ess because the siuation was thought to be
‘objectvely good enough o achieve democratic
gosls. If ths process was hindered n such 3
way that there was o chance to go anead. 1
‘wouldn't only be ETA'sjob o analyze the situa-
ton, but al the forces i the process should
evaluate i and reach conclusions_ I he proc-
‘ess was 50 seriously attacked tha f was clear
there was no way ahead and that we were ai
another poltical tage. ETA would make 3 dec:
sion then. And I's ikely that other social and
poltical agencies would make their own dec:
sions too.
The HB National Executive s in prison for
spreading the Democratic Alternative.
‘What does ETA think about the trial at the.
Supreme Court?
The members of the National Execuve.
are ot n jai for spreading 3 recarding of the.
Democratic Atlenative. They're i prison be-
cause they warked for the Basque Country
and speciically.for this process 1o take place.
This is something the Spanish know very well.
‘They found that the work of the National Ex-
‘ecuiive was dangerous and decided togetthem
out of their way. This is the result.these HB
members worked as Basaue ciizens on behalf
of freedom, just ke other Basaue ciizens work
1 other levels, and that's the reason why
they're in prison now. We do not make any
diferentation amongst the prisoners.
Anyway. the work carned out by the im-
prisoned National Executve is related 1o the
curent stuaton. The National Executve and all
the members in HB worked to bring about this
process. After them, other miltants - top and
bottom HB members - ook on this responsivi-
ity when many steps had been areacy taken.
and they promoted the process and got sub-
stantial schievements. HB members then and
now are doing good work. We wan to under-
ine that previous work set the grounds. and
present work is making the process move for-
ward,
The Spanish government has taken no
steps after the announcement of cease-
fire, and repeats that ETA has appointed
o official spokeperson. What does ETA
expect from the Spanish government?
What should be first done to overcome
ETA has aways had representatives.
we've got them now and we wil have them in
the future. ETA hasn been waitng for a state-
ment fom the Spanish government to appoint
their representaties and offcial spokepersons.
On the other han, the President of the Span-
8h Government has publcy stated he is ready
totalk with ETA. Regarcless of s aims, this
11 Political Prisoners Worldwide
Arm The Spi
is sometning ETA takes into accout
The process we started i September
oes ot address the Spanish government
however, the Spanish government may feel
‘compelledto say something i s regard. pob-
ably due 1o other states’ pressures. But, basi-
cally.the Spanish governmen hasrt changed
1 atttude Ther job shouidnt be making ges-
tures ither. ftney truly wanted to embark in a
process of taks. they shouid buid the archi-
tecture required to resalve the confict_ The
problem is not whether ETA appoints offcal
Spokepeople or nol. The point i to reflect on
Wwhat kind of process they want to resolve the
confict
Alteady in 1995, when the Democratic
Alernative was spread, we set foth our pro-
posal 10 overcome the armed conflict with
Spain.This proposal specified what the Span-
ish and French States should do regarding the
Basaue County. {0 recognise the right 1o sef-
determination andtorespec the decisions made
by Basae people afer a democratic public
debate Tosay. there's a democratic debate
going on. or f you want_there’s a process of
national constructon. Thus. fthe Spanish gov-
emment wants (o tak with ETA, based on the
respect fo this process, s cear that ETA wil
talk with the Spanish government, to remove
obstacies and encourage this process. f these
{alks took pace at ths very moment that much
better.
Has ETA had any relation with the Spanish
government after the cease-fire was an-
nounced? ETA has publicly stated that
they issued the organisation’s “official
testimony” to the Spanish government.
What are the contents of this report?
These kinds of processes require some
sort of discretion. Not excesswe secrecy, but
discreton indeed. We understand 8 pubic de-
bate shouldn' be held between ETA and the
‘Spanish goverment through the mass media,
because discreton is completely necessary 1o
promote these sor of processes. We confirn
that there's been a communicatin, but at this
moment. we have no more 10 say.
Is it possible that the Basque normalisa-
tion process ended up without having any
contact with the Spanish government?
That could be possible. but we think Spain
is 2 state demanding our land to be part of their
tertiory. and we don' think the Spanish wil et
our liveation process advance without inter-
fering. Therr interference can be positive or
negative. We'd ike t10 be posiive. For exam-
ple IntheIrsh process, the Brtish govermment
defends s own interests. but (s involved in
the process to keep powers the Brtsh deem
important We tink the Spanish sate wil finaly
o something in our case, because that's the
way it must be. When & nation i strugging to
get ree fom a tate, there must be contacts or
ks
On the other hand, we find these talks are
global and the Lizarra-Garaz groups shouid
leading role. Thus, Lizarra-Garazi must
be a ramework of loyatty and commitment.
The Spanish Government uses prison-
ers as 3 means for pressure. What are
the effects of this attitude?
The Spanish government uses dispersion
a3 pressure and blackmal. Butthe Basque pec-
ple have deciared ourseives in favour of hav-
g our prisoners back in the Basque Country
Tne Spanish goverment doesn' respect this
opinion, which 15 3 bad example for the fulure
The Basaue people have expressed our opir-
on and this opinion is not respected. There-
fore, tne Basaue people will have to make the
Spanish goverment respect i, If this govern-
ment doesnit respect our decisions, wil our
people's decisions be respected concerning
otner significant ssues? The point s not that
they don't enforce theic own laws. The pointis
that the Basque people have stated what we
think regarding a given issue, and ths opinon
st respected. Thal's the nub of the matter
indeed
In previous communiques, ETA has called
upon the Basque people fo work for pris-
oners and victims of reprisal. How does
ETA evaluate recent protests?
Inifatives to have our prisoners back in
the Basaue Country began n 1996. he prison-
ers'struggle, ETA's actions, people demanding
that the Spanish government should not use
prsoners of war a5 a means fo confrontation,
and no more actions on the prison front. Since
then. our evaluation is posiive. Throughout ail
these years, prisoners and ther rlatives have
been sufferng in prvate, and now, this suffer-
ing has spread. Most peapl think now that this
issue nesds o be resolved. However, we must
succeed in bringing prisoners back to the
Basaue Country. I's the Basque people’s b to
eflect on the current situation and fid inta
ives 1o succeed. The poin i not what Kind of
protest we need to make, or what kind of social
greement is reached o make a protest, but
how we all design the stiategy to make this
desire become tre.It's many people's respor-
siily, s notonly ETA's business.
The issue of prisoners is painful and ur-
gent. However, and bearing in mind how
Crusl it is, does ETA consider that this
issue must be understood in the context
of a wider political process? Or in other
words, the political process is the im-
portant thing and the issue of prisoners
must be resolved as far as this process.
goes on?
We's rather ask this question of the
Basque people. Is possivie that process of
constructon. Weration. normaization -or
ever name is given - goes on when the Basque
people have given our opinion and this opinion
is not respeced?. Then, this issue is mportant
according to the answer. The Basaue people
must succeed in brnging the prisoners back to
the Basque Counry, but this goal must ot block
other buiding ntatives. The prisoners must be
taken into sccount. but must ot siop other
Haies. This ssue is in the Basque pecple’s
agenda and a strategy must be designed o
have our prisoners back s actually the Basaue
pecple who must make the efor.
Does ETA think that the Spanish govern-
ment members all agree on how to deal
with the conflict, or as It is widely shared,
there are different opinions within t?
What we know is Spanish government's
actons. Rumaurs created by poltical experts
are not very important o us. What concerns us
is what the Spanish goverment does.
‘What's the role of the French government,
according to ETA?
s fa a8 repression is concerned, there's
been no change. However. there's a new thing
the French goverment has now the Basque
problem in their agenda. Up until now. & was
much easer fo them o use the Basgue con-
it fortheirbusiness. They thought this polt-
cal problem wasn' o tetile inthe land under
thei junisdicton. Today. the “Basque problem”
doesnt only concern the Ministers of the Ine-
ior and Justce, but the whole goverment
“We'l take steps as far as Spain does’, they
say. as if it was a Spanish problem; but
present s dbvious tha he French ik there's
3 prodiem inthe Basque Courtry and that the
Basque people agrea on thal. Ths is the result
of the Basaue nationalst people’s fgh. because
our concems and claims have touched socity
and because a arge movement has been cre-
ated. The clearest exampl s thathe atude in
favour of a Basaue single ‘department - for
the provinces under French jurisdiction - i in-
creasing
In the communique on February 24th this
year, ETA welcomed the "brave atttude™
of the PNV, HB, AB and EA. Recentl, some
PNV members expressed a different
point of view. Are these statements sim-
ble inner contradictions or are they part
of the PNV game? Can these kinds of
opinions put the development of Lizarr
Garazi at risk?
Lizara-Garazi sn't a simple settiement
‘among partes, fs something more. s rame-
Work to overcome the confict, laying the foun-
dations to tackle a democratc process in the
Basque Courtry. I's the contents of this setie-
ment tha really matter. and that can't be sub-
et 0 the mood-swings of poitical party.
Some people think Lizarra-Garazi is
drained. Ibarretxe (President of the
Autonomous Government)
seeks 3 new forum, and the Izquierda
Unida (IU) has proposed two parallel and
coordinated forums in the Basque Au-
tonomous Community and Navarre. What
do you think about these initiatives?
Should Lizarra-Garazi be developed?
s ciear that Basque publc ife is much
Freedom For Al Policical Prisoners Worldwit
ter 1999/2000
faster now. It took ten years for the parties at
the Auria Enea Table to reaise that that sette-
ment was drained. and then. ten days were
enough to despise the poleniial of his agree-
ment_ Lizarra-Garazi s a settiement to be de-
veloped. indfferent stages. We must ook at ts
Contents; ths is what must be respected, be-
cause its 8 democratc opton. The Ajuria Enea
Pact was an instrument for war. The Lizarra-
Garazs agreement. on the contrary, makes an
appraisalof the conflic inthe Basaue Couriry.
a general assessment, taking Basaue Country
25 2 whole_ 1t aiso presents a method o re-
Solve this confict. Taking Lizarra-Garazi as 2
startng point. we must buld polticsl. socil,
abour and insttutonal scopes of action. Al
‘ways bearing in mind its contents and imple-
menting he seftioment according to them
s Lizarra-Garazi the only possible option
to safeguard the future of the Basque
Country?
Lizarra-Garazi must not be neither 3 new.
symbol nor @ means fo confrontation. Lizarra-
‘Garazils an nstuument for integration. The prob-
lem needs a global answer, and thaf's the po-
tentalty of Lizara-Garaz. The proposal made
by the IU. regarcing two forums, is & partal
answer_If more than one forum was neces-
sary. we should have three: in the Basque
Autonomous Communiy. Navarre and the North-
‘e Basque Country. The problem s global,
because we are submited [0 the rues of two
states. and that needs an answer.I's only one.
forum that s needed so as o tackle globainess.
Two o three foru ral answers, and
thus we should make the same work more than
‘onca. making things more compicated han they.
are now. On the oiher hand, the members of
the forum must take partn t voluntariy. no one.
can be forced to take part in this forum. The
‘signatories to the Lizarra-Garaz! agreement
musttake into account there are some parties
that are not with them. However, bearing in
mind that Basque pluralty is not representec.
they must go on working.
Nevertheless,the parties out of the agree-
ment don't have the power of veto_If they dont
et involved in this forum, thats because they
don' want to. They have no rght to say that
Pothing can be done “unti we si at the same.
table with ther and then. they cant say any-
thing when Basque people make our own de-
cisions, arguing tht these decisions doritcom-
ply withthis or that Constiuton.
1 the process goes on, will it be more
easy or more difficult for those who are
ot involved to come to you?
We are completely sure about that. The
faster the process goes on, the sooner will
those who are out, o us. And this is not mpo-
siton: f they act as Basque ciizens, they ee!
tempted to et involved in deciding what kind of
country we want to buid.
Is there a possibility of social confronta-
tion, for instance, in Navarre?
We think there's no room for social con-
frontation. There can be such a confrontation
‘among poltcians, who use and manipulate the
process to end i, but not n society.
The contents of Lizarra-Garazi are now
taking shape in talks at the Parflament of
Gasteiz. Does this imply that part of the
Basque Country s being left behind?
tmust be cieared up that what happens in
the Pariament of Gasteiz s not mplementation
of the Lizarra-Garazi Agreement In Gasteiz
Basque natonalst parties co-operate and tak
For exampl, the IU. that signed the Lizara-
‘Garazi settiement, doesn' take part i this co-
operation, just ke the rade unions and social
organisations.
Talks at the Pariiament in Gastsiz are be-
ing a determining factor in the political
life of part of the Basque Country. Can
the government agreement be decisive
when developing Lizarra-Garazi?
‘Some partes were for the Statute frame-
work before but consider crained now. Since.
‘September, the hypothesis of buiding the
Basaue Country out of the narrow statute
framework has become true; i fact s a real-
ity. Thus, the goal ofthe possible govemment
settiement s not enhancing thatnstiuion, but
benefting from this framework to work for the.
national construction process
But, will it be a decisive factor?
Wnat is decisive is our people’s desire
and work_ There were many theories after ETA
announced the cease-fire and the new proc-
ess started. I, as a result o ths settiement
construction, that
steps are taken for nations
means one of the theories worked out in Sep-
tember has become true. This effiient step
Wwould show that nationalist forces agree on
enhancing the process in geners
ness and courage. The sette
wih eager
n Gasteiz
must be useful 1o show it
Have the government settiement and
Lizarra-Garazi nothing to do with each
other?
fagreement is no reached in the govern
ment, Lizarra-Garazi can' be stoppe. Lazarta
Garazi is 2 means to resolve the confict, and
this canit be influenced by anything. The gov-
emment settlement stands off reiations among
partes.
The Lizarra-Garazi Declaration is eight
months old now. What is ETA's level of
confidence and hope abou the process?
We see a high level of maturty in he
Basque nationalst ef.and other poicalforces
facing up 1o thei responsiiltes: so we are
very confident and hopeful s possible. we
must say. to bring the process to an end. The
Basaue people have the chance to be free.
“The point s for all of us.to 60 our best 1o make
twork. We must all make a great effort. but all
together, we'l gt it
Twenty years ago. some nationalists
broke away, which was called the Txiberta
rupture. Some of them, in the name of
pragmatism, got completely involved in
the autonomous and statute process;
others suggested going against that
framework. Twenty years later, there's a
new atmosphere of co-operation among
nationalists. Does ETA think this process
is more mature now than Txiberta was?
Is it possible that a common strategy is
agreed upon by all nationalists on some
points of agreement?
s true that we see the Basque forces
are more and more mature. A few months ago.
we had a theory. Now, we see that ths theory
s giving it results and that we'e on the right
r0ad. Al the crossroads twenty years ago, the
Choice was othing or 3 specifc thing, and
some went for the cake: (oday. s clear that
this cake satisfied them but i didn' for our fu-
ture at al. This s the way we think of maturty.
we don' think they' make the same mistake.
Thus, weire convinced the Basaue poliical
forces have leart flom experience and they
o on unti the process is ended.
What's ETA's view regarding the Assem-
bly of Basque Local Representatives?
Must this Assembly walk hand in hand
with Lizarra-Garazi?
Lizarra-Garazi s both the grounds of the
process and the means to resolve the conflct
Tne Assembly of Basque Local Representa-
tives is wihin the framework of natonal con-
siruction We can' be waitng for the confict to
nd to start buiding our country. This Assem-
bl is an instituton that represens the whole
Basque Country. and that is worth tn of sel.
The tasks and potentalies of this Assembly
wil depend on the people taking part n . The
Job of this nstuton, of the Basaue people,
—__——fi
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worlc
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is o make it work. To make a resl appraisal of
the stuation and then to work.for the Basaue
language. socio-economics. educaton, land
structunng, tc. Is crucial to et insight o the
Stuation and put new natives n action. Look.
for instance. we don't have an intiute of N
tional Statstics: or as regards the impover-
Ished economic stuation o Zuberoa, who gives
an answer? Nobody.
ETA has repeated time and again that the
Basque people have the floor. What doss
it really mean? Basque people could
make decisions when the Basque Coun-
try is ot legally recognised?
That'the nub ofthe matter. Lizarra-Garazi
states that thi 1s a poltical confict and s it
must be resolved by accepting wnat the
Basque people say. However. we have o in-
stutional subject. One of the most important
reasons for national constructon is precisely
o gve shape 1o ths subject that i, build an
Institutional network. The Assembly of Local
Representatives is the first step. although it
wonitbe the only one. Thus, confiuence of the
Lizarra-Garazi agreement and national con-
struction s something natural. Even more, s
essentl.
I's been said that the Assembly of Local
Representatives is aimed at replacing the
current institutions.
That's not true. The Assembly of Local
Representatives is something new, which dis
ot exist before. Therefore, it cant replace
anyihing. This Assembly was made up be-
Cause there was no insttutional structure rep-
resenting the whole Basaue Country. I we go
on withthis infiative. other nstiutions wil have
1o be created that logically replace the current
ones. There wil surely be many questions and
proposals.
How must soversignty be recognised?
What would its judicial-legal and const-
twtional framework be?
It crucial 1o see the process as whole
to clear up this question. AL the end of this
process i course, the Basque peopie will have
our own Consttution; and by the way, t worit
take long. We are on the way t0 getting it Our
Consttuton wil be worked out by the Basaue
people. taking the Basque Country as 3 whoe.
ang wil define the framework we want
But then, should the Spanish and French
Constitutions recognise sovereignty?
Recognition of sovereignty is another
question. which must be fulfiled by the two
los. At some poin of the process, France
and Spain wil have to get involved, and then
we'll see how they do it Anyway. that's not
our main concer. We're not going to wait &
minute to speculate on how theic constiutions
recognise our independence. The key is 1o go
on buiding our nation, and that tme will aive,
but we can't keep waiing or it because ih-
erwise. we'l have nothing We'l go on buiking
our country, 50 that when that time comes.
weire ready for . Lets Guess the right o sel
determination i recognised for us today. What
would we do then? Our house isn' done yet
Lets buidit We don'twant o change the Span-
ish Constiution. As we have mentoned be-
fore, we must work out our own Basque Con-
stuion.
“Land unity” and “recognition of territo-
rial integrity” are two widely used con-
cepts.
These two concepts are mixed.‘Recog-
niion” must come from outsde and ‘unty” rom
nside. How 1o do i is another thing. We very
much tend to import foreign models. We don't
fing t eally imporiant, what s signiicant for us
s the proect tsel. We shouid all eflect o the
ol 0 play by the ixterories i the uny. Our
peopie's Constiution wil have o safeguard two
elements. first, unity; second, the power o
make decisions
How important are the provinces in insti-
tutional organisation?
The terrories have been very imporant
in our istory.they re deeply rooted and are the
basis of nstiutional organisation. These tefr-
tories are very old. And now they need an
answer. Each province is dfferent and their
unity is the comerstone of national construc-
ton. Unity must aso be buit, taking ito ac-
count diflerences in provinces. We can't mix
specifcity with unity. Specifty must favour
uniy.
“Ths, i can be predicted that the Basaue
Country will have two instutional structures:
the first one, orented at meeting the needs and
projects which concern al of us; and the sec-
ond one. 1o guarantee that all the provinces
participate and make decsions. Hawever, we'l
Dave les instiutions than we've got now, which
wil be faster, more democratic and effcent
For nstance, Nafarroa will el more comort-
able i the Basaue County, because the Basque
Country will accept Nafarroa's istinctive fea-
tures. something that Spain doesn't do and wil
never do. Nafarroa wil have the floor and
power to make decisions. in other words,
Natarroa wil have more power than # has to-
ay. Anyway. this model i to be discussed
and shaped by ai Basaves.
Recently, the map of Europe has changed.
There are new countries such as
Caechia, Slovenia and Lithuania. Where
s the place of the Basque Country today
in Europe? Is It worth being in a hurry to
join the European community “with the
things we aiready have": three provinces,
o only Gipuzkoa, o Bizkaia...
1t we oined the European community just
with one part o the Basque Country, we'd make
the same mistake we did twenly years ago.
We have embarked on a new process to make
all the parts of our country move at the same.
time. We must overcome our countrys part-
ton: divided into two iflerent states and 1
ifferent pans wihin hose states. We must be
entiled 1o self-determination not only in the
Basque Autonomous Community. but in the
whole Basque Country: SO it clear that we
Must avoid the sk of moving only with one part
of our people.
Do elections on June 13th have a special
meaning, if we compare them to previ-
s polls? How can they be decisive?
They e not decisive n of hemselves. but.
sl its obvious they can favour or hinder the
process in course. From a Basaue nationalst
point of view, this lection will be more positve
1groups get more votes tha bring a solutonto
the confict and natonal construction
‘As in the previous elecions in the three
wesier provinces, the pro-Spain groups have
presented thi electoral appoinimen as gen-
eral slection. This view is more siressed now
that the process has advanced. The Basaue
Country has a real challenge ahead with the
Assembly of Local Representatives and the
ew insiiutonsl strcture stemming fom . The
PP, thus, urgently needs to have good resuls
10 go on wih their war strategy at the nstu-
tional level t0o. The PP and PSOE don' mind
what kind of project each town-council has.
their campaig is not based on a poltical pro-
gramme, but on a strategy of war.
The Basque nationalist forces don't stand
for the European elections together
This fact means we've lost @ eally good
opportunity. In fact, we've lost a chance for al
the nationaist forces to get united and show
other countres that the Basque Country e
ist. We've lost the chance to defend our der
ttyin Europe. Nobady istobiame for that Some
natonalst forces refused to accept the offer
and ' only them who know why. Lack of cout-
age, indeed Perhaps, ourenemy's atacks made
the poltical stuation too tense... Finaly, some
forces did not dare, because they thought pre-
senting one single lstof candicates was per-
haps too much.
Do you ask people to vote for a given op-
tion?
Yes. In general, we'd ke them o vote for
the partes that have snown they are for na-
tonal construcion. But we hink the most use-
ful vote s EM, because this force has made
clear wha they wart, i able 1o make the proc-
ess advance and because they defend a
Basque nationalst and lefl poject. However,
wed like to underine that we don't do it be-
cause its good for us, but because ifs good
for allthe Basque Peopl.
as
what do you think it wil happen f some
nationalist forces reached an agreement
with Spanish parties - PP o PSOE-
to make management easier"?
Fist of il we must say we donit
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
Arm The §
I Edition - Winter 1999/2000
that wil appen. That fact would mean that the
natonalst forces wer against he process i
course. This fact would mply a turming-back
o the process. We foresee the nationalists
Wil b together in the years to come and wil
co-operate in the fight for the rights of the
Basque County. This is what should logically
happen. Anyway. we've already said the
grounds are set by Lizara-Garazi o resolve
the confict. and we think other agreements are
possidie based on these grounds. aways tak-
ng ths settiement as a staring point.
s possible to be at new situations. and
thus, the forces for nationalism and the demo-
cratic process can look for new alteratives.
However. they should have aways the same
goal enhancig the process in course. If CON.
PSE. PSN and other parties showed they were
Interested in joning ths democratic process -
they were ready to accept the Basaue peo-
ples decisions - we could all possibly reach
another kind of settiement. deriving from
Lizarta-Garazi I this way, Navarte woud no
longer be a branch of the government in Ma-
drid. The basis or future agreements must be
the setiemen reached by the forces for na-
tonalsm and respect for the Basaue people’s
rights_In the Basaus Country. there are gven
s inthe poltcal game, and we must piay in
accordance with them.
The PP says they can't trust these polis
in the same conditions because of the
great pressure and threats. What do you
think about that?
s completay flse. As a mater of fact
PP and PSOE have the support of about 20,000
votes of Spanish civl guards. judges. cvilserv-
ants, relatves and so on. 20,000 voies, and in
fact, 20,000 armed votes. Besides, they have
body quards, five TV channels, most mass
media. judges, adminisration, efc. They just
want 10 play the victms’ ole. Trings would be
very diferent f al the forces stood on a true
equal bass
According to ETA, what's the role of the
economic forces?
To begin with, these forcess must ap-
praise th siuation inthe Basque Country. and
then. they should set forth specfic proposal
and solutions.
At he present time, the Basaue people
have o power to control our economic e-
Soutces. Athough i seems that the economic
agreement with Spain provides partof our fand
with some kind of power, we've actualy got o
chance to decide on our economic poices from
a nationaist point of view. Lack of power has
serious consequences for our peaple; take the
‘example of the serious process of industial
‘ismanting imposed on us
1f we had power to control our economy,
We could take other measures: we coud, for
instance, diversify industry. We're sure the
Basque Country would have a deeper eco-
nomic development f we were a ree nation
On the other hand, we believe its high
time we improved the social struggle. Thus.
scopes and rues of the social game must be.
Gefinea n order to determinedly undertake the.
work for a new model of socely. We fecenty
Said the Basaue land should get i of the re-
mains 1o lay new foundations for the future
And one of our mainjobs now s to defne and
create the Basaue Scope of Labour Relations,
because d be a significant step towards
new modelof socety and wil mprove thesocial
struggle
Does ETA consider the rol of the mass-
media as important to the process?
It very important indeed. Up uti now.
the mass media has clearty opted to extend the.
confict. The mass media plays a 10 in the
process, namely attacking and spreading black.
propaganda. Their main goal is covering the
offensive against the Basque Country and, o-
ten, promoling it Things wil be more easy or
more compiicated depending on the ole of the.
mass-media. And as a matter of fact, L the
majorty ofthe mass-media inthe Basque Coun-
ry who adopt this clear attitude against the.
process.
We don't really know how aware some
mass-media and journalsts are of the serious.
consequences thei atttude can have in the.
Basque Country. We arent sure i they know.
how responsibl they are or the situation here.
Whats happened inthe st twenty years?
Those polfical forces who cal themseives na-
tionalst - and now agree wih Lizarra-Garazi -
have long use the mass media as loud-speak-
ers. and today this mass-media s against the
ieration process. diminishing or indering s
development. Meanwhie, the communication
monsters are growing, and obviousy. the re-
sultls thatthe mass-media are now the bigges!
ones
Another thig is what to do in the future.
As we've said before, we should refiect on
that and shape a project for the future And
now, partculary, s journalsts who should think
of that, analysing what ind of mass-media the
new Basque Country needs and what rules
‘must thus be agreed upon. What s clear s that
the Basaue Country needs a national TV. a na-
tional radio, etc
What does ETA think about the work for
the recovery of the Basque language?
In general, we find i positve, because
Basque is 2 Iiving language. because t is a
means for commnication, and because more
people use it now i dfferent feds. But, at the
same time. the Basque language is considered
tobe lostn some areas of the Basque County.
by many Basaue people. If we are at this point
today, that is because Basque people have
struggled. even against the administration,
which is supposed to defend our language.
Anyway. socio-inguistc statistics confim
the Basque language's siuation is criical in
many areas. Our language is about 10 disap-
pear because we have no means to make
survive. and i be very dificul to change this
Situation with our present tools. Then, there's
only one way out we mustea Basave. speak.
‘Basaue and get the power to make Basaue be
the language of the whole Basaue Courlry
And, besides the Basque language. we.
would aso ke to deal with education. Educa-
tion has always been considered very mpor-
tant when leaming Basave. but then. the con-
ents hat were taught - through the medium of
Basaue. and aiso Spanish and French - have
often been left aside. t seems now that people
have become aware of that fact. but 1 wenty
yesrs that we've been learning the Basaue
Country s not he Basave Country. but Spain or
France, in such subjects & nistory. geogra-
Phy and iterture. Altne Bagues have the gt
o lea through the medium of Basaue. they
should aiso be entiled and obliged o learn
Basaue history and identty. On the contrary.
we'll have people who can speak Basaue but
Who are Spanish or French as far as cutre is
concerned
How important is it for ETA to spread the
process at the International level?
1t very important. But s you sa, s the
process that must be spread. And. tha proc-
ess creates instruments for us o have a voice
atthe inemationsl level or.at least. we'l have
the chance to have 3 say abroad. Intermatinal
communiy is important n the end. What's cru-
cial now is working al home: awakening mner
strength and showing t abroad. If we ravel
abroad with a weak process. no one wil help
or pay attentin to us.
“The message we have 1o spread at the
iterational level i simple but meaningul we
are a nation. and the present conflct can be
democraticaly resoived. simply by respecting
the Basque people’s voice. We must stress.
that fact.
Quebec, Scotiand, Irsland, etc. What does
ETA think about these processes? Are
they modes for the Basque Country?
Analysing otner processes can help, be-
cause we can leam many lessons from them.
But above al the mostimportant thing fo us i
these peoples’ fight o foce the states oppress-
ing them to acoept & point o agreement.f, on
the contrary. we imported foreign methods.
we'd realise that many aspects are missing
we actually have diferent realtes.
Luckiy, theformer Natonal Executive stud-
ied the Irsh example and later. the Lz
Garazi Forum made a diagnos's 1o see how
this model could be used in the Basque Coun-
try_I's not a copy. because our siuation and
problems are diferent: we have no armed un-
fonists, but we have the Civi Guard and Gen-
darmerie. We must get them out of here, we
must work out our own insttutional structure,
etc. The processes i the Basaue Country. re-
and o Quebec canit be equaly resolved. be-
cause the processes are not the same efther
Justlike us, the Spanish wil also watch
conficts abroad. They will surely look or pos-
sible solutions, lessons or measures. And if
we all o the right thing, the Basaues wil finaly
e free. and the Spanish and French will have
new neighbour. Thus, we'l il be winners
Arm The Spi
ter 1999/2000
Herri Batasuna Leaders Freed
1n a decision that gets the.Spanish gov-
ermment off the hook. Spain's Consttutional
Court on Tuesday overtumed prison sentences
against the leaders of the Basque pro-inde-
pendence party Herr Batasuna (HB) for ‘co-
Iaborating”wit the armed organization Euskad!
Ta Askatasuns (ETA - Basque Homeland and
Freedom)
‘Ao days of deliertion to find a justi-
cation to s deciion to free the 22 HB leaders
~inthe least damaging way 1o th state and the
‘Supreme Court - the court's 12 members ruled
eight 1o four on Tuesday night that Spain's pe-
al code arcles under which the 23 HB lead-
ers were tred and sentenced for colldboration
with armed groups were unconsttutional
They raced to thrash out deal for a sen-
tence which would save Spain from the humi
aton of being equated to Turkey by the Euro-
ean Human Rights Court in Strasbourg. Here's
the deal: the Constiutonal Court agreed not to
study other slements ofthe appeai by the aled
leaters wno protested ther innocence
‘Government spokesman Josep Pique i
mediatey rejected the suggestion that poics
played a role i the leaders' mprisonment, i
sisting the Constituional Court's decision
showed “the rule of aw works regardless of
who you are”.
Bt in poltcs, where there is a wil there
s 8 way
In December 1997 the Spanish govern
ment imprisoned 23 members of the National
Board of the Basque political party Herri
Batasuna (HB - People's Uniy) fora 7 year jai
sentence. Their alleged crime was to dissemi-
nate for public debate a video which discussed
ETA's peace proposal for democratc end to
the existing confict.
The Supreme Cour failed to prove the
partication of each of the 23 policians in the
Gecision to distibute the video and thus, i vio-
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Iated the principle of nocence.
Intermstional cbservers from human rights
organizations n sleven countries watching the
proceedings said the tril was poitical and a
biary because organizations in Europe have
made simiar actons and not prosecied.
“The observers were bothered by the lack
of evidence presented by the prosecution In a
joint statement ssued during the i, they said
the accused were given the burden of proof
which Violates the fundamental principie of the
presumption of innocence”
The judges considered that a crime was
committed when in fact the video had never
been broadcast. Moreover, the judges applied
Franca's penal code, which deciared the crime
of “calaborating with an armed band" as any
type o colaboration with the actvites and goals
of an armed group. I thus criminalzes the role
of intermediaries in disseminating negotating
postions or peace proposals i a biter and
ong standing confict
The guity verdicts and long sentences
were praised by Spain's government and man-
stream oppositon partes but cricized from in-
sice the Basaue Counlry where even ‘moder
ate” Basques temed it polcally motivated.
HB attomeys appealed the Supreme Court
verdict and warned they would take the case
1o before the European Human Rights Court.
The release of the imprisoned HB leaders
came hours afte the Constiutional Cout after
the Constiutional Court ulng quashed the con-
vitions.
One of them was released last year on
health grounds, and the other 22 et prison in
the early hours of Wednesday morning after
20 months behing bars.
But Eugenio Aranburu did not survive this
latest poiical persecuton of Herr Batasuna
leaders. The HB leader was found dead hang-
ng from tree near hs home - a hanging not
P e
R
R S ialel.
.
uniike the KKK(nthe U.S.
The body of Eugenio Aranburu was found
a fow hours before he was 1o be arested and
taken o Madnd along with thecther 23 HB iead-
ers that were prosecuted
Baiona, Euskal Herria
July 22, 1998
(Source: Euskal Herria Journal <http://
i froespeech. orgleh>)
“The Sentence That Imprisoned
The National Executive Of
Herri Batasuna Was Reversed”
Twenty-one months have passed for
22 Basque people, members of the Na-
tonsl Execuiive of Her Batasuna, to be
released, after an unjust sentence took
them o prison for poltcal ather than for
legal reasons. Regardiess o the legal dis-
quise of this sentence, 22 men and women
Wwere imprisoned because they tried todis-
trbute the peace proposal known as the
“Democratic Atematie’.
“The trial tself was just the logic and
predictable staging of the Parido Popuiar
‘and the Spanish Goverments deter’-
nation to destroy. no matter how. the
Basaue Nationalist Left In a context of
persecation and annhiaton o he Basque
Gissidents. shaped by the effects of the
death of the PP councilr Miguel Angel
Blanco Garrdo, pressures were perma-
nently exerted on the magistrates of the
Supreme Court. The Ministry ofthe Interior
created a ciimate which favoured and
demanded an exemplary sentence. even
if i was not in due process of law. The
context in which the tral was held, under
great mass media and poltical pressures,
Came to blur the legal aspect of the pro-
ceedings. Then, the speech of the attor-
ey Jose Maria Luzon at the tal, a clear
poltical declaraton. showed that it was
ot ony the 23 members of the HB Execu-
ive who were sitng on the dock. but aiso
the alterative of fulure and peace repre-
sented by the Basque nationaist et Be-
sides, the subsequent justice-police ac-
tions 1. Egin and Eginratia were closed
own, the ETA leadership was allegedly
dismantied, etc.) clearly showed again the
Partido Populars tough polcy”against the
Basque people’s constant claims fora,ust
and democratic resolution.
ssque Country
July 22, 1998
Herti Batasuna International Dept.
(Source: HB International Department
Sararissa
*
Freedom For Al Policical Prisoners Worldwide!
Special Edition
Vow We Must Find Ways To Be Released...”
Interview With Political Prisoner
Helmut Pohl On The Politics Of
The Red Army Fraction (RAF)
ATS Note: This interview was conducied i 1996, amost 2 years before the RAF announced its
selfdissolution. We are including it here because it provides valuable insight nto the broak
between the RAF prisoners and the RAF tsell. Pohi aiso engages n a wide-ranging discussion
about the ailngs of the RAF throughout the diferent phases of s history, partcularly from the
mic-80s onwards.
There was a split between the RAF and
many of the prisoners, and now the po-
litcal prisoners no longer present them-
selves as a united group. So, for whom
are you speaking in this interview?
Fist of il speaking for myselt, but |
also know what some of the ther prisoners
are thinking. We have all been solated from
one anothersince the 1989 hungerstrike. There
was possibiy to have an exchange about the
ew situaton. Letters are not an approprate
medium for sich a discussion.
Why not?
Our mail has been utiized by the authorl-
i for well over ten years. The BKA [Federal
Grime Offe] pours over every sentence. try-
g to analyze the style - that makes discus-
sions impossible. 11 ust not possible to com.
municate exciusively by means of such a tedi-
ous medium fike lettrs. It just not an option
afer years o isolation and the eventual de-
cine of contacts to the outside. But the collec-
tve does st exst. We are stugging together
for our freedom.
How do you explain the fact that since the
1982 cessation by the RAF, which ended
armed atiacks against persons, the pris-
oners group has dissolved and the RAF
itself has disappeared from the political
scene?
The cessation. a least a5 we envisioned
it never came about. Our vision of the cessa-
tion was meant tostand for a transformation of
that which RAF once was into a polical force
Which could influence new poltcal stuatins
And that dian' happen. Al that happened in
1852 was that actions were hated, and every-
thing else ust evaporated. The reasons for this
i in the fact that a politcal discussion about
How things should continue on n the future
never even got ot the groun.
But there have been a series of texts, full
of critcisms and selfcriticisms of the RAF
and the prisoners...
But hese papers fom the RAF, and the
“self-citcism’, weren't real criiques. It was
just a rehash of the 1980s. putting 1t through
the wash one more time. The so-called ‘new.
poltic” of the RAF was ust an attempt to make
2 variant of “fevolutionary poliics” on 10p of
the old foundation, a reproduction of the same,
but this tme done the right way. S0 to speak.
But there was never a complete break fom the
old concept. I ine with ti, | hnkits important
for those who are stil underground to an-
nounce the dissolution of the RAF. Other pris-
oners expressly tod me to say that i this inter-
view. The RAF must be dissoived. then we can
see what develops.
How should the discussion have gone, in
Your opinion?
I order t expiain that, we need t look at
the history of the cessation discussion. i 1887,
the prisoners made mention of a cessation for
the first tme.
In other words, after the attacks on MTU
manager Ernst Zimmermann, Siemens
manager Kurt Beckurts, and the diplomat
Gerold von Braunmuehi. Was there a con-
nection between these attacks and talk
of a cossation?
Thoughts of a cessation had more 1o do
with intemational developrents. By 1987, twas.
lear o us that things were going to change.
That meant, in our opinion.that the entre con-
ept of the RAF up to that point needed to be
put in question. But no discussion followed
from this analysi. things just got stuck. That
citiism s aiso apples to us, he prsoners: At
that time. when it was.clear 1o us that we
weren't going 1o get any further, we should
have stated clearl that things can't go on in
the same way. But at that time we thought we
Couldn' push that through. We Justdidnt have.
‘snough fundamental thoughts on this. W, far
away i prisons, isolated from one another.
weren' in a positon to say what f all means.
and how things should continue. But we should
have said sometning nonetheless. But sl we.
were some of the few people who had our
fingers on the puise. 50 1o speak.
In the 1989 hungerstike. we tred once
again to introduce a fundamental recrintation
We were pushing for the RAF 1o stops i ac-
tions, then for a political discussion to start,
then freedom for the poltical prisoners.
That was an demand issued intenally?
Yes. those were our ntemal discussions
concerming the armed actions.
How, in your opinion, did international de-
velopments lead to armed struggle no
longer being relevant?
“The polics of the RAF are aways imime.
distey associated wih armed struggle But i
was. never supposed to be that way. and the
facttha t became that way was a mitake. So
the thoughis of a cessation had nothig 1o do
with armed struggle per se. All across the worc
2 tendency towards marginaization couit be
seen. One example from our discussions at
thattime. In Central America, a war of destruc-
tion was. being waged. but over here t was
hardly taken notie of, on the contrary. quie 3
diferent image was being portayed. Here t
was assumed that supposedly democratic
steps were taking hold there, when in reaify
entire areas were being destioyed. At the same
time, the ruling powers were able to push
through nearly al over theiprojects in Central
Europe. Whether twas gene technoogy. aomic
energy, Fortress Europe. or remiitarization
there were qualtaiive changes taking place. |
should mention that al of this became Cear to
s then. but some non-Europeans sai 1o us
thatthey had been discussing that back in 1980,
that says something.
Thats why it was of great importance to
us that people come together from across the
lefist specirum and discuss things. 5o as o
understand the catastrophic direction things
were heading in. It wasn just our way of mak-
ng polics which had become outdated. ofher
lefist groups. even bourgeais ones. had failed
1o find methods of dealing with the new stua-
tons,
That means, the decision to halt the at-
tacks which had become characteristic
of the RAF was of a fundamental nature.
But how does that fit with your statement
trom 1993, In which you said: “The things
1 have boen saying for the past fow years
1 1o longer say now. And the possibilities
which the cessation gave rise to are
gone. So 'l be damned if I'd ever ‘re-
Rounce’ the armed struggle.” That seems
more like the hardliner image which the
authorities have tried o pin on you.
twas certainy a mistake to formulate my
anger in such a way in the conciuding para-
graph of that statement. But f you read the.
entire text, which was published i ‘die taz'
you can easiy see the message | was tryig to
convey: | will ot be biackmaied by state propa-
ganda. Al that tme. the state was demanding
that we renounce violence and the politcs of
the RAF from the very beginning - | am not
wilng 1 do that The cessation was not meant
n that way either, rather it was necessary so
as to continue poliical work. When we first
staring discussing the cessation, people who
visted us and the RAF had no idea what it was
all about. For exampl, people kept saying that
We had 10 keep open the opton of an attack
Personaly. | don'tfnd that o be convincing:
*
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide!
Something s done right n the meantme. tnen i
Goesnt mater -t option to atack s nolonger
there". But even if people saw things difer-
ently. anyway a new fom of attack reeded to
be found. And 30 same thinking was done at
his time - for exampe. nstead of shooting peo-
Pl hgh-level acts of sabotage could be car-
ied out.But that never nappened either. As for
the hardiner stigma: That's got nthing to 6o
wih what we prisoners say or do. Unti 1981/
52, al the prisoners were seen as “nardiners
~ despite our atempls to brng about some sort
of social discussion. That brings to mind the
Volmer/KasemannWaiser Infiatve of 1988 an
attempt by the Greens to win amnesty for the
prisoners]. W responded to tha, not s a tac-
tical manoeuvre, because i was in e with
our thoughts of a cessation. But the stae pre-
vented this initiative. We were seen as
“hardiiners” despite our efforts in the
hungerstie of 1989, when we had talks win
state authoriies and other persons - and de-
spie the fact that everyone knew we wanted
Something new. Al the ime, supposed attacks
plans atiributed to us were discovered and
Spread n he media. And this continued against
the prisoners who were stil inside after the
cessation. despite our public statement via
Imgard Moeler that we weicomed the hatting
ofattacks. Facts play no role when t comes to
the state's smear campagns
1fyou ook atthings today, you come o the
following conclusion: Despite the transform
tion of the RAF and the necessary poltical i
cision with regards to the prisoners, @ it de-
Veloped. atiiouted o 3 few of the prisoners
and backed by “hardiiner” propagands. and ths
has made i possibe fo the state to attempt to
achieve wih those of us who remain wha t
has sought o do for the past 20 years, namely
bring an end o the prisoner problem
What would be the state's interest in this?
s important for the state to continue to
Gevelop s picture of a politcal enemy. and the
state unde no circumstances wants 1 alow 3
poltical process to develop. 35 we propose.
The istory of the RAF s 1o end with an ac-
counting, with the burden fling on some indi-
viduals, and not with a polical process. And
that's not just the case wih the RAF, rather s
wha the authorites have in mind for society in
general
But the fact that the state can do this
also parly the fault of the RAF, a group
which was never very open to controver-
al discussions, and which was a group
which many people couldn't imagine ex
cept in the context of Killing people.
Of course, i also comes back t the RAF.
ftsefIn the 1080s, controversial discussions
werent exactly a speciaiy of the RAF. It was
the same way in other leftst groups. The
causes for that, in my opinion. go way back to
fundamental mistakes by us. but also n cther
leftst groups as well, namely the fact that po-
Iiical structures were hardly developed at sl
Insteac. ideology and actionism prevalled. But
the RAF concept aways siressed the prmacy
of poltcs. the armed actons were supposed
1o aavance poltics. not replace 1.
Lefist groups often criicized the fact that
the RAF acted primarily on a military,
rather than a politcal, basis.
Yes. but only when i ft with thei poltical
concept. That's why these discussions aiways
fala. | nink the fundamental mistakes made by
everyone, ffom groups on the radicalieft in
general o the RAF itself, was that we werent
based enaugh n reaity and were 0o obsessed
with deology. There were meeings, papers,
concept discussions, events, campaigns - but
these weren' reaity. And the colapse of the
radicallef at the end of the ‘805 and the begin-
ning of the ‘805 was the hour of trth for this
siruciue of polcs which had come out of the
'60s - f sometning had been won fom the strug-
gle. which was what i was all about al along,
then sometning should have been taken out of
that. But that didn' happen. Instead, seliis-
Solution o running in place. And that bings us
o the point tha its not any diflerent for the
RAF. the German radicaklef, o the et n gen-
eral, namely that we were never able 1o es-
‘cape from the cortradiction of ving nthe most
developed socialsystem and not being able to
‘avoid the contracictions which arse from that
fact. O the one had. you wan to escape from
that systemto something different. on the other
hand its the best of al places that are visie
“This contradicton i our spectrum e o a theory
and praxis of ideological thinking, character-
ized in cycical actity and actonism. | cal that
“replacement polics” Poltics means realproc-
‘esses. Not ideology. The whie European lef,
and the German lef in particular, was more
clover than ayone.No one read more o talked
more than the eft here did. But that's na pol-
tics. That's a signof a sationary process which
remains adapted to social norms. An example
of what | mean by “stationary”. Women have
often noted that the never-ending so-called
“sexism debate”, the men's discussion o i
has only ever resulted in the problem being
endlessiy debated, seen as paltically tacked,
and everything stays the way t was. And the
‘women are righ about this. I's a sor of prob-
lem-defeating mechanism The same s true for
the anti-racism discussion During the ant-IMF
actions in 192 in Munich]. the events served
5 2 repiacement for poitics
And the RAF, in your opinion, is part of
this stationary process?
The RAF became a part of . The actons.
which we carred out in the second af of the
1880s were fundamentally wrong according
to most of the prisoners stl insde today. For
us. armed actions ahways had a srategi func-
tion. They were to make something clear. to
‘aovance something. The actons o the ate 805
were just a series of shootings. And when
Jou get right down to . to thew poltical core.
they were nothing but revenge attacks. And
the RAF knew we would citcize these ac-
tons. Ty knew.from e especaly. trat | as
against things continuing to develop as they
had, with more people gong nto legalty. When
a concept no longer has any perspectie. you
can' attract new people. even on the basis of
maintaining the abilty o attack. Peogle going
underground envision continuing the siruggle
Wwhich they had previously cared out in con-
crete base projects. only now on a diferent
level, but in realy they are enterng a vacuum
1 don't want to create a faise impression here
orto separate us from that We were al part of
this process and developed . Im speaking now
about the changes in the relationships i the
unwinding the prisoners issue over the past
few years. We kept it going because we
wanted a continuty. from the infial outcry 1o
the silence. We al agreed about the unavoid-
able effect a total collspse would have. so
we wanted to maintain some source of
sirength, That kept us from the drawing the
decisive conclusion.
But arent you stating a contradiction: on
the one hand a continulty, on the other
hand being opposed o new people join-
ing the illegal structures?
twasn't about a continufy of the RAF as.
ithad existed before, rather a continuty of po-
Itical content, The amed struggle was not the
poitical content of the RAF. The poltcal con-
fent of the RAF, to be bref, was fberation.
You criticize the attacks and assassina-
tions by the RAF in the latter half of the
1980s. What was better about the earler
actions? What's the difference, for exam-
ple, between the failed attempt to Kill
General Krasen and the shooting of the
diplomat von Braunmahi?
You are speaking there about an acton
Where the diferent understandings meet one
ancther. We were criicalof actons n the 305
such as the one against von Braunmuhl be-
‘cause the means andthe poitical goal were far
removed from one anather. And that is true
‘even for those of us who experienced 77, the
so-called "hardiiners". The action against
Krssenor the U.S. amy instalaton at Ramstein
were part of the conficts surrounding NATO
milanzation. Both were sirategic actions, at-
acks which, we thought, would help force the:
globalcolapse of itarization nthe metropoes.
Preventing milltaization was also a goal
of the peace movement, which by and
attacks. Didn't
rge denounced the RAF's
that make you wonder?
Wel. there were a ot o things about the
peace movement that made us wonder. For
‘example. the peace movement akso had some
very nationalstic slements. They were prima-
iy opposed o a war being fought here, and
this wing of the peace movement dd not cor-
cem tself wih imperalisms interests o war
But I you criticize the peace movement
for having nationalistic tendencies, then
you must also recognize that in older RAF
texts as well. Thers, Germany s de-
scribed as being a U.S. puppet and an oc-
cupled country.
Those ar tones from the ‘70s, based in
an incorrect. shortened analysis: The fact that
US. captal was dominant n the work, and the
fact that U S. corporatons dominated German
corporations, Ied 1o the conclusion that Ger-
many was a USS. colony. That was faise. But in
our poltcs, this thinking only piayed a minor
ole.
But the attacks of that time were mainly
directed at U.S. miltary installations and
USS. military personnel.
Yes. but aways inconjunction with NATO
‘and miltarzation. Those weren' actions sgainst
‘America as some occupying pawer. But | wil
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide!
‘admithatin the lef and in ourstrctures. here
Wwere some weak areas. some art-American
lendencies which went so far as 1o reject
American cultre. But we. | was underground
at the time, aways criiczed this ant-Amer-
Canism cisguised as antrmperiaism is our dis-
cussions and during our contacts. But we.
weren't ahways successful But | think there
exsts a faise impression of our stuation and
our sympainizers rom that tme. Al the begin-
ning of the ‘80s. we it want 10 strengthen
ihe RAF, ratner we sent people who came o
s back into the local struggles. We wanted
Structures and polfical processes, but all we.
heard was the demand that we cary out ac-
tions. We couldt change that pressure at that
time. Its wrong to magine that things aiways.
o the way one plans i 2 concept The same.
thing faled later on during the cessation de-
vate.
For a long time, the demand was made to
regroup the prisoners in one or two
groups so that a discussion could take
place among them. How do you think
things should proceed today?
At the present time, we need 1o gt the
geman put back on the table that we need to
be released. Now, as before, that i a poltcal
question, not legal one. We'r notaking about
some abstract prncigle here. We aren' even
that affected by the Justce Department i gen-
eral, rather the BAW [Federal Prosecutors Of-
fice] and the state security courts, and our
On May 4. 199, at 4pm, Sieglinde
Hofmann walked out the gates of Cologne
Prison (JVA-Koin) ater 19 years of imprson-
ment. Due to her aleged particpation in the
kianapping of Jurgen Ponto, the murder of
HannsMartin Schieyer, and three counts of
attempted murder for the attack on Alexan-
der Haig. an international warrant for
Sieginde Hofmann's arrest was issued in the
late 1970 She was arrested in France in
May 1980 and deported to Gemany on the
conditon that prosecutors notsesk.a e term
against her. Back in Germany, she was sen-
tenced to 15 years in prison on fimsy evi-
dence. and because 2 winess for the state
responded to the question. “Do you want to
Speak out in favor of Ms. Hofmann?”, with
silence. In the words of Heinz-Jurgen Sch-
neider, Sieglinde Hofmann's lawyers since
1891 “Since the court ook no answer for an
answer. they judged her guity in the Ponto
Kidnapping case.”
But the end of Sieglinde Hofmann's
prison term in the fall of 1995 dd not mean
that she was free. Some former Red Ammy
Fraction (RAF) members who had dropped
outand resettid in East Germany tumed into
winesses for the state. For my clent’ Sch-
neider says, it meant that aformer RAF mem-
I_w impicated her in the murder of Hanns-
rin Schieyer.” That meant a fe sentence
Sieglinde Hofmann Free After 19 Years
Lawyers Seeks Freedom For All Remaining RAF Prisoners
being handed down in the fal of 1985, ‘But
even prisoners who are servig e tems
must be given a chance at freedom”, says
Schneider. At a hearing. statements from
prison officals have to be given, and the
prisoners have to detal their proposals for
thei Ives after they are released * One such
hearing atthe State Supreme Court i Stutt-
gart i late 1997 came to the conciusion that
Sieginde Hofmann must senve at least 19
years. In March, her defintive release date
was set at May 4, 1989.
“Despite my joy at the release of my
client, we must not forge that there are stil
Six other former RAF members in prison”,
the lawyer continues. “Chiistian Klar. who
has been in prison since 1982, is supposed
1o serve 26 years. For the ather fve. Rofl
Heissler. Rolf-Clemens Wagner. Brigitte
Mohnhaupt, Eva Haule, and Birgit Hogeleld
there is no end in sight orther prison tems.
“The rlease of Sieginde Hofmann s ess
a poliical success and rather more an iso-
lated case which shouldnt be generalzed
upon, the lawyer points out. “To reach our
goal of freedom for al potical prisoners, a
polfical base has to be created. We need &
social cimate of acceptance for this
(Transiated by Arm The Spirt from junge
Wl - May 5. 1999)
Arm The Spirit Special Edition - Winter 1999/2000
cases are ail well known, Besides, mos of us
e In very poor heaith. so the queston of us
Spending 20 years plus 3 few more. depending
on the individual. ' not an option. W need ©>
find ways now of being reieased. And to G
this, there need to be a decsion which s more
than words. & must be something visible. n our
prsoners statute: What does someone do. who
willbe released nthe foreseeaie fure? That
person can bud up socal relations on the out-
Side. Tne same must aiso be allowed o us. We
must be able to star buiding the foundatons
for how we want o Ive. There must be com-
munication and projects o work on Right now.
we have almost o contact to the outside. IS
ke 10 stress that this interview today has been
one of the few chances I've had to speak win
someane from the outside for a long period of
time. The biggest success of my time inside
has been a 90 minute conversation. without
the police walching over me. a few weeks
ago
Is this orientation towards communi
tion with people on the outside a con-
sensus among the prisoners?
It depends. some think regroupment is
more important 5o that we can make a public
Statement together. | aiways thought it was
more important o get out
We alone are too fow to succeed. we
need furthe reaching exchanges. We canjust
Keep repeating the catch phrase “dicussion”
for years on end. Of course we sesk discus-
sions for our common interests, but commun-
cation with the outside needs to mainly am at
finding ways to win our freedom.
“The worst thing that has happened to us
and from it came the biter interal spis, was.
the fact that long years of isolaton letus in 3
situation where we could not deal with this
isolaton. The thngs which have happened over
these long years needed 1o be discussed and
looked at together wilh others. But we werent
allowed o do this. Instead we came from isola-
tion nto the vacuum of our sations a group of
people in prison. a smal group who couldnt
meet together inside and who were preverted
from contacting the outside. Orce the first of
us starting having health problems was when
the isolation reatment realy began to Kick in
“This isolation, which we have experienced wih
our own bodies, needs o be struggled against
at every tum. If someone has been inside for 2
ong time. aferwards something needs to hap-
pen. you can' ust take offthe I and then that
person has to see where they re at. And when
1'say that as someone who has experienced
1 Tm no just trying to describe darkest mo-
menis of our histoy, rather because tis sys-
tematic solaton is now become charactersic
of prisons in general. That which we were
subjected t from day one is now being appied
1o other prisoners who are selecied to endure
®
Endnote: Pohl was released from prison in 1996
(Transiated by Arm The Spirit from
“Angehoerigen Info’ #162 - June 15, 1996)
The Urban Guerrilla IS Histor)’
Final Communique From
The Red Army Fraction
Aimost 26 years ago. on May 14, 1970
the RAF was born from an act of lberation
Today we are ending ihis project. The uban
guerrila n the form of the RAF is now history
We, that i allof us who were organized
in the RAF unti the end, are taking this siep
oty From now on. we, like all others from
this associaton. are former RAF miitants
We stand by our history. The RAF was
the revolutonary attempt by a minory of peo-
ple o resst the tendencies i ths socity and
Contribute to the overthrow of capialst con
tons. We are proud to have been part of ths
attempt
The end of this project shows that we
were ot abe to succeed on ths path. But this
Goes not speak against the necessiy and le-
gtimacy of revol. The RAF was our decision o
stand on the sige of those people strugging
against domination and for iberaton al across
the word. For us, this was the right decision to
mave
Hundreds of years in prison terms for RAF
prisoners were ot able to wipe us Out, nor
ouldal the attemts to eracicate the guerrila.
We wanted a confrontation wit the uig pow-
ers. We acted as subjecls when we decided
upon the RAF 27 years ago. We remain sub-
jeci today. a5 we consign ourselves 1o his-
tory.
The results are critica of us. But the RAF
ke al of the left unti now - was nothing mare.
than a phase of ransiton on the path to ibera-
tion.
After fascism and war. the RAF brought
Sometning new into the society The moment of
2 break with the system and the hstorc fash
of decisive opposion 1o the conditions which
structurally subject and exploit people and
which brought about society in which the
people are forced to fight against one ancther.
The struggle i the social cracks, which marked
our oppositon. pushed a genuine social ibera-
ton forward. s broak withthe system, 3 sys-
tom in which proft s the subject and people
are the objects, and the desire for a e without
the lies and weight of this distorted society
Fed up with stooping down. functoning, Kick-
ing, and being kicked. From rejecton o attack,
1o lberaton
The RAF Arose From
‘The Hope For Liberation
Backed by the courage which emanated
from the guerrilas fom the South to the rich
nations ofhe Nort, the RAF came about n the
early 18705 in solidarty with iberation move-
mens in order to take up a common struggle
Milions of people saw in the struggles of fe-
sistance and liberation around the globe @
Chance forthemseives as well. The armed strug-
gle was a hope for iberation in many parts of
the worid. In Germany, too, fens of thousands
of people were in soldarty wih the struggles
of the miltant organizations Second of June
Movement. the Revalutionary Cels (R2). the
RAF. and ater Rote Zora, The RAF came about
a5 a resul o the discussions of thousands of
people in Germany who began to think about
armed strugge as a means to ieraton in the
late 1960s and early 19705, The RAF took up
the struggle against the state, a state which
nad never broken with s nationl-sociat past
fllowing the lberation from Nazi fascism
“The amed siruggle was a rebelion against
an authortarian form of society, against alen-
tion and competiion. It was a rebelion for
new social and culural realty. In the euphoria
of the global attemts at beration, the tme was.
ignt for a decisive struggle which seriously
‘aimed at overtuming and no longer acceptng
the pseudo-naturallegitimacy of the syster.
187577
‘With the 1975 occupation of the German
embassy in Stockholm, the RAF launched a
phase during which it Gid everything possible
1o lberate s prisoners from jail
Fisst came the *1677 Offensive”, during
Which the RAF kidnapped Schieyer. The RAF
posed the question of power. This began a
radical and decisie attempt o push through an
offensive position for the revolutionary left
against the state power. It was exactly this
‘Which the state warted t0 prevent. The explo-
sive escalation of the conflct, however, also
came against the background of German his-
tory. The continuty of Nazism in the West Ger-
man state, which the RAF attacked wih its
offensive.
‘Schleyer. a member of the SS during 1
Nazi regime, was, ke many Nazis n al levels
of society, back in offie with all hs honor in-
tact, Nazis bul careers in the West German
state in government posions, the couts. !
palice apparatus. the armed forces, the media.
‘and in major corporations. These ants-Semites.
racits. and genocidal murderers were often
times the same people resporside for crmes.
against humanty under the Nazis, and now
they were back among the powerfl eie.
Schleyer worked towards the ends of the
Nazis and the captalsts to create a European
economic region under German dominance. The
Nazis had wanted a Europe in which there
were neither iruggles between industral work-
ers and capialnor any resistance whatsoever
o their system. They wanted to end the class
struggle by utiizing German workers or work-
ers who could “be made ke Germans” and
incorporating them into their socity. Al thers
were 1o be ensiaved to forced Iabor or system-
atcally desiroyed in concentration camps.
‘With the Iberation from Nazi fascism came.
Freedom For All Policical Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spirit Special Edition - Winter 1999/2000
the end of the industrial destruction of people
by the Natzis. but there was no lberaton from
Caplalism. Afer 1945, Schieyer worked to-
wards the same economic goals - in 8 more
modeized form. The push fowards moden-
Zation came wih the social democratic model
ofthe 1970s. As the chiefof industy. Scrieyer
was contnually buiding up 2 system o contain
Socil resstance to the conditons of captal
for example, by locking out workers - and o
integrate workers into the system by means of
negotiated conracts for socil securty. This
integraton was meant to incorporate the Ger-
man porton of the sockty most of il mear
while captal increasingly exploted mmigrant
Workers and, at the giobal level, dominated and
exploited the people of the southern hemi-
sphere, which resuted in massive destructon
from hunger. The continuty of the system wnich
Schieye embodied - in the 15708 during the
period of the social democratic model - was a
Crucial moment inthe buiding and development
of the Federal Repubic o Germany.
The Absolute Necessity To Approve Of
All Measures Enacted By The Crisis Staff
And The Reprossion Of All Critcal Voices,
Going So Far As To Try And Eliminate The
Political Prisoners - These Were The
Same Reactionary Techniques Utilized By
The Nazis
The actions of the 1977 offensive made it
Clear that there were elements n the socety
which would in no way be integrated into or
controlled by the system. Afer the Nazis had
iminated the resistance, the actons of the
rban guerriia groups sfer 1968 marked a fe-
tur to's moment of ciass struggle. o longer
integrated to the ruling powers, n post-fascist
West Germany. The abduction of Schieyer
heightened ths aspect even more. The state
aid not by any means react wih panic, as has
often been said. The tate reacted by suppress-
ing allforms of expression which did not sup-
port the state of emergency measures. The
State ordered il media to follow the I of the
Crisis Stafl. which most willngly d. Al who
refused risked a confrontation with the sys-
tem. Inteliectuals, who everyone knew 6 not
sympathize with the RAF, but who nonethe-
less contradicted th state o emergency, were
o longer s flom smear campaigns and re-
pression. The members of the governments
*
Crsis St some of whom had miary back-
Grounds.reacted with the same means n 1977
25 the Nazis had done - afthough the Nazs. of
Course, wen 1o a far greater degree of bar-
barty - 1o prevent and wipe out ant-capiaist
anc antifasest struggles. Under Nazi fascism.
and in 1977. the state’s policies were amed at
elminating any space between total foyaty 1o
the state In an emergency situaton on the one
side and repression on the other
Wnen i became more cear tha the state
was prepared to abandon Schleyer, the RAF
gave s approval for a cvilan airiner to be.
hiacked in a querria acton as part o s own
offensive, and this made it appear as though
the RAF o longer difereniated between the
top and battom sectors of the society. Atnough
the attempt to free the prisoners from torture
was jusiified. the sociakrevolutionary dimen-
Sion of the struggle was now no longer visible
From the break wi the system and the rejec-
ton of the conditons in the socety - the pre-
conditons for any revolutionary movement -
had come a break with the society as a whoe.
From The 1970s To The 1980s.
"The RAF had gambled everything and suf-
fered a huge defeat. In the process of struggle
unti e end of the 1570s. t became ciea that
the RAF was left wih just 3 few people from
the period of the 1968 upheavals. Many people
rom the ‘68 movement had given up on move-
ment politcs and used their chances 10 build
carcers. The RAF, as part of the global ant-
imperilist stuggle. had taken up the war of
Toeration within West Germany. The year 1977
had shown, however. that the RAF had neither
the poticainor the miltary strength to irectthe.
situation after the subsequent reaction. the
Gomestic war_ It was righ 1o make use of the.
istoricalstuaton atthe beginning ofthe 19705
and open a new and previously unknown chap-
ter of struggle in the metropoles in the fight
betweenimperiaism and beration. The exper-
‘ences of the defeat of 1977 revealed the imia-
tons o the old urban guerila concept of the
RAF. There needed to be a new cancept of
iberation
“The front concept of the 1980s was an
attempt 10 achieve this. The RAF warted new
ties and a basis for a jon siruggle wit radical
segments of the resistance movements which
had arisen n the late 1970s. But the fron con-
eptheld on to many of the basic notions of the
0ld project from the 1370s. Armed actions re-
mained the conral focus and the decisive mo-
ment of the revolutonary process, which was
seen as war of lberation.
The Anti-imperialist Front Of The 1380s.
In the early 1980s, there were several
struggles directed against inhumane projects
of the system. but which were also expres-
sions of the search for fee forms of Iving. A
Social revolt which Sough a new social realty.
Thousands of people from these new
movements went oo the streets inthe 19805
1o protestthe same thing which the RAF sought
1o attack since 1675: The miltarzation polcies
of the NATO states. which would enable the.
Freedom For Al Policical Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spiri
West to wage “one and a half wars simuta-
heously. the war against the Soviet Union and.
2t the same tme. warlke nterventions agains!
fberation movements and revoluions. ke inNica-
fagua, where the firt step towards iberation
ffom Western dictatorship had been taken
The RAF assumed tha they woud not be
alone during this new phase. The concept was.
fueied by the hope that miltant sectors of var
ous movements would jon a common frot. But
nis concept faied torecognize that, n the given
Social situation. only very few people saw any.
purpose in 2 iberation struggle on the evel of 3.
war. Tne iberation sruggle. whose cental mo-
ment s that of war, only makes sense when
there is a possivilty that there are forces n the.
Society who are willng to take it up and ex-
pand & - at the very least, the radical elements
of the movements.
But even those who were in soidarty -
and they were by no means few in number -
id nottake up he struggle wit this in mind. A
quertila war requires a perspective for ex-
pansion to a level o struggle. s is neces-
Sary for the exstentil development ofthe gue
ila, and we were not able o achieve this.
The RAF's notion of amed action at the
focal point o the siruggle placed less impor-
tance on the poltical and cultural processes.
outside of the polical-miltary siruggle. Over-
coming tis strategic directon, which ad come
rom the fundamental struciure of the concept
n the 1970, should have been a precondition
for any new revolutionary project. The front
ould not become this new beration project fo
remove the distinclions between the move-
ments and the guerra
1 the 19805, the RAF operated under the
assumpton that a socikrevolutionary approach
fay in the attacks on the central power struc-
tures of imperiaism. With this approach. the
RAF's polfics became increasingly abstract
This led 10a spit of what shoukd be uited: anti-
imperialism and social revolution. The social
revolutionary outiook disappeared from the
theory and praxis of the RAF. The orentation
became reduced to the ant-mperialitine. and
21
Gundrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader
the resultof this was the ant-mperalst font
‘The RAF was not factor in social questons.
“This was & fundamental mistake.
Subsuming all social and politica content
Special Edition - Winter 1999/2000
undertne ant-mperiist atack agaist he ‘er-
e system” produced faise diisions mstead
of 8 process of unty. and 1 led to a lack of
dentty on concrete questions and the contert
of the struggle
“The resonance within the socity re.
mained lmited, because the proposal to Create
Consciousness in the socety and o break the
onsensus between the state and the society
revolutionary proc-
5. the RAF sought to
Gestroy the state's dominance of control by
increasing the intensiy of s atiacks. The pr-
orty shified t the miltary Gimension This em-
phasis remained throughout the 19805 and it
defined our struggle
We carried out attacks against NATO
projects as wellas the miltary-ndustria com-
plex of capial, together with other guerrila
Broups in Western Europe; an sttempt was
made to forge s West European Guerrila Frot
comprised of the RAF, Action Ditcte n France.
and the Red Brigades/PCC i Haly
The RAF concenrated - as far as its
strength allowed - on attacking NATO projects
and, ater 1984, the formation of a new power
bloc by West European states.The focus re-
mained on our own imited forces and those
miltants who closely identfied wih the RAF
The attempt to form ront with other groups.
rom the resistance movement did not broaden
into realty. For this reason, the ront colapsed.
because 100 much energy was spent on trying
10 adhere to the ‘correct” ine. This naow fo-
cus prevented any polical dynamic from being
Created. Instead of a new horizon, which
Seemed possible given the varity of resist-
ance in the early 19805, the rigiiness and nar-
fowness of the poliics increased as the dec-
ade wore on
There was a great discrepancy between
the willngness of RAF miltants o give every-
thing in the confrontation and the abity. at the
same time, to seek new ideas for the process
of iveration. In this respect. very ttle was
risked.
During ths tme - the concept of the 19808
was by then a few years oid aleady - there
was aiso Gevelopment on our side, which was.
Characterized by demonsiratively codly drven
poltics,which was lftle more than ‘making pol-
tics”, and which was far removed from any-
thing having to do wih beration
Bt this was aiso a time when the RAF
and s prisoners, despie al the ificulies and
efeats. showed wih their determination that
they had remained uncorrupted by the course
of history and remained commited to changing
the conditions against the wil of the uing pow-
ers. This gave ofhers hope as well and drew in
pecpie who wanted to siruggle for collctity
‘and togethemess and against isolation and
oneliness in the society. The struggle by the
prisoners against isolation detention and for
their regroupment thei siruggle fo gy and
freedom, which other peaple onge for as wel.
was something many people coud dentiy wih
The determination an lack of compromise by
the RAF and the prisoners against the rulig
powers stood in the face of al attempts by the
authorites 1o suppress all stuggles for an-
otner way of Iving
We, Most Of Whom Became
Organized In The RAF Very Late.
Joined inthe hape that our struggle Could
contribute new impuises for global fevol in the
changed conditons. We sought changes for
e iberation struggle. for new path on which
Wwe could jom ourselves, with others. And we
Wated to ge something back to those who
had taken Up the siruggle before us. and who
had died or been sent o prison. The struggle in
legalty had a very atractve affecton us. We
wanted o break though our borders and be
ree of everything which confined us within
the system
‘Armed struggle in ilegaity was, for us
nothing more than the anly possible and neces-
Sary way for the lberaton process. But aiso.
especilly considering the cisis of the left ail
around the world, we wanied to further de-
Velog the urban guerila as 3 possibilty and
keep egalty as aterai for the Iberation poc-
ess. Bul we recognized then that that alone
Wwoukd not be enough. The guerria, 100, would
have to change.
Our hope was to create new ties between
the guerria and other sectors of the resit-
ance in the society To do this. we sought a
ew proposa. in which al struggles from the
iy neighbornoods 1o the guerrila could stand
together.
It Was Important For Us, Following The
Collapse Of East Germany, To Bring Our
Struggle In Tune With The New Existing
Social Situation
We wanted to take steps 1o relate to al
those peaple whose dreams had ended with
the collapse ofthe DDR and s annexation into
West Germany. Some had reaized that ‘real
existng sociaism’ was not iberation after all
Others. who were par o the oppositon o real
xsingsocialsm n East Germany, had dreamed
of something dfferent rom eithe capitabsm or
Uirike Meinhof
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide! -
eal exsting socialsm. Most people Who nad
Ied im the DDR and who had demanded
reunfication win West Germany began o ex-
amine the new. depressing social situation
which had come about with social secuy
Imeasures having been drastcally done away
Wih. We wantec to elate 1 all those peopl.
Guring tis istorical stuation which was un-
Known to everyone, who had struggled for -
eration in conflotation wih the West German
State and aiso those who were fed up wth he
Tacstand completel reactionary developments
Unflding 1 the now non-exitert East Ger-
many. We did niot want to abandon these pec-
Ple o resignation, or o the right-wing
Later on we saw that the dimension of
this change could only resut in & new and in-
tematonalst lberaton project f the new rea-
ity inbotn East and West were deat with. The
RAF, wih s foots n the nistory of resistance
in the old West Germany. could not achieve
s
The Attempt To Anchor The RAF In
The 19308 Was An Unrealistic Propos
We wanted to transform a concept which
had aisen fromthe 1968 movement to a new.
socilrevolutionary and ntematonalst conept
7 tune withthe 1990s. This was a tme when
we sought for something new. but - weighed
own by the dogmas of the past years - we
i notgo radically enough beyond the oid con-
cept. So we made the same mistakes which all
of us made afer 1977 We overestimated the
Support for this continuty of our conception of
Struggle. Fundamentally, the danger exists of
discrediting armed struggle when f is main-
tained without explaining how it concretely
‘advances the revolutionary process and leads
o siengthening o he beration struggle. Itis
important o deal with (i issue in a responsi-
ble manner, because otherwise the armed
struggle becomes discredited - even for an-
other stuation, in which s needed again.
“The crisis, when the left reached s imis
in the 1980s and began partaly 1o disband
‘made our aftempt 1o ink the RAF into some new
project an unrealitic proposal. We were much
100 late - even (o transform the RAF afer a
period of eflecton. Cticism and selfcricsm
o not aim at ending something, rather at fur-
ther developing 1. In shor,the end of the RAF
is not the result of our process of (sefcrt-
Gism and reflection rather because i i neces-
Sary. because the concep of the RAF does
ot contain the necessary elements flom which
Something new can arise
When we examine this segment of our
history tody in ght o th historical process in
general, the attampt to bring the RAF back info
a strong poltcal process was more than any-
thing just the prolongation of something which
hadlong since had the perspective of project
atits end. We needed o realze that the form of
struggle, above al else, was what had re-
mained from the old concept. There was 1o
new meaning, sometning which couid offer a
perspeciive of an altemative o the labor soc-
ety and its inhumane. proft-oriened economy.
Something which could serve as the founda-
ton for the iberation struggles of the future
Arm The Spirit Special Edition - Winter 1999/2000
and bring many people together
Folowng our defeat in 1993, we knew
that we Gouldn' Just Keep going On 35 we hag
Since we began the break wih our stTuggle 11
1852 We were sure that we had set the cor-
et goas for ourseives. but that we had mace
Some serious tactical mistakes We wanted (o
hink things over one more tme with thase who
were in prson, and take a new step togethe.
Bt i the end, e very hurtul spit of one
oroup of the prisoners from us, who deciared
35 to be enemies. completey erased he very
Condiions which had gven rise to the RAF in
the frst place - soldarty and the siruggle for
collectivity.
The Process Of Our Own Liberation.
was important to us, and yel we aways
seemed to become stagnant. We desired
Collctiviy just as we desired the joint over-
Coming of alform of alenation_ B the con-
radiction between war and Iiberation often got
pushed off or taked away by us. Revolutn-
ary war also produces alienation and struc-
tures of authorky, which 1 n contradicton o
eraton. Dealing with that, so tha t does not
become established as a structue. s only p0s-
sile f there s consciousness abou i. Other
Wise it goes without saying that new siruc-
tures of authorty wil arse. 35 well as a hard-
oning n both polics and relatonships. That
fact showed itsell during the often changing
hieratchical structures of the front nthe 13805
and the authortarian tendencies dung the spif
101993, And i showed iselfGuring the relapse
into mainsiream aralysis and thought. which,
in the history of the RAF. led to many people
Who struggled here no longer being able (o see
2 justication for tota revot any longer
It Was A Strategic Mistake Not To Build Up
A Political-Social Organization Alongside
The lliegal, Armed Organization
In no phase of our history was an
outreaching,poltical organizatin realzed n a
it to he poltical-mittary struggle. The con-
ceptof the RAF knew only the armed struggle.
wih a focus on the poitical-miary attack
I the fornative commuriques of the RAF
4p 1o the mid 1970s. tis important question
Was never even posed. nor could nave been
1 the metropoles in general, and especally in
Germany, there was no prvious experence
Wit an urban guerrila. Many things had be
discovered and leamed along the way. and
Shown to be true or fase in practce. Never-
theiess, there was never an orentaton (o the
decisive question, whether the project of ib-
eration can b fufiled by an legal organization
‘and the armed struggl -or f the buiing up of
the guerrila should go hand in hand with the
expansion of poltical structures which can
grow in the base processes. In January 1976,
urmprisoned comrades wrote about ti, stat-
ing tnat only an armed struggle from ilegaity
oukd be a practcal-crtical pposiion to mpe-
ialsm. The concept i the May 1962 paperaiso
maintained his posion, despite allhe conta-
dictions and despite the fact that it was an
attempt to find 3 new poliical association
*
togetner wih otner pecple. Because this con-
o, too, 4 not break with the noton that the
2Tmed struggle should be central in the
etropoles. The poliical actiies which arose
from the front process got bogged down in
Communicatng the attacks wihin th structures
of the radical ket
“Tne lackof a poitical organizaton for more:
than 20 years resulted n the coninual wesk-
ening of te poltical process. The over-estima-
Hlon of the poltical-miltary actions in the
metropoles of the last few decades was the
precondtion for tis concept. The RAF based
{s strategy on armed struggle n diferent ways
Guring dfferent phases. but at no point 4t
arrive at the point where miltant actions aim at
The tactial opton of a comprenensive iera-
ton strategy. This weskness also led 10 the
fact that our organzation could not transform
s afer two decades. The precondions for
placing the focus of the siruggle on the poltical
fevel - which is what we wanted o 6o in 1982
were ot at han. But. in the end. that was
Simply the result of fundamental srategic mis-
fakes. The lack of a politca-socialorganization
Wwas & deciswe mistake by the RAF. I wasnit
the oniy mistake. bu I's one important reason
why the RAF could not become a stronger -
eration project. and in the end the necessary
precondtions were lacking t0 build up a fight-
ng counter-movement searcing for Iberatio,
one which could have a strong influence on
Social developments. The mistakes inherent in
the concept, such as these, which accompe-
i the RAF thraughout s enir history show
hat the concept of the RAF can no fonger be.
Televant i the Iberation processes of the fu-
The End Of The RAF Comes At A Time
When The Whole World Is Confronted With
The Effects Of Neo-Liberalism - The In-
ternational Struggle Against Displace
ment, Alisnation, And For A Just And Fun-
damentally Different Social Reality Is In
Opposition To The Entire Development Of
Capitalism
Global and inner-socetal rlations are be-
caming heightened in the turbulence ofthe his-
torical developments followng the end of real
existing socialsm. Nevertheless, i nota con-
radicton for us to end our project whike sil
recognizing the necessity that everything which
15 useful and possible must be done 50 that a
world without capialism can come about, one.
in which the emancipation of humanity can be
realized. Considering the devastating effects
of the coliapse of real existing sociaism worid
wide, anc the mass poverty of milions of peo-
ple i the former Soviet Union ' notenough to
talk today of the chances which have been
brought about by the end of real existng so-
Calism_ Nevertheless, we recognize th true
oeration was not possible under the madel of
real existing socilism. It is possible to oraw
consequences from the ant-emancipatory ex-
periences wit the authortarian and state bu-
reaucrati concepts of real existng socalsm
and to recognize future paths to Iberation
Wi the colspse of real existing social
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The S
sm, the competiion between systems ended.
Imeaning hat the proponents o the capitlst
Syatem no longer fes! the need to make their
System appearto be better”. In the absence of
an ideslogical check on captal. a process of
global unleashing of capial s resulec: Al of
Rumaniy are o be subjected to the needs of
Captal. Neo-iberalism s (e ideckogica and eco-
omic foundation for a workd wide push to-
ards optimization and the evaluation of peo-
ble and nature according (o the demands of
Capial Representatives of the system cal this
“rform’ or ‘modemizaton”
tis more than clear that he present stage.
of the development of the system will brng an
overwhelming majorty of humaniy further so-
Cia and exstental dificuty. For the majorty of
the peopie in the work, neo-iberalism adds 2
ew dimension to the threats on theiives.
I the struggle for potical hegemony and
economic power. only those economies sur-
RAF Attack On NATO General Haig
Vive which increasingly orent therr capacites.
towards the blank profis of the corporations
and an ever smallr segment of the saciety.
The side effects of this system lead to deep.
‘changes within societies. Furthermare, inceas
g poverty and the increasing brutalization of
a further unleashing of wars and barvarey. I
Their own economic and polticalinterests are.
3t stake, the ich natons wil ntervene n these.
Conficts wih theic own wars, i order 10 se-
cure “uniimited access o raw materials” in the
arth and to enhance thei positions of power.
They will never concern themselves with ac-
tually solving the problems of people, rather
they wish to controlthe destruction which their
system sets into mation 5o a5 to squeeze out
profs for the few.
Itis nota contradicion, ather tis apartof
the logic of the system that transnatonal cor-
porations are more powerful than ever. with
{arger profts than ever in this phase of poiiical
systems in csis all around the wori, the break-
ing apart of societes, and the impoverishment
of wider sectors of the metropoitan masses
Who had previously been spared from material
protiems.
‘Paradoxicaly.the successful maxmazaton
of profs by capdal and the process of scca
Colapse called forth by i seems 1o be PuUShING
‘Gaptarsmto ts s, This development reat-
‘ona. above all eise. oresutn futher ouireaKs
of varbarty. From the independent dynamis of
System development,this negativ process wil
Zontinve. untl such tme as there s 3 proposal
for iberation which can callforth a new force
to overturn the system.But today. there s not
only the defeat o the historic let and the vic-
lence of the giobal socal relatons there s 1S
2 wealth of revel movements who can draw
on the experences of the global hstory o re-
sistance.
T this global development, capialism. in
the metropoles as well. tres to buy social
peace by means of ‘wefare systems” Instead
Powever, increasingly large segmens of the
Society become marginaized when they are
7o longer needed in fhe production process.
Tne ‘worid power” and the ‘weffare state” can
o longer exit together under one rocf. In Eu-
Tope. for exampl. the od “welfare sates” are
Goming under the polfical and economic he-
‘Gemony of Germany, with Germany serving as.
2 Tacet frontine state in an entre continent
Which is urning into a poice state
The police and milltary are deployed
against those fleeing from poverty, war. and
oppression. A societyfull o prisars. Cops and
securty forces tossing the homeless out of the
Consumer shopping areas, as well 25 youths.
and anyone else who upsets the regular cus-
fomers and the bourgecisie. The re-ntroduc-
ion of closed facilties as prisons for kids. The
atempt to exert total control over refugees in
the near future by means of computer chip
cards, with other Social groups coming later
o Poice batons and weapons agais! the fore-
seeable revols by those pushed 1o the edges.
Exclusion,repression, and displacement. Even
the total perfection of fumans by means of
genetic engineering can no longer be consic-
ered unthinkable.
Exclusion and repression through lack
of social feeling within the socety as well s
‘nomal both here and elsewhere. Racism from
below threatens the ives. of millons, which in
‘Germany is the murderaus mark of the nistori-
cal continuty which this sociey carries wih &
The exclusion of handicapped persons from
above and aggression against them from be-
low are expressions of the day to day brutaly
of the society. Only people who dorit conta-
dict the efficency of the economic system are
Gesired, as well as anything which can be capi-
takzed. Anyihing eise which is outside of the
needs of the capitalst society are given no
place. The great many people who can no
longer ive here, or who no onger want t0 - and
there are many people who chose (o end ther
es every day - speak of the emptiness of the
system and the harcness in the society.
“The marketing of people and the violence:
n the home and on the streets, these are the
Violence of suppression, the social cokiness.
against others. the violence agains! women -
all of these are expressions of patiarchal and
racst conditions.
The RAF aways stood in contradiction to
the conscious mentalty of a large segment of
this society. That s 2 necessary moment n the
process of lberation, because its ot only the
condilions which are reactionary. rather the
Gonditions produce reactionary Gharacter in
pecple, and this continually suppresses theic
ity tobecome iberated. Without adous. s
a matter of existence to resist and fight against
racism and all forms of oppression. Future out-
iines for lberation must be measured accord
ng tothis. and they must find a key to unlocking
the closed. reactionary consciousness and
awakening the desie for emancipation and ft-
eration
The Reality Of The World Today Proves
That It Would Have Been Betier If The Glo-
al Wave Of Revolt, Which The RAF Was A
Part O, Had Boen Successful
‘The global wave of revol which the RAF
arose from as well. 4d not succeed, which
does not mean that the destructive and unjust
developments up unt today can't il be urned
around. The fact that we stil don' see suff-
Gt answers to these developments weighs
more heaviy upon us than the mistakes which
we made. The RAF came fiom the revolts of
the last decades. which did not exactly fore-
See how the system would develop. but which
at least recognized the threat which it posed
We knew that this system would allow fewer
and fewer people around the word o lve their
ves wih Gigny. And we also knew that this
system seeks total access to people. 5o that
they subjugate themselves to the values of the
system and make them their own. Our racical-
ism sprung from these realzations. For us. we
had nothing to lose withthis system. Our strug-
gle - the violence wih which we resisted these
relations - nad a diffcul, a heavy side. The
iioeration war has its shadows, 100, Attacking
people in their capaciy as functinaries for the
State s 2 contradicton to the thoughis and feel-
ings o sl revolutionaries n the workd - con-
radicts their noton of fberation. Even when
there are phases in the iberation process when
his is viewed as necessary. because there
are people who desie injustice and oppres-
sion and who seek to defend their own power
or the power o others. Revolutonaries desire
= e
AMtormath Of RAF Bombing At The Rhein-Main Airbase
Freedom For Al Policical Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spiri
2 workd in which no one has the nght to decide
ho may Ive and who may not. Nevertheless.
our violence upset some people in an irational
Way. The real terror s the nommaly of the eco-
nomic system.
The RAF Was Not The Answer For
Liberation - It Was One Aspect Of It
Although many questions remain open to-
day, we are sure that from the Iberation eas
of the future the seed of free relations can
arise, 1 truly does embrace the variety which
is needed to overturn the conditons. It s use-
Jess 1o speak of e corect ie”, the aspect
of lfe outsde of which everything eise seems
inefficint.just 35 s to seek a revolutionary
Subject. The project of beration i the fuure
wil Know many subjects and a variety of as-
pects and content. and this had nothing o do
with being random. We need a new proposal in
which seemingly very different indiduals or
Social groups can be subjects, and yet st be
together. In this sense. the iberation project of
the future will ot contain the old conceps of
the German lef since 1968, not those of the
RAF or other groups. The joy of buiing an
encompassing, ant-authortarian. and yetbinc-
ing organizing project o lberatin lies before
us stil,sadly (oo ite attemsted up unti now.
We see that there are people all over the worid
Wwho are trying this, 1o finds ways out of the
vacuum,
We draw hope from the fact that every-
where, even in the most remote comers o tis
country - where the cutural hegemony of the
fascistright & o longer a seldom thing - there.
are people who have the courage 10 jon to-
getner against racism and neo-nazism, o de-
fend themselves and others and 10 struggle
tis necessary to recognize that we are
at a dead end and we nesd to fnd ways out.
So it makes sense to abandon things which
an only be carried foward in a theoretical
sense. Our decision to end something s the.
expression of our search for new answers
We know that we are joined with many other
people around the workd in this search.
“There willbe many future discussions untl
althe experiences have been brough together
and we have 2 resistic and reflective picture
of history.
We wantto be part o ajoin iberation. We
‘want o make some o our
own processes recog-
nizable, and we want to
leam from others
& This excludes the no-
ton of a vanguard which
leads the struggle. A
though the conceptof be-
ing the “vanguard had
been dropped from our
understanding of the
struggle for years, the
0ld concept of the RAF
would not alow this to be
actually done away wih
That's another reason
why we had to cut our-
selves loose from this
concept.
Special Edition - Winter 1999/2000
The Guerrlias In The Metropoles Brought
The War Back Into The Belly Of The Beast.
To The Imperialist States Which Waged
Their Wars Outside Their Own Centers
of Power
Despie everything which we could have
done ette, # was fundamentally correct o
‘oppose the conditons i West Germany and to
Seek to wage resisance to the contnuty of
German history We wanted to open up
chances for revolutionary struggle n the
metropoles as well
The RAF took up s own socal terrain of
siruggle and sought to develop it for more than
two decades. a temain which historically knew
Ifteresitance,lacked a movement against fas-
cism, and which was characterzed by a popu-
latin loyalto fascism and barbarism. Unike in
other countes, in Germany. iberaton fom as-
cism had to come from the outside. There was
o self-determined break with fascism “fom
below here. There were very few peaple in
this country who resisted fascism; 100 fow
with any trace of humanity. Those who sirug-
gled nthe Jewish resistance, i the communist
Tesistance - in whatever antrfascit esistance
were rignt to struggle. And they wil aways
be right. They were the fow gimmers of igntin
the history of this country since 1933, when
fascism began to kil of al that was social in
s society.
n conrast to these people, the trend in
this sociely was always more o less o ac-
ept what those in power said, authorty de-
termined what is legitimate. In the social de-
struction of this socity. which was a precon-
diton for the genocide by the Nazis. the ndi-
ference to any other essential moment remains
today. The RAF broke with German tradiion
afer Nazi fascism and refused to grant it any
legitmacy. The RAF came flom he revoRtaganst
21t not only rejected this national and social
Gontinuty, # waged an intematonalist struggle
n place of this negation, a struggle whose
praxis rejected the rling conditons i the Ger-
man state and atiacked the miltary structures
of its NATO alles. Al over the worid, this all-
ance, in whose hierarchy the USA was the
driving force and the unquestioned leader,
Soughi 1o defeat social rebelions and beration
movements by means of the miltary and war.
The guerilas i the metrcpoles brought the war,
which the imperiaists waged outside their
centers of power, back into the belly of the
beast.
We answered the violent conditons with
vilence of revolt
It not possibe for us o look back on a
‘smooth and periect history. But we tried to do
Something, and in doing 50 we overstepped
many of the ruing powers'laws and the nter-
alized boundaries of bourgeois socety
“The RAF was not ableto pont out the path
to beration But it contrbuted for two decades
o the fact that there are stil thoughts about
beration today. Putting the system in question
was and stl is legitmate, as long as there &
dominance and oppression nstead of freedom.
emancipation, and digniy for everyone in the
There are nine former milkants from the
struggle of the RAF st n prison. Athough the
Siruggle for ieraton s far from over, s cor-
fict has become part of isory. We support all
efforts which seek o, get the prisoners from
this confict out of prison upright
At his me, we'd ke togreet and thank il
of those who offered us saldarty on our path
for the past 28 years. who supported us in
various ways, and who struggled together with
Us in the ways that they coukl. The RAF was
Getermined to contriute to the struggle for -
eraton. This revolutionary interventon i ths
Country and in this history would never have
takenplace i many people. not organized n the
RAF themselves, hadnt given a part of them-
Selves to ths struggle. A common path es be-
hind all of us. We hope that we wil ail find
ourselves together again on the urknown and
winding paths of iberation
Our houghts are with il those around the
worid who ost their ves in th siruggle against
Gomination and for beration. The goals which
ey strved for are the goals of today and to-
mortow - unt al relations have been over
Freedom For Al Political Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spi
tumed in which a person is but a lowly object
2 downcast, abandoned. and contemptuous
Being. 1 15 $ad that so many gave their ives.
but their deaths were not i vain. They ive on
n the struggles and the future ibecation.
‘We will never forget the comrades of the
Popular Front fo the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) who lost thei Ives in the falof 1977 in
an act of intemationalist soldarty. seeking 1o
ierate the poltical pisoners. Today we would
especialy ke to remember al hose who chose
1o.gie their a0 the armed struggle here. and
Who st thei ves.
Our memories and all our respect goes
out 10 those whose names we do not know.
because we never knew them, and to
Petra Scheim
Georg von Rauch
Thomas Weissbecker
Holger Meins
Katharina Hammerschmidt
Urich Wessel
Siegired Hausner
Werner Sauber
Special Edition - Winter 1999/2000
Brgtte Kunimann
Wiffed Bose
Ukike Meinho!
Jan-Carl Raspe
Gudrun Enssiin
Andreas Baader
Ingrd Sehubert
Wil-peter Stoll
Michael Kol
Elisabetn van Dyck
Jukane Plambeck.
Wollgang Beer
Sigurd Debus
Jonannes Timme
Jurgen Peemoeller
na Siepmann
Gerd Aartus
Wolfgang Grams.
“The revolution says:
T was
lam
il be 3
Red Army Fraction - March 1998
Interview ‘With Till Meyer, Former Member Of The
‘Second Of June Movement’, On The End Of The RAF
In their communique, the Red Army Frac-
tion acknowledge the “failure of the ur-
ban guerrilla project”. Is this statement
that armed struggle in general has failed.
or is this only a concret reference to the.
RAF?
“The revolutionary intervention at the mil-
tary level. in a highly-ndustrialized county e
West Germany. can only be seen as a method
‘which was tested during a very particular his-
toncal context. Historicay, using miltary means
towards the foundations, goals, and proposals
of the 68 movement - of which the RAF was
e part - had o ail. Especialy once the global
conditions or struggle had changed. When the.
Gonflict between socialism and capitalsm ended
n 1989 with the overwhelming victory of caph-
taism, there was no basis for any longer. So
1t no surprise that the RAF has now drawn
the consequences from that fact and cancelled
the armed strugge. In Germany, n this form, in
this tme, and wih thi strategy for revoR, t s
fnished
The dissolution communique had been
expected for quite some time, and since
1993 there had not been any more actions.
But when had the RAF become politcally
finished with its armed struggle in Ge
many? Only when East Germany ceased
to exist?
The RAF themselves, in thei text “The
Concapt Of The Urban Guerrila’, once wrote:
Whether amed struggle is possible can only
be transmitted through praxis.” That means,
afer a certan time, they shou have made
clean siate. and based on their practical expe-
riences asked themselves whether the uban
querrla makes sense i this historcal period
Whether €1 having an effect o achieving sorme-
thing poltically. Ate all t wasn't just about
going around blowing things up and shodting
people. ratner i was a pollicalmiltary inter-
Vention. After ten years. at the most, there
should have been some crfical poltical reflec-
tions. Afe the disastrous action in Mogadishu
n October 1977, the RAF should have ended
their amed struggle
The head of the Office for the Protection
of the Constitution, Peter Fritsch, has
warned about premature celebrations of
the end of the RAF, since they are stil an
extremist movement which wishes to
bulld "broad counter-power from be-
low”. Its members want to “continue the
political struggle for social liberation to-
gether with others”. Is the new genera.
tion of the RAF the PDS [Party of Demo-
cratic Socialism], or do they still envision
continuing the political struggle from il-
logality, as Fritsch soems to indicate?
When Mr_Fritsch claims, which i his right
s haad of the ntligence agency. that people
Wwho are actve poiticaly in a completey legal
way are somehow more radical than every-
thing else which we today call lefist, namely
Joschka Fischer [of the Greens], who is sup-
posedly the futhest on the lef wing - anyone
eise is just 3 foolsh radical or a Staiist, he
says - then of course he is mistaken. It s com-
pltely legtimate and polticaly justfied, sven n
his country. o place socil questions on the
agends, and in a radical manner - of course in
a clea, offensive, and legal potical confrnta-
ion. It couid be ihat there are a few hundred
thousand peopie to the lef of the PDS wha will
Say thatthey wil perhaps organize themselves
That s legitmate and legal. Mr.Frisch's state-
ment s trly out of ine.
Will the RAF's statement have a positive
effect on the prisoners from this move-
ment, or could it be that the prisoners,
Who are now without the “froe the guer
illas guerrila® of the past years, will sink
into obscurity and be forgotten?
We shouldt hope so. s a fact tha there
are 9 people - some of whom have been in
prison for over 20 years - stil n prison Now.
thatthe RAF has offcaly deciared themseives
disbanded, that marks an end 10 2 30-year is-
tory which is unique 1o this country. SO the
vicor - whomeve is in power i Bonn - needs
0 respond and draw this thing to a close by
feting these people out of prison. t s Gefintely
time for that, especially with the century draw-
ing o close. Tns chapter i finished. With the
RAF's siruggle over, the ruing elte here can
breathe more easily afer 30 years of watching
their backs. They should at least be prepared
10 offer a gesture and draw this o 3 close by.
releasing the prisoners
‘What's acking, of course. is an operative
guerila which can exert pressure for the pris-
oners. Thi task needs to be taken up instead
by a legal potcal movement.
(interview by Rudiger Gobel. Transiated by Amn
"The Spit from Junge werr - Apri 22. 1998)
Freedom For All Political Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spirit Special Edif
Thoughts On The End Of The Red Army Fraction (RAF)
“We Are Not Pol
Rolf Clemens Wagner was a méinber of the RAF and was amested in Swizeriand in November
576, Acoused of pariciation in the RAF's abduction and execution of he head of the German
Employers. Assocation. former SS-member Hans.Martn Schieyer, in the fal of 1877, the State
Suprome Court in Dusseldot sentenced him o ife in prison n 1985. Due lo later statements
rom RAF dafector Wemer Lotze, who was amestad n the former East Germany. Wogner was
Given an adcilional 12.year prison sentence in November 1993 by the State Supreme Court in
rankiurt According to Lotze, Wagner aiso paricipated in the bomb attack on NATO secretary
enoral Alexander Harg n June' 1975, Like most RAF prisoners. Wagner disassociated himsalf
fom the RAF's remaining clandsstine members in 1993, The impetus for tis decision was an
unspoken initiative from the RAF. togetner wih some of the prsoners. (o win freedom for the
isoners by means of negotitions with representatives the poltical and economic esiablsh-
ment In the name of the other prisoners, including Wagner, Brigte Mohnhaut spoke of &
‘Gegeneration” and criicized the fact that the pause in amed siruggle which they had nilated
ot ead 1o now openings and re-onintation of radical and revolutonary piics. but rather
o adaptation 10 the system and de-pollicization. The folowng text was sent o Beriin lefist
weekiy “Jungle Werid by Rolf Clemens Wagner from prison
Let's start from benind, frst of all.| would
say thatrevolutions o occasionalytake piace.
but they aciually speak very te.
Least of al here. where they are notice-
able in their sbsence.
There was never a revoltion here. there
is o revolution here. and there wil never be
one here in the foresseabl fulure
That s the continuty of history. the realty
which we must face and the one which we
Sough to atack with hard means.
But 1 Gon't wish t b ke the rest of the
left, pouring over the communique ke vines on
an old wal s bad enough that it has to be
nterpreted in a fundamentaly diferent situa-
tion with a correspondingly dferent set of in-
terests
But | can' allow us o be labelled a polt-
cal dits wihou responding.
Yes. we thought, in the configuration of
that time. that we had a chance to start some-
thing in the metropoles. 10 launch a dialectcal
process for Iberation. But we never proposed
that we. a5 2 small, clandestine group. could
tear down” something with armed sirugg)
aicne,
“The project was explicily poltcal-miltary.
the armed struggle was only one element of
the praxis. to move away from burdensome
deology and feelings of powerlessness to-
wards real attacks. The concept was broad
enough 1o allow for worthwhile agtaton from
wihin'a movement.This maovement exited, both
here and ntemationally, s0 | don't need to de-
scrive t once again.
I the end. however. a strong fundamen-
1l interest prevailed. one which links the ma-
Jorty of the et to “normaf”ciizens the desire
for a relatvely secure and pleasant ife (the
price one has to pay for thi is ahiays left in
the background, however) The metropoles are,
after al. warm places with many pleasant fea-
tures. Al that time even more so, because there
was o “social queston” n the narfow sense
ofthe phvase. The economy was booming,there
was 0o mass unemployment, the welare state
was still expanding, the strategic German
model But allthis onlyasted uni he end of e
bioc confrontaion, then twas nolonger needed
and was tossed onto the trash heap of history:
now there's “shareholder value" instead of
social secuty.
"As for mking with “the social queston.
remember well many wasted early mornings
handing out leaflts s the shifts changed at
the factories, listening 1o the harsh tones of
rejection we were mel wih. These thoughts.
about how its possidle to “wake up” the “de-
Sie for emancipation and lberation” in people
are completely useless.
To say t anachronistically. it all comes.
Gown 1o the old problem of “Ciass in and of
ftsel becoming “class for tsel”. We shoudnt
Speak of ‘miltarstic” mistakes i the concept
rather 2 lack of necessary condiions for any
emancipatory poltical approach. notonly amed
Struggle, because in the end all leftst ap-
proaches failed. not oly the RAF.
‘OK. s01n the 16705 came the siogan Into
private fer",ntoaernatve forms of ving. back
10 the universities, back to the “long march”
through the nstitutions. AnG after a quarter
century the marchers have now fnally arved
at the center and may now take part in the
aggressive project of tepostoning Germany.
Perhaps, n fac, it would have been bet-
ter f the global wave of evol, which the RAF
was a part of_ had been
Successfur’ Then maybe we woukin' be in
the mess we are today.
But hypothetical statements are meaning-
less. WWhy bother thinking about forms of evo-
ution and proposals.from the 19th and 20tn
centuries when our world has so radically
changed in front of our very eyes? Today, prac-
ticaly nothing is the same today s it was ten
years ago. It reminds me of Don Quixcte (and i
has about 3s much to do with ‘the social ques-
ton as with Dulcinea).
But back to history for 3 moment. We
musin' forget that following the first real wave
ofrepression inthe early 1970, the “fsh in the
water" concept was done for good. Before.
the RAF could aways count on finding open
doors. Altnough there were always one or two
Who thought 1 necessary to inform the poice.
But now. suddenly. there we
unbridgeable policalideological difierences.
on - Winter 1999/2000
itical Idiots!”
ang someane needs o try and expiain this 0p-
porunist movemen of reiecton. because 15
one of the main raasons why aimost all of the
clandestine members ended up n prson A few
weeks earer things had looked a lite dfer-
ent. notexactly consensus.but a east 10 one
Wwen running to the cops. Later. people gave
detaled depictions of RAF actons on the TV.
Saer polics, 5o to speak
Due toth “refecton ofthe positon of sym-
pathizer” (Herol).th state organs ddn' need
o work overtime. Afer this, the RAF s position
was in jeopardy for a long tme. The stuation
forced us to concentrate on bulding up I0gis-
tics, and on the prsoners eitherto protect hem
or f possibi to get them out, because their
psycho-physical ntegry i the sate's custody
Coukd not be quaranteed (iose who ke 1 pass
s off as the “ree-the-guerrila guerrila’ never
Seem interested in tnat realy. nowever)
“The results of tis everyone knows. 1977
Of course, this concentration was
feducive and ail of the actions were aimed at
the prisoners. which had a negave effect on
the actions themseives. and led. among otner
things. to the wrong decision to hjack an
aplane.
“The authors of the RAF's dissolution com-
munique now wrte what they suppressed for
years: This reduction and the prominence of
amed action continued throughout he 1980s.
This prevented things being at the polticalevel.
the “social’ question was ignored. and this '
why a “social revolutionary” component was.
lacking, and whatever the hel eise they wrote
msicking of hearing ths bulsh. The real
stuation was (and probably will aways be. to
some degree) that there were various difir-
ent groups and individuals wh, altnough not
wanting to directy jon the RAF. could envision
poltical cooperaton with an armed organza-
Tion. As far as | could tell.that was no small
number of people i the 1380s.
One thing there never was n the history
of the RAF (and this came from the experi-
ences in the 18705) was “social movements'
however you choose to define them, who had
an interest o, | wouid say. a need to possibly
discuss similr poltical goals, because they all
categorically rejected the use of polfical vio-
lance (a position which never heiped their
cause. however).
So this fascination with the “socil” ele-
ment can't hide the fact tha they are ust com-
plaining long and wide about their own inabi-
ties.about o longer being able to cortinue on a
path which they somehow recognized as faise.
‘about wanting 0 seek something new. The e
Son for this is: They wouki nave wanie 10 be
the way i was. But before they admit o ts.
they d rather say the mistakes were in the con-
cept. No, they weren' “miltars, the mistakes
‘were in the concept, 50 you can' biame them.
Trly pathetic
s aready been said a few tmes, but Il
say tone finaltme: The fact s, thatfor 3 long
tme in the 1980s there were re-polticization
attempts which were made. hard discussions
Whose nitators gave up on because they Aid
ot trust themselves to 0o actions.
'And when the Cele prisoners sought sup-
portduring ths exchange, here came the stae-
Tent.“One acton, then the next one. Thats
ow & goes
Today, many people can sit around and
complain about the hierarchical, authorarian.
it structures of the RAF, but the issue of
formcoats is by no means a aughing mater
“The factremains tha. since the end o the
19805, armed siruggle - o mattr how i rans-
forms or modifies fse - no longer makes any
polfical sense. The conditons are all wrong.
The points of eference sre lacking. The epi
emic use of vioence at all levels makes this
e of violence as 2 means i a poldical sirg-
gle ineffective.
‘And now the fina point.
“Following our defeat in 1993, we knew that
we couldn'just keep going on a5 we had been
Freedom For All Policical Prisoners Worldwide! - Arm The Spirit Spe
() We wanted to think things over one more
Lime wih those who were i prison. and take 3
new step together. But in the end. the very
Rurtul 5t of one group of the prsaners from
s, who declred us o be enemes. completely
erased the very conditions which had gven
fise 0 he RAF In the it place - soicarty and
the struggle for collectiuty.”
Whats tnat supposed to mean?
s important o keep some tnings stright
Defeats, sure. there have been more than
enough of those. But why in 19837 What was.
Specialaboutthat tme? O yeah.the Steinmetz.
Unit, that ahways seems to be quickly forgot-
ten
“The authors of the last RAF communiaue
Gon't seem to want to discuss thal with us. as
far a5 we can tal. We were always confronted
with their papers point blank. Our crcisms of
this were seemingly just brushed off unt the
next one-sided statement appeared
We ceciared no one fo be our enemy, we
never once spoke of a spit, rather we mater-
1 Edition - Winter 1999/2000
offacty separated ourselves from people WhG
ad begun (0 advance ther partcular teresis
agaimst us (and who now - such a tresome
pont - spea of soidarty and collctty) The
‘uthors of the communique seem preoccupE
with finding & way out of the vacuum which
they got themselves into, and they came up
Wih nothing better than to portray our Nistory
a5 sometning which wasn't. | think s legii-
mate 1o refuse to allow that
‘And i there’s anyone who's had to suffer
a cefeat in all of this. then surely s us. the
femaining prisoners. W stared the “opening
Which everyone took ther turns at maripulat-
ng. and now we are up to our necks in cor-
crete thanks to the "Kinkel Itiatve”
For 26 years. f necessary.
Perhaps even a it longer
RolfClemens Wagner
‘Schwaimstadt, Germany. the end of Apri 1998
(Transiated by Arm The Spirt from “Jungle
Workd #20 - May 13. 1998)
A Few Last Words On The End Of The Red Army Fraction (RAF)
Somewnere.In March 1998, the Red ATmy
Fracton (RAF) announced is dissoluton afler
26 years of armed siruggle. This step was an
antrcimax. and one long expected. since notr-
g had been heard offrom the RAF for months.
Just ke the Left in general, the organization
had lost ts socialrelevance over the past few
years. and i could not be expected that the
RAF would provide any impuises for a re-or-
entation of the LeR But sighs and the shaking
of heads are by no means called for
For 26 years, the RAF was an atlempt to
wage resistance o the murderous capialist
system and conditons of explotation. It arose
from the correct consciousness of bringing the
antrimperialststruggle of the iberation move-
ments around the workd back here, o the certer
of power. It arose from the reaization that the.
Social movements and the guertila movements.
of the Trree Continents, which are confronted
with U.S. and NATO interventions and the dity
wars being waged by contra-guerrila forces
raned by the BD [German nteligence agency]
and the CIA, can only be successful i there s
0 peacelul cam i the metropoles, inthe belly
ofthe beast. The formation of the RAF was the
frstserious atiemt to ransform the ‘68 siogan
“Creal One. Two, Many Vietnams” o a real
ity. This was expressed i the early years
mainly n the form of atacks on U.S. miltary
institutons. I the eary 1970s, RAF actons, for
‘examplethe atack on the U.S. Headguarters n
Heidelberg, where logistcs for af aids on the
Vitcong were planned, enjoyed broad. i si-
lent. support. At that tme. around 20% o the
population were wiling o help shelter RAF mil-
tants from state repression. So its no surprise
that the repressive authorties in Germany did
everything possible to create a socialcimate in
which the RAF and the Lef in general could be
isolated and defeated. This chance came dur-
ing the confrontations i 1977. The surveilance
State was prepared to make the most of s
Searching metnods and isolaton torture. The
polfical ertor of the RAF. to approve of the
hiacking of a cuilian Lufivansa airiner by 3
Palestinian commando during the Schieyer Kid-
napping. tipped the balance of pUBl OPIoN,
aiready heated by media smear campaigns.
aganst the guerrila once and for all. The po-
rom-ke simosphere among the public against
the RAF poliical prisoners gave the govern-
ment’s Crisis Staf the signal # needed: The
‘alleged-suicdes’ of theprisoners n Stammheim
were just a formay following the stoming of
the aifiner by a GSGS police commando.
“The RAF could never recover fiom s
featin 77. The state had succeeded in creating
a permanent gulf between the guerila and &
maorty of the extra-parlamentary Left. and
Soldarty fromthe general public was now com-
pltely out o the question. The consciousness.
that the actions of the guerila were only di-
fected at the ruling structures, against those.
fesponsile for explotation, war. and oppres-
Sion, could no longer be proclaimed. “Anyone
Who attacks people vacationing on Mallorca
would eat their own chidren. * - wasn't hard
for the uling powers to make such notions.
stck inthe minds of the peopie. Afer tis time.
only a smal porion o the radical Let showed
soldarty with RAF actions.
Eventhe aempls by the RAF nthe 1980s,
by means of the Front Concet, o ik up with
radical socisl movements at he national level
and wih Action Directe (France) and the Red
Brigades (tay) st the West European level id
ot make any new beginnings possible. These
oniy exhibited the developments which the RAF-
themselves criiczed in their issolution com-
municue: The lack of 3 poltcaksocil organ-
2ation, which needed to have an equal impor-
tance as the armed polfics of the RAF.
The distance between the actons of the
RAF, who were only becoming more isolated.
and ihe repressive social realy of the class
whose lieration the RAF propagaed became
o0 great. Unlke the early 1970s. when social
relationships played an important fole i texts
fssued by the RAF (for example. with refer-
nce fothe strke movements in 1671, and “Ur-
ban Guerila And The Class Stuggle” of Apri
1872).th statements by the new RAF miitants
hovered st the absiract.mitarist evel For peo-
ple involved In concrete social confrontatons,
like unemployed people,the Latin America s
darty movement, or antifascists, there was
Il common ground for discussion with the
RAF. The attempts by the RAF in the 19905 (the
execution of Treuhand chief Rohwedder, the
destruction of the new prison in Weterstadt) to
fenew a concrete relationship with the social
Stuation in Germany and a dialogue wih the
Lef came oo late. The lack of an organi:
tional framework, poltcal-social organzation
which would have made such a discussion
possibie, was a major problem. This mistake
was the faul of the entire radcal Lef. because.
the RAF never had the chance t buik up such
an organization while operating underground
The dissalution of the RAF is a natural
result of thei history. But 1 merely the end of
the chapter on the RAF in the hstory of the
revolutionary Left in Germany. not the end of
amed siruggle for al tmes. As long as social
conditions exit ‘in which a human being s
rested a5 adiy,pitful, abandoned, and hated
being’, solong as the heartof the beast contin-
es 1o best, producing new capialst barbary
wih each new day - he struggle for iberation
wil ontinue. The means of ths struggle wilbe
ecided on by the radical Leh, not dictated by
their enemies.
(Source: ‘Einsatz! #31 - July 1998 - Trans-
ot il
—k