CATEGORIES OF REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY POLICY T. Derbent, April 2006 Categories of Revolutionary Military Policy ‘T. Derbent, April 2006 ‘Translation by Kersplebedeb ISBN 978-1-894946-43-8 First printing Printedin ws.a. Kersplebedeb can be contacted at Kersplebedeb cP.63560 CCCP Van Horne Montreal, Quebec Canada H3W3H8 ‘or email info@kersplebedeb.com Visit the Kersplebedeb website at http://wwwkersplebedeb.com Guide to illustrations: page iv, barricades in Prague, 1848; page 7, Naxalite guerilla, India; page 15, Nicaraguan revolution, 1979; page 20, Soviet partisans during Second World War; page 23, demonstration against police, Italy; page 29, peasant guerillas, China 1930s; page 34, member of Sendero Luminoso, Peru 2005; page 36, New People's Army, Mindanao; page 38, partisan during Second World War. Preface by Kersplebedeb ‘The following essay, by the Belgian revolutionary communist T. Derbent, isan unusual and valuable contribution to understanding, renewing, and rebuilding the revolutionary option. ‘The term “revolutionary” is used here to refer to something precise, namely action and reflection intended to bring abouta revolution, a hege- monic change in the way society is organized, “bottom lining” the goals, ofliberation and building a new way of life for all. Military policy is a prerequisite for revolutionaries—in the sense that, withoutit, there can be no successful revolution. Those who neglect it, who think away from itas we so often do, may have nice ideas, but they are neglecting a question that will be necessary to address ifthey are ever to put those nice ideas into practice in a durable manner. Indeed, would- be revolutionaries who have no military policy are not revolutionaries at all, but only more people with political opinions. While Derbent does not belabor this point, it underlies everything addressed here. This essay is based on a talk given in Brussels at an event organized by the Bloc Marxiste-Léniniste in April 2006, and subsequently pub- lished in two parts in the Bloc ML’s magazine Clarté (#5 May 2006 and #6 December 2006). It was subsequently translated into German, Greek, and Italian, being debated and discussed by comrades through- out Europe, mainly within the Marxist-Leninist tradition, ‘The present translation constitutes the first time this text is being made available to an English-reading audience—and specifically, to a North American one. The history of armed struggle in the united states and canada is necessarily different from that elsewhere; obviously, this is not Italy, or Algeria, or Nepal. The armed experience here has always been defined by the realities and contradictions of settler-colonialism, the tension between the ongoing anticolonial resistance and the fact that any movement here must find its way on terrain claimed by the coloniz- ex's society. Furthermore, as in any overview of such a dense area of knowledge and activity, this is not an exhaustive study. More to the point, it is a study with a specific goal: to introduce us to the concepts of military doctrine, and to explain how these have been used and misused by revo- lutionary forces. Although the author mentions objective factors, there is, no discussion of historical materialism or broader historical patterns or dynamics; for example, the relationship between global changes in the means of production and distribution, and the inevitable calling up of completely new forms of struggle from military doctrine to individual tactics. Likewise, the author presupposes revolutionary organization, but doesn’t have the space to go into what revolutionary class organiza tion means in military practice (and vice-versa, dialectically). Yet it would be a cop-out to hold this specificity against the text, or to dismiss Derbent’s educational endeavor as a “European view” of little practical interest to those of us on Turtle Island. That is because this is not a “how-to-do-it,” but rather a “how-to-study-it,” paper. Surveying military experiences in various times and places—with particular atten- tion paid to that period of the twentieth century marked by the existence of “real existing socialism” and ubiquitous anticolonial revolutions—in order to distill those elements, questions, and dilemmas that reoccur time and again; ice, those that are universal. Laying out the background and consequences of already developed revolutionary policy consider ations, in order to help us apply the lessons learned to our own context. As such, this paper does not provide answers, it simply clarifies what some of the questions will be for those who choose to develop a revolu- tionary practice. Derbent proceeds from the larger to the smaller, from the more gen- eral to the more specific. In this order, he defines and discusses revo- lutionary military policy (an overall military orientation & activity), military doctrine (a war plan), military development (organization of practical activity), the science of war (recognizing universal laws that always apply), the art of war (experience & mastery of the practice of warfare), strategy (a specific plan to achieve military goals in the existing overall situation), operational art (which connects strategy and tactics), and tactics (the means by which operations are carried out). The author examines how these different concepts are related to one another, how they have been articulated in different circumstances, and to what effect. ‘This is far from a rah-rah, inspirational pep talk relying on heroic examples of rebel armed struggle. Instead, itis of necessity fairly abstract, and formal—otherwise it would be 440 instead of just 40 pages long. In particular, its terminology conforms to professional military usage. A graduate of the u.s. army's command & staff college at Fort Leavenworth ‘would be at ease reading this paper, whose terminology and frame of mind would be familiar to them. While, on the other hand, a revolution- ary who has never read Clausewitz along with Lenin and Mao's military writings (“Lessons of the 1905 Uprising,” “Strategic Problems in the AntiJapanese Guerrilla War,” ete. ) might find it difficult going. All the more reason why it should be read, studied, discussed, and built upon by comrades here. Categories of Revolutionary Military Policy by T. Derbent “Itis true that at times the officers, exaggerating the relative impotence of intelligence, forget to use it.” Commander Charles de Gaulle, 1936 “Studying books is one way oflearning; applying what we have learnt is another, even more important way... Our most important way is to learn to wage war by waging it...” —Mao Zedong, 1936 I INTRODUCTION Dear Comrades, Louis XIV had the words “ultima ratio regum” engraved upon his can- rons: the final argument of kings. Every social revolutionary project must think ahead to the question of armed confrontation with the forces of power and reaction. To put off making such a study because “the time is not right yet” for armed confrontation, amounts to making choices (political, strategic, organizational) which risk, at that point when “the time will be right” for armed confrontation, leaving the revolutionary forces powerless, vulnerable, with characteristics that will be totally inadequate. Choices which risk leaving them open to defeat. Organizations that claim to be revolutionary but which refuse to develop a military policy before the question of confrontation becomes a practical reality, disqualify themselves as revolutionary forces. They are already acting as gravediggers of revolution, the quartermasters of stadi- ums and cemeteries.’ ‘Therefore, the subject of this presentation is revolutionary military policy, which we can define as the analysis, the preparation, and the use of armed force in the service of the revolutionary objective. ‘The question of revolutionary military policy is being discussed once again. Whether it isa matter of studying the Protracted People’s Wars led by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist type parties (in Peru, Nepal, India, or else- where), whether itis in re-examining the experiences of the urban gue- rilla in the imperialist metropoles over the past thirty years, or in other ways, debates about revolutionary military policy are experiencing a slight comeback. Even if the positions coming out of these debates remain very different (from the reaffirmation sine variafur of the insurrection- ary principles of Lenin and the Comintern, to the crude appropriation of recent experiences in the dominated countries), this renewed interest in the question of revolutionary military policy is both good and necessary. Yet revolutionary military thought remains anemic. Its propositions are the bastard progeny of historical methods (based on experience, which is based on historical antecedents with all the risks of dogmatism and conservatism that that implies) and philosophical methods (based on theory, which proceeds deductively with all the risks of subjectivism that that implies), methods that are used with no methodological or epis- temological remove. Witness the amorphous body of theory, with notions, for exam- ple, like “strategy,” “military policy,” “military theory,” and ‘military 1_Aswellar the rightwing deviation that rejects thinking about strategy at this pointin time that eveals (and which ends up bringing abou) the fact hat evolutionary struggle has bbeen reduced to the mos trivial kindof protest, ther x alsa left-wing deviation that rejects the need to think about strategy beforchand. This deviation occurs amongst revolutionary forces which are anarchist, militar, subjective, te and which claim that thinking about strategy “divides” revoltionaries who can only be united through action. In the heyday of facoism, some even claimed that thinking about strategy was a "bourgeois preoccupation, doctrine” all employed as if they were interchangeable. ‘The theoretical ambiguity is such that it permits, by means of an abuse of language, real political manipulations, as we saw when we analyzed the document from the (n)PCI [the (New) Italian Communist Party—translator] in our previ- ous discussion, ‘This presentation is not about what today’s revolutionary military policy should be. Itis intended to be atool to assist ina rigorous, methodi- cal, and scientific evaluation of revolutionary military policy. ‘The limits of this presentation are plain to see. Inand of itself, itis not tied to any particular line, but itis dealing with a field where categories are based on analyses and political-theoretical choices. The old debate about whether or not such a thing as proletarian military science exists is an example of this problem. Between the left-wing deviation, which denies that there is anything valid in the body of military science elabo- rated under the bourgeois regime, and the right-wing deviation which prostates itself before bourgeois military thought, there is a narrow path which has yet to be made clear. What's more, as soon as it abandons its basis in precise strategic thought—meaning its basis in a concrete analysis of a concrete situation, which means connected to political practice—then the author's efforts will amount to nothing but abstract theory. But to the degree that this presentation isa tool, it will be how it is used, that isto say its application in concrete situations, that wil allow us to identify and get rid of those categories that are of only academic interest. As Maurice Biraud said, in the film Un taxi pour Tobrouk, “an uneducated person who walks will go farther than two intellectuals who remain seated.” Right? We're off... 2. This wasa debate that initially involved Trotsky opposing Stalin and Vorachilovin 1918, and then Frounzé in 1921 IL. OBJECTIVE FACTORS, SUBJECTIVE FACTORS ‘The first thing to note regarding revolutionary military policy sits inher- ent limits, We know that the counter-insurgency command is happy to draw upon the ideas of Colonel Trinquier. But these ideas are crudely antidialectical, and conceive of revolution as the result of a conspiracy consisting of two types of person: the “agents” of subversion and the “masses” who they manipulate. According to Trinquier, revolutionary crises break out at the point that the underground command decides: that’s when it plays its hand. In fact, revolutionary crises break out due to a combination of objec- tive and subjective factors. More often than not, the revolutionary forces are surprised by the rush of events. Such was the case in the crisis of 1905, which caught the Bolshevik party by surprise and without any military structure; it was the case in 1917 (we know how hard Lenin had to fight within the party—especially against Zinoviev and Kamenev— to move towards insurrection); the magnitude of success at Santa Clara (September-December 1959) came as a great surprise to the Castroist guerillas; the same with the general insurrection in Managua in 1979. Preparations and actions by the party are indispensable for a revolu- tionary victory, but they are never enough to explain the revolutionary phenomenon. A revolution is first and foremost the expression of a soci- ety’s internal contradictions. This is why Lenin held the position that no insurrection was possible if the ruling classes were not already ina severe political crisis, unable to govern as before, and if the oppressed classes ‘were not pushed to revolt by a decline in their living conditions. The fail- ure of counter-revolutionary subversive wars shows how important these socio-historical conditions are (failure in that they have never brought a counter-revolution to power by means of “people's” war, though they may have contributed to the process by destroying the economy in Nicaragua and Mozambique). Il. MILITARY DOCTINE ‘The first thing the Party’ must decide upon is its military doctrine, The military doctrine is the articulation of opinions held by the Party as to its political evaluation of the problems related to the war in question, the Party’s attitude towards this war, its definition, the organization and preparation of the Party’s forces, the choice of its strategy and methods. Its, to use the Clausewitzian term, its war plan. It follows that what military doctrine is chosen will depend on the socio-historical situation. At the time of the Nazi invasion, the European Communist Parties (CPs) were “configured” for a doctrine of “internal” (national) class struggle and so they had decided upon a proletarian- insurrectionary strategy, i.e. primarily legal parties supplemented by clandestine military structures. This setup was not suited to the new conditions and led to heavy initial losses (the Belgian Communist Party was decapitated by Operation “Sonnenwende”), and the CPs were then forced to improvise a practice of protracted people's war.* ‘The Party's military doctrine can be defined as the answer to the fol- lowing questions: 1. Who is (and who will be) the enemy? ‘This is based not only on an analysis of the State and its forces, but also ona class analysis of society (to define the possible attitudes of the inter- mediate classes), an analysis of the international situation (to determine 3 Whetherornotacass Party is necessay forthe socal evolutions eriticallyimportant question, but one that is beyond the scope ofthis presentation. As isthe equally important question of whether ifwe deem the Party tobe necessary) establishing such aParty isa necessary precondition fr commencing the armed confrontation, For the sake of convenience l am sing he term “Party” het, butif one prefersone could understand this as seaning’ force," “organization, “movement, ec 4 Theachiovements ofthe CPs once the embarked upon this new path were remarkable: they were able to militarily organize large masses of people despite fsrce repression, What limits the use ofthese examples for the futuce isthe fac thatthe CPs were emphasizing [National Liberation rather than Socialist Revoltion: this won them support from large layers ofthe petit bourgeoisie and the peasantry that would have been hostile tothe dictatorship of| the proletariat. how much support the State can expect from the imperialist bourgeoisie as well as what forces might intervene to assist the revolutionary camp), ete. 2. What is (and will be) the nature of the war to come? Willit bea “pure” class struggle right from the very get-go, with the prole- tariat facing the bourgeoisie in a struggle to the death? Willit be a strug- glein which the class dimension is associated with a national dimension? And ifso, then will some process unite these two dimensions or will they ‘occur in two different stages (a national liberation stage where itis “only” a matter of getting the occupation forces to leave and a social stage where it is a matter of destroying the reactionary forces)? Will it be a struggle with both a democratic revolution stage and a proletarian revolution, stage? And if so, then will these be two separate things or will there be two distinct stages (a stage where the proletarian forces can count on large sections of the middle classes joining the revolutionary camp, and a stage where the proletariat will have to fight on its own to establish its dictatorship)? 3. What are the objectives and the missions that the armed forces will under- take as a result? Destroy the enemy's armed forces? Make the human and/or material cost of the war too high for the enemy? A combination of the above (for example: destroy the domestic bourgeoisie’s armed forces and discour- age possible foreign intervention by acquiring the means necessary to make the war too costly for them)? Limit armed activity within the nation’s borders or integrate it within a regional strategy? Ete. 4, What are (and will be) the armed forces necessary at first, and what kind of organizational and technical developments will be required to reach this stage? What will be the armed forces necessary in the later stages of the war, and what military, organizational and technical developments and what kind of internal process will this require? Itis not just matter of numbers, but also of what kind of forces these will be—militias (of workers and/or peasants) and/or regular units—and of their relationship to the Party—organic unity between the political and the military or the (relative) separation of the armed wing, for instance in the form of a Red Army. 5. How should the Party prepare? Not only in terms of its internal organization (clandestinity, choices about internal process in terms of Party democracy and discipline, mili- tarization of some of its cadres and militants, separation into cells, cre- ation of an ad hoc security and intelligence apparatus, etc.), but also in terms of bringing together different resources, ete. 6. What will be the strategy and the methods used to wage and win this war? Guerilla warfare? Insurrection? A coup? ete. This must be based upon an analysis of the politico-military balance of power (objective and sub- jective factors, such as the will to fight). It must also be based upon an analysis of the impact of geographic, economic, social and other factors on the ability of the forces in question to move, to strike, to gather infor- mation, to hide, to concentrate their forces, to disperse, to fall back, to communicate, ete. IV. MILITARY DEVELOPMENT ‘The Party’s military doctrine effects its military development, which includes all aspects relating to its military force: 1. Organizational Aspects In the case ofa strategic decision in favor of a “Fighting Patty,’ a“Politico- Military Party,” or a"Militarized Party”: thought must be given to how the Party's structures are set up in order to tailor them to both political and military work. ‘© Inthe case of a strategic decision in favor of a Party control- ling a distinct military force’ (an embryonic Red Army), this, distinct structure needs to be created, or, at the very least, thought must be given as to how to prepare for its creation Gcelection of cadres, ete.). ‘© Inall cases: either bringing the Party underground or preparing to bring it underground; training cadres for underground work; establishing a clandestine structure (cafehouses, documents, communication); adopting security measures (separation into cells, etc.) 2. Military Aspects Acquiring the military resources (weapons, equipment) required or beneficial for the military doctrine, and/or making plans and preparing methods and connections to make these resources available at the appro- priate time’ (for example: plans to attack a barracks); providing all cadres, with an introduction to military questions and providing military train- ing to specific cadres. “The theory held by the European fighting communist school of thought “The theory held by one section ofthe Marxist-Leninist- Maoist school of thought ‘The theory held by the other communist schools of thought. “The appropriate time is ot necessarily the chosen time: it can be imposed by the enemy's Initiative, such as the Nazi coup in 1933 which pre-empted the insurrection the KPD had been preparing. 3. Economic and Logistical Aspects Acquiring the economic and logistical resources (money, housing, vehi- cles, means of communication, of making false papers, etc.) required or beneficial for the military doctrine, and/or making plans and preparing methods and connections to make these resources available at the appro- priate time. 4. Political Aspects Implementing a program of politically preparing the Party's militants and cadres for the war defined as necessary or desirable by the military doctrine. 5. Scientific and Technical Aspects Acquiring the scientific and technical resources required and/or avail- able (to produce weapons and equipment required by combat and clan- destinity, to intercept enemy communications and to protect one’s own communications, etc.) defined as necessary or desirable by the military doctrine, or updating plans and methods in order to ensure that these resources will be available at the appropriate time; training cadres. 6. Ideological and Moral Aspects ‘The ideological and moral preparation of militants, of the sympathetic masses and of the masses in general, for the war considered necessary or desirable by the military doctrine. An example of this would be the way in which solidarity work with revolutionary prisoners can contribute to the ideological struggle in favor of armed conflict. 7. Internal Process: Discipline and Democracy Adopting an internal process with forms of discipline and democracy defined as necessary or desirable by the military doctrine. An example of this would be the choice made by the Vietnamese communistsin the time ofthe Resistance to adopt the system known as the “three great democra- cies.” This allowed them to develop the initiative, the dynamism, and the creative faculties of cadres and combatants, to reinforce the cohesion and the solidarity of the armed forces and to increase their combat strength: ‘* Political Democracy: in base units, to regularly hold demo- cratic meetings, military assemblies where combatants as well as cadres can voice their opinions about everything relating to combat, work as well as training, education, and life in the unit; the cadres have the right to criticize the com- batants, but the combatants also have the right to criticize the cadres. © Military Democracy: in the field and training alike (condi- tions permitting), to hold democratic meetings in order to communicate the operational plan to everyone, to allow people to use their initiative, and to work together to find the means to overcome difficulties in order to accomplish the task athand? ‘* Economic Democracy: combatants and cadres alike have the right to participate in the administration and improvement of material conditions in an “open book” system. Revolutionary armed forces normally adopt a system of strict disci pine, freely consented (0. Discipline that is freely consented to, because it builds upon the political consciousness of the cadres and the combat- ants and is largely maintained through a process of ongoing education and persuasion. This system is such that everyone is motivated to respect, it and to help each other to observe it. Strict discipline means that all members of the army, without exception, cadres as well as combatants, superiors as well as subordinates, must respect it to the letter and nobody is exempt. Democracy and discipline should serve to reinforce the military power of the revolutionary forces. From this perspective, the difference 9 Inbourgeois armies, soldiers only has the right to know what is strictly necessary in ‘order to accomplish their mission, They obey orders because they were trained to do so, ‘Murat didn't bother to explain anything to his guards, he simply shouted "The direction: my asshole!” and shoved theirhead into their objective. 10 between democracy and “democratism” is essential; the former rein- forces military power, the latter weakens it.” V. THE SCIENCE OF WAR ‘The science of war aids the Party in elaborating its military doctrine. This is the unified body of knowledge dealing with the psychological and physical aspects of combat. Its contents are organized around two basic laws: 1. Waris subordinate to political objectives; 2. The result of a conflict depends on the relationship of mili- tary power (numbers and quality—courage, discipline and self-discipline, motivation, training—of combatants, quality and quantity of war matériel, capacity and character of the leadership, etc.), as well as political, moral, technical, social, and economic forces. ‘The science of war can be divided into four categories: 1. The study of was, including the history of wars (or more precisely, so far as we are concerned, the history of civil and revolutionary wars). 2. The laws of war, meaning those principles which itis impera- tive to apply onall levels (strategic, tactical, etc.), and those rules whose application, while desirable, is not always pos- sible in conditions that make them worthwhile." Meanin, 10 The Spanish Civil War provides numerous examples ofthe disastrous effects of| "democratism.” For instance, atthe battles of Alto de Leon and Somosierre in July-August 1935 where the mil superiority in numbers, motivation, equipment and position, but despite all this they were as refused to attack without first holding a vote... The militias enjoyed, badly beaten bythe regular units led by fascist officers. The question of "democratism’ was at the center of Lin Piao’s attack against General Ho Long during the Cultural Revolution. 11 For example, initiative is only worth having if one is able to keep it: the Paris Commune took the initiative against Versailles, but at the ist setback itbecame clear thatit did not have the means tokespit, By the same token, surprises only useful ifone is able to exploit, et. n => The principle that the means should be proportional fo the goal. => The principle of freedom of action, which requires that forces be deployed so as to be able to pursue their goal without offering a hold for enemy forces, and which contains certain rules such as bringing forces together (enabling them to engage in com- bat as needed); security (constantly seeking intel- ligence on the enemy, active and passive security measures, etc,); initiative; mobility; hiding one’s intentions from the enemy; preventing the enemy from reacting; establishing reserves; ete. => The principle of an economy of force (in other words: getting the most out of one’s resources by the active and intelligent use of al forces), which also contains certain rules: bringing together the greatest possible resources at the point where the stakes are highest, by cutting back on secondary fronts;!* concentrat- ing the use of forces as much as possible; coordinat- ing all resources in order to multiply their respective effectiveness; choosing the right moment; choos- ing the right place; surprise (strategic, tactical, 12. ‘Theuniverslity ofthe principle of economy of forces what gives the guerilla its strategic ‘value The guerilla (and the urban guerilla even more than the raral guerilla) slows for an ‘optimal use of weak forces, and obliges the enemy ta deploy countless forces in orderto guard potential targsts—and inthis way, obliges to abandon this principle. But ifhy definition the gues benets from the advantage provided bythe economy offorc, the principle an and must be applied with care by the gui n the positioning and ue oftheir own forces. When an insurection (oa coup) enjoys the necessary conditions ofsurpris, too benefits fiom thisprincipl, which explains how weak forces, fused intelligently can take apart numerically superior enemy: insucrectionary forces seize certain aeasbuttemporasily leave othersin the hands of enemy nits, they concentrate theieforces at decisive points and butles while the enemy; taken by suepriss, has some ofits troops at rest et. Allthe same, the principle of conomy of force hasts limits, nd there are discrepancies in the relationship of forces that it cannot overcome technical through the use of new methods or by an original or unexpected use of old methods); speed (which extends the effect of surprise and guarantees freedom of action); continuity of efforts; exploiting the enemy's lack of preparedness; ete. 3. The theoretical basis of the Party's preparation for war. 4. The art of war. VI. THE ART OF WAR Unlike the science of war to which it belongs, the art of war is not arigor- ous body of knowledge about phenomena and their laws. As a concrete activity (not a speculative one), the art of war never encounters two identical situations: neither the means nor the enemy nor the terrain nor the socio-economic conditions are ever the same. What's more, war is not just a confrontation between material forces, it is also a confronta~ tion between wills, between moral forces that often radically modify the value of the material forces. ‘The principal aspects of the art of war are: Strategy ‘The art of operations (or operational art) Tactics eee Logistics (relative to movement, positioning, and supplying the armed forces) 5. Organization (relating to the organization and preparation of matériel and people) ‘The art of war residesin mastering and articulating these differentaspects and their specific characteristics. (For instance, being aware of the tacti- cal importance of establishing reserves given that combat often proceeds as.a series of engagements, even though strategy demands strict respect, for the economy of forces, meaning their full use where they might make accritical difference.) VII. STRATEGY Strategy consists of implementing the concepts and recommendations that emerge from the military doctrine. To do this, it addresses both military and non-military problems, it transforms the Party's military strength (a quantitative concept) into military power (a dynamic, non- quantifiable concept), and it takes the place of military doctrine as soon asthe combat begins. ‘Therefore, strategy has: 1. This definition: the proper use of combat in pursuit of the aims of the war. 2. This starting point: the will to obtain the greatest result, as quickly as possible and with the least cost, by efficient use of force—strategy therefore obeys the law of economy of force. 3. These means: Successful operations (made possible by the correctness of the strategic analysis and obtained by revolu- tionary forces mastering operational art and tactics) which are then exploited militarily, politically (propaganda, etc.), and organizationally (integration of new combatants, ete.). 4. These principles: the (absolute) importance of superiority at key points (one cannot “attack everything” or “defend every- thing”); the (relative) importance of surprise and subterfuge; keeping the goal in proportion to the forces and obstacles. 5. This goal: objectives that should lead to peace, which in the case of revolutionary war means destroying the enemy forces and breaking the enemy’s will to fight. Nothing guarantees that the means will advance towards the goal; not every successful operation is necessarily a good thing on the strategic level (for instance, one that leads to an escalation that the revolution- ary camp is not prepared to handle—foreign intervention for example). Strategic analysis determines what operations should be carried out, and in what framework. Other than the principles and rules ofthe art of war, of which strategy isa key part, strategic analysis is based on its own criteria. These include: 1. The laws that govern warfare. Listed above, they are objec- tive and apply equally to both sides. 2. The nature and characteristics of the war to be waged; the distribution of forces (social, military, political, ete,, actual as, well as potential, in both qualitative and quantitative terms); its prospective duration, intensity, and scope ; the possibi ties of foreign intervention (friendly or hostile); geographic and social conditions, ete. 3. The Party’s preparedness for war. 4. Material and technical assets (military resources, tech- niques, information, cadres, combatants, scientists). 5. Leadership of the forces. 6. The choices the enemy is likely to make, for the strategic domain consists of the belligerents’ actions and reactions. On this basis, strategic analysis means: 1. Ameticulous calculation of the risks involved; specifically, this means anticipating how as the revolution progresses there will be a qualitative escalation on the part of the counter-revolution (torture, extrajudicial executions, etc.); 2. Always keeping operations perfectly in line with the politi cal-military goal (i, not reacting on the basis of prestige); 3. Preparing fallback position; Resolution once the action is initiated; 5. Being flexible about what methods/resources to use when faced with unforeseen developments. + VIII. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY What are the general principles of revolutionary strategy? We can list five: L Itis based on the primacy of the political over the military (and this goes beyond the general principle of subordinat- ing military options to political objectives: itis a matter of politics being primary across the board; as such, the political education of revolutionaries is more important than their military education; the political-ideological impact of an operation can be more important than its material effect, military operations can be suspended but political work must never stop, ete); Itis based on the primacy of people over things;"* Itis based on the primacy of the interior (what is happening within the country, what is happening within the class) over the exterior; Itis always concerned with its connection to the popular mass Regardless of the main form of struggle adopted (insur- rection, guerilla, ete), no form of struggle is neglected: mass struggle (strikes, demonstrations), guerilla warfare, traditional warfare, sabotage, legal struggles, psychologi- cal warfare, covert warfare, terrorism, and insurrectionary movements. Its goal is the total destruction of the enemy's armed forces. Unlike other forms of war, the revolutionary war is a war of annihilation which cannot be ended by making a deal or holding peace talks with the enemy. 13. In China’s People’s Liberation Army, these theses were spelled out in the system known asthe four primacies" primacy of people over things, of political work aver other activities, ofideological work over other forms of political work, and ofliving ideas over booklearning within ideological work 1X. THE PRINCIPAL REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES To speak a bit more concretely, we will quickly go over the principal revolutionary strategies that have been theorized since the proletariat’s entrance on the historical scene. I have counted eleven, though this is, somewhat arbitrary as certain categories could be subdivided to make new ones. 1. The Blanquist Insurrectionary Strategy. ‘The most advanced example of this strategy is the Blanquist strategy, theorized in the Manual for Armed Insurrection." A small group of armed conspirators (between 500 and 800 in the May 12 uprising in 1839) strikes when it thinks the people are subjectively ready for insurrection, acting in the place of the unorganized proletariat. They take control of the armories and distribute weapons, striking at the head of the political power structure and its agents of repression (attack on the police head- quarters), systematically erecting barricades and organizing the masses, who rally to the insurrection, On a tactical level, Blanqui relied heavily on barricades—a decision which was correctly criticized by Engels. The passive tactic of barricades was pursued by the revolutionary proletariat up until 1848; the only way it could have succeeded would have been if large numbers of soldiers from the bourgeois army had decided to desert and cross over to the insurrectionary camp. 2. The Strategy of the Insurrectionary General Strike. Bakunin’s legacy (whether acknowledged or not), which aimed to bring about the abolition of the State through a single collective action, prefera- blya general strike. Such an insurrection would be set offas a result ofthe spontaneity of the masses. According to this strategy, the insurrectionary 14 Theway tooverlookthefact that the Blanguist taking up ofarmsistheintermediae step between the which Lenin denied accusations thathe was Blanquist” should not ead us [Babouvian conspiracy and the Leninistinsurrection. The "Blanguist epithet that Plekhanov and Martov threwat Lenin had veryltte to dowith true Blanguism, Whatt meant, in the pot {cal vocabulary ofthe day, was that one was in favor of conspiratorial rather than mass action, general strike will occur when the masses are subjectively ready, and this, subjective disposition will allow all the objective questions (military, organizational) to be easily resolved thanks to the masses’ revolution- ary creativity. This strategy also relies on a large-scale breakdown of bourgeois power, this too being due to the subjective disposition of the ‘masses (mass desertions from the army, etc.). This strategy was proposed anew in the interwar period by the Revolutionary Syndicalists, and has also reappeared at times amongst the “mao-spontex” and within the Bordiguist ultraleft. 3. The Strategy of Exemplary Terrorism. Practiced by a tendency within the anarchist movement and by the Russian populists. It is based on either the actions of individuals or of a secret organization—and is always lacking any organic connection to the masses. Their only way of connecting to the masses is through the example their actions provide, or the attitude of their militants when faced with repression, and, eventually, some declarations. The terrorist strategy was able to hit reaction at its highest points, provoking terror amongst the enemy and winning the admiration of the masses, butit has, never been able to translate these factors into forces able to overthrow a government. Historically, this strategy has only ever produced failures: one does not “wake up” the revolutionary layers of the masses without organizing them. 4, The Leninist-Comintern Insurrectionary Strategy. First implemented in October 1917 and meticulously theorized thereaf- ter (notably in the collective work Armed Insurrection signed “Neuberg”), this was the strategy adopted by the Communist parties in the 1920s and "30s. It integrates and systematizes the analyses of Marx and Engels (and the lessons of experiences like 1905) by bestowing a central role on the vanguard Party which will work to bring together the elements neces- sary for a successful revolution (raising the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, political and military organization of the masses notably by creating a Red Guard, training and equipping shock troops and using 18 these instead of barricades, setting up an insurrectionary headquarters, drafting battle plans, determining the right time to strike, ete.). This strat- egy met with major failures in Germany (1923), China (1927), Asturia (1934), Brazil (1935), and elsewhere. 5. The Strategy of Protracted People’s War Ithas three stages: a guerilla stage, strategically defensive (though tacti- cally very active, consisting of non-stop initiatives); a stage of strategic equilibrium; a strategically offensive stage during which the revolution- ary forces are able to wage a war of movement and a (supplementary) war of position. The specific principles of Protracted People’s War were outlined as follows by Mao Zedong : ‘© First attack dispersed and isolated enemy forces, then attack the more important forces. ‘* First establish liberated zones in the countryside, encircle the cities by the countryside, first take the small cities, then take the large ones. ‘* Make sure to greatly outnumber the enemy in combat (the strategy is about how to fight one against ten, the tactic is to fight ten against one).'* ‘* Ensure combatants have a high level of political consciousness, so that they will be superior in endurance, courage, and sense of self-sacrifice. ‘* Make sure to have the support of the people, take care to respect their interests, ‘* Make sure that captured enemies pass over to the revolution- ary camp. 15 This principle was theorized by Mao Zedongin On Protracted War and by Zhu De in On the Anti-Japanese War. But iap andthe rest ofthe Viet Minh leadership did not agree, andin any case considered itill-suited tothe Vietnamese situation, The small numbers of Viet Minh forces often led them to engage with equal umbers of combatants on the tactical level; sue prise better knowledge of the terrain, and the operational quality oftheir troops (the degree ‘of combat preparedness and revolutionary heroism) being enough to make the difference. 19 '* Use the time between battles to improve, train, and educate yourselves. Victorious in Yugoslavia, Albania, China, and Indochina, this strategy has met with major failures, notably in Greece (1945-49) and Malaysia (1948-60). 6. The Strategy of the Coup Relies on the relationship of forces being extremely favorable to the revo- lutionary party. For instance, in Prague 1948, we can note the presence of the Soviet Army, the strength and prestige of the Communist Party, the existence of popular militias (15,000-18,000 armed workers), the near total infiltration of the National Security Corps and of several army units, ete. This strategy has the advantage of being infinitely more eco- rnomical than those which necessitate armed conflict. It can even main- tain the semblance of legality, which enables the political neutralization of certain intermediate social strata. The coup generally results from an opportunity provided by extraordinary historic circumstances rather than revolutionary strategy theorized as such or elaborated as a model. ‘Nonetheless, in the Third World in the 1960s and ’70s it was systemati- cally applied by young progressive officers connected in various ways to the Soviet Union. 7, The Strategy of Armed Electoralism Based on the theory that a partial seizure of power is possible by legal means (the condition being that a large mass struggle exists to guaran- tee democratic rights) and that this partial seizure of power will provide the revolutionary movement with the tools that, in conjunction with the resources of the revolutionary forces themselves, will be enough to censure the advance of the revolutionary process and to hold in check the reactionary counter-offensive (military coup or foreign intervention). Organizations that adopt this strategy outfit themselves with a military potential to ensure a seizure of power which is actually based on legal methods. General Pinochet did a lot to discredit this strategic hypoth- esis, which had already experienced a bloody failure with the decimation of the Austrian Schutzbund in 1934. 8. The Focoist Strategy A theory based on systematizing the specific experiences of gueril- Jas active in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Latin America (includ- ing Cuba). It makes establishing and developing a mobile rural base of guerilla operations into the central aspect of the revolutionary process. Focoism is not intended to be universally applicable, and was largely based on ideas about the duality of Latin American society (the capi- talist city and the feudal countryside), of the impossibility of establish- ing liberated zones as was done in Indochina, ete. The guerilla’s mobile bases are supposed to develop into a people’s army, to encircle the cities until the regime is finished off by an insurrectionary general strike in the urban centers. Prior to this coup de grace, the proletariat’s role is limited to supporting the rural guerilla, 16 Thisbasing a theory on the systematization of specific experiences (often the result of ‘empirical experience, and the product or expression ofthe weaknesses of the Latin American, revolutionary movement) has been the source ofa lot of confusion. It allowed the most important theoretician of focoism, Regis Debray, to reject Leninist- Maoist ideas (such asthe role ofthe class Party) despite these having been insisted upon by the person who, according to Debray, embodied the focoist “revolution inthe revolution": Che Guevara, 9. The Neo-Insurrectionary Strategy Emerged following the success of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. In the wake of this victory many revolutionary forces either wholly or partially abandoned the Protracted People’s War strategy—a strategy that in some cases they had been pursuing for decades—in order to try to bring things to a head by calling for urban uprisings. This was the case with the New People’s Army, led by the Communist Party of the Philippines,” until its 1992 rectification campaign brought it back to the concept of Protracted People’s War. 10. The P.A.S.S. Strategy (Politico-Military Fighting Strategy) of Combined Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) Defined and implemented by Mahir Gayan and the founders of the People’s Liberation Party/Front of Turkey, and adopted by several orga- nizations in the 1970s and '80s (Dev Yol, Dev Sol, MLSPB, THKP- People’s Revolutionary Vanguards, etc.). According to this strategy, the guerilla remains primary up until the stage of traditional warfare, and other forms of struggle (political, economic, democratic, and ideologi- cal) are subordinate to it. The PASS strategy is divided into three stages: ‘© The creation of the urban guerilla (itis easier to build up a fighting force in a city, armed actions there will resonate more, the social terrain is better disposed to accept and understand high-level actions). ‘© The guerilla spreads throughout the entire country, and alongside the urban guerilla a rural guerilla is established. (This will play a more important role because a rural unit can 17 _Ievas primarily in Mindanao inthe early 1980s thatthe NPA rejected the strategy of, Protracted People’s War and ina subjectivist manner forced a transition from the “defensive” phase to the phase of the "strategic counter-offensive.” Small mobile NPA units that were firmly anchored amongst the people were prematurely combined into battalions within ‘which PCP cadres were supposed to take on military responsibilities for which they were insufficiently prepared. The Party's clandestine structures came out ofthis severely weakened, nd the major NPA battalions, which were easy to identify, suffered heavy losses from an ‘enemy that was far from being on the verge of defeat withdraw and develop by progressively integrating peasants onan ongoing basis, while the urban guerilla, which must scatter to clandestine bases following each action, cannot hope to establish an ongoing relationship with the masses or develop into a people's army.) ‘* The transformation of the guerilla forces into a regular army. LL. The Strategy of Protracted Revolutionary Warfare Defined and implemented by fighting communist organizations in Europe. Based on the principles of Maoist Protracted People’s War but with the major difference of giving up on any form of rural guerilla (and with it the idea of the countryside encircling the cities), by replacing liberated zones with clandestine networks in mass organizations (trade unions, ete.), by the greater importance given to acts of armed propa- ganda, and by adopting new organizational relationships between Party- and military-oriented work (to the point, in some cases, of rejecting the traditional separation between Communist Party and Red Army and developing the idea of the Fighting Party, justified by the new political quality of armed struggle), ete. ‘This highly schematic list is not meant as a “catalog” from which one has to choose some ready-made formula. Every particular situation calls for a particular response. Each concrete case will contain elements from dif- ferent strategies, either due to inertia (the survival of old methods), or alternately because the struggle causes new methods to crop up, meth- ods that will only be theorized and systematized after the fact. The most ‘we can hope for is that this list serve as a guide. It will be noted that these strategies can be divided into two broad categories: those that seek to bring things to a head in one battle (insur- rectionary strategies) and those that seek to settle matters through a series of battles and campaigns (guerilla strategies)" Each of these broad categories comes with its own deviation: a right-wing deviation in the case of insurrectionary strategies, which are sometimes adopted by forces affected by opportunism as a way of postponing the confrontation with those in power; a left-wing deviation in the case of guerilla strate- gies, which are sometimes adopted by forces affected by subjectivism in order to avoid doing the work required to root themselves in the class. X. REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND DOGMA In and of themselves, neither the insurrectionary nor the guerilla school of strategy is necessarily dogmatic, nor is either one necessarily undogmatic. Each school has “its own” dogmatic adherents, and what stands 18 Inthe debate we had previously (about the document from the (a)PC1), we had to consider the idea that the Bolshevik Party had been pursuing a people's war strategy ‘without knowingit”—the 1917 insurrection coreesponding to the thied phat (the general- sued offensive) ofthis strategy. Thisis avery interesting idea, but we have not been abeto pursue the kindof historical investigation that would be required to evaluate t. Amongst the «questions that would have tobe answered for us: Between 1905 and 1917, did any aspect of the Bolshevik Party's ine parallel that of protracted war fs did that aspect sigaiticantly contribute othe Party's development? The Bolshevik Party did engage in armed struggle (helering militants, liquidating informants, fundraising operations), but what was the objec: tive and subjective ality (he importance that thishadin the eyes of cadres, of militants of the masses)? Did any armed activities persist between 1908 and 1917? 4 out in each case is that dogmatic interpretations of the strategic option are the product of forces which are developing an opportunist practice behind their warlike rhetoric. 1. Regarding Insurrection Amongst true-believers in “insurrection theology,” the latter is some- what like the horizon: the more they move towards it, the further it moves away. By separating the medium-term objectives from the (sup- posed) long-term objective—armed insurrection—they are developing alline that might strengthen the Party and its influence in the medium term as regards Party-oriented work, the organization of advanced work- cers, tactics in mass struggles, ete.—but which objectively hinders the emergence of those objective and subjective conditions necessary for the revolutionary crisis that will set off the insurrection, 2. Regarding Protracted War Some “Maoists” propose aping Mao's Protracted People’s War in con- ditions (politico-historical, socio-economic, geographic, ete.) that are far removed from those in the dominated countries, and then they con- stantly put off initiating the armed struggle with the pretext that the sup- posedly necessary “preconditions” are lacking. At times certain substi- tutes for armed struggle will appear, for example borrowing spectacular forms of propaganda (a hammer and sickle in flames on a mountainside overlooking a city) used by forces (in the case of this example, the PCP) that actually do wage armed struggle. That is when we see this real abuse oflanguage occur, whereby declarations are made that a group is waging a “people’s war” even though it is not carrying out any armed actions.” 19 ‘This snot only problem amongst dogmatists, We experienced the same thingin our previous debate: the (n)PCI claims tobe in the “frst phase" of people's war and yet not only