THE SIEGE OF THE THIRD
dst) LT Se) bd

 

An Account and Analysis
THE SIEGE OF THE THIRD
PRECINCT IN MINNEAPOLIS

An Account and Analysis
THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS is motivated by a discussion that took
place in front of the Thied Precinct as fires billowed from its windows
‘on Day Three ofthe George Floyd Rebellion in Minneapolis. We oined
«group of people whose fre faces beamed in with joy and awe from
across the street. People of various ethnicities sat side by side talking
about the tactical value of lasers, the “share everything” ethos interra

cial unity in fighting the police, and the trap of innocence” There were
no disagreements; we ll saw the same things tha helped us win. Thou:

sands of people shared the experience of these battles. We hope that
they will carry the memory of how to fight. Bur the time of combat and
the celebration of victory is incommensurable with the habits, spaces,
and attachments of everyday life and its reproduction. Ie is frightening
how distan the event already feels from us. Our purpose here is to pre

sceve the strategy that proved victorious against che Minneapolis Third
Precinet.
 

Our analysis focuses on the tactics and composition of the crowd
that besieged the Thitd Precinct on Day Tivo ofthe uprising. The siege
lasted roughly from 4 pm well into the early houts of the morning of
May 28. We believe thatthe tactical retreat of the police from the Third
Precinet on Day Three was won by the siege of Day Two, which exhaust-
ced the Precincr’ personnel and supplies. We were not present for the
fighting char preceded the retreat on Day Thre, as we showed up just as
the police were leaving, We were across the city in an area where youth
‘were fighting the cops in vit-for-tar battles while trying to loot a stip
mmall—hence ou focus on Day Two here

CONTEXT

“The lase popular revolt against che Minneapolis Police Department
took place in response to the police murder of Jamar Clark on Novem:
ber 15,2015. Iespurted ewo weeks of untest that lasted until December
2. Crowds repeatedly engaged the police in ballistic confrontations
however, the response tothe shooting coalesced around an occupation
‘of the nearby Fourth Precinct. Organizations like dhe NAACP and the
newly formed Black Lives Matter aserted their contol over che crowds
that gathered: they were often at odds with young unafiiated rebels
who preferred to fghe the police directly. Much of our analysis below
focuses on how young Black and Brown rebels from poor and work
ing-class neighborhoods sized the opportunity to reverse tis relation:
ship. We argue thar chs was a necessary condition for the uprising

George Floyd was murdered by the police at 38th Street and Chi
«ago Avenue between 8:20 and 8:32 pm on Monday, May 25, Demon
trations against the killing began the next day a che ste ofis murder,
where a vigil took place. Some attendees began a march to the Third
Precinee at Lake Street and Minnehaha, where rebels atacked police
vehicles in che parking lor.

“These ewo locations became consistent gathering points. Many

‘community groups, organizations, liberals, progtesives, and leftists
 

 

May 28: The Third Precinct during the day. It was set alight that night,
assembled at the vigil site, while those who wanted co fight generally
¢gathered near the Precinct. This put over two miles between two very
different erowds, a spatial division that was reflected in other areas of|
the city as well. Loorers clashed with police in scattered commercial
‘zones outside of che sphere of influence ofthe organizations while many
‘of the leftse marches excluded fighting elements with che familiae tactic
‘of peace policing in the name of identity-based risk aversion.

‘THE “SUBJECT” OF THE GEORGE FLOYD UPRISING

“The subjece of our analysis is nota race, a cass, an organi

 

movement, bur a crowd. We focus on a crowd for three reasons. Fits,
with the exception of the srect medics, the power and success of those
‘who foughe the Third Precinct did not depend on their experience in
“organizing” or in organizations, Rather, it resulted from unaffiliaced
individuals and groups courageously stepping into roles thae comple
mented each other and seizing opportunities as they arose.

‘While the inital gathering was occasioned by a rally hosted by a
Blackled organization, all of che actions thae materially defeated che
“Third Precince were undertaken afer the rally had ended, carried out
by people who were not affliated with it, There was practically no one
therefrom the usual gamut of selEappoineed community and eligious
leaders, which meant that the erowd was able to transform the situation
freely. Organizations rely on stability and predictability to execute strat
gies thar require great quantities of time co formulate. Consequently,
‘organization leaders an be threatened by sudden changes in the social
conditions, which can make their organizations irrelevant, Organiza
tions—even self;proclaimed “revolutionary” organizations—have an
inceres in suppressing spontancous revole inorder to recruit from those
who ate discontent and enraged. Whether i isan elected oficial, a re
ligious leader, a “community organizer” ora lest representative heir
message to unruly crowdsis always the same: wait

‘The agency thac cook down the Third Precinct was a crowd and
not an organization because its goals, means, and ineemnal makeup were
not regulated by centralized authority. This proved beneficial, as the
«crowd consequently had recourse to more practical options and was
freer to create unforeseen intemal relationships in order to adapt to che
conflice at hand. We expand on this below in the section vtled “The
Paccern of Battle and ‘Composition’”

“The agency in the streets on May 27 was located in a crowd be
cause its constituents had few stakes in the existing order that is man
aged by the police, Crucially, a gang eruce had been called after the
first day of untest, neutralizing territorial barriers to participation. The
crowd mostly originated from working-class and poor Black and Brown
neighborhoods. This was especially tue of those who threw things a
the police and vandalized and looted stores. Those who do not identify
as “owners” of the world chat oppresses them are more likely to fight and.
steal from it when the opportunity arises. The crowd had no interes in
justifying iself to onlookers and ie was scarcely inecrested in “signify
ing” anything to anyone outside of self There were no signs or speech-
«s only chants that served the tactical purposes of “hyping up” ("Fuck
12s") and interrupeing police violence with strategically deployed “in

nacence” (“Hands up! Don't shoot!)
ROLES
‘We saw people playing the following roles
Medical Support

“This included sere medics and medics performing triage and urgent
care ata converted community center two blocks away from the pre
«inet. Under different circumstances, this could be performed at any
nearby sympathetic commercial, religious, or not-for profit establish
ment. Alternatively, acrowd ora medic group could occupy such aspace

for the duration ofa protest. Those who were organized as street medics
did nor interfere with the tactical choices of the crowd. Instead, they
consistently treated anyone who needed theit help.

Scanner Monitorsand Telegram App Channel Operators

‘This is common practice in many US cities by now, but police scanner
monitors with an ear for strategically importane information played
4 critical role in setting up information flows from the police to the
<rowd. Ics almost certain that on the whole, much of the erowd was
nor practicing the greatest security to access the Telegram channel. We
advise rebels to set up the Telegram app on burner phones in order to
stay informed while preventing police stingrays (als cell phone tow
1s) from gleaning their personal information,

Peacful Protestors

“The non-violent tactics of peaceful protesters served two familiar aims

and one unusual one:

«They created a spectacle of legitimacy, which was intensified as
police violence escalated,

+ They created a font line chat blocked police artempts to advance
when they deployed outside of the Precinct.

+ In addition, in an unexpected turn of affairs, the peaceful procs
tors shielded those who employed projectiles.

‘Whenever the police threatened tear gas or rubber bullets, non-violent
protesters lined up a che frone with their hands up in che ait chanting
“Hands up, don’t shoot!” Sometimes they kneeled, but typically only
during relative lulls in the action, When the cops deployed outside the
Preciness, their police lines frequently found chemselves facing line
‘of “non-violent” protestors. This had the effect of temporarily stabil

ing the space of conflict and gave other crowd members a stationary

0
target. While some peaceful protestors angrily commanded people ro
stop throwing things, they were few and grew quiet asthe day wore on.
‘This was most likely because the police were targeting people who threw
things with rubber bulles early on in che conflic, which enraged the
crowd. e's worth noting tha the reverse has often been the ease—we are
used to secing more confrontational tcties used to shield those prac
ticing non-violence (eg. at Standing Rock and Charlottesville). The
reversal of this relationship in Minneapolis afforded greater autonomy
to those employing confrontational tactics.

Ballistics Squads

Ballistics squads threw water borles, rocks, anda few Molotov cocktails
at police, and shot fireworks. Those using ballistics didn’t always work
in groups, bur doing so protected them from being targeted by non-v-
‘lene protestors who wanted to dictate the tates of the crowd. The

ballistics squads served three aims:

+ They drew police violence away from the peaceful elements of,
the crowd during moments of escalation.

+ They patiently depleted the police exowd control munitions.

+ They threatened the physical safety of the police, making it more

costly for them to advance.

“The first day of the uprising, chere were aetacks on multiple parked
police SUVs at che Third Precinct. This sensibility esumed quickly on
Day Two, beginning with the throwing of water bores at police officers
positioned on the roof of che Thitd Precinct and alongside che build
ing. Afer the police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets, che
ballistics squads also began to employ rocks. Elements within the crowd
dismantled bus bench embankments made of stone and smashed them
up to supply addtional projectiles. Nightfall saw the use of fireworks
by a few people, which quickly generalized in Days Three and Four.
“Boogaloos” (Second Amendment accclrationists) had already briefly
‘employed ficeworks on Day One, but from what we saw they mostly sat
icouton the sidelines thereafter Finally. itis worth noting thatthe Min-
neapolis police used “green tips” rubber bullets with exploding green
ink tips o mark lawbreakers for later arrest. Once it became clear that
the police department had limited capacity to make good on its threat
and, moreover, that the crowd could win, chose who had been marked
hhad every incentive to fight like hel to defy the police.

Laser Pointers

In the grammar of the Hong Kong movement, those who operate la
st pointers ate referred to as “light mages” As was the case in Hong
Kong, Chile, and elsewhere in 2019, some people came prepared with
laser pointers to attack the optical capacity of the police. Laser point

«rs involve a special rsk/rewaed ratio, as it is very easy to track people
using laser pointers, even when they are operating within a dense and.
active crowd at night. Laser pointer users are particularly vulnerable if
they ateempe eo target individual police officers or (especially) police
hhlicopeers while operating in small crowds; this is sill the case even if
the entire neighborhood is undergoing mass looting (the daytime use of
high-powered lasers with scopes remains untested, co our knowledge)

“The upside of laser pointers is immense: they momentarily compromise
the eyesight of the police on the ground and they can disable police
surveillance drones by interfering with their infrared sensors and ob-

stacle-detection cameras. Inthe latter case, a persistently lasered drone
may descend tothe earth where the crowd can destroy it. This occurred,
repeatedly on Days Two and Three. Ifa crowd is particularly dense and
visually difcule co discern, lasers can be used to chase away police heli

<copters This was successfully demonstrated on Day Three following the
retteat ofthe police from the Thitd Precinct, as well as on Day Four in
the vicinity of the Fifth Precinct bate

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Barricaders

Barricaders built barricades out of nearby materials, including an im-
pressive barticade that blocked the police on Minnchaha Avenue just
north of Lake Street. Inthe latter eas, the barricade was assembled out
‘of atrain of shopping carts and acarc-recurn station pulled from a near

by parking lot, dumpsters, police barricades, and plywood and fencing
materials from a condominium construction site. At the Third Pre-
«inet, the barricade provided useful cover for laser pointer attacks and
rock-throwers, while also serving as a nacural gathering point for the
crowd to regroup. Atthe Fifh Precinct, when the police pressed on Foot
toward the crowd, dozens of individuals filled che street with a mult

rowed barricade. On the one hand, thishad the advaneage of preventing
the police from advancing further and making arests, while allowing
the crowd to regroup out of reach of the rubber bullets. However, i
quickly became clear that the barricades were discouraging the crowd
from retaking the street, and it had co be partially dismantled in order
to facilitate a second press toward the police lines. Iecan be difficult co
coordinate defense and aeack wishin a single gesture.

Sound Systems

Car sound systems and engines provided a sonic environment that en:
livened the crowd. The anthem of Days Two and Three was Lif Boosi’s
“Fuck The Police” Yer one innovation we had never seen before was
the use of car engines to add to the soundscape and “rev up” the crowd.
‘This began with a pick-up truck with a modified exhaust system, which
was parked behind the crowd facing away from it. When tensions ran
hhigh withthe policeandit appeared that the conflce would resume, the
driver would red line his engine and make i roar thunderously over the
crowd. Other similarly modified cars joined in, as well as afew motor
eyeliss

8
 

curfew.
Looters

Looting served three critical aims.

Firs, i liberated supplies to heal and nourish the crowd. On the.
fist day, rebels attempted to seize the liquor store directly aeross from
the Thitd Precinct Theie success was brief asthe cops managed to re-e-
cure it, Early in che standoff on Day Two, a handful of people signaled
their determination by climbing on top of the store to mock the police
from the roof, The crowd cheered at this humiliation, which implicily
set the objective for the rest ofthe day: to demonstrate the powerless
ness ofthe police, demoralize them, and exhaust thei capacities.

‘An hour oF 50 later looting began at the liquor store and at an
Aldi a block avay: While a majority of those presen participated in the
looting, ie was clear that some rook it upon themselves to be strategic
about it. Looters at the Aldi liberated immense quantities of bortled
‘water, sports drinks, milk, protein bars, and other snacks and assembled
‘huge quantities ofthese items on street corners throughout the vicini-
ty: In addition to the liquor store and the Aldi, che Third Precinct was
convenienty situated adjacent to a Target, a Cub Foods, a shoe store,
4 dollar store, an Autozone, a Wendy’, and various other business.
‘Once the looting began, it immediately became a part ofthe logistics of
the crowd’ siege on the Precinct.

Second, looting boosted the crowds morale by creating solidarity
and joy through a shared act of collective transgression. The act of gift
giving and the spire of generosiey was made accesible co all, providing
4 positive counterpoint o the head-to-head conflices with the police.

‘Third, and most importantly, looting contributed to keeping the
situation ungovernable, As loosing spread throughout the city, police
forces everywhere were spread thin. Their artempesto secure key targets
‘only gave looters fie rein over other areasin the city, Like a fist squece
ing water, the police found themselves frustrated by an opponent that

expanded exponentially,

6
Fires

‘The decision to burn looted businesses can be seen as tactically intelli
‘gent. Ie contributed co depleting police resources, since the firefighters
forced to continually extinguish structure fires all over town required
heavy police escorts. This severely impacted their ability to intervene
in situations of ongoing looting, the vast majority of which they never
responded to (the malls and the Super Target store on University Ave
‘bing exceptions). This has played out differently in other cities, where
police opted not to escort firefighters. Pethaps chs explains why dem
‘onstrators fred in the air around firefighting vehicles during the Watts
rebellion.

Inthe eas of che Third Precince, che burning ofthe Autozone had
‘wo immediate consequences frst, it forced the police to move outinto
the streecand establish a perimeter around the building for freighter.
‘While chs diminished the clash a he site ofthe precinct, it also pushed
the erowdl down Lake Street, which subsequently induced widespread
looting and contributed to the diffusion of the riot across the whole
neighborhood. By interrupting che magnetic force ofthe Precinct, che
police response to the fre indirectly contributed to expanding the rot

actos the city.
‘THE PATTERN OF THE BATTLE AND “COMPOSITION”

‘We call the bares of the second and third days ar the Precinct a siege
because che police were defeated by atrtion. The pattern of the battle
‘was characterized by steady intensification punctuated by qualitative
leaps due to the violence ofthe police and che spread ofthe conflict into
looting and attacks on corporate-owned buildings. The combination
‘of the roles listed above helped co create a situation that was unpolice
able, yee which the police were stubbornly determined to contain, The
repression required for every containment effort intensified the revolt

and pushed it further out into the surrounding area. By Day Threeall of

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the corporat infrastructure surrounding che Third Precince had been
destroyed and the police had nothing buta “kingdom of ashes” to show
for ther efforts. Only their Precinct remained, a lonely target with de

pleted supplies. The rebels who shovsed up on Day Three found an ene

my teetering on the brink. Alt needed was afnal push

Day Two ofthe uprising began with a rally: attendees were on the
streets, while the police were stationed on top of their building with
an arsenal of crowd control weaponry. The pattern of struggle began
during the rally, when the crowd tried to climb over the fences that pro:
tected the Precinct in order ro vandalize it. The police fred rubber bul-
letsin response as rally speakers called for ealm. After some time passed
and more speeches were made, people tied again, When the volley of
rubber bullets came, the crowd responded with rocks and water bores,
“This sct off a dynamic of escalation that accelerated quickly once the
rally ended, Some called for non-violence and sought co interfere with
those who were throwing things, bue most people didn’t bother arguing
with them. They were largely ignored or else the reply was always the
same: “That non-violence shit don’t work!” Infact, neither side ofthis
argument was exactly correct: as the course ofthe bate was to demon:
strate, both sides nceded each other to accomplish the historic feat of
reducing the Third Precinct to ashes.

Ie important co note thatthe dynamic we saw on Day Two did
not involve using non-violence and waiting for repression to escalate the
situation, Instead, a number of individuals stuck their necks out very
far to invite police violence and escalation. Once the crowd and che
police were locked into an escalating pattern of conflict, the objective
‘of the police was to expand their territorial control radiating outward
from the Precinct, When the police decided to advance, they began by
throwing concussion grenades a the crowel asa whole and firing rubber
bullets at those throwing projectiles, setting up barsicades, and fing
wear gas.

“The intelligence of the crowd proved iselfas participants quickly
learned five lessons in the cours ofthis strugle

”
Firs, iis importane co remain calm in che face of concussion gre
nades as they are not physically harmful if you are more than five feet
away from them. This lesson extends to a more general insight about
«tsi governance: don’t panie, a the police wil always use panie against
us. One must react quickly while stayingas ealm as posible.

Second, the practice of flushing tear-gassed eyes spread rapidly
from street medics throughout the rest ofthe crowd. Employing stores
‘of looted bottled water, many people in the crowd were able to learn
and quickly execute eye-fushing, People throwing rocks one minute
could be seen treating the eyes of others in the next. Ths basic medic
knowledge helped to build the crowd’ confidence, allowing them to
resist the tempration to panie and stampede, so that they could return
to the space of engagement.

“Third, peshaps the crowds most important eatical discovery was
that when one is forced to retreat from tear gas, one must refill he space
‘one has abandoned as quickly as possible. Each time the erowd at the
“Third Precinct returned, ie came back angrier and more determined ei
ther to stop the police advance or to make them pay as dearly as possible
for every sep they took

Fourth, borrowing from the language of Hong Kong, we saw the
«crowd practice the maxim “Be water” Not only did the crowd quickly
flow back into spaces from which they had co recreat, bt when forced
‘outward, the crowd did't behave che way thatthe cops did by fxating
‘on tertitorial control. When they could, the erowd flowed back into
the spaces from which they had been forced co retreat due to tear gas,
But when necessary, the crowd flowed away from police advances like a
torrential destructive force, Each police advance resulted in more bus
nesses being smashed, looted, and burned. This meant thatthe police
‘were losers regardless of whether they chose to remain besieged or push
back the erowd,

Finally, che fll ofthe Third Precince demonstrates the power of
uungovernabilty asa strategic aim and means ofcrowd activity. The more

that a crowd can do, the barder twill be to police. Crowds ean maximize

18
their agency by increasing the number of roles thar people can play and
bby maximizing the complementary relationships beeween ther,
Non-violence practitioners can use their legitimacy to temporar-
ily conceal or shield ballistics squads. Ballistics squads can draw police
fire away from those practicing non-violence. Looters can help feed and
hhcal the crowd while simultaneously disorienting the police. In carn,
those going head co head with the police can generate opporeunities for
looting. Light mages can provide ballistics crews with temporary opac-
ty by blinding the police and disabling surveillance drones and cameras.
Non-violence practitioners can buy time for barticaders, whose works
can later alleviate the need for non-violence to secure the front line.
Here we se that an internally diverse and complex crowd is more
‘powerful chan a crowd that is homogenous. We use che term composi=
son to name this phenomenon of maximizing complementary practical
dlversty Ie is distinct ftom organization because the roles are elective,
individuals can shift between them as needed or desired, and chere are
no leaders to assign or coordinate chem. Crowds that form and ight
through composition are more effective against the police not only
because they tend to be more dffcue to contro, bur also because the
ineelligence that animates them responels to and evolves alongside the
really existing situation on the ground, rather than according to preex
isting conceptions of what a battle “ought” to look like. Not only are
“compositional” erowels more likely o engage the police in batles of
atrition, but they are more likely co have che fluidity that is necessary
‘As a final remark on this, we may contrast composition with the
idea of “diversity of tacts” used by che alter-globaization movement.
“Diversity of tactics" was the idea that different groups at an action
should use different tactical means in different times or spaces in order
to work toward a shared goal. In other words, “You do you and I'l do
‘me but without any regard for how what 'm doing complements what
you're doing and vice-versa, Diversity of tactics is activist code for “tol:
crance.” The crowd that formed on May 27 against che Third Precinet

19
did not ‘practice the diversity of tacties” bur came together by connect
ing different tactics and roles to each other in a shared space-time that

«enabled participants to deploy each tactic asthe situation required.

‘THE AMBIGUITY OF VIOLENCE AND
NON-VIOLENCE ON THE FRONT LINES

‘We are used to seeing more confrontational tactics used to shield those
practicing non-violence, asin Standing Rock and Charlottesville or in
the figure of the “frone-linet” in Hong Kong. However, the reversal
‘of this relationship divided the functions of the “militane frone-liner”
la Hong Kong) across two separate roles: shielding the crowd and.
<counteroffense This never rose tothe level ofan explicit strategy inthe
streets; there were no calls to “shield the throwers” In the US context,
‘where non-violence and its attendant innocence narratives ate deeply
cnerenched in serggles against state racism, i i unclear if this sera
«gy could function explicitly withoue ballistics crews frst taking risks
to invite bloodshed upon themselves. In other words, it appears likely
thar che joining of balistis tactics and non-violence in Minneapolis,
‘was made possible by a tacitly shared perception of the importance
of selfsacrifce in confronting the state that forced all sides to push
through chet fear

Yee this shared perception of risk only goes so far. While peace
ful protesters probably viewed each others gestures as moral symbols
against police violence, ballistics squads undoubeedly viewed those
gestures differendy, namely, as shields, or as materially strategic oppor
tunities. Here again, we may highlight the power of the way that com:
position plays out in real situations, by pointing ou how ie allows the
possibility char rorlly diferene understandings of the same tactic can
coexist side by side. We combine without becoming the sume, we move
together without understanding one another and yet it works

“There are potential limits to dividing frone-liner functions across

these roles, Fits it doesnt challenge the valorization of suffering in the

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poles of nonviolence. Second, leaves the value of ballistic confion
tation ambiguous by preventing om coalescing na stable roe at the
front ofthe crowd. lei undeniable that che Third Precinet would not
have been taken without balls tactics. However, because che front
line was identified with non-violence, che spatial and symbole impor
tance of ballistics was implicitly secondary. This leaves us to wonder
‘whether dis has made i easier for counterinsurgeney t0 take root in
the movement through “community policin
self policing of demonstrations and movements within the bounds of

non-violence

 

and its corollary, the

FACT-CHECKING: A CRITICAL
NECESSITY FORTHE MOVEMENT

‘Werbelieve tha the biggest danger facing the current movement was a:
ready presenta the Baee ofthe Third Precinet—namely the danger of
rumors and paranoia, We maintain that the practice of "fet checking”
is crucial for the current movement to minimize confusion about the
terrain and ingernaldiserut about its own composition.

We heard a liany of rumors throughout Day Two. We were told
repeatedly that riot police reinforcements were on their way to kettle
us, We were warned by flecing crowd members cha the National Guard
‘vas “twenty minutes away" A white lady pulled up alongside us in her
van and scteamed “THE GAS LINES IN THE BURNING AUTOZONE
ARE GONNA BLOwWW!"” All ofthese rumors proved ro be false. AS
expressions of panicked anxiety, chey always produced the same effec:
to make the crowd second-guess their powet I was almost as if certain
members of the cowd experienced a form of vertigo in che face of che
power that they nonetheless helped to forge.

Tei necessary to interrupt the rumors by asking questions of those
repeating chem. There are simple questions that we can ask to ale che
spread of fear and rumors that have the effect of weakening the crowd,

“How do you know this?” *Who told you this?” “What isthe source

2
‘of your information?” “I chs a confirmed fier?" “The evidence seems
inconclusive: what assumptions are you using to make a judgment?”

Along with rumors, theres also the problem of acsibutingdispro:
pportionate importance to certain features of the confit. Going into
Day Two, one of the dominane storylines was the threat of “Boogaloo
‘boys? who had showed up the previous day. This surprised us because
‘we didn’ encounter them on Day One, We saw half dozen of them on
Day Two, bur they had relegated themselves tothe sidelines ofan event
that outstripped them. Despite their proclaimed sympathy with George
Floyd, couple of chem later stood guard in front ofa business to defend
it from looters. This demonstrated not only the limit of thir claimed
solidarity, bu also oftheir strategic sensibility.

Finally, we awoke on Day Three to so-called reports that either
police provocateurs oF outside agitators were responsible for the pre
vious day’s destruction. Target, Cub Foods, Autozone, Wendy’, and a
half-constructed condominium high rise had all gone up in lames by
the end ofthe night. We cannor discoune the possibilty that any num:
ber of hostile forces sought to smear the crowd by escalating the destruc
tion of property. IFthat is tue, however, it cannot be denied that hei
plan backfired spectaculaely

In general, the crowd looked upon these sublime fires with awe
and approval. Even on the second night, when the condominium de
velopment became fully engulfed, the erowd sat acros from it on 26th
“Avenue and rested as if gathered around a bonfire. Each structure fire
contributed co the material abolition of the existing state of things
and the reduction to ash became the crowds seal of victory: Instead of
believing the rumors about provocateurs or agitators, we find it more
plausible thar people who have been oppressed for centuries, who are
poor.and who ae staring down che barrel ofa Second Great Depression
‘would rather set che world on fre than suffer the sight of es order. We
inenprer the struceure fies as signifying thatthe erowd knew thatthe
structures ofthe police, white supremacy, and class are based in material

forcesand buildings.

2
May 29: The beauty supply section of a looted Walgreens on Lake Street, just east
(of the Third Precinct.

 
For this reason, we maintain that we should asses the threat
posed by posible provocateur, infiltrators, and agitators on the ba-
sis of whether their actions directly enhance or diminish the power
of the crowd. We have earned that dozens of structure fires are not
‘enough to diminish “public support” for the movement—though no
‘one could have imagined this beforehand, However, those who filmed
crowd members destroying property or breaking the hw—regardless of
whether they intended to inform law enforcement agencies—posed a
material threat to the crowd, because in addition to bolstering confi
sion and fear, they empowered the state with acess o information.

POSTSCRIPT: VISIONS OF THE COMMUNE

Ever since Guy Debord 1965 tex “The Decline and Fal ofthe Spects
«le-Commodity Economy” there has been a ich tradition of memorial:
izing the emergence of communal social life in riots, Riots abolish cap
italise social relations, which allows for new relations between people

and the things that make up theie world, Here is our evidence.

When the liguor store was opened, dozens came out with cases of beer,
which were set on the ground with swagger for everyone to share. The
crowed’ beer afeboice was Corona

We saw a man walk calmly out of the store with hoch arms ful of
whiskey. He gave onc to each person he passed as be walked off to rejoin the
“fight. Some ofthe empried liquor bortleson the treet were later thrown at
the police.

With buildings tame all around us, a man walked by and said to no
one in particular, “That tobaco shop used to have a great deal on loses.
oh well. Fuck em.”

We saw 4 woman walking a grocery cart fill of Pampers and steaks
bck oer house. A group that was aking a mack and water break onthe
corner clapped in applause as she rolled by.

Afra group opened the Autozone, people sat inside smoking ciga-

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retesas they watched the battle between cops and rebel from bebind the
_front window. One could see them pointing back and forth benween the
police and elements in the crowd as they spe and nodding in response to
cach other Were they sceing the same things we were seeing?

We shopped for shoesin the ransacked storeroom ofa looted Foot Look-
r The floor was covered wall to wal with half destroyed shoeboxes, tissue
per and shoes. People called out for sizes and types as they rummaged.
Wespentffcen minute justo finda matching pair until we heard the din
ofbatle and dipped.

On Day Three, the floors ofthe grocery stores that had been partially
‘burned out were covered in inches of iprinkler water and afoul mis of food
shat had been thrown fom she shelves Still people in ran boots could be

_found inside combing over the remaining goods like hey were sopping for
deals. Gleaner helped each other step over dangerous objects and, again,
shared their lot outside.

As the police made their rereat, a young Somali woman dressed in
rational garb celebrated ly digging up a landscaping bri and uncere-
‘moniously heaving through a busstop shelter window. Her fiends—abio
sradivionallydressed—rased their fists and danced

A masked shirtless man shipped past the burning Precinct and
pumped bis fists, shouting, “Covi 15 OVER!” while twenty fet ausy,
some teenage gnk took a group self. Instead of saying "Chee! they said
“Death tothe pigs!” Lasers flashed across the smoke filled sky ata police
Arlicopter overhead.

We pased a liquor store that was being loted as we walked away

_from the best party on Earth. A mother and her va young teenagers rolled
‘up in their car and asked if there was any good booze left “Hell yea! Get
some!" The daughter grinned and said, Come on! TI elp you Mommy!”
They donned their corto masks and marched off

A day later, before the assault on the Ff Precint, there was mass
Looting in the Midsown neighborhood. A young kid who couldn’ be more
‘than seven or eight years old walked up tous with a whiskey bottle sporting
arag coming out the top. "Vall gota light?” Welaughed and aed, “What

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do you wanna hit?" He pointed toa friendly grocery stove and we asked if
oe could find “an enemy target” He immediately turned to the US Bank
across the street.

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