197.-stop-hunting-sheep-smarter-security-culture.pdf
Web PDF • Imposed PDF • Raw TXT (OCR)























reating
etworks



Informant: « person recruited by

police to provide information

+ Isamember(s), friend(s), or
associate(s) of group

# Referred to as ‘Confidential
Source’ or ‘Confidential Infor-
mane by police

Infilteator: A person who infilrates a

group by posing asa genuine member.

‘© May be military, police, intelli
gence, corporate, private contrac-
to, ‘patriot

«May be citizen facing
imprisonment

‘Snitch: Someone who gives up in-
‘criminating evidence to authorities.

Snitch Jacket: Reputation for being
an informant. Is used both in police
Jargon and street slang. Jacket comes
“from the “fie jackets” that were used
‘by the police prior to computerization
“of records. Uhe phrase has part ofits
“origins in the police interrogation
tactic of threatening criminals who
will not cooperate. Ironically police of
_ficers have been known to threaten to
‘publicize or have correctional officers
publicize that a perpetrator’s “jacket”
says they are an informant to get them
ainform.

Network: 4 social structure made
Lup of individuals (or organizations)
called “nodes’, which are linked
(connected) by one or more specific
{types of interdependency. Radical

Networks may have comples links
based on friendship, sharing living
space, common interest, common
organizational practice, membership
in organizations, shared identity,
sexual relationships and connections
to. physical space,

5 Basic Infiltrator Types

1. Hang Around: less active, a
tends meetings, events, collects
documents observes listens

2. Sleeper: low-key at first, more





3. Novice: low political analysis,
“helper; builds erust and ered.
ibility over longer term

4, Super Activist: out of nowhere,
now everywhere. Joins multiple
groups or committees, organizer

5. Ulera-Militant: advocates mili-
tant aetions & conflict
* Agent Provocateur: incites
illegal acts for arrests orto
discredit a group or movement

Light Undercover: may have fake
ID, more likely to return to family life
on weekends, ee,

Deep Undercover: fake goo" issued
ID, employment & renting history, te.
«May have job, apartment, part-
net, or even family as part of
undercover role
# Lives role 24-hours day
for extended time (with
periodic breaks)

Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks 1
“GOD: I own you like Lown the caves.
THE OCEAN: Nota chance. No comparison.

GOD: I made you. Icould tame you.
THE OCEAN: At onetime, maybe. But not now.
GOD: I wil come to-you, freeze you, break you.
THE OCEAN: Iwill spread mysef lite wings. Lam a
billion tiny feathers. You have no idea what's happened to me!
Dave Eggers






Part %: An Introduction

Ir must be made clear thar if there is one thingto take from this pamphlet,
there are no fool proof methods for routing out undercover'sand informants.
“This pamphlet is about exploring possibilities or countering covert investigative
efforts initiated or assisted by police. The objective of counteringall aspects of
state-led intelligence gathering is not inherently to reveal undercover activity
bur to create a safer and less penetrable network to operate out of. Dialogue
about this issue need to be addressed with a bit of finesse as there are many
dangers, disservices and fruitless avenues people worried about undercover
investigative operations can explore. Its clear that our practices in dealing with
undercover investigations need invigorated theoretical and practical attention
in a manner that we can communicate across our personal networks. In the
last several years undercover operatives have been suspected or confirmed in
radical networks across the country. In the courtrooms, holding cells and on
the gallows, or navigating new worlds free from imposition and misery, we will
realize itis only us who can organize our own safety and only our choices that
can prepare us for freedom.

“There appears to be arise in known infiltration investigations in North
American radical networks, with thorough destabilizing effects on our ca-
pacities to struggle, comrades facing heavy repression and of course, the less
obvious consequences on our personal mental states. The place that we start
is with dialogue. We realize that organizing in radical environments has led
‘many of us to have experiences already with undercover operatives. We have







2 Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks
allrtically thought aboue dealing with them, and had personal experience or
have heard historical stories of individuals and networks that have dealt with
them in the past. We all come from unique organizing environments, and
both our networks and police investigative operations are incredibly dynamic.

“The need for dialogue and personal reflection on methods to provide greater
protection for ourselves and the networks we organize out of has become an
unavoidable dilemma to confront. Our analysis of the shifting terrain thae
makes our networks grow and disband, and thorough communication of these
understandings to other radical networks are our strongest tools for subverting
covert police operations.

‘A pamphlet that deals with addressing ways to combat undercover
investigative work needs to explain the role of an undercover in relation to
much broader investigative efforts of police. Le. undercover's and informants,
do nor exist in vacuums. They are not lone gunmen vigilante types. They are
‘employed in specific investigations to gather information, build cases against
people and possibly destabilize the effectiveness of a network. Ifthere is an
undercover operative in your network, they are a visible manifestation of a
larger investigation which often but not always includes surveillance operations,
{groomers and handlers, and people working on the more technical aspects of
information gathering. In the case of a recent undercover police operation, it
hasbeen revealed thar the undercover was always in very close proximity to 1wo
other police officers, while in the presence of people in the radical neeworks
they were embedded in. They also had a handler who they met with morning
and night to review notesand make daily objectives, and there were many more
police involved in surveillance operations.

“There are also various types of covert operatives that have infiltrated and
destabilized both radical and criminal organizations. Briefly, there are both shal-
low and deep undercover’. Informants that range from people imbedded deeply
in radical movements that decide to switch sides and build cases as well as former
allies that role under repressive pressure. These notes only deal with informants,
and police who are entering neeworks, not states witnesses and heavily embedded
informants who have developed a long history of trust. The question of how to
‘reate necworks that are uncompromisingly free of snitches, people who cross the
line and states witnesses need to be addressed on a more Fundamental eve in dif-
ferent settings. For various case studies, research Anna Davies, Jacob Ferguson,
William O'Neal, Rob Gilchrist, Dave Hall, Jay “Jaybird” Dobyns, Alex Caine,
Brendan Darby, Brenda Dougherty, Khalid Mohammad, Andrew Darst.

Protecting your safety is protecting everyone's safety. The goal of
anarchist agitation isto build a social force that has the potential to destroy
hierarchical institutions and paradigms with solidarity. Other goals include:
building infrastructure and autonomous space, to intervene in conflict,
push tensions to conflict, and to realize the potentials and interconnected-
ness of our personal and collective freedom. Anarchists expose that liberal
concepts of individual freedom are predicated on dominance and apathy



Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks 3
towards others, whereas individual freedom as an anarchist concept cannot
be severed from the collective, but ean also only be personally defined.
‘An example of this can be seen in offensive struggles and the relevance
of solidariey central to the anti-authoritarian spirit. Attacking police for
instance in Vancouver, isa direct act of solidarity with people in Guelph or
anywhere else who face the same institutions of repression. Through these
attacks, the weakening and the example of insolence has implications on
the infallibility of police as enforcers of social morality and our collective
ability and agency to fight them and win back decentralized control.

On a similar level, our ability to organize ourselves in a manner that is
effective in staving off the investigative efforts of the criminal justice systen
‘while maintaining a social presence, is interwoven with our concepts of free-
dom. Ihave heard people who have just been deale the devastating effects of
undercover police pillaging their social network say, “she lesson to learn is that
I need to distance myself from people Lam not confident in and work on projects
with people I know well” The issue is that if we see undercover operations as 2
threat to our personal freedom only, we make half efforts that remove ourselves,
from danger and leave our networks open to attack. If we individually inves-
tigate and critically examine al che links in our networks instead of removing
‘ourselves from parts of them, we provide a greater security to our network and
ourselves. We are strengthened by the acts of mutual aid and solidarity, they
protect usand at che same time make us more dangerous and uncontrollable.

“Let the pigs join our activist group, they can cook our food and wash our
dishes. They arent going to get shit, because Igot nothing to ide.” Wis till fairly
prevalent idea that covert police investigations don't really harm necworks if
the more clandestine culture within these networks stays well sealed from
the outside. Le sick them on the activist groups or if you are concerned about
someone, let them stay involved in a peripheral way as longas they dont get
close. The concept comes out of the conceited notion that the militant is the
center of investigative efforts. This logic does not consider that criminal inves-
tigations into anti-authoritarian networks are meant not just to criminalize
militant resistance, but destabilize and undermine the networks themselves
and ereate social profiles.

“The mentality of the Lasez-fare anarchist in relation to investigative efforts
‘comes out oflaziness, not wanting to upset the herd, not wanting to make yourself
look like a person who is concerned about police investigations, not wanting your-
selfto look lke you are snitch jacketing someone, not having the tools to inquire
further about someones background, and feeling helpless or isolated and probably
‘other reasons as well Ie is human to have these feelings and rationalities bur i is
ultimately the most dangerous thing to do. In the absence of being routed out of
networks, covert operatives end up building credentials through association, build
ing intensive social profiles on everyone, finding pressure points to cause tension
and conflict within networks, entrapping people, and monitoring our daily lives
from the comfort of our living rooms















4 Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks
A final note: There may be people in your network that
youtare uncomfortable with or hnd disruprive to organizing
efforts. They may not be an undercover operative but still
need to be confronted or removed from an organizing
capacity to provide safery or a more functional network.

[though the goals may not be the same, the destabilizin
effects of these relationships on networks have similar effects
and should be openly discussed.



‘Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks 5
“Thank you for teaching us that,”
against power, the only lost battle

isthe one not fought.”



The Practical Side of a
Safer Network

‘We attend discussions, read information on and do research about the
history of repression in radical networks at least partially wo learn practical
lessons that apply to our life. Below isan attempt to develop an incomplete set
of guidelines for discussion which can be adapted and applied to our networks
today.

Briefly we have included some broad suggestions for tools that may be
helpful in aiding personal efforts to create a stronger base of safety.

6 Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks
Building your Toolbox

«Understand and research the different types of risks that are posed.
from undercovers informants and state witnesses.

«Research the historical case studies and impacts of undercover’, infor-
mants and snitches on social movements and underworld tendencies.

«Review relevant police literature on investigative techniques, to gain in-
sight into ways undercover police operations may function and to develop
investigative techniques to use in combative ways and gain security.

«Review literature and ongoing discussions related to security culture.

+ Examine the history of organizing methods used in radical networks,
revolutionary organizations in different eras and places and compar-
ing them to modern affinity-based organizational models of today’s
anarchist networks

«For historical examples research: OCAP, Os Cangaceitos, Rote
Zora, The A.LF/E.LE, The Red Army Faction, The LR.A., The Black
Panthers, Insurrectionary Anarchism, Autonomist movements and
‘Anti-fascist resistance in occupied Europe during WWI Or read
books such as We Are dn Image Of The Future, The Subversion Of
Politics, Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret War Against the Black
Panther Party and the American Indian Movement, Black Mask & Up
Against The Wall Motherfucker, Argentina's Anarchist Past: Paradoxes
(of Utopia, Conftonting fascism: Notes On a Militant Movement Direct
Adtion...et.

Security Guidelines for Discussion
“Ie is easy to bit a bird flying in a straight line.”
“B. Gracian
‘This isa security guideline for developing safer networks into 6 parts for
farther discussion. There will never be single solutions. This model may provide
suggestions that guide a more secure practice. Ultimately, these structured ways
‘of creating more secure networks must be very dynamic to continue relevance.
As investigative efforts adapt, so do our practices to stay ahead.

‘They are:

Creating a base of safety list

Creating a network map

Tactics for further inquiry

Communicating with your base

Communicating with a potential police informant
Concluding action



AVAWNE

Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks 7
Jill’s Base of Safety
Network Map
Example



LEGEND

O Base of Safety

Need Slightly More
Communication

Need alot of
communication

Links between people

= Who is close with
who

Living Together

Group or Project Membership
¢ ¢ © ¢© Books to Prisoners

‘oa © Food Not Bombs


Sheilag

ore

oo,
Create a Base of Safety List

Create alist of people that are involved in your neeworks.
‘Asking yourself series of structured questions which reveal your level
of safety with an individual in the network

who are the people close to you?

how do you know them?

who are your comrades (people you work on projects with)?

twho are the people you likely enter confrontation with?

what is their historical connection to you?

how did you meet, where did you meet?

through which people were you introduced?

have you met their other friends from different social networks?

have you met their families?

‘can people you trust verify their history?

are there aspects of ther life you have a hard time communicating

about or verifying (work, home, vebicle, aspects oftheir past)?

+ have you clearly talked about and are satisfied with the intentions of
the people you organize with on the projects you mutually work on?

+ do-you like how they communicate to others about similar experiences
you have had with them?

+ “doyou have a strong sense of trust? why?

‘You will now have divided lists of people. Some of which you were at ease
answering the above questions forand feel very secure and rusting with: Thsis your
base of safety. Other people on the list you may know varying degrees of information
about buthave revealed that aspects of thee life or the way you relate to them may
bealoof'to you. You want to communicate more with them before adding them
to your base of safety. You will realize that a hierarchy of knowledge and safety
will probably develop, where some people may just need small conversations to
feel more secure with, and other people may need alot of effort to revel safety.

(Ona personal level investigative lst like these re formal extensions of our
choices in ascociation we make mentally ona daily bass. This exercises to sharpen
‘ourability co make informed and critical choices about the people we associate with.
“Thegoalsin chese assessment questions are to critically understand the socal relations
that make up day-to-day interactions with the broader network you commonly relate
to. Analyzing relationships in this manner maybe effective in both mapping and
realizing a network of relative saery, while exposing aspects of people you want to
lear more aboutin the hopes of them becoming safe links in your network. The
use of exercise ike this affirms a base of safety and allows for pro-active individual
research, preferably in periods of relative calm. Taking the time and energy to do
this work are steps towards critical and empowering choices related to our safety
thar steal agency from the rips of paranoid haplessness and fear.



10 Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks
Create a Network Map

Place the list of people in your network on to a network map. Use 3
different color pens or markers to write peoples names on the map, depending
on whether they are on your new base of safety, or someone you would like to
know more about before adding them to your list.



Colour 1) Base Of Safety
Colour 2) People that need slightly more communication with
Colour 3) People that require a lot of communication.

Now create links using more colors to reveal the perceived conne:
of people within the network.



Colour 4) Who lives together

Colour 5) Who are people closest to you in the network

Colour 6-2) Use markers to define project membership to the best of your ability.
Le I marker will be used to connect the member of your local Food Not Bombs
group, while another marker willbe used to define the Books to Prisoners group.

Note: It would be foolish to include clandestine organizational efforts
in this list.



‘Your completed map will now reveal several details:

+ Thelevelat which people are embedded in your networks by the amount

and types of links they have.
«The types of social connections that people have to each other in a
network.
Ir could reveal...

«That someone you are interested in more communication with is also
close to people that are on your base of safety.

+ There are people you or other people in your base of safety organize
with that have tentuous social connections.

+ Doyounced help from people in your base of safety toassistin the inquiry?

‘Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks 1
Tactics for further inquiry

Ikis imperative to see the people you want to know more abouts people
with the potential tobe in your safety network. Ifyou believe that there is no
‘way you will ever feel safe with that person in your network, there are probably
more issues than just untrustworthy behavior. Consider talking with very close
friends from your base of safety about options, such as, removing that person
from your network, or having a discussion with the person around why you
do not want to organize with them.



Sort Questions

Soft questions are meant to be asked in subtle and undetected ways
and are aimed at revealing information in a way that masks intention of the
questioner,

“Think about the environment and atmosphere and attempt to control the
environmental variables for the questions. A relaxed and comfortable person
is more likely going to have their guard down. They are more likely going to
indulge you to keep up the pleasantries of conversation. Itisalso impossible to
detect shifts in body language and facial expression when people are stressed
out. Subtle and benign questions focused around the direction of aspects of
their life that you would like to know more about may help. If you want to
understand their past better, for example, during a friendly conversation you
could steer the direction of conversation to your family history, and maybe
ask questions like: What is your mom's name? Did she keep her maiden name
ors that your dads last name too?

Haro Questions

Hard questions are meant to be interrogative. They are meant to put the
person you are communicating with on edge, to let them know that you are
serious about retaining information.

‘These types of questions are aimed at revealing information through
implied coercion. They work with questions that you can verify in the
moment. Where were you born? Where did you go to primary school?
What is your birthday? What is your middle name? What job do you
have? Give me your parents phone number and wait here with me while I
verify the informati



12 ‘Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks
PrysicaL SURVEILLANCE

«License plates and VIN numbers
# Addresses for surveillance (garbage checks, visits)
Refer to Tracking and Monitoring Supplement™



Case Stupies:

On the East Coast a freedom of Information request led
to the deduction of an operational informant, and through
investigative efforts they narrowed their search and surveilled
4 potential informant until confirmation.

In Pittsburgh during the lead up to the G-20 a pop
questionnaire was put on everybody that attended a meeting.
When one person could not answer the questions adequately,
they were asked to leave the meeting and disappeared from
the network.

When traveling to some networks in Europe it is common
for people to ask you for background checks involving phone
numbers of people close to you and other verifying information
before you enter the network.

A license plate check through the Ministry of Transpor-
tation in Ontario may reveal who the owner of a car is, and
whether the car is a fleet vehicle or belongs to a company that
deals with law enforcement

Research in Guelph related to verification of Brenda
Dougherty asa student at the local university, could have oured
her as an undercover as early as September 2009.









Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks 13
Communicating with your base

“Lihink shes a cop.” “Why?” “did you see the clothes she was
wearing, and she asked me what I thought about how the
demo went.” “Dre you wasted!”

Contrary to the very common, very uninformed snitch-jacketing that
{goes on in anti-authoritarian networks, we need to develop a security model
that limits paranoia through gathering intelligence and communicating in ways
that refrain from alarm and sensationalism,

All communication approaches are contextual, these suggestions are
based on personal experience and reflection and may not apply.

“The importance and delicacy of communication with your network
can not be understated. Security issues have a way of bringing out irrational,
frustrated and upsetting tendencies within most people. It is hard to broach a
conversation that focuses on the idea that a person you know could potentially
be manipulating and deceiving you for malicious purposes and in many ways
can cause strong tension and divisions amongst the network.

In my experience with conversations related to dealing with potential
undercover’, there was alwaysa strong sense of division and frustration amongst
close friends on how to approach the person, if at all. With this knowledge,
think about ways to disarm and de-escalate potentially divisive conversations,
with people before you have them. The place to start communication is on the
{ground floor of general inquiry with explanations that build cases for more
research on an individual or add people to a position on your base of safety

‘Think hard about how you want to reveal information you have to your
very closest comrades, to people who are closest with people you are inqui-
ing about, and of course to the individual you are interested in with the goal
being a zero tolerance for gossip and hurtful rumors. The objective of good
‘communication as is the objective of countering all aspects of Seate-led intel-
ligence gathering is not inherently to reveal undercover activity but to create
safer and less penetrable network. This desire for personal and collective safety
can be helpfal in communication with hostile people in the network over the
desire to find a rat chat may not exist.

14 Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks
Communicating with Potential
Undercover Operatives

Know that ifthey are in your presence and they are working, they very
‘well may not be alone, in terms of recording devices or unseen law en-

forcement.
‘Wait for confirmation before allegations.

‘Watch the ways you threaten people and make choices based on well
thought out plans. Intimidating peace/police officer is becoming a
more widely used charge.

Nor revealing intentions and a friendly attitude can be more appropriate
for gleaning information than interrogative communication.

Concluding action if undercover
informants discovered


“Let us speak, though we show all our faults
and wedbesses,- fortis asign of eiength
to be weak, to know it, and out with it - not
ina set way and ostentatiously, though, but
incidentally and without premeditation.”

W-Herman Melville



‘the posibilites for countering covert
investigative efforts initiated of assisted

by police. The objective of countering all aspectdof
state ed intelligence gathering is not inherently
to reveal undercover activity but to create a safer
and less penetrable network to operate out off

Sprung from discussions following two police
infiltrations into anarchist networks in Southern
Ontario inthe lead up to the G20 summit in
Toronto in 2010, this text offers suggestions on
how to start making your networks safer and
creating an active security culture within our
everyday activities and organizing.

T his pamphlet explores.

y Srens of a



we