135.-categories-of-revolutionary-military-policy.pdf
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CATEGORIES OF
REVOLUTIONARY
MILITARY POLICY





T. Derbent, April 2006
Categories of Revolutionary Military Policy
‘T. Derbent, April 2006
‘Translation by Kersplebedeb

ISBN 978-1-894946-43-8

First printing
Printedin ws.a.



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‘or email info@kersplebedeb.com
Visit the Kersplebedeb website at http://wwwkersplebedeb.com

Guide to illustrations: page iv, barricades in Prague, 1848; page 7, Naxalite guerilla,
India; page 15, Nicaraguan revolution, 1979; page 20, Soviet partisans during Second
World War; page 23, demonstration against police, Italy; page 29, peasant guerillas,
China 1930s; page 34, member of Sendero Luminoso, Peru 2005; page 36, New People's
Army, Mindanao; page 38, partisan during Second World War.
Preface by Kersplebedeb

‘The following essay, by the Belgian revolutionary communist T. Derbent,
isan unusual and valuable contribution to understanding, renewing, and
rebuilding the revolutionary option.

‘The term “revolutionary” is used here to refer to something precise,
namely action and reflection intended to bring abouta revolution, a hege-
monic change in the way society is organized, “bottom lining” the goals,
ofliberation and building a new way of life for all.

Military policy is a prerequisite for revolutionaries—in the sense
that, withoutit, there can be no successful revolution. Those who neglect
it, who think away from itas we so often do, may have nice ideas, but they
are neglecting a question that will be necessary to address ifthey are ever
to put those nice ideas into practice in a durable manner. Indeed, would-
be revolutionaries who have no military policy are not revolutionaries
at all, but only more people with political opinions. While Derbent does
not belabor this point, it underlies everything addressed here.

This essay is based on a talk given in Brussels at an event organized
by the Bloc Marxiste-Léniniste in April 2006, and subsequently pub-
lished in two parts in the Bloc ML’s magazine Clarté (#5 May 2006
and #6 December 2006). It was subsequently translated into German,
Greek, and Italian, being debated and discussed by comrades through-
out Europe, mainly within the Marxist-Leninist tradition,
‘The present translation constitutes the first time this text is being
made available to an English-reading audience—and specifically, to a
North American one. The history of armed struggle in the united states
and canada is necessarily different from that elsewhere; obviously, this
is not Italy, or Algeria, or Nepal. The armed experience here has always
been defined by the realities and contradictions of settler-colonialism,
the tension between the ongoing anticolonial resistance and the fact that
any movement here must find its way on terrain claimed by the coloniz-
ex's society.

Furthermore, as in any overview of such a dense area of knowledge
and activity, this is not an exhaustive study. More to the point, it is a
study with a specific goal: to introduce us to the concepts of military
doctrine, and to explain how these have been used and misused by revo-
lutionary forces. Although the author mentions objective factors, there is,
no discussion of historical materialism or broader historical patterns or
dynamics; for example, the relationship between global changes in the
means of production and distribution, and the inevitable calling up of
completely new forms of struggle from military doctrine to individual
tactics. Likewise, the author presupposes revolutionary organization,
but doesn’t have the space to go into what revolutionary class organiza
tion means in military practice (and vice-versa, dialectically).

Yet it would be a cop-out to hold this specificity against the text, or
to dismiss Derbent’s educational endeavor as a “European view” of little
practical interest to those of us on Turtle Island. That is because this is
not a “how-to-do-it,” but rather a “how-to-study-it,” paper. Surveying
military experiences in various times and places—with particular atten-
tion paid to that period of the twentieth century marked by the existence
of “real existing socialism” and ubiquitous anticolonial revolutions—in
order to distill those elements, questions, and dilemmas that reoccur
time and again; ice, those that are universal. Laying out the background
and consequences of already developed revolutionary policy consider
ations, in order to help us apply the lessons learned to our own context.

As such, this paper does not provide answers, it simply clarifies what
some of the questions will be for those who choose to develop a revolu-
tionary practice.
Derbent proceeds from the larger to the smaller, from the more gen-
eral to the more specific. In this order, he defines and discusses revo-
lutionary military policy (an overall military orientation & activity),
military doctrine (a war plan), military development (organization of
practical activity), the science of war (recognizing universal laws that
always apply), the art of war (experience & mastery of the practice of
warfare), strategy (a specific plan to achieve military goals in the existing
overall situation), operational art (which connects strategy and tactics),
and tactics (the means by which operations are carried out). The author
examines how these different concepts are related to one another, how
they have been articulated in different circumstances, and to what effect.

‘This is far from a rah-rah, inspirational pep talk relying on heroic
examples of rebel armed struggle. Instead, itis of necessity fairly abstract,
and formal—otherwise it would be 440 instead of just 40 pages long.
In particular, its terminology conforms to professional military usage. A
graduate of the u.s. army's command & staff college at Fort Leavenworth
‘would be at ease reading this paper, whose terminology and frame of
mind would be familiar to them. While, on the other hand, a revolution-
ary who has never read Clausewitz along with Lenin and Mao's military
writings (“Lessons of the 1905 Uprising,” “Strategic Problems in the
AntiJapanese Guerrilla War,” ete. ) might find it difficult going.

All the more reason why it should be read, studied, discussed, and
built upon by comrades here.

Categories of Revolutionary Military Policy
by T. Derbent

“Itis true that at times the officers, exaggerating the relative impotence of
intelligence, forget to use it.” Commander Charles de Gaulle, 1936

“Studying books is one way oflearning; applying what we have learnt is
another, even more important way... Our most important way is to learn
to wage war by waging it...” —Mao Zedong, 1936

I INTRODUCTION
Dear Comrades,

Louis XIV had the words “ultima ratio regum” engraved upon his can-
rons: the final argument of kings. Every social revolutionary project must
think ahead to the question of armed confrontation with the forces of
power and reaction. To put off making such a study because “the time
is not right yet” for armed confrontation, amounts to making choices
(political, strategic, organizational) which risk, at that point when “the
time will be right” for armed confrontation, leaving the revolutionary
forces powerless, vulnerable, with characteristics that will be totally
inadequate. Choices which risk leaving them open to defeat.
Organizations that claim to be revolutionary but which refuse to
develop a military policy before the question of confrontation becomes a
practical reality, disqualify themselves as revolutionary forces. They are
already acting as gravediggers of revolution, the quartermasters of stadi-
ums and cemeteries.’

‘Therefore, the subject of this presentation is revolutionary military
policy, which we can define as the analysis, the preparation, and the use of
armed force in the service of the revolutionary objective.

‘The question of revolutionary military policy is being discussed once
again. Whether it isa matter of studying the Protracted People’s Wars led
by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist type parties (in Peru, Nepal, India, or else-
where), whether itis in re-examining the experiences of the urban gue-
rilla in the imperialist metropoles over the past thirty years, or in other
ways, debates about revolutionary military policy are experiencing a
slight comeback. Even if the positions coming out of these debates remain
very different (from the reaffirmation sine variafur of the insurrection-
ary principles of Lenin and the Comintern, to the crude appropriation of
recent experiences in the dominated countries), this renewed interest in
the question of revolutionary military policy is both good and necessary.

Yet revolutionary military thought remains anemic. Its propositions
are the bastard progeny of historical methods (based on experience,
which is based on historical antecedents with all the risks of dogmatism
and conservatism that that implies) and philosophical methods (based
on theory, which proceeds deductively with all the risks of subjectivism
that that implies), methods that are used with no methodological or epis-
temological remove.

Witness the amorphous body of theory, with notions, for exam-
ple, like “strategy,” “military policy,” “military theory,” and ‘military

1_Aswellar the rightwing deviation that rejects thinking about strategy at this pointin
time that eveals (and which ends up bringing abou) the fact hat evolutionary struggle has
bbeen reduced to the mos trivial kindof protest, ther x alsa left-wing deviation that rejects
the need to think about strategy beforchand. This deviation occurs amongst revolutionary
forces which are anarchist, militar, subjective, te and which claim that thinking about
strategy “divides” revoltionaries who can only be united through action. In the heyday of
facoism, some even claimed that thinking about strategy was a "bourgeois preoccupation,


doctrine” all employed as if they were interchangeable. ‘The theoretical
ambiguity is such that it permits, by means of an abuse of language, real
political manipulations, as we saw when we analyzed the document from
the (n)PCI [the (New) Italian Communist Party—translator] in our previ-
ous discussion,

‘This presentation is not about what today’s revolutionary military
policy should be. Itis intended to be atool to assist ina rigorous, methodi-
cal, and scientific evaluation of revolutionary military policy.

‘The limits of this presentation are plain to see. Inand of itself, itis not
tied to any particular line, but itis dealing with a field where categories
are based on analyses and political-theoretical choices. The old debate
about whether or not such a thing as proletarian military science exists
is an example of this problem. Between the left-wing deviation, which
denies that there is anything valid in the body of military science elabo-
rated under the bourgeois regime, and the right-wing deviation which
prostates itself before bourgeois military thought, there is a narrow path
which has yet to be made clear.

What's more, as soon as it abandons its basis in precise strategic
thought—meaning its basis in a concrete analysis of a concrete situation,
which means connected to political practice—then the author's efforts
will amount to nothing but abstract theory. But to the degree that this
presentation isa tool, it will be how it is used, that isto say its application
in concrete situations, that wil allow us to identify and get rid of those
categories that are of only academic interest. As Maurice Biraud said, in
the film Un taxi pour Tobrouk, “an uneducated person who walks will go
farther than two intellectuals who remain seated.”

Right?

We're off...

2. This wasa debate that initially involved Trotsky opposing Stalin and Vorachilovin 1918,
and then Frounzé in 1921
IL. OBJECTIVE FACTORS, SUBJECTIVE FACTORS
‘The first thing to note regarding revolutionary military policy sits inher-
ent limits, We know that the counter-insurgency command is happy to
draw upon the ideas of Colonel Trinquier. But these ideas are crudely
antidialectical, and conceive of revolution as the result of a conspiracy
consisting of two types of person: the “agents” of subversion and the
“masses” who they manipulate. According to Trinquier, revolutionary
crises break out at the point that the underground command decides:
that’s when it plays its hand.

In fact, revolutionary crises break out due to a combination of objec-
tive and subjective factors. More often than not, the revolutionary forces
are surprised by the rush of events. Such was the case in the crisis of
1905, which caught the Bolshevik party by surprise and without any
military structure; it was the case in 1917 (we know how hard Lenin had
to fight within the party—especially against Zinoviev and Kamenev—
to move towards insurrection); the magnitude of success at Santa Clara
(September-December 1959) came as a great surprise to the Castroist
guerillas; the same with the general insurrection in Managua in 1979.
Preparations and actions by the party are indispensable for a revolu-
tionary victory, but they are never enough to explain the revolutionary
phenomenon. A revolution is first and foremost the expression of a soci-
ety’s internal contradictions. This is why Lenin held the position that no
insurrection was possible if the ruling classes were not already ina severe
political crisis, unable to govern as before, and if the oppressed classes
‘were not pushed to revolt by a decline in their living conditions. The fail-
ure of counter-revolutionary subversive wars shows how important these
socio-historical conditions are (failure in that they have never brought a
counter-revolution to power by means of “people's” war, though they may
have contributed to the process by destroying the economy in Nicaragua
and Mozambique).


Il. MILITARY DOCTINE
‘The first thing the Party’ must decide upon is its military doctrine, The
military doctrine is the articulation of opinions held by the Party as to
its political evaluation of the problems related to the war in question,
the Party’s attitude towards this war, its definition, the organization and
preparation of the Party’s forces, the choice of its strategy and methods.
Its, to use the Clausewitzian term, its war plan.

It follows that what military doctrine is chosen will depend on the
socio-historical situation. At the time of the Nazi invasion, the European
Communist Parties (CPs) were “configured” for a doctrine of “internal”
(national) class struggle and so they had decided upon a proletarian-
insurrectionary strategy, i.e. primarily legal parties supplemented by
clandestine military structures. This setup was not suited to the new
conditions and led to heavy initial losses (the Belgian Communist Party
was decapitated by Operation “Sonnenwende”), and the CPs were then
forced to improvise a practice of protracted people's war.*

‘The Party's military doctrine can be defined as the answer to the fol-
lowing questions:

1. Who is (and who will be) the enemy?

‘This is based not only on an analysis of the State and its forces, but also
ona class analysis of society (to define the possible attitudes of the inter-
mediate classes), an analysis of the international situation (to determine

3 Whetherornotacass Party is necessay forthe socal evolutions eriticallyimportant
question, but one that is beyond the scope ofthis presentation. As isthe equally important
question of whether ifwe deem the Party tobe necessary) establishing such aParty

isa necessary precondition fr commencing the armed confrontation, For the sake of
convenience l am sing he term “Party” het, butif one prefersone could understand this as
seaning’ force," “organization, “movement, ec

4 Theachiovements ofthe CPs once the embarked upon this new path were remarkable:
they were able to militarily organize large masses of people despite fsrce repression, What
limits the use ofthese examples for the futuce isthe fac thatthe CPs were emphasizing
[National Liberation rather than Socialist Revoltion: this won them support from large layers
ofthe petit bourgeoisie and the peasantry that would have been hostile tothe dictatorship of|
the proletariat.
how much support the State can expect from the imperialist bourgeoisie
as well as what forces might intervene to assist the revolutionary camp),
ete.

2. What is (and will be) the nature of the war to come?

Willit bea “pure” class struggle right from the very get-go, with the prole-
tariat facing the bourgeoisie in a struggle to the death? Willit be a strug-
glein which the class dimension is associated with a national dimension?
And ifso, then will some process unite these two dimensions or will they
‘occur in two different stages (a national liberation stage where itis “only”
a matter of getting the occupation forces to leave and a social stage where
it is a matter of destroying the reactionary forces)? Will it be a struggle
with both a democratic revolution stage and a proletarian revolution,
stage? And if so, then will these be two separate things or will there be
two distinct stages (a stage where the proletarian forces can count on
large sections of the middle classes joining the revolutionary camp, and
a stage where the proletariat will have to fight on its own to establish its
dictatorship)?

3. What are the objectives and the missions that the armed forces will under-
take as a result?

Destroy the enemy's armed forces? Make the human and/or material
cost of the war too high for the enemy? A combination of the above (for
example: destroy the domestic bourgeoisie’s armed forces and discour-
age possible foreign intervention by acquiring the means necessary to
make the war too costly for them)? Limit armed activity within the
nation’s borders or integrate it within a regional strategy? Ete.

4, What are (and will be) the armed forces necessary at first, and what kind
of organizational and technical developments will be required to reach this
stage? What will be the armed forces necessary in the later stages of the war,
and what military, organizational and technical developments and what
kind of internal process will this require?
Itis not just matter of numbers, but also of what kind of forces these will
be—militias (of workers and/or peasants) and/or regular units—and of
their relationship to the Party—organic unity between the political and
the military or the (relative) separation of the armed wing, for instance
in the form of a Red Army.

5. How should the Party prepare?
Not only in terms of its internal organization (clandestinity, choices
about internal process in terms of Party democracy and discipline, mili-
tarization of some of its cadres and militants, separation into cells, cre-
ation of an ad hoc security and intelligence apparatus, etc.), but also in
terms of bringing together different resources, ete.

6. What will be the strategy and the methods used to wage and win this war?
Guerilla warfare? Insurrection? A coup? ete. This must be based upon
an analysis of the politico-military balance of power (objective and sub-
jective factors, such as the will to fight). It must also be based upon an
analysis of the impact of geographic, economic, social and other factors
on the ability of the forces in question to move, to strike, to gather infor-
mation, to hide, to concentrate their forces, to disperse, to fall back, to
communicate, ete.


IV. MILITARY DEVELOPMENT
‘The Party’s military doctrine effects its military development, which
includes all aspects relating to its military force:

1. Organizational Aspects

In the case ofa strategic decision in favor of a “Fighting Patty,’ a“Politico-
Military Party,” or a"Militarized Party”: thought must be given to how
the Party's structures are set up in order to tailor them to both political
and military work.

‘© Inthe case of a strategic decision in favor of a Party control-
ling a distinct military force’ (an embryonic Red Army), this,
distinct structure needs to be created, or, at the very least,
thought must be given as to how to prepare for its creation
Gcelection of cadres, ete.).

‘© Inall cases: either bringing the Party underground or
preparing to bring it underground; training cadres for
underground work; establishing a clandestine structure
(cafehouses, documents, communication); adopting security
measures (separation into cells, etc.)

2. Military Aspects

Acquiring the military resources (weapons, equipment) required or
beneficial for the military doctrine, and/or making plans and preparing
methods and connections to make these resources available at the appro-
priate time’ (for example: plans to attack a barracks); providing all cadres,
with an introduction to military questions and providing military train-
ing to specific cadres.

“The theory held by the European fighting communist school of thought
“The theory held by one section ofthe Marxist-Leninist- Maoist school of thought
‘The theory held by the other communist schools of thought.

“The appropriate time is ot necessarily the chosen time: it can be imposed by the enemy's
Initiative, such as the Nazi coup in 1933 which pre-empted the insurrection the KPD had
been preparing.
3. Economic and Logistical Aspects

Acquiring the economic and logistical resources (money, housing, vehi-
cles, means of communication, of making false papers, etc.) required or
beneficial for the military doctrine, and/or making plans and preparing
methods and connections to make these resources available at the appro-
priate time.

4. Political Aspects

Implementing a program of politically preparing the Party's militants
and cadres for the war defined as necessary or desirable by the military
doctrine.

5. Scientific and Technical Aspects
Acquiring the scientific and technical resources required and/or avail-
able (to produce weapons and equipment required by combat and clan-
destinity, to intercept enemy communications and to protect one’s own
communications, etc.) defined as necessary or desirable by the military
doctrine, or updating plans and methods in order to ensure that these
resources will be available at the appropriate time; training cadres.

6. Ideological and Moral Aspects
‘The ideological and moral preparation of militants, of the sympathetic
masses and of the masses in general, for the war considered necessary or
desirable by the military doctrine. An example of this would be the way
in which solidarity work with revolutionary prisoners can contribute to
the ideological struggle in favor of armed conflict.

7. Internal Process: Discipline and Democracy

Adopting an internal process with forms of discipline and democracy
defined as necessary or desirable by the military doctrine. An example of
this would be the choice made by the Vietnamese communistsin the time
ofthe Resistance to adopt the system known as the “three great democra-
cies.” This allowed them to develop the initiative, the dynamism, and the
creative faculties of cadres and combatants, to reinforce the cohesion and
the solidarity of the armed forces and to increase their combat strength:

‘* Political Democracy: in base units, to regularly hold demo-
cratic meetings, military assemblies where combatants as
well as cadres can voice their opinions about everything
relating to combat, work as well as training, education, and
life in the unit; the cadres have the right to criticize the com-
batants, but the combatants also have the right to criticize
the cadres.

© Military Democracy: in the field and training alike (condi-
tions permitting), to hold democratic meetings in order to
communicate the operational plan to everyone, to allow
people to use their initiative, and to work together to find the
means to overcome difficulties in order to accomplish the
task athand?

‘* Economic Democracy: combatants and cadres alike have the
right to participate in the administration and improvement
of material conditions in an “open book” system.



Revolutionary armed forces normally adopt a system of strict disci
pine, freely consented (0. Discipline that is freely consented to, because
it builds upon the political consciousness of the cadres and the combat-
ants and is largely maintained through a process of ongoing education
and persuasion. This system is such that everyone is motivated to respect,
it and to help each other to observe it. Strict discipline means that all
members of the army, without exception, cadres as well as combatants,
superiors as well as subordinates, must respect it to the letter and nobody
is exempt.

Democracy and discipline should serve to reinforce the military
power of the revolutionary forces. From this perspective, the difference

9 Inbourgeois armies, soldiers only has the right to know what is strictly necessary in
‘order to accomplish their mission, They obey orders because they were trained to do so,
‘Murat didn't bother to explain anything to his guards, he simply shouted "The direction: my
asshole!” and shoved theirhead into their objective.

10
between democracy and “democratism” is essential; the former rein-
forces military power, the latter weakens it.”

V. THE SCIENCE OF WAR
‘The science of war aids the Party in elaborating its military doctrine. This
is the unified body of knowledge dealing with the psychological and

physical aspects of combat. Its contents are organized around two basic



laws:

1. Waris subordinate to political objectives;

2. The result of a conflict depends on the relationship of mili-
tary power (numbers and quality—courage, discipline and
self-discipline, motivation, training—of combatants, quality
and quantity of war matériel, capacity and character of the
leadership, etc.), as well as political, moral, technical, social,
and economic forces.

‘The science of war can be divided into four categories:

1. The study of was, including the history of wars (or more
precisely, so far as we are concerned, the history of civil and
revolutionary wars).

2. The laws of war, meaning those principles which itis impera-
tive to apply onall levels (strategic, tactical, etc.), and those
rules whose application, while desirable, is not always pos-
sible in conditions that make them worthwhile." Meanin,



10 The Spanish Civil War provides numerous examples ofthe disastrous effects of|

"democratism.” For instance, atthe battles of Alto de Leon and Somosierre in July-August
1935 where the mil
superiority in numbers, motivation, equipment and position, but despite all this they were



as refused to attack without first holding a vote... The militias enjoyed,

badly beaten bythe regular units led by fascist officers. The question of "democratism’ was at
the center of Lin Piao’s attack against General Ho Long during the Cultural Revolution.

11 For example, initiative is only worth having if one is able to keep it: the Paris Commune
took the initiative against Versailles, but at the ist setback itbecame clear thatit did not have
the means tokespit, By the same token, surprises only useful ifone is able to exploit, et.

n
=> The principle that the means should be proportional
fo the goal.

=> The principle of freedom of action, which requires
that forces be deployed so as to be able to pursue
their goal without offering a hold for enemy forces,
and which contains certain rules such as bringing
forces together (enabling them to engage in com-
bat as needed); security (constantly seeking intel-
ligence on the enemy, active and passive security
measures, etc,); initiative; mobility; hiding one’s
intentions from the enemy; preventing the enemy
from reacting; establishing reserves; ete.

=> The principle of an economy of force (in other words:
getting the most out of one’s resources by the active
and intelligent use of al forces), which also contains
certain rules: bringing together the greatest possible
resources at the point where the stakes are highest,
by cutting back on secondary fronts;!* concentrat-
ing the use of forces as much as possible; coordinat-
ing all resources in order to multiply their respective
effectiveness; choosing the right moment; choos-
ing the right place; surprise (strategic, tactical,

12. ‘Theuniverslity ofthe principle of economy of forces what gives the guerilla its strategic
‘value The guerilla (and the urban guerilla even more than the raral guerilla) slows for an
‘optimal use of weak forces, and obliges the enemy ta deploy countless forces in orderto guard
potential targsts—and inthis way, obliges to abandon this principle. But ifhy definition
the gues benets from the advantage provided bythe economy offorc, the principle an
and must be applied with care by the gui n the positioning and ue oftheir own forces.
When an insurection (oa coup) enjoys the necessary conditions ofsurpris, too benefits
fiom thisprincipl, which explains how weak forces, fused intelligently can take apart
numerically superior enemy: insucrectionary forces seize certain aeasbuttemporasily
leave othersin the hands of enemy nits, they concentrate theieforces at decisive points and
butles while the enemy; taken by suepriss, has some ofits troops at rest et. Allthe same, the
principle of conomy of force hasts limits, nd there are discrepancies in the relationship of
forces that it cannot overcome
technical through the use of new methods or by an
original or unexpected use of old methods); speed
(which extends the effect of surprise and guarantees
freedom of action); continuity of efforts; exploiting
the enemy's lack of preparedness; ete.

3. The theoretical basis of the Party's preparation for war.

4. The art of war.

VI. THE ART OF WAR

Unlike the science of war to which it belongs, the art of war is not arigor-
ous body of knowledge about phenomena and their laws. As a concrete
activity (not a speculative one), the art of war never encounters two
identical situations: neither the means nor the enemy nor the terrain nor
the socio-economic conditions are ever the same. What's more, war is
not just a confrontation between material forces, it is also a confronta~
tion between wills, between moral forces that often radically modify the
value of the material forces.

‘The principal aspects of the art of war are:

Strategy
‘The art of operations (or operational art)
Tactics

eee

Logistics (relative to movement, positioning, and supplying
the armed forces)

5. Organization (relating to the organization and preparation
of matériel and people)

‘The art of war residesin mastering and articulating these differentaspects
and their specific characteristics. (For instance, being aware of the tacti-
cal importance of establishing reserves given that combat often proceeds
as.a series of engagements, even though strategy demands strict respect,
for the economy of forces, meaning their full use where they might make
accritical difference.)
VII. STRATEGY

Strategy consists of implementing the concepts and recommendations
that emerge from the military doctrine. To do this, it addresses both
military and non-military problems, it transforms the Party's military
strength (a quantitative concept) into military power (a dynamic, non-
quantifiable concept), and it takes the place of military doctrine as soon
asthe combat begins.

‘Therefore, strategy has:

1. This definition: the proper use of combat in pursuit of the
aims of the war.

2. This starting point: the will to obtain the greatest result, as
quickly as possible and with the least cost, by efficient use of
force—strategy therefore obeys the law of economy of force.

3. These means: Successful operations (made possible by the
correctness of the strategic analysis and obtained by revolu-
tionary forces mastering operational art and tactics) which
are then exploited militarily, politically (propaganda, etc.),
and organizationally (integration of new combatants, ete.).

4. These principles: the (absolute) importance of superiority at
key points (one cannot “attack everything” or “defend every-
thing”); the (relative) importance of surprise and subterfuge;
keeping the goal in proportion to the forces and obstacles.

5. This goal: objectives that should lead to peace, which in the
case of revolutionary war means destroying the enemy forces
and breaking the enemy’s will to fight.



Nothing guarantees that the means will advance towards the goal; not
every successful operation is necessarily a good thing on the strategic
level (for instance, one that leads to an escalation that the revolution-
ary camp is not prepared to handle—foreign intervention for example).
Strategic analysis determines what operations should be carried out, and
in what framework.

Other than the principles and rules ofthe art of war, of which strategy
isa key part, strategic analysis is based on its own criteria. These include:
1. The laws that govern warfare. Listed above, they are objec-
tive and apply equally to both sides.

2. The nature and characteristics of the war to be waged; the
distribution of forces (social, military, political, ete,, actual as,
well as potential, in both qualitative and quantitative terms);
its prospective duration, intensity, and scope ; the possibi
ties of foreign intervention (friendly or hostile); geographic
and social conditions, ete.

3. The Party’s preparedness for war.

4. Material and technical assets (military resources, tech-
niques, information, cadres, combatants, scientists).

5. Leadership of the forces.

6. The choices the enemy is likely to make, for the strategic
domain consists of the belligerents’ actions and reactions.



On this basis, strategic analysis means:

1. Ameticulous calculation of the risks involved; specifically,
this means anticipating how as the revolution progresses
there will be a qualitative escalation on the part of the
counter-revolution (torture, extrajudicial executions, etc.);

2. Always keeping operations perfectly in line with the politi
cal-military goal (i, not reacting on the basis of prestige);

3. Preparing fallback position;

Resolution once the action is initiated;

5. Being flexible about what methods/resources to use when
faced with unforeseen developments.





+


VIII. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY
What are the general principles of revolutionary strategy? We can list five:

L

Itis based on the primacy of the political over the military
(and this goes beyond the general principle of subordinat-
ing military options to political objectives: itis a matter of
politics being primary across the board; as such, the political
education of revolutionaries is more important than their
military education; the political-ideological impact of an
operation can be more important than its material effect,
military operations can be suspended but political work
must never stop, ete);

Itis based on the primacy of people over things;"*

Itis based on the primacy of the interior (what is happening
within the country, what is happening within the class) over
the exterior;

Itis always concerned with its connection to the popular
mass

Regardless of the main form of struggle adopted (insur-
rection, guerilla, ete), no form of struggle is neglected:
mass struggle (strikes, demonstrations), guerilla warfare,
traditional warfare, sabotage, legal struggles, psychologi-
cal warfare, covert warfare, terrorism, and insurrectionary
movements.

Its goal is the total destruction of the enemy's armed forces.
Unlike other forms of war, the revolutionary war is a war
of annihilation which cannot be ended by making a deal or
holding peace talks with the enemy.



13. In China’s People’s Liberation Army, these theses were spelled out in the system known

asthe four primacies" primacy of people over things, of political work aver other activities,

ofideological work over other forms of political work, and ofliving ideas over booklearning

within ideological work
1X. THE PRINCIPAL REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES
To speak a bit more concretely, we will quickly go over the principal
revolutionary strategies that have been theorized since the proletariat’s
entrance on the historical scene. I have counted eleven, though this is,
somewhat arbitrary as certain categories could be subdivided to make
new ones.

1. The Blanquist Insurrectionary Strategy.

‘The most advanced example of this strategy is the Blanquist strategy,
theorized in the Manual for Armed Insurrection." A small group of armed
conspirators (between 500 and 800 in the May 12 uprising in 1839)
strikes when it thinks the people are subjectively ready for insurrection,
acting in the place of the unorganized proletariat. They take control of
the armories and distribute weapons, striking at the head of the political
power structure and its agents of repression (attack on the police head-
quarters), systematically erecting barricades and organizing the masses,
who rally to the insurrection, On a tactical level, Blanqui relied heavily
on barricades—a decision which was correctly criticized by Engels. The
passive tactic of barricades was pursued by the revolutionary proletariat
up until 1848; the only way it could have succeeded would have been if
large numbers of soldiers from the bourgeois army had decided to desert
and cross over to the insurrectionary camp.

2. The Strategy of the Insurrectionary General Strike.

Bakunin’s legacy (whether acknowledged or not), which aimed to bring
about the abolition of the State through a single collective action, prefera-
blya general strike. Such an insurrection would be set offas a result ofthe
spontaneity of the masses. According to this strategy, the insurrectionary

14 Theway
tooverlookthefact that the Blanguist taking up ofarmsistheintermediae step between the



which Lenin denied accusations thathe was Blanquist” should not ead us
[Babouvian conspiracy and the Leninistinsurrection. The "Blanguist epithet that Plekhanov
and Martov threwat Lenin had veryltte to dowith true Blanguism, Whatt meant, in the pot

{cal vocabulary ofthe day, was that one was in favor of conspiratorial rather than mass action,
general strike will occur when the masses are subjectively ready, and this,
subjective disposition will allow all the objective questions (military,
organizational) to be easily resolved thanks to the masses’ revolution-
ary creativity. This strategy also relies on a large-scale breakdown of
bourgeois power, this too being due to the subjective disposition of the
‘masses (mass desertions from the army, etc.). This strategy was proposed
anew in the interwar period by the Revolutionary Syndicalists, and has
also reappeared at times amongst the “mao-spontex” and within the
Bordiguist ultraleft.

3. The Strategy of Exemplary Terrorism.

Practiced by a tendency within the anarchist movement and by the
Russian populists. It is based on either the actions of individuals or of
a secret organization—and is always lacking any organic connection to
the masses. Their only way of connecting to the masses is through the
example their actions provide, or the attitude of their militants when
faced with repression, and, eventually, some declarations. The terrorist
strategy was able to hit reaction at its highest points, provoking terror
amongst the enemy and winning the admiration of the masses, butit has,
never been able to translate these factors into forces able to overthrow a
government. Historically, this strategy has only ever produced failures:
one does not “wake up” the revolutionary layers of the masses without
organizing them.

4, The Leninist-Comintern Insurrectionary Strategy.

First implemented in October 1917 and meticulously theorized thereaf-
ter (notably in the collective work Armed Insurrection signed “Neuberg”),
this was the strategy adopted by the Communist parties in the 1920s and
"30s. It integrates and systematizes the analyses of Marx and Engels (and
the lessons of experiences like 1905) by bestowing a central role on the
vanguard Party which will work to bring together the elements neces-
sary for a successful revolution (raising the revolutionary consciousness
of the masses, political and military organization of the masses notably
by creating a Red Guard, training and equipping shock troops and using

18
these instead of barricades, setting up an insurrectionary headquarters,
drafting battle plans, determining the right time to strike, ete.). This strat-
egy met with major failures in Germany (1923), China (1927), Asturia
(1934), Brazil (1935), and elsewhere.

5. The Strategy of Protracted People’s War
Ithas three stages: a guerilla stage, strategically defensive (though tacti-
cally very active, consisting of non-stop initiatives); a stage of strategic
equilibrium; a strategically offensive stage during which the revolution-
ary forces are able to wage a war of movement and a (supplementary)
war of position. The specific principles of Protracted People’s War were
outlined as follows by Mao Zedong :

‘© First attack dispersed and isolated enemy forces, then attack
the more important forces.

‘* First establish liberated zones in the countryside, encircle the
cities by the countryside, first take the small cities, then take
the large ones.

‘* Make sure to greatly outnumber the enemy in combat (the
strategy is about how to fight one against ten, the tactic is to
fight ten against one).'*

‘* Ensure combatants have a high level of political consciousness,
so that they will be superior in endurance, courage, and sense
of self-sacrifice.

‘* Make sure to have the support of the people, take care to
respect their interests,

‘* Make sure that captured enemies pass over to the revolution-
ary camp.

15 This principle was theorized by Mao Zedongin On Protracted War and by Zhu De in On
the Anti-Japanese War. But



iap andthe rest ofthe Viet Minh leadership did not agree, andin
any case considered itill-suited tothe Vietnamese situation, The small numbers of Viet Minh
forces often led them to engage with equal umbers of combatants on the tactical level; sue
prise better knowledge of the terrain, and the operational quality oftheir troops (the degree
‘of combat preparedness and revolutionary heroism) being enough to make the difference.

19
'* Use the time between battles to improve, train, and educate
yourselves.

Victorious in Yugoslavia, Albania, China, and Indochina, this strategy
has met with major failures, notably in Greece (1945-49) and Malaysia
(1948-60).



6. The Strategy of the Coup

Relies on the relationship of forces being extremely favorable to the revo-
lutionary party. For instance, in Prague 1948, we can note the presence
of the Soviet Army, the strength and prestige of the Communist Party,
the existence of popular militias (15,000-18,000 armed workers), the
near total infiltration of the National Security Corps and of several army
units, ete. This strategy has the advantage of being infinitely more eco-
rnomical than those which necessitate armed conflict. It can even main-
tain the semblance of legality, which enables the political neutralization
of certain intermediate social strata. The coup generally results from an
opportunity provided by extraordinary historic circumstances rather
than revolutionary strategy theorized as such or elaborated as a model.
‘Nonetheless, in the Third World in the 1960s and ’70s it was systemati-
cally applied by young progressive officers connected in various ways to
the Soviet Union.
7, The Strategy of Armed Electoralism
Based on the theory that a partial seizure of power is possible by legal
means (the condition being that a large mass struggle exists to guaran-
tee democratic rights) and that this partial seizure of power will provide
the revolutionary movement with the tools that, in conjunction with
the resources of the revolutionary forces themselves, will be enough to
censure the advance of the revolutionary process and to hold in check the
reactionary counter-offensive (military coup or foreign intervention).
Organizations that adopt this strategy outfit themselves with a military
potential to ensure a seizure of power which is actually based on legal
methods. General Pinochet did a lot to discredit this strategic hypoth-
esis, which had already experienced a bloody failure with the decimation
of the Austrian Schutzbund in 1934.

8. The Focoist Strategy

A theory based on systematizing the specific experiences of gueril-
Jas active in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Latin America (includ-
ing Cuba). It makes establishing and developing a mobile rural base of
guerilla operations into the central aspect of the revolutionary process.
Focoism is not intended to be universally applicable, and was largely
based on ideas about the duality of Latin American society (the capi-
talist city and the feudal countryside), of the impossibility of establish-
ing liberated zones as was done in Indochina, ete. The guerilla’s mobile
bases are supposed to develop into a people’s army, to encircle the cities
until the regime is finished off by an insurrectionary general strike in the
urban centers. Prior to this coup de grace, the proletariat’s role is limited
to supporting the rural guerilla,



16 Thisbasing a theory on the systematization of specific experiences (often the result of
‘empirical experience, and the product or expression ofthe weaknesses of the Latin American,
revolutionary movement) has been the source ofa lot of confusion. It allowed the most
important theoretician of focoism, Regis Debray, to reject Leninist- Maoist ideas (such asthe
role ofthe class Party) despite these having been insisted upon by the person who, according
to Debray, embodied the focoist “revolution inthe revolution": Che Guevara,
9. The Neo-Insurrectionary Strategy

Emerged following the success of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua.
In the wake of this victory many revolutionary forces either wholly or
partially abandoned the Protracted People’s War strategy—a strategy
that in some cases they had been pursuing for decades—in order to try
to bring things to a head by calling for urban uprisings. This was the
case with the New People’s Army, led by the Communist Party of the
Philippines,” until its 1992 rectification campaign brought it back to the
concept of Protracted People’s War.

10. The P.A.S.S. Strategy (Politico-Military Fighting Strategy)

of Combined Revolutionary Warfare (CRW)

Defined and implemented by Mahir Gayan and the founders of the
People’s Liberation Party/Front of Turkey, and adopted by several orga-
nizations in the 1970s and '80s (Dev Yol, Dev Sol, MLSPB, THKP-
People’s Revolutionary Vanguards, etc.). According to this strategy, the
guerilla remains primary up until the stage of traditional warfare, and
other forms of struggle (political, economic, democratic, and ideologi-
cal) are subordinate to it. The PASS strategy is divided into three stages:

‘© The creation of the urban guerilla (itis easier to build up
a fighting force in a city, armed actions there will resonate
more, the social terrain is better disposed to accept and
understand high-level actions).

‘© The guerilla spreads throughout the entire country, and
alongside the urban guerilla a rural guerilla is established.
(This will play a more important role because a rural unit can

17 _Ievas primarily in Mindanao inthe early 1980s thatthe NPA rejected the strategy of,
Protracted People’s War and ina subjectivist manner forced a transition from the “defensive”
phase to the phase of the "strategic counter-offensive.” Small mobile NPA units that were
firmly anchored amongst the people were prematurely combined into battalions within
‘which PCP cadres were supposed to take on military responsibilities for which they were
insufficiently prepared. The Party's clandestine structures came out ofthis severely weakened,
nd the major NPA battalions, which were easy to identify, suffered heavy losses from an
‘enemy that was far from being on the verge of defeat
withdraw and develop by progressively integrating peasants
onan ongoing basis, while the urban guerilla, which must
scatter to clandestine bases following each action, cannot
hope to establish an ongoing relationship with the masses or
develop into a people's army.)

‘* The transformation of the guerilla forces into a regular army.

LL. The Strategy of Protracted Revolutionary Warfare

Defined and implemented by fighting communist organizations in
Europe. Based on the principles of Maoist Protracted People’s War but
with the major difference of giving up on any form of rural guerilla (and
with it the idea of the countryside encircling the cities), by replacing
liberated zones with clandestine networks in mass organizations (trade
unions, ete.), by the greater importance given to acts of armed propa-
ganda, and by adopting new organizational relationships between Party-
and military-oriented work (to the point, in some cases, of rejecting the
traditional separation between Communist Party and Red Army and
developing the idea of the Fighting Party, justified by the new political
quality of armed struggle), ete.


‘This highly schematic list is not meant as a “catalog” from which one has
to choose some ready-made formula. Every particular situation calls for
a particular response. Each concrete case will contain elements from dif-
ferent strategies, either due to inertia (the survival of old methods), or
alternately because the struggle causes new methods to crop up, meth-
ods that will only be theorized and systematized after the fact. The most
‘we can hope for is that this list serve as a guide.

It will be noted that these strategies can be divided into two broad
categories: those that seek to bring things to a head in one battle (insur-
rectionary strategies) and those that seek to settle matters through a
series of battles and campaigns (guerilla strategies)" Each of these
broad categories comes with its own deviation: a right-wing deviation in
the case of insurrectionary strategies, which are sometimes adopted by
forces affected by opportunism as a way of postponing the confrontation
with those in power; a left-wing deviation in the case of guerilla strate-
gies, which are sometimes adopted by forces affected by subjectivism in
order to avoid doing the work required to root themselves in the class.





X. REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND DOGMA
In and of themselves, neither the insurrectionary nor the guerilla
school of strategy is necessarily dogmatic, nor is either one necessarily
undogmatic.

Each school has “its own” dogmatic adherents, and what stands

18 Inthe debate we had previously (about the document from the (a)PC1), we had

to consider the idea that the Bolshevik Party had been pursuing a people's war strategy
‘without knowingit”—the 1917 insurrection coreesponding to the thied phat (the general-
sued offensive) ofthis strategy. Thisis avery interesting idea, but we have not been abeto
pursue the kindof historical investigation that would be required to evaluate t. Amongst the
«questions that would have tobe answered for us: Between 1905 and 1917, did any aspect of
the Bolshevik Party's ine parallel that of protracted war fs did that aspect sigaiticantly
contribute othe Party's development? The Bolshevik Party did engage in armed struggle
(helering militants, liquidating informants, fundraising operations), but what was the objec:
tive and subjective ality (he importance that thishadin the eyes of cadres, of militants of
the masses)? Did any armed activities persist between 1908 and 1917?

4
out in each case is that dogmatic interpretations of the strategic option
are the product of forces which are developing an opportunist practice
behind their warlike rhetoric.

1. Regarding Insurrection

Amongst true-believers in “insurrection theology,” the latter is some-
what like the horizon: the more they move towards it, the further it
moves away. By separating the medium-term objectives from the (sup-
posed) long-term objective—armed insurrection—they are developing
alline that might strengthen the Party and its influence in the medium
term as regards Party-oriented work, the organization of advanced work-
cers, tactics in mass struggles, ete.—but which objectively hinders the
emergence of those objective and subjective conditions necessary for the
revolutionary crisis that will set off the insurrection,



2. Regarding Protracted War

Some “Maoists” propose aping Mao's Protracted People’s War in con-
ditions (politico-historical, socio-economic, geographic, ete.) that are
far removed from those in the dominated countries, and then they con-
stantly put off initiating the armed struggle with the pretext that the sup-
posedly necessary “preconditions” are lacking. At times certain substi-
tutes for armed struggle will appear, for example borrowing spectacular
forms of propaganda (a hammer and sickle in flames on a mountainside
overlooking a city) used by forces (in the case of this example, the PCP)
that actually do wage armed struggle. That is when we see this real abuse
oflanguage occur, whereby declarations are made that a group is waging
a “people’s war” even though it is not carrying out any armed actions.”

19 ‘This snot only problem amongst dogmatists, We experienced the same thingin our
previous debate: the (n)PCI claims tobe in the “frst phase" of people's war and yet not only
<doesit not carry out any armed actions, ut what's more it distances itself from those forces
thatare doing so (i.e. the Red Brigades). Depending on how much faith one hasin the honesty
ofthe (n)PCI, this sether an abuse of language (fr as Clausewitz has shown, waris defined
by the used of armed free), oritis a politcal scam.

25
XI. UNIVERSAL AND SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
‘Turning away from dogmatism means:

1. Establishing military policy (and in doing so, making stra-
tegic choices) based on a rigorous analysis of history and of
the current objective and subjective conditions. This analysis
can lead either to the position that one strategic option is
universally applicable (in other words, that either insurrec-
tion or protracted warfare should always and everywhere be
adopted as the sole revolutionary strategy applicable),”" or to
the position that the choice between insurrection and pro-
tracted warfare should be based on objective circumstances.
To hold that a strategic option is universally applicable is not
inherently dogmatic, It can be, but it can also be the product
of exhaustive, rigorous, and honest investigation, an attempt
to identify the laws of history in order to act upon it. This is a
method in line with the principles of historical materialism.
So long as the only revolutionary victories had been the Paris,
Commune and the October Revolution, historical analysis
naturally tended to view armed insurrection as the only way
possible. The revolutionary victories in China and Indochina
shook up this supposed historical proof. Distinguishing the
exception from the rule” is an absolutely necessary exercise,
but one that is beyond the scope of this presentation.

2. Once the strategy has been decided upon, turning away from
dogmatism means facing the question of the universal and
specific aspects of the strategic option chosen.

20 Thisdoes not mean that one should not take advantage of exceptional historical
circumstances, such a occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1948,

21 Was the October 1917 insurrection the historical exception that only managed to
succeed due tothe extreme weakness ofthe regime? Or were the protracted wars in China and
Indochina the exceptions that only succeeded due tothe critically important anti-feudal and
national liberation dimensions to their struggles?

26
L. For Insurrection

‘The Neuberg Comintern manual provides an excellent example: armed
insurrection is presented as a “necessity” and a “destiny” of the class
struggle. At no point does Neuberg’s work question the insurrection-
ary strategy; all of the criticisms it makes (which are both numerous and
interesting) concern errors implementing it (bad timing, insufficient or
badly deployed forces, lack of coordination, etc.). It is assumed that the
insurrectionary option has been “proven,” and on this basis each con-
crete experience (Hamburg in 1923, Canton in 1927, Reval in 1934, etc.)
is studied in order to aid revolutionaries in adapting the strategy to their
own socio-historical circumstances: over here it will be necessary to pre-
cede the insurrection with a general strike, over there it will be necessary
to initiate it by surprise, ete.

2. For Protracted War

‘The question of the universal and specific characteristics of protracted
war has been most thoroughly examined by President Gonzalo. In his
view, when Mao Zedong established the principles of people's war he
provided the proletariat with its military ling, its theory, and its military
practice, “universally, meaning applicable everywhere based on concrete con-
ditions.” Regarding the criticism that this recognition of the universal
applicability of revolutionary warfare is a sign of dogmatism, President
Gonzalo’s answer is that concrete circumstances give rise to different
kinds of tactics, struggle, and organization. He listed three such speci-
ficities in Peru: first, the importance of the struggle in the cities along-
side the struggle in the countryside (reflecting the importance of cities
in Latin America); second, the fact of having been able and obliged to
establish forms of popular power in the liberated zones prior to the defeat
ofthe armed forces (because of their late entry on the scene in 1982, long
after the police forces had been routed); third, the militarization of the
Party.

22. *Prachanda Path” isthe Nepali equivalent of “Gonzalo Thought." (Translators note:
recall that this text was written in 2006.)


XII. BASES OF SUPPORT, GUERILLA ZONES,
AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES

Unlike the question of universal and specific characteristics, the question
of “bases of support” only applies to guerilla strategies. We will begin by
examining the different categories.

1. The Guerilla Zone
This is a geographic category: the area in which the guerilla is active,
where it moves and is active.

2. The Base of Support

‘This category is both geographic and politico-social. It is a zone where
the enemy is present (or which it can penetrate with ease) but where rev-
olutionary counter-power also exists. The revolutionary party is firmly
anchored amongst the masses and the guerilla enjoys support (recruits,
supplies, shelter, information, etc.). The social relationships are still those
ofthe old society, but the balance of power between classes has changed:
the people's demands are reinforced by support from the revolutionary
armed forces.®*

3. The Stationary or Stable Base of Support

Agiven area in which political-military control exists, where the regime's
institutions have been driven out, and which will be defended against
enemy armed forces. It is the intermediate level between a base of sup-
port and aliberated zone.

23 Soitwas in China and Indochina, where the Communist Party put limits on|
sharecropping, usury etc. in order to defend the interests of impoverished peasants. So also,
today in Colombia, where narcotrafickers operating in the PARC’: bases of support are
obliged to pay peasants a guaranteed price for coca (as wells ataxto the FARC), while in
areas controlled by the paramilitaries the narcotraffckers use white terror (starting with the
systematic elimination of peasant trade unionists) in order to impose rock bottom prices
4, Liberated Territory

A given area where revolutionary power has done away with the institu-
tions and forces of the old regime, and where the new society is coming
into being. The capitalists, landowners, and oligarchs are expropriated
and held accountable. The means of production are socialized, ete. From
a military point of view, this assumes having both the capacity and the
will to defend these zones."*



‘These categories can be all the more confusing as different authors and
texts sometimes use the same terms to indicate different categories. Most
ofthe time, Mao Zedong used the term “base of support” to mean a “sta
ble base of support,” in other words, to mean an area under total politico-
military control.* The Vietnamese resistance referred to territory it con-
trolled atnightas “guerilla zones’ —the Saigon forces remained in control,
during the day. In this way, many seeming paradoxes can be untangled,
ice. the recent documents by the Communist Party of Nepal which claim

24 Which does not mean that they must be defended at any cost. Liberated zones can be
evacuated when faced with overwhelming military pressure, The "Long March” isan example
ofthis.

25 “Thenotion of"baseof support” was very flexible for Mao Zedong, who poke of"Tong-term
bases “temporary bases,""seasonal bases,” "bases forsmall units,” and even “mobile bases.”

2»
“not to be in a position to create stable bases of support,” while at the
same time stating that “a certain kind of base of support exists at Rolpa
and Rukum, where we collect taxes, hold people's tribunals, control the
forests, etc. [...] The police does not enter these zones.” In this more than
any other question, one should not fixate on the words used, but rather
pay attention to the concepts being described.

Focoist analysis makes much of the fact that the Cuban guerilla did
not establish a stationary base of support until more than 17 months
of non-stop fighting, and blames the failure of the Peruvian guerillas,
in 1965 on their attempting to establish such bases prematurely. Thus
focoism directly and openly calls into question the principles of Maoist
Protracted People’s War, according to which the creation of a base of sup-
port is the guerilla’ starting point (and not some future achievement).
‘The focoist critique not only rejects the idea (in the conditions that pre-
vailed in Latin America in the 1960s) of trying to establish a stationary
base (which would be one thing), but it even rejects the idea of depend-
ing on a “safe zone” of thousands of square kilometers. But this critique
confuses the concepts base of support and stationary base of support. In
actual fact, and long before the seventeenth month, the Castroist guerilla
had bases of support in the Sierra Maestra. Ifwe take the focoist critique
of the base of support to its logical conclusion, we are left with nothing
more than guerilla nomadism.

‘The experiences of those Latin American guerillas deprived of bases
of support (notably the Colombian ELN in the 1960s) gave rise to the
concept of facticism. This refers to a situation in which isolated gueril-
las—either insufficiently, badly, or simply not at all supported by a politi-
cal structure—lose their revolutionary value as they are forced to focus
on tactical questions (provisioning, maneuvering, keeping track of what
is happening on the ground, etc.) Guerillas which fall into tacticism
become unable to properly carry out the necessary armed propaganda
work or education of the masses, nor are they even able to develop them-
selves or to incorporate or train new recruits.





x0
XIII. OPERATIONAL ART
(OR THE ART OF OPERATIONS)

Strategy is mediated by operational art: if strategy determines which
operations should be carried out, operational art determines the condi-
tions under which they will be carried out. It concerns the basis and the
preparation of military operations as a function of the strategic plans.
As defined by Alexander Svechin, the leading Soviet military theorist of
the 1920s, the operation is the means of strategy, operational art is the
material of strategy; the battle is the means of the operation, the tactics
are the material of the operational art. Svechin developed the concept of
operational art by observing that wars were no longer settled in one big
‘Napoleonic-style battle like they had been in the 19th century. Instead,
they were decided by a series of connected operations. We can see that
operational art is more relevant to guerilla strategies than to insurrec~
tionary ones. The revolutionary forces engaged in the latter would only
have use for operational art when dealing with the civil war (and/or for-
eign intervention) that would follow the successful insurrection.

It is obvious that what Mao referred to as the science of campaigns,
the intermediate category between strategy and tactics, can be classified
within this category of operational art.

In Maoist Protracted People’s War, operational art addresses coop-
eration and interaction between the three levels of the armed forces: the
local militias (self-defense militias), the regional forces, and the regular
forces (battle corps devoted to offense, which answer directly to the gen-
eral command). The guerilla’s spontaneous form is that of the small fight-
ing unit, emerging from and supported by the local population, active in
the immediate vicinity from which it comes. To maintain and, even more
importantly, to develop its forces, the guerilla must break with this spon-
taneous practice and adopt the principle of the guerilla of movement,
which falls within the category of operational art. This is a matter of
bringing together fighters from different local guerilla units in order to
create mobile forces which are able to spread out and move effectively
over a large area (by working with local guerilla units). Such mobility

26 The term was coined by General Giap.

31
protects the unit (as the enemy does not know where itis), allows it to
maintain the initiative (both when attacking and falling back)”, and by
being present throughout the area it reinforces the authority of the revo-
lutionary forces. In this way the guerilla of movement develops into the
large guerilla, and then reaches the stage of traditional warfare.

‘The principles of operational art are:

1. Mobility and the importance of accelerated rhythms in com-
bat operations;

Concentrating activity at the decisive time(s) and place(s);
Surprise;

Initiative and activity in battle;

Preserving the capacity and efficiency of one’s own forces;

aveyey

Conformity of the operation’s goals to the conditions of the
actual situation;
7. Coordinating forces and methods/resources.

To present these categories more simply (and schematically), we can say
that waging war is a matter of strategy, conducting campaigns is a matter
of strategy and operational art, conducting battles is a matter of opera
tional art and tactics, and that a simple armed encounter is a matter of
tactics.

XIV. TACTICS
So if'strategy determines what operations should be carried out, and oper-
ational art determines the conditions in which these operations are car-
ried out, itis tactics that determine how these operations are carried out.
Tacticsis the domain of preparing and using arms, people, and methods/
resources to successfully engage in an armed encounter.

Tactics possess both general and specific principles relating to differ-
ent types of military operation.

27 Tohave the initiative is not the same as being on the offensive. There are hopeless
offensives which reveal lack of initiative (which area kind of fleeing forward) as wellas

daring retreats through which one maintains the initiative (auch as the Long March).

2
As we have seen, no revolutionary strategy consists of just one
method, of just one tactic: for instance, the insurrectionary strategy not
only applies insurrectionary tactics, but also (to a lesser degree) all of the
other tactics and specific forms of the art of revolutionary warfare. To
give an example, in revolutionary warfare sabotage takes on dimensions
it never enjoyed in traditional warfare. It is no longer a matter of a few
strategic sabotage operations decided upon by on high, but an infinite
number of acts of sabotage carried out by the masses. These include
actions big (putting an electrical substation out of business) and small
(tearing down a government poster), and by their very number they bog
down the enemy.

XV. INSURRECTIONARY TACTICS: PRINCIPLES

1. Abandon barricades in favor of small mobile groups (some of
which should be specialized in anti-tank fighting) which have
a.good grasp of the terrain. Prepare the terrain to facilitate
the action of mobile groups (make holes in the walls between,
houses to create passageways, etc.)

2. Use all weapons possible. In 1956, the Hungarian counter-
revolutionaries electrocuted Soviet mechanized infantry by
dropping tramway cables on their tanks, while the oil-soaked
sheets the tanks were sliding around on made them easier to
attack. In the 1946 Hanoi insurrection, the Viet Minh mili-
tias dug anti-vehicle ditches and covered them with obstacles
so that the tank driver would accelerate as they approached.
Use lures (decoy booby traps, decoy dugouts, etc.), obstacles
(metal points dug into the ground, ete.), and traps (ay traps
in areas likely to be abandoned, or even pretend to retreat in
order to lure the enemy into a booby trapped area). Pay atten-
tion to the creativity of the masses and encourage the spread
of useful ideas.

3. Right from the start, make the most out of the third dimen-
sion: roofs, balconies, basements, sewers.

B
4. Block offlines of sight (with screens hung across streets, for
instance).

5. Make extensive use of snipers and ambushes and the timely
setting off of booby-traps. Use methods (caches, secret pas-
sageways) that allow fighters to act in areas that the enemy
believes it has secured.

6. Eventually tie up the enemy by occupying several defendable
buildings (reinforced concrete, with many storeys and base-
ments) and an open range of fire (parking lots, esplanade,
boardwalk, ete.) by groups of fighters prepared to defend
them to the end.

Points 5 and 6 are only justified as complementary to the mobile groups
which remain the heart of insurrectionary tactics.

Initiative is the key for insurrectionary tactics. No defensive bulwark
can hold out if all it does is wait for the enemy. New techniques (like
systems that use microphones to capture the shockwaves froma bullet to
instantaneously calculate the sniper's location) make this principle even
more important.



#
XVI. GUERILLA TACTICS: PRINCIPLES
‘The struggle of the weak against the strong make guerilla tactics nec
essary; the general principles (valid for urban and rural guerillas alike)
being:

1. Go from the simple to the complex in the organization of
operations.

2. Carry out careful intelligence and reconnaissance work (time
how long it will take to fall back, ete.). This can go so far as
rehearsing aspects of the operation on the ground.

3. Select combatants with care and assign them their roles on the
basis of their aptitudes.

4. Keep your forces hidden prior to, and in some cases during, the
operation.

5. Make sure the combatants are not carrying any objects or
papers that could be of use to the enemy intelligence services.

6. Make sure each combatant is completely familiar with the ter-
rain, the objective, the unit they are in, and the action plan.

7. Know to concentrate your forces, to maneuver rapidly in the
time desired.

8. Exploit the errors and oversights of the enemy.

9. Abandon (or postpone) an operation ifit looks like it has been
compromised (even partially) by the enemy.

10. Favor deception and mobility over firepower, while not
neglecting the latter.

11, Favor ambush and surprise attacks, and ideally combine the
two (ambushing units coming to reinforce the target of a sur-
prise attack).

12, Acquire the means necessary for surprise (through the choice
of objective and/or the choice of means: a target that the
enemy expects to be attacked by a commando can instead be
surprise attacked by a mortaz).

13. Double up in order to allow new fighters to experience guerilla
action without allowing for their possible shortcomings to put
the operation or other fighters at risk.

35
14. Ensure superiority in numbers and/or resources at the time
and place of the operation by employing the principle of con-
centrating one’s forces.

15, Fall back immediately, quickly, without leaving a trace.

16. Deploy forces in order to facilitate the fall back; for example,
have forces in buildings nearby prepared to treat the wounded.

17. Cover your trail.

18. Scatter your forces.

19, After each operation, have participants practice criticism and
self-criticism. Communicate useful observations (mistakes to
avoid, etc.) to all combatants.



XVII. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
Experience shows that revolutionary forces have often neglected learn-
ing certain tactics, as opposed to certain techniques. In terms of street-
fighting, for instance, fighters are often taught how to handle weapons
(classes about gun care, target practice, etc.) but there is a tendency to
neglect teaching firearms tactics (for instance, how it is better to advance
on the right side of the street, because this will mean that in order to
defend themselves the enemy will have to place their weapons on their
left side; in order to not expose themselves, a right-handed sniper should
stick to the left side ofa doorway or window). Its impossible in a presen-
tation like this to go over all of the specific tactical principles of use in
revolutionary war. These techniques are listed and described in military
‘manuals that should be easy to obtain.

%6
XVIII. TERRORISM
‘The necessity to oppose the counter-revolutionary “anti-terrorist” rheto-
ric is such that revolutionary forces anxious to avoid any “terrorist pro-
file” sometimes forget that terrorism is a key element of revolutionary
military policy.

It is an illusion to think that everyone will support the revolution-
ary project. For this reason, the revolutionary project needs to take on a
didactic character: it should not only champion the historical interests
ofthe masses, but should also be clearly seen to do so. At the same time,
given the damage that can be done by traitors, infiltrators, agent pro-
vocateurs, turncoats, etc. the revolutionary forces need to benefit from
their own equivalent of the “fear of the policeman’ that strengthens the
regime. Towards this end, deliberate counter-revolutionary activities
should be punished.

Necessary though it may be, those who use terrorism should be
aware of its limits. When Jerome Bonaparte, threatened by insurrection
in the kingdom of Westphalia, called upon his brother Napoleon for help,
he received the answer: “For the love of God, my brother, use your bayo-
ne(s!” Jerome replied, famously, that "You can do everything with a bayonet
except sit on it.” The point being that terrorism is never sufficient, not for
the counter-revolution and not for the revolution.

Nevertheless, for the revolutionary forces it does play an essential
role in equalizing things. It is one of the least heroic aspects of guerilla
warfare (it often amounts to executing unarmed people) and for that
reason is often omitted from texts that serve (even partially) a propa-
ganda function. Yet the numbers speak volumes. In South Vietnam, vil-
lage chiefs were appointed by the Saigon authorities, and played the role
of police (they were supposed to report if there were strangers passing
through the village, etc.) Village chiefs who were not sympathetic to the
NLEF had to either be killed, or paralyzed by the fear that they might be
killed. To accomplish this, a large-scale terrorist campaign was waged:
between April 1960 and April 1961, 4,000 village chiefs were killed.

To the degree that they embody the interests of the people and of the
proletariat, the revolutionary forces have far less need to rely on terror
than do the reactionary forces. And as there is always a political price

y
to pay for terror (it provides the enemy with a
propaganda weapon), it should be measured,










proportionate, and kept to a strict mini-
mum—the example of the NLF in 1960-
61 is an extreme case, as it was up against
the white terror ofthe Diem regime.
Although the question has not
been studied much, it is clear that
there are consequences to not
meeting the strict minimum. An
American counter-insurgency
expert has suggested that one
of the major reasons the Red
Brigades were defeated was that
they did not use terrorism and
had failed to intimidate the lit-
tleagents of counter-revolution.

XIX. THE ART OF
TRADITIONAL
WARFARE
(OR “BIG WAR’)
As well as all this, there are also
all of the specific principles of
the art of traditional warfare (the
necessary war of movement, and
eventually the war of position) that
apply to the degree that the revolu-
tionary war develops into and takes
on the methods of traditional war-
fare—but that is beyond the scope of
this presentation.

‘Thank you for your attention,
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“Activity in War is movement in a resistant medium.
Just asa man immersed in water is unable to perform
with ease and regularity the most natural and simplest
movement, that of walking, so in War, with ordinary
powers, one cannot keep even the line of mediocrity. This,
is the reason that the correct theorist is like a swimming,
master, who teaches on dry land movements which are
required in the water, which must appear grotesque and
ludicrous to those who forget about the water. This is also
why theorists, who have never plunged in themselves, or
who cannot deduce any generalities from their expe!



ence, are unpractical and even absurd, because they only
teach what every one knows—how to walk.”
—Clausewitz, On War